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‘For the Ashes of his Fathers, And the Temples of his Gods’. Or is it something else that makes a soldier fight? – Part I

May 2, 2018 by Sonia Bhatia and Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

By Sonia Bhatia and Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

‘Horatius Cocles defending the Bridge’ by Charles Le Brun (1619 – 1690) – Google Art Project (Credit Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Introduction

In the 6th century BC, during a battle between the armies of Rome and Clusium, a Roman officer Publius Horatius took a suicidal stand defending a bridge on river Tibre. His actions injured him permanently but saved the day for the city, as the delay he caused was enough for the bridge for to be damaged by the Romans, thus preventing the enemy from crossing the swollen river Tiber.

Later in the 19th century, Thomas Babington Macaulay, inspired by this Roman tale of bravery, wrote a poem ‘Horatius’ in his dedication, narrating the often-quoted lines, ‘… For the ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his Gods…’ These lines have influenced plethora of narratives inspiring generations of young men and women to fight for their motherlands both in and out of armed forces.

One can argue that these narratives do ignite passion and romanticism to serve and to protect the society from which one emanates. However, when it comes to the actual battlefield, when bullets are flying overhead and buddies are getting killed or injured, what is the motivation that drives a soldier to kill and to die? Thomas Macaulay’s Horatius suggests a viewpoint that a soldier is motivated by the desire to protect his family, friends and society in general and thus performs such extreme acts of violence. In the contemporary era, the language used in the recruitment drives, news reporting, obituaries, commentaries on military ceremonies, etc also advocates this viewpoint. It forces us to think that the spirit needed for deliverance or sacrifice during wartime is usually derived from ideology, political ideals and, above all, nationalism.

From a soldier’s point of view things are very different. At an individual level, soldiers, like any other human being, seek meaning to their job and do so by more visible and immediate things such as by ‘pursuing relations of estrangement and identification with others’,[1]  especially with whom they live and work on daily basis. For a soldier, what matters is his squad, company, battalion or at most his regiment. Based on Tarak Barkawi’s latest book, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in the World War II’, this two part article aims to carry this debate further.

 

Primary Group Theory

Shils and Janowitz in their seminal essay published in 1948, based on the study of captured prisoners of war of Wehrmacht, argued that it is a soldier’s relationship with his primary group, that is his section, platoon and company, which goes far to explain why he responds to one appeal and not to another.[2]

‘He [a soldier] was likely to go on fighting, provided he had the necessary weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership, with which he could identify himself, and as long as he gave affection to and received affection from the other members of his squad and platoon. In other words, as long as he felt himself to be a member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations and demands of its other members, his soldierly achievement was likely to be good’.[3]

The average age of a soldier, when he joins his battalion for the very first time is about twenty years. This is also the age at which he starts carving out his own identity for the very first time. While he may identify with the customs and ideals of his family, his identity is still very malleable. As he leaves home to serve his country, his background and upbringing continue to have an impact on his speech, accent, food preference etc. These traits however are dwarfed in front of the adaptations he makes willingly with a susceptible young mind ready to be impressed upon by his peers and environment. It creates a distinct identity for him as he serves alongside other men of various backgrounds and beliefs.

For soldiers, the idea of fighting, living and dying for the motherland/fatherland or for the cultural possessions of the fatherland, is a relatively distant thought. In Indian Army, for example, officers and soldiers are groomed under strong regimental ethos to serve for ‘Naam, Namak aur Nishaan’ (reputation, loyalty and standard/identity) of their battalions and regiments. While ideas such as nationalism, patriotism, country, nation, ideology and politics are commonly used to articulate the required social and political narratives; when in actual operations, these ideas are overshadowed by soldiers’ relationships with each other, their will to survive and succeed. Tarak Barkawi has argued that during the Second World War, the shared political beliefs did not shape soldiers’ discipline and cohesion. Their actions were shaped by what was more immediate – deprivation, fatigue, fear for limb, for oneself and others near him.[4] This issue, therefore, inherently becomes one of the critical considerations for battle effectiveness.

 

Battle effectiveness

But how does it matter? As long as soldiers have the required motivation to do their job, why is this distinction necessary and this debate critical? In the fast changing socio-economic context it is pertinent to be aware of the dynamic motivations of a soldier, especially for the military leaders. The Indian Army Infantry Regiments are a case study in hand. Since independence in 1947, the Indian Army has won many conventional battles. Besides good strategy, tactics, training and logistics, one of the most important battle-winning factor has been the cultural and linguistic cohesion at the unit and sub-unit level. Hence, until recent years, the recruitment for the infantry regiments was carried out from specific social groups and regions. The military elites had resisted the political pressure to recruit from all communities, under one pretext or another, in order to maintain the class composition of its infantry battalions. The army’s leadership was determined to preserve these compositions, because it saw them as crucial to its effectiveness and cohesion based on ‘intimate sense of kinsman-ship and traditions’.[5] However during the last few years, the army has started recruiting from all communities for its infantry regiments.  So, what will be the binding factor for the units, which were so used to bonding based on kinship and common language dialect, when troops from different regions and languages start joining?

Fortunately, the universal fact is that the cultural identities of soldiers in a group are malleable. The Second World War proved that when the army was disrupted, disordered and re-ordered due to the heavy losses suffered initially, the British realised that their worries about the martial races and mixing classes were ill-founded. [6] Soldiers become attached to their unit identities through serving in those units.[7] For instance, in 2/13th Frontier Force Rifles, Jats were incorporated into its Sikh company due to wartime recruitment shortages .The Jats ‘fitted well with the Sikhs’. When the time came to revert to an all Sikh company toward the end of the war, the Jats asked if they could convert to Sikhism in order to remain with the battalion.[8]

 

Conclusion

Nationalism and fighting for the flag may seem as the ultimate motivation for a soldier. It is, however, the operating environment generated factors – which include a vivid account of passion for survival that they share with their comrades, about conviction of the cause, their dependability on each other, clarity of each other’s perspectives, strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly, the faith that they stand by each other – that truly act as a driving force. The military effectiveness will always remain dependent upon effective group formation at the lowest levels of squad, section, platoon and company. The empirical evidence suggests that as long as a military sub-unit has good training and strong leadership, it will be ‘fit for battle’ irrespective of its cultural, demographic or linguistic composition.

 

(…To be continued in Part II)


Raised in an army household, Sonia Bhatia is a Post Graduate Diploma holder in Public Relations and Human Resource Management from the University of Madras. She graduated in BA, Health and Nutrition from Delhi University. She has been brought up in a traditional Army family which has seen generations of men and women serving in the Army and the Air Force. Her experiences and interests have been close to the social structure of the Army Regimental life. She also has five years of work experience in Human Resource Management in the corporate sector, which enriched her with the contrast of the social structure that exists outside the army. She is married to an Army officer and continues to uphold the values she has learnt, while imbibing the same in her two children.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. He is currently researching on India’s defence diplomacy in the 21st century. His other research interests include South Asian security and military culture. Kamaldeep is an alumni of National Defence Academy, Pune as well as Army War College, Mhow. He has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. Thereafter he graduated in MA, ‘War in the Modern World’ from the department of War Studies at King’s College London in 2014. You can find him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78


Notes: 

1 Barkawi, Tarak, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p.159

2 (Shils and Janowitz 1948), p.380

3 (Shils and Janowitz 1948), p.284

4 (Barkawi 2017), p.82-83

5 Wilkinson, Steven I., ‘Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence’, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2015), p.115

6 (Barkawi 2017), p.80

7 (Barkawi 2017), p. 271

8 (Barkawi 2017), p.56


Image Source

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22151760

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: army, feature, Horatius, Macaulay, soldiers

Saudi Arabia: The Wind of Change?

April 30, 2018 by Roisin Murray

By Roisin Murray

Bin Salman ushers in a new era for Saudi Arabia?

With a historical legacy as the foremost theocratic state in the Sunni Muslim sphere, political developments in Saudi Arabia that threaten to challenge its conservative, religious identity are significant.[1] The domestic situation of Saudi Arabia is a concern for many foreign governments; states worldwide are reliant on Saudi oil, and Saudi Arabia is vital to the security of the Gulf region.[2] The international community has focused its attention on Saudi Arabia, as Prince bin Salman continues to implement his modernisation agenda under the banner of ‘Vision 2030’. Bin Salman, who previously held the position of defence minister, is the son of King Salman and has been named the successor to the throne. The latest development in bin Salman’s reform agenda has seen him embark upon an anti-corruption crusade directed at upper-level elites, crystallising in the detention of 325 top officials in Ritz-Carlton hotel on corruption charges. Thus, this article will discuss the recent corruption crusade in light of the wider reformist drive. Essentially, it will analyse to what extent this crackdown on fraudulent practice in business is a logical expansion of bin Salman’s blueprint for modernisation, or rather a smokescreen to distract from the pervading, growing autocracy of the kingdom.

These reforms are part of bin Salman’s wider drive for modernisation of the Kingdom, enshrined in his ‘Vision 2030’ blueprint. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia’s hegemony has remained wholly uncontested. Its national identity has been built on its role as ultraconservative Kingdom, greatly influenced by Islamic clericalism and financed by a state -sponsored oil industry. Bin Salman’s push for modernisation and diversification of the Saudi economy comes at a critical time. The financial situation of the Kingdom is precarious, following a decline in oil prices and the rising expense associated with participation in the war in Yemen. Bin Salman aspires to transform the Kingdom into a more expansive economy, driven by private investment and renowned for its ingenuity. However, systemic corruption is an obstacle to bin Salman’s precious roadmap.

Bin Salman’s so-called anti-corruption purges saw approximately 325 figures from Saudi’s elite placed in detention for eighty days under corruption and embezzlement charges. The ensuing investigation saw finances audited and personal bank accounts frozen. Yet, as January came to a close, bin Salman released the majority of those who had been detained in the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh, as their accounts faced scrutiny from analysts. A reported $100 billion was recovered by the Saudi government, following the end of a three-month investigation into charges of corruption amongst high-ranking royal families and businessmen. Over three hundred of the detainees managed to secure their freedom following a financial settlement which included an exchange of commercial property, stocks and cash. A full breakdown has not been made public, raising concerns that state business continues to be conducted behind closed doors, with little regulation. Accusations that the crackdown was the result of a nefarious political agenda, seeking to target individuals who were critics of the Prince, are rife. The private nature of the negotiations exposes the hollowness of bin Salman’s reforms. Traditionally, Saudi decision-making has been notably opaque ‘in the form of decrees with a flavour of palace intrigue’.[3] The continuation of such policies when addressing the lack of transparency in business dealings is somewhat ironic. Furthermore, it also emphasises bin Salman’s failure to challenge the lack of accountability of the royal family.

Those advocating change in Saudi Arabia applaud bin Salman’s reforms, which seek to promote accountability for financial malpractice in business ventures. However, his plans for the nation do not come risk-free. There is the likelihood that such practices will hamper potential foreign investment, while investment at home potentially stalls. Bin Salman’s excessive centralisation of the government and the nonchalance with which he requisitions assets does not exactly endear domestic investors.

The crusade to eradicate the corruption plaguing the upper echelons of Saudi Arabia is only one element of bin Salman’s wider template for modernisation. Bin Salman has already announced his intention to lead the Kingdom back to moderate Islam and has sought to curb the excesses of the religious police force. But the reform which has garnered widespread international attention is the lifting of the notorious ban on female drivers, to be enacted in June. Female liberation in Saudi Arabia has been further compounded by women’s increased access to the public sphere, enshrined in new legislation which permits them to attend football games.

Yet, beneath the surface of these progressive developments, Saudi Arabian despotism only continues to strengthen. A recent centralisation of the power structure has afforded bin Salman almost uncontested power, highlighted by the extensive responsibilities bestowed upon him; he now enjoys control of the Defence, Foreign, Finance and Petroleum ministries.[4] Recent restructuring of the governing body means that decision-making has become highly exclusive, a privilege reserved for the elite.[5] Bin Salman has carved a position from where he can pursue his hawkish foreign policy goals, exemplified by Saudi intervention Yemen.[6] Thus, bin Salman’s reforms can be seen in the context of a diversion technique to distract from the growing tyrannical and coercive nature of the Kingdom.

Bin Salman is not only the driving force behind ‘Vision 2030’ but is also the fresh new face of Saudi Arabia’s public relations. Symbolic visits to the NATO headquarters and the White House suggest approval for bin Salman in the Western world, which has largely, and conveniently, ignored bin Salman’s continued centralization of power.[7] Yet, Hammond contends that the tendency of the Western states to endorse Saudi Arabia’s ‘empty discourse of reform, with its essentially limited gains’ is influenced by an ulterior motive;[8] their concern for stability in the Kingdom, given that it provides essential services to governments in the West.[9]

Ultimately, bin Salman’s reformist agenda is a red herring, and merely a pretext for bin Salman to pave his way to a Saudi Arabian autocracy. The anti-corruption purges are evidence of bin Salman’s far-reaching influence and power, and the lack of transparency in the final negotiations have thus far been excused. While it is easy to welcome the progressive social developments, on deeper analysis they seem tainted by a nefarious agenda; these ‘reforms’ are simply symbolic concessions to placate the international community and divert attention from bin Salman’s escalating power drive. The wind of change is blowing, but it is not strong enough to dislodge the authoritarianism of the Saudi royal family.

 


 

Roisin Murray is currently undertaking an MA in International Relations at King’s College London. She holds an undergraduate history degree from University College Dublin. Her research interests include diplomacy, counter-terrorism and insurgency, particularly in the context of the Middle East.


Notes

[1] Joseph Nevo, “Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.3 (1998): 35,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263209808701231?needAccess=true&instName=King%27s+College+London–

[2] Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006): 1.

[3] Hamid Hussain, “Royal Rumble: Dynamics of Saudi Royal Family,” Defense Journal 21, no.1 (August 2017): 50.  

[4] Umer Karim, “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy and the Role of Decision-making Processes and Actors,” The International Spectator 52, no.2 (2017): 77, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03932729.2017.1308643?needAccess=true&instName=King%27s+College+London

[5] Karim, “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy’, 82.

[6] Karim, “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy’, 82.

[7] Karim, “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy’, 76.

[8] Andrew Hammond, The Islamic Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia (London: Pluto Press, 2012): 231.

[9]Hammond, The Islamic Utopia, 231.


Image Source: 

http://www.arabianbusiness.com/politics-economics/386638-saudi-arabia-releases-two-princes-after-corruption-probe


Bigliography

Hammond, Andrew. The Islamic Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia.  London: Pluto Press, 2012.

Hussain, Hamid. “Royal Rumble: Dynamics of Saudi Royal Family.” Defense Journal 21, no.1 (August 2017): 50-56, https://search.proquest.com/openview/783c8d01468270b5a07a0f4fb0fafc92/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=616545

Karim, Umer. “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy and the Role of Decision-making Processes and Actors.” The International Spectator 52, no.2 (2017): 71-88. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03932729.2017.1308643?needAccess=true&instName=King%27s+College+London

Nevo, Joseph. “Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia.” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.3 (1998): 34-53. 35, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263209808701231?needAccess=true&instName=King%27s+College+London–

Niblock, Tim. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Bin Salman, corruption, Diplomacy, feature, MBS, roisin murray, Saudi Arabia

Decrypting the effects of the Russian Presidential Election

April 27, 2018 by Jackson Oliver Webster

By Jackson Oliver Webster

 

Credit Image: БЕЛАРУССКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ

 

This article is part of a two-part pre- and post-election analysis of the Russian elections and their significance for the country and region going forward. The pre-election break-down can be found here.

 

It came as no surprise that, late in the evening of 18 March 2018, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was announced as the clear winner of Russia’s Presidential Election, with 56,430,712 votes representing 76.69% of participating voters. This result represents more votes in real terms for any president in the history of the Russian Federation. The most important figure for the Kremlin however was not Putin’s score in terms of votes, rather his score in terms of turnout, which fell below the announced target of 70%. The runner up was the Communist Party candidate, billionaire Pavel Grudinin, who won 11.77% of the vote, performing slightly better than expected, possibly as a result of his personal notoriety compared to Putin’s liberal challengers.

This article will outline the performances and reactions of several opposition candidates, as well as the fate of the opposition following the election. The second part will briefly discuss how Putin’s victory and eventual succession might affect Moscow’s foreign policy and defence posture over the coming years.

 

Opposition Candidates

Liberal candidates performed particularly poorly, with Ksenia Sobchak, the self-styled “other choice against all” (“Sobchak protiv vsekh”), winning a whopping 1.68% of the vote, and veteran politician Grigori Yavlinski of the Yabloko Party obtaining only 1.05% of the vote, according to official results. Perhaps the best-performing liberal candidate was Abstention, with turnout rates especially low in the traditionally opposition-leaning city of Yekaterinburg, where, according to the Mayor’s office, only 434,000 of the city’s over 1,300,000 residents participated. Navalny will continue to claim abstaining voters as his own supporters, given his repeated calls to boycott the elections, having changed his campaign hashtag from #Navalny2018 to #NeVybory2018 (“non-elections2018”). Fraud occurred in multiple polling stations, and independent observers including Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) noted less-than-clandestine ballot stuffing on security camera footage. Grigory Melkonyats of the NGO Golos said fraud was “partly in reaction to Navalny’s boycott campaign.” In Chechnya, due to political repression and fraudulent polling, Putin won over 99% of the vote, duplicating his other strong showings in the Autonomous Republic against which he fought a war in 1999, his first action as Russia’s Prime Minister.

During the  vote, Navalny and a campaign manager sat in Navalny Live’s studio with Sobchak and a member of her staff to watch the results roll in on a broadcast later replayed by Dozhd, Russia’s only non-state owned TV network. After it was evident that, to everyone’s surprise, Putin was to emerge the clear winner, Sobchak proposed that she and Navalny’s party form a united opposition for the upcoming State Duma elections. Navalny, in his typically direct style, launched into a speech ultimately condemning Sobchak as part-and-parcel of the system she claims to oppose, saying he wants nothing to do with her ‘opposition’ which he views as ‘permitted’ and ‘selected’ by the Kremlin. Some Russian political commentators have alleged that the Kremlin will begin reorganizing a straw man ‘opposition’ based on an engineered entente between nationalist and ‘liberal’ forces, with caricatures like Zhirinovksy and Sobchak serving as rhetorical punching bags for United Russia. This would be reminiscent of the early days of the Putin presidency, when Kremlin political technologists used rapid party creation and dissolution to engineer a surprise victory for pro-Kremlin factions over the Communist Party, and later reorganised these elements into United Russia. Though your author usually avoids conspiratorial thinking, he would be less than surprised if the Kremlin tapped Sobchak for some sort of role in a post-Putin political order, however this speculation will be left for another, much longer article.

Liberal movements such as Sobchak’s and Navalny’s are caught between a rock and a hard place. Either they follow Navalny’s model and refuse to take part in an unfair election process and exclude themselves; or they participate, thus legitimising an election campaign run by a politicised Federal Electoral Commission and influenced by highly-biased state-run media with rampant voter fraud. The despondent mood of the liberal opposition is best summarised by Yabloko political consultant Max Katz:

“The opponents of Putin have put forward many strategies. And none of them has worked. The boycott hasn’t worked: the turnout is very high and — it seems — will not be artificially propped. The calls to spoil bulletins haven’t worked — there are few of them. Voting for Sobchak hasn’t worked: her score is very low. Voting for Grudinin hasn’t worked . . . his score is lower than Zyuganov’s [the leader of the Communist party] in the last presidential elections. And our calls to vote for Yavlinsky haven’t worked either.”

Navalny for his part is falling back on his “political machines”, the Civic Platform Party and the FBK, to give him and his campaign longevity beyond the presidential election. His YouTube presence has been particularly active since the elections, attacking the government over its handling of a deadly mall fire in Siberia and denouncing the elimination of direct mayoral elections in Yekaterinburg. Most recently, he called for protests on 5 May in a video entitled “Putin is not our Tsar” (“Putin nam ne tsar’”).

 

Consequences

So what can be expected, particularly from a European perspective, in the coming months and years from a reelected Putin?

Before the elections, most Western media were fixated on Putin’s particularly bellicose State of the Federation address. He boasted of all sorts of first-strike, high-tech weapons clearly in development with Western conventional foes in mind: hypersonic intercontinental cruise missiles, underwater tactical nuclear platforms, and other weapons. Many defence analysts have argued that these systems are either not beyond the conceptual stage, and may not provide any significant strategic edge should they become operational. However, the spirit of the address seemed to mark a shift towards openly aggressive rhetoric which may come to define Putin’s fifth term foreign policy.

Russian historian Irina Pavlova argues that Putin’s comments represent his will to “raise the stakes” of his current confrontation with the West. This belligerence is, she continues, a demonstration of Putin’s confidence in his own competence and position relative to his adversaries. She concludes that this assertiveness follows the general framing of Kremlin foreign policy by state media, which sets Russian civilisation against a weak and decadent Western world. It also feeds into Kremlin talking points, namely the framing of the Ukraine conflict in terms of the fight against so-called ‘Ukrainian fascists’. This creates a “modern Stalinist’” confrontation with the West in which Putin himself is the hero. “As for the sanctions the West threatens, they only strengthen this regime above all in the eyes of its own population,” argues Pavlova.

NATO defence planners[1], on the other hand, operate largely under the assumption that succession is, eventually, inevitable, and that this succession period will be extremely unstable. Many Western governments may view the current Russian regime as undesirable, but there is a general respect for the current Kremlin’s competence and strategic rationality. Thus, the key strategic goal for NATO in the east is to raise the cost of miscalculation for Moscow by strengthening Baltic defences. A legitimate concern is that, in the coming years, a succession battle within the Kremlin combined with long-term economic instability may cause Russia —or rather certain powerful actors in Moscow— to lash out in the ‘near-abroad’.

 

Conclusion

Moving forward, the most important developments in Russian politics worth following will be the fate of the ‘liberal’ opposition, in all its various forms, and eventually the succession process. The main question for the opposition is whether or not a united front will form between various factions —old liberals, Navalnyites, nationalists, communists, and so on. As for succession, there are multiple possible outcomes over the next six years. We will either see a reordering of the current elite as Putin steps down from power, or a constitutional amendment abolishing the two-term limit. Regardless, the West can expect an assertive stance from Moscow as Putin attempts to reinforce his domestic credibility in the face of a stagnant economy and shrinking European demand for fossil fuels.

 


Jackson Webster is a graduate of the Department of War Studies, and is currently reading for a master’s in International Security at Sciences Po Paris. His research focuses on Russia, its relationship with Central Europe, and cybersecurity. He is currently working on cybersecurity issues with a legal tech consultancy in Paris.


Notes

[1] Section based on an off-the-record conversation between the author and senior NATO officials.


Image source

http://journalby.com/news/navalnyy-protiv-rossii-rossiya-protiv-evropy-i-sobchak-protiv-vseh-1099 (in Russian)

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: election, feature, Jackson Oliver Webster, Politics, putin, Russia

The Multi-Domain Battle Doctrine, or the Art of Gambling on Future Warfare

April 20, 2018 by Pierre Dugué

By Pierre Dugué

Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025-2040 (Credits: The Dupuy Institute)

In 2007, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates declared ‘We can expect that asymmetrical warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time’. The United States (U.S.) considerably outweighs any military opponent. Hence, asymmetry appears to be a weapon of choice for competitors: terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, or even Russia in Eastern Europe. But as the U.S. Army seek to anticipate tomorrow’s conflicts, the Multi-Domain Battle Doctrine seems to be dangerously gambling on future conflicts by assuming their inherently symmetrical nature.

 

The U.S. Army’s Strategic Culture

Based on a distorted reading of Clausewitzian theory, U.S. Army doctrine has historically considered the object of war to consist in the utter destruction of enemy forces. As a result, Field Manuals—the Army’s regulation of combat operations and engagement doctrine— have emphasised overwhelming firepower and decisive manoeuver as essential factors to achieve victory. Great success was consequently achieved against regular forces in the Second World War and the Korean War.

However, the doctrine clashed with the political realities of counterinsurgency warfare (COIN) in Vietnam, as U.S. conventional superiority was negated by the tactics of an irregular enemy. This episode showed the limits of the Army’s operational definition of the object of military action, and the primacy of politics in war.

At the time, the Vietnam experience was deemed a military anomaly. Head of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) General DuPuy foresaw that the time of ‘combat with light and elusive forces was over’. In light of the highly conventional Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Army sought to refocus its development on mechanised and aerial warfare to anticipate a force-on-force war against the Soviet Union.

As a result, the AirLand Battle Doctrine of 1982-86 was believed to provide a relevant doctrinal framework for future operations. The Doctrine relied on the principle of denial, as the Air Force could substantially attrit the enemy rear so as to interdict the deployment of reserves and facilitate the advance of allied ground troops. Swift, cheap and decisive victory was sought and the AirLand Battle proved particularly effective during the Gulf War.

The Army’s kinetic culture, however, clashed again with operational realities in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The used of mass firepower in urban areas resulted in civilian casualties that, in turn, fed the political grievances of insurgent fighters. The operational recommendations elaborated by Field Manual 3-24 ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare’ (2006) brought hope that the U.S. Army could, at last, factor political ramifications in to their definition of –and thus approach to- the object of war.

Yet the recent re-emergence of high-intensity operations indicate a shift back to the AirLand Battle Doctrine, and away from irregular conflicts.

 

The Multi-Domain Battle Doctrine

Russia’s meddling in NATO’s Eastern Flank has provided the U.S. Army with a unique opportunity to shift its doctrinal paradigm back to the familiar area of linear warfare. General Perkins, TRADOC commander, wrote in 2017: ‘Transitioning the Army from the Vietnam War to AirLand Battle took over ten years. In the years to come, multi-domain battle is our concept to drive change’.

The Multi-Domain Battle Doctrine seeks to adapt the Army’s capabilities and doctrine to match a peer – or near-peer – threat on a force-on-force contest rather than an enemy whose strategy would rely on battle avoidance. The Doctrine emphasises key operational concepts such as deep fires, deep area, close support, and operational support area to bring hostilities to an early termination.

In December 2017, the Multi-Domain Battle concept was implemented in Army doctrine through the revision of Field Manual 3-0 ‘Operations’. Lieutenant-General Lundy, Combined Arms Centre (CAC) commander, wrote that the focus on ‘counterinsurgency operations from static bases against enemies with limited military capabilities created a view of ground combat incongruent with the realities of fighting large-scale combat against a peer threat’. The Army arguably have China and Russia in mind, whose current hybrid practices may well escalate tensions and lead to a major conflict.

These military concepts have recently been given consideration at the highest political level within the Pentagon. Under Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy announced in late 2017 the creation of a new United States Army Command -‘Futures Command’ – whose chief purpose will be the study of ‘combat development, combat capability and combat systems’ with in mind Multi-Battle operational concepts such as ‘Long-Range Precision Fires, Next-Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift and Soldier Lethality’.

In sum, the Army is refocusing its operational doctrine back to high-intensity operations. Field Manual 3-24 will likely remain a valid guide for irregular conflicts, but is undeniably overshadowed by Field Manual 3-0. The latter encompasses multiple branches of the armed forces, regulates military dynamics at the division level- the highest- and plays a normative role in influencing threat perception in the United States.

 

Foresight and Warfare

There is a clear willingness on the part of the Army to re-establish itself as the undisputed military hegemon in the world. This endeavour is arguably motivated by a reading of the current strategic environment–the re-emergence of Great Power confrontation–along with the assumption that its dynamics are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

The U.S. Army is seeking to build itself a new identity that coincides with its historical mission to fight aggressive states like Imperial Japan or the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, one is forced to conclude that asymmetric enemies remain the most likely threat to U.S. national security and core economic/political interests.

Although China and Russia remain credible peer competitors, their strengths rely on information manipulation, deniable operations, special operatives and proxy actors. Both are aware that they cannot sustain military operations against the U.S. Army, whose military industry confer them an unmatched, long-term attritional potential. An early termination of hostilities through nuclear coercion would be the only conventional option both countries may opt for. Hence why asymmetry remains their most relevant option, and the U.S’s greater threat.

Likewise counterinsurgency warfare may re-emerge as a military necessity to the U.S. Army. As John Nagl rightly pointed out: ‘While the central problem of international relations in the 20th century was States that were too strong, the primary problems […] in the 21st century are States that are too weak’. Potential failed States such as Venezuela, Egypt or nuclear-armed Pakistan may facilitate the emergence of asymmetric enemies, undermine U.S. interests, its national security and therefore incite military actions.

The U.S. Army is dangerously gambling on the future of warfare. The re-edition of Field Manual 3-0 adopts contingency dynamics theorised by the Army in the 1980s and a linear understanding of the character of war, ignoring its volatile nature. The current strategic context renders high-intensity warfare between peer competitors the least likely threat –though potentially the most destructive. The Multi-Domain Battle, if Gates’ assumption is proven right, may leave the U.S. Army greatly unprepared to face this century’s strategic issues.

 


Pierre DUGUE is a third-year candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. His main interests revolve around U.S. military doctrine, transatlantic defence relations and NATO. He interned at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, worked as an undergraduate research fellow at King’s College London and is an American Enterprise Institute (Washington D.C.) scholarship recipient


Image Source: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainBattle/docs/DRAFT_MDBconcept.pdf

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: army, doctrine, feature, future, Russia

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part V – The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

April 17, 2018 by Felix Manig

By Felix Manig

UN Unmanned/Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is prepared for take-off (Credit Image: UN Dispatch)

The nature of conflict is changing and so must UN peace operations if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security. What then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated in 2014 echoes even louder today, given the ever more politically complex and high-risk environments UN peacekeepers operate in. While there is no one-size-fits-all peace operation, adopting a number of priorities can help all UN missions to move toward necessary reform. The future peacekeeping architecture should build on strategic and regional partnerships, strengthen conflict prevention capacities and harness emerging technologies to effectively sustain peace in the twenty-first century.

 

Strategic and Regional Partnerships

 A key challenge for UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) is to compel states with more advanced military capabilities and technical expertise to contribute more meaningfully to missions in the future. Perhaps the most promising path for this lies in building on the strategic partnership with the European Union (EU), which vowed to cooperate more closely with the UN on peacekeeping and crisis management. The EU is uniquely qualified to aid the UN in capacity building for the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in complex operations for which regular troop contributing countries are ill-equipped. In fact, EU member states collectively represent the largest financial contributor to UNPKOs and UN peace operations also address key EU foreign and security policy priorities in counterterrorism, the rule of law and promoting the role of women in peace and security. The initial results of increased policy coherence, joint training exercises and EU engagement in support of UN peacekeeping over the last years appear promising. In Mali, EU military and civilian support helped MINUSMA to strengthen local internal security forces. In the Central African Republic, the EU’s EUFOR RCA operation set the foundation for the later UN-led MINUSCA mission.

In Africa, where the UN currently conducts the majority of its peacekeeping missions, building on partnerships means strengthening collaboration with the African Union (AU) and other regional and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or IGAD. While the UN already cooperates with the AU in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping, simultaneous or complementary deployments by the UN and AU will likely feature more prominently in the future. These hybrid mandates can add important political capital to operations and prove valuable during peace negotiations, such as in the Central African Republic, where local and regional knowledge may be indispensable.

 

Strengthen Conflict Prevention

In his vision statement, Secretary-General António Guterres stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. One major strategy to promote stability and prevent conflict is to include more women in UN peacekeeping, both as security sector officials within operations and in critical decision-making bodies for conflict resolution. Passing UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was a historic and important step. However, the UN must act more decisively to build up women’s participation and turn the resolution’s pledges into a reality. Given that it is the responsibility of UN member states to commit peacekeeping personnel, the organisation should feature its gender mainstreaming strategy more prominently and boost the reach and responsibility of its Gender Advisers to encourage troop contributing countries to increase the share of female staff. Strong evidence shows that women’s participation in peace and security processes improves the safety of peacekeepers, leads to more successful radicalisation prevention programmes, and improves the economic recovery in conflict-affected regions. Perhaps most importantly, peace agreements in which women participated meaningfully are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years than agreements which were concluded by male-only signatories.

 

Harnessing Emerging Technologies 

The reform agenda introduced by the Secretary-General equally calls for scaling up the technological capabilities of UNPKOs to make peacekeepers more flexible and mobile. In 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological tools considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement agencies to operate effectively. The report also drew a direct connection between these deficiencies and the reluctance of developed countries to meaningfully contribute troops to existing operations.

An improved understanding of operating environments as well as the presence or intent of adversaries are key components for risk reduction in conflict. Harnessing emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is one way to move into this direction. Unarmed UAVs were first used by the UN MONUSCO operation in December 2013, helping peacekeepers to improve their situational awareness, monitor migration movements and track armed groups in the mountainous terrain of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Since then, camera and sensor-equipped UAVs have become increasingly common in other UNPKOs, including in Mali and the Central African Republic, and their use should be expanded to other operations as needed.

The UN should also push for more intelligence gathering and monitoring tools within UNPKOs of the future. From satellite reconnaissance to ground surveillance radars and acoustic or seismic sensors, the cost of such once exclusive technologies has now fallen so dramatically that even the small peacekeeping budget allows investment in them. The collection and analysis of data about movements, crime and conflict can then produce intelligence which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic and data-driven monitoring and mapping of crises can also promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective.

 

Looking Forward

 A meaningful implementation of the above recommendations depends, as always, on the necessary funding and political will of UN member states. Threats by the US administration to cut its share of the already meagre $6.8 billion peacekeeping budget, which is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, sends a troubling sign to multilateral efforts at maintaining peace and security. For UNPKOs, gaining the necessary political will largely depends on the strategic interests of P5 members in conflict regions. In this sense, geopolitical competition and the current stalemate at the UN Security Council around humanitarian crises such as in Syria or Yemen represent major challenges to the UN peacekeeping architecture.

However, the UN is not in an existential crisis. Since taking office, the Secretary-General has made reform a priority for the UN and the organisation is responding to the justifiable criticisms. The UN realised the changing nature of conflict and is in the process of adapting its prevention and peacekeeping missions to this new threat landscape. Although the UN may sometimes seem like a relic of the 20th century, it has the ability and necessary vision under its current leadership to evolve and remain irreplaceable for promoting international peace and security.

 


Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig


Image Source:  https://www.undispatch.com/un-learning-love-drones/

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Africa, drones, feature, strategy, Strife series, UN peacekeeping

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