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You are here: Home / Archives for First World War

First World War

Better Late than Never: Late Arrivals of the First World War

December 23, 2020 by James Holtby

Learning to fight: from civilian to soldier during the First World War (Image credit: Imperial War Museum)

The decision to go to war is one of the toughest a policymaker can face. We can see as much from the First World War, as statesmen found themselves drawn into the growing conflagration. Kaiser Wilhelm II pleaded with his cousin, the Tsar of Russia and fondly called Nicky, to stop his mobilisation before it was too late. King Albert I enlisted his German-born wife to choose the weightiest words in the Belgian king’s final plea for peace. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, noted ruefully on the outbreak of war that ‘the lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.’ Such was the fate of the First World War’s main belligerents.

However, when considering these humanising anecdotes of Western leaders, it is easy to forget that the First World War was truly a global war. Japanese forces helped to suppress an Indian uprising in the British colony of Singapore. T.E. Lawrence (and the lesser-known Gertrude Bell) fermented revolt in Arabia and the US led a punitive expedition into Mexico to secure its southern border. At some point, every cabinet, cabal, or king had to consider how they would react to the war. At first glance, some decided to involve themselves very late in the day. The cavalry had already arrived, these nations were seemingly following the great charge with oats and hay. However, closer inspection of motives and efforts, explains the careful political movements of these ‘secondary’ powers.

Whilst the Pacific theatre of the Second World War is well-discussed, little attention has focused on the role of Asian countries in the First World War. During this Great War, India joined immediately, sending one million soldiers to serve the Allied cause. Japan joined on the side of the Entente in 1914, aiming to solidify its position as a regional power. Arguably one of the greatest photos demonstrating the truly global aspect of the First World War is that of the Nisshin, a cruiser from the Imperial Japanese navy docked in the then-British Mediterranean port of Malta.

A rendition of the Japanese cruiser “Nisshin” in Malta (Image credit: Imperial War Museum)

Japan was not the only party intend to increase its international prestige. China declared war on the Central Powers in August 1917, but its contribution to the Entente war effort already started the year before. In the hope of regaining the lost territory of Shandong from Germany, and then later from Japan, China offered Britain 50,000 troops to assist in capturing Qingdao. Although Britain refused this proposal, it did accept a later offer of Chinese labourers to help dig trenches, repair tanks and transport ammunition.

Over 100,000 Chinese labourers were employed by France and Britain during the war, some serving as far away as Basra, Iraq. China’s ‘neutrality’ ended on August 14, 1917. In what would become a recurring theme, the impetus for this declaration was the German pursuit of unrestricted submarine warfare; five-hundred Chinese labourers had been killed earlier that year when the French ship Athos was torpedoed. China continued to send labourers but was not authorised to send its own forces to help roll up the enemy. As a consequence, China was offered fewer seats at the Paris Peace Conference than her more militant Japanese neighbour, who prevailed in convincing the other victors they should keep Shandong. Despite their many offers and a far more measured approach to the alliance of the Entente, China was left feeling deeply betrayed by the post-war peace process.

Members of the Chinese Labour Corps wash a British tank in Teneur, Spring 1918 (Image credit: Imperial War Museum)

Two months after the Chinese declaration of war, Republican Brazil followed suit. The coffee and rubber-rich nation had attempted to sell to both sides at the beginning of the war but the British blockade of German ports soon meant they had to become more reliant on trade with the Allied camp. This affected foreign policy; Brazil and the United States grew closer. It is no coincidence that Washington’s only Brazilian institute is based at the Woodrow Wilson Centre. Increased trade with the Allies made Brazilian ships a target to German U-boats. Pro-Entente public opinion was confirmed in April 1917, when anti-German riots across Brazilian cities followed the sinking of a Brazilian freighter.

However, a declaration of war was slow to follow because the Brazilian Republic was a relatively new state; it had to spend several months amending their constitution to give the government the legal right to declare war. Little changed militarily after the declaration was presented to Germany. Brazil sent a small naval division to assist the British in late 1918. It arrived in Gibraltar one day before the Armistice. Brazil was given three delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, one more than China and Portugal, the latter having sent 60,000 troops to fight on the Western Front. The war had increased the prestige of Brazil; it became one of the founding members of the League of Nations and continued its lucrative and close relationship with the United States.

President of the Brazilian Republic, Venceslau Brás, signs declaration of war on the Central Powers (Image credit: WikiMedia)

Accordingly, a declaration of war on the Central Powers was seen as the best way to gain an invite to the post-war peace conference. But some states found themselves in circumstances that forced them to join (what appeared to be) the losing side. Azerbaijan is a fascinating example. Following the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, diasporas of Russians and Armenians (who had suffered greatly under the Ottoman Empire) seized power in Baku and declared a Marxist republic.

In response, Muslim nationalists declared their own state in May 1918, enlisting the help of the crumbling Ottoman empire to drive out the Bolsheviks. The ‘Army of Islam’ marched into Baku two months before the signing of the November Armistice. This force never formally cemented its reign; between May 1918 and April 1920 the country went through five governments in rapid succession. A changing of the guard took place at the end of the war, from Ottoman troops to British, but this was not enough to save this new state from a Soviet invasion in April 1920. Azerbaijan’s complicated relationship with a member of the Entente, a former member of the Entente and a member of the Central Powers shows how joining the war was not as cut and dry as predicating the winning side.

The 4th Gurkha Rifles marches through Baku in July 1919. The British occupation had been preceded by that of the Ottoman Empire and was followed by a successful invasion of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia (Image credit: Imperial War Museum)

What conclusions can be drawn from these three very different countries, unified by one very loose concept of ‘being late’? Despite the arbitrary lines I have drawn in this article, there is something to be gleaned from a study of great alliances at a localised level. The war started by the larger European powers permeated the borders of neutral states. It created opportunities for countries disgraced by the previous impositions of imperial powers.

Equally, it offered the chance to improve relations with other powerful actors, a proposal bolstered by great financial incentives. But perhaps most interesting is how the war created competition between states who were, in theory, on the same side. China saw an opportunity to side-line the influence of Japan, Brazil became a regional power in South America (and created a minor diplomatic incident by one-upping their former rulers), and Azerbaijan attempted to wield the clashing interests of neighbours and rival great powers to safeguard the world’s first Islamic parliamentary democracy.

It is all too easy to view the First World War as a clash of two almost indefatigable alliances, with final victory only accomplished with the complete surrender of the enemy. But many smaller nations did not see this endgame as their overarching goal. Perhaps an hourglass is a better analogy: as the Armistice grew ever closer, each falling grain of sand became a lost opportunity to upend their misfortunes.


James Holtby is a part-time Masters student at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. He is interested in exploring the long-term organisation of national and international intelligence gathering institutions, especially concerning future efforts to combat global pandemics and climate change. As part of such a long-term strategy, James also has a keen interest in assessing how intelligence organisations should interact with and educate the public on issues relating to security, whilst still remaining effective at covertly gathering and collating information when necessary.

 

 

 

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Asia, First World War, Imperialism, James Holtby

Remembering conflict: the two Great Wars

August 1, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Louis Mignot:

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

War as a phenomenon hangs in the public consciousness, something that has become all the more apparent as we approached the centenary commemoration of the First World War. All wars are characterised by violence and loss of life, but the First World War has come to represent the experience of soldiers worldwide. This is evinced in the poppy; the flower that grew in Flanders has now come to symbolise remembrance for soldiers who have fought in all wars. It is significant, however, that the public do not seem to commemorate conflicts from before the First World War to the same extent. For example, the Napoleonic Wars – the original ‘Great War’ – have, apart from ongoing academic interest, faded from public consciousness. The question should be asked; will the First World War’s impact on the public consciousness fade in the face of later conflicts?

‘The Great War’        

There can be no doubt that the First World War was horrific, bloody and, indeed, global in its profound impact on society. With approximately nine million deaths spread across all sides throughout the four-year conflict, there is an obvious, direct and indirect, impact on the population to this day. Many families will have distant relatives who fought, or indeed died, in the First World War. Yet, the number of deaths cannot be the only causal factor behind the conflict’s continued vivid remembrance. The Napoleonic wars were, whilst longer, exceedingly costly in terms of lives. For instance, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, marking the end of the Napoleonic Wars proper (the bi-centenary passing in 2012), was exceedingly bloody; of the 422,000 soldiers that marched into Russia, only 10,000 returned.[i] This is a staggering loss, taking place over a very short time period: six months of combat against a spectral Russian enemy and the deadly Russian winter. The bi-centenary of the 1812 campaign was marked by receptions at the Russian Embassy to mark the ‘Patriotic War’ and by a series of scholarly articles, amongst other things. Now, whilst this is a commemoration, there is far less profundity. This is by no means unjustified: the First World War is, in chronological terms, much closer to the modern day and was, arguably, the start of a new phase of warfare; the industrial war.

The chronology of the conflict must be a factor contributing to the level of its commemoration. Yet, there is more to it than simple timing. If this were the case, then the Second World War would surely supersede it in terms of commemoration. The fact that the First World War is seen as a turning point in history, coming near the start of the 20th Century, involving millions of combatants and using new, increasingly brutal and efficient weapons marks it out in the consciousness of many people to this day. This is perfectly demonstrated by the Poppy Campaign; the campaign aims to raise money for serving soldiers, but its iconography is rooted in the First World War; this conflict has been held up as the epitome of war’s impact on society, making it the perfect symbol for an appeal for serving soldiers.

Will this trend continue?

Whilst there have been numerous conflicts since the First World War, only the Second World War seems to have gained similar levels of commemoration. There seems to be an implied ‘ranking’ of conflicts in the public consciousness; the title ‘world war’ sets up the First and Second World Wars on a par – they come to be seen as the epitome of what negative impacts war can have, and therefore something to avoid. Despite this, the Second World War has not superseded the First in terms of its impact in the public consciousness; people view the Second World War as almost a bi-product of the First. That is, students at GCSE level in the UK learn of the Treaty of Versailles, how Germany was humbled and, indeed, humiliated by its terms, leading to economic decline and the rise of Adolf Hitler. As a result, the First World War retains its mantle as the ‘first’ of the industrial, ‘new’ wars; it remains one of the turning points in history. Whilst the Second World War has its own horrors and is rightly remembered for the fight to stop them, this trend will likely continue.

Some may argue that as the last combatants of the First World War have passed on, the war will lose its continuing significance and commemoration. Yet, the First World War is rooted in our architecture; the cenotaph, the memorials at Thiepval (amongst others), school children take sobering tours of the battlefields, and learn of the horrors of the war. Moreover, films and television shows continue to be made about the conflict; classics such as ‘Paths of Glory’ and ‘Blackadder’ followed by more recent productions like ‘Joyeux Noelle’ and ‘Our World War’ keep this conflict in our minds, albeit in a simplified and somewhat detached form. As the centenary approaches, new articles will be written, new television programmes will be produced, all adding to the existing work on the subject, inciting new debate – most recently over the pre-existing view that the generals were to blame for the losses of the war. As a result, the First World War will, for a significant time to come, be remembered with the same levels of profundity as current commemorations. Whilst wars of the previous centuries may have lost some of their lingering impact, none of them rival the First World War for its continued effect on everyday life. As is clear from the centenary commemoration of the First World War, the conflict retains its profound impact on the national consciousness, and, even after those who experienced it first-hand pass on, the experience of the war will remain in the public consciousness.

 

________________

Louis Mignot is a second year undergraduate student at King’s College London reading War Studies and History. You can follow Louis Mignot on Twitter @LouisMignot.

 

NOTES
[i] Frank McLynn, Napoleon, a Biography, (London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 375.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: First World War, Great War, Memory, remembrance, WWI

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