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Strife Feature – Italy’s short circuit week and the fight over Europe

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by Andrea Varsori

The President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella (Image Credit: LaPresse)

 

Italy’s short circuit week

Last week, Italy’s political system went into short circuit. 84 days after the last national elections, an apparently successful attempt at forming a government unexpectedly collapsed at the last minute. Ten days earlier, the two political forces behind the attempt, the right-wing League and the anti-politics Five Star Movement (5SM), had already produced a joint manifesto, a “government contract”. Their members had already approved it: the League had organised voting at hundreds of stands across Italy, while the Movement, coherently with its calls for direct democracy, let its members vote on its online platform, Rousseau. The two forces had already chosen someone for the role of Prime Minister: Giuseppe Conte, a little-known lawyer and professor. They had already agreed on the future ministers. In short, everything seemed ready to go.

Italy’s political system, however, proved to be an obstacle for their plans. In Italy, the President of the Republic nominates the ministers, while the Prime Minister proposes the names. In the days before the collapse of government formation, the President, Sergio Mattarella, had signalled informally that he would not approve the prospective choice for the Minister of Economy. The League wanted Paolo Savona for that role; however, Savona, an economist and former minister, is a hardline Eurosceptic, known for his statements on the euro as a “cage” for the Italian economy and as an instrument of German economic domination. On few occasions, he had stated that Merkel’s Germany amounted to a new version of Hitler’s Third Reich. Most importantly, on May 26, the Italian Huffington Post showed that, in 2015, Savona had presented a Powerpoint presentation proposing a secret plan to leave the euro. On May 27, Mattarella formally declared that he would not accept Savona as Minister, due to the risks he posed to the savings of Italian citizens.

This decision set off what was to be defined as Italy’s deepest constitutional crisis. The League, in fact, reacted by stating that they would never accept to form a government without Savona as the Economy Minister. Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, claimed that Savona was rejected because “he would have defended the interests of Italians, not Germans”. Luigi Di Maio, political leader of the 5SM, went even further, declaring that the Movement would propose Mattarella’s impeachment. If enacted, this would have constituted an unprecedented move in Italian politics. Due to the role of the President as the symbol of the Italian state, rather than a political actor, impeachment was considered seriously only twice in the past, and on both the occasions the Presidents resigned before the process could even start. On May 28, however, Di Maio, in a Facebook video, confirmed the intention to proceed with impeachment and called for a general mobilisation to respond to the President’s decision. On May 29 the Democratic Party, Italy’s main left-of-centre party, organised counter-demonstrations to support Mattarella. In the meantime, most parties were agreeing on holding elections as soon as late July.

 

What ended the short circuit?

Considering that this was happening as early as the morning of Tuesday 29, it seems incredible that, on Friday afternoon, the same Giuseppe Conte was swearing the oath as Prime Minister, with Savona on his government team. In little more than two days, Italy went from a high-level political crisis to successful government formation; from early elections to political stability (of sorts); from the delegitimisation of the head of State to smiles and toasts with him. What had happened in the meantime? The answer is a mix of economic and political events.

Earlier, on May 27, just after having vetoed Savona, Mattarella tried to form a “neutral”, caretaker government, led by former IMF Departmental Director Carlo Cottarelli. Mattarella had already announced a similar initiative on May 7, when negotiations for a political government had seemed to stall. The prospective Cottarelli government seemed to follow in those steps; besides, the institutional and technocratic character of its components was expected to reassure the markets. This, however, did not happen. In the following two days (May 28-29), the difference in yield between Italian and German government bonds skyrocketed from 191 points to 306 points, pointing out to investors considering Italian sovereign debt as a riskier asset. Stock markets in Europe, Asia, and North America fell, with Italian banks the most hit. This backlash seemed to defy the purpose of the Cottarelli government. The latter also seemed condemned to fail from the start, as only a handful of MPs were ready to vote in its favour.

On the other hand, Di Maio soon understood that he had gone too far, as even the League was refusing to support the impeachment process. He let go of that on the evening of Tuesday 29 and started to pressure Salvini into modifying the government team, moving the controversial Savona to another portfolio. On his part, Salvini was looking forward to new elections, as fresh polls said that his party was due to achieve strong gains; however, a new election would have posed financial problems for the League. Moreover, while Salvini could market himself as the defender of Italian democracy, his continued refusal to form a government without Savona as Economy Minister risked to attract the blame on him. Besides, the opportunity of being part of the government and becoming the Home Minister seemed an acceptable outcome.

Consequently, at the end of a frantic week, Italy received a political government. Notwithstanding the fact that the Five Star Movement is not pro-business at all, and that the League still has a decidedly Eurosceptic tone, investors seem to have valued this development positively. Starting from May 30, global stock markets, including Italian bank shares, recovered. On June 1, the same day as Conte was sworn in as PM, the difference between German and Italian government bonds continued to fall, although to this day it continues to be higher than in April. There seems to be relative harmony between the Five Star Movement and the League, as well as between political parties and the President, notwithstanding the calls for his impeachment  a few days  earlier and the demonstrations against the President’s decision that were due to take place on June 2. Instead, on that day, also observed as Italy’s Republic Day, Conte was sitting next to Mattarella at the celebrations taking place in Rome.

 

The three main takeaways

If this were the end of Italy’s short circuit week, all these events would be relatively uninteresting; just another episode in the national political drama. Instead, they are tremendously important, not only for the country, but also for the whole continent. There are, in fact, three main conclusions to be taken from all this.

The first takeaway is that, after this week, the Italian political system cannot be really seen as stable, regardless of the existence of a government. This judgment is not based on prejudice: rather, it flows from the behaviour of the governing parties and their leaders. Italy, in fact, could have at least partly avoided the turmoil in the markets. There is a distinct possibility that Matteo Salvini engineered the collapse of the negotiations because the veto on Savona was a great opportunity to go to early elections and gain a larger share of votes. That would amount to an irresponsible act of political opportunism that exposed the instability of the country. Even if that was not true, however, the knee-jerk reaction of the 5SM, Italy’s largest political force, is an even more serious event. Instead of keeping in touch with the President, Luigi Di Maio opted to propose impeachment, without even knowing if the League would have followed him. He was then forced to withdraw that idea. This mix of opportunism, radical tones, and lack of coordination is, potentially, the sign of further instability to come. It may happen again.

The second insight is that Italy is still economically weak and exposed to the opinion of investors. The relatively good economic situation of the country must not mask Italy’s long-standing issues. Italy’s growth is still smaller than most other countries in the Eurozone, and it is expected to slow down next year. The country also has a historically low productivity and a mediocre environment for doing business, beyond being relatively unattractive to foreign investments, lagging behind the UK, Germany, and France, despite recent improvements. Taxes are among the highest in Europe; poverty is increasing; unemployment rate is still high, especially for people between 25 and 34; and the country’s extant growth is dependent on exports, which may be hard hit by the potential U.S.-EU trade wars.

Most importantly, Italy has the 2nd largest sovereign debt in Europe as a percentage of GDP and 5th largest in the world. A 32% share of this debt is owned by external investors. This is important, as any concern regarding the country’s ability or will to repay its debts translates quickly into a higher cost of obtaining funds on the markets, which in turn restricts greatly the government’s ability to spend money for its policies. Foreign ownership of the Italian sovereign debt has been steadily declining in the past years: the share of foreign investors-held debt was 36.1% in 2016, and around 51% in 2010; the ECB’s quantitative easing has been an opportunity for these investors to shed a reported €78 billion of Italian bonds between 2015 and early 2018. On the one hand, decline in foreign ownership is a positive development, as it lowers the risk of contagion between Italy and the EU and makes Italy less dependent on foreign markets. This also means, however, that domestic banks now hold a comparatively larger share of debt. Every sovereign debt crisis, then, translates quickly into a bank crisis, restricting access to credit for firms and families. All these economic fundamentals are unlikely to change anytime soon.

The third insight is that there is still a battle being waged over the common currency and the future of the European Union. It is, first of all, a battle of rules. The new Italian government, although relatively divided on several topics, shares a common goal: relaxing European rules regarding the reduction of debt and restrictions on deficit spending. Cottarelli, a few days before being nominated PM designate, published with his Observatory on Public Budget, a study outlining that the prospective costs of the 5SM-League government amounted to at least €108.7 ($126.8 or £95) billion, with prospective revenues for only €0.5 billion. Although it is likely that the government will enact only some of these policies, it is clear that the 5SM-League executive will try to negotiate, even forcefully, more freedom for Italian economic policy. However, there seems to be scarce appetite for that in Brussels. Although Spain and Greece may join Italy in this battle, Northern countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Finland, will oppose all such moves. The German government will also ward off such requests. Surrendering to Italy’s demands would attract fierce criticism from the right-wing, Eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany, the main rival to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU. As for France, President Emmanuel Macron’s reform drive seems to have stalled months ago. His ideas have found formidable obstacles in the countries cited above and have been considerably downsized by Merkel just on last Sunday. The Italian government can scarcely change that, even if it abandoned Savona’s brinkmanship, with his project of obtaining concessions in Brussels by threatening to leave the euro.

This is, however, a battle of feelings as well. In the first half of the past week, the tension between Italy and the European Union skyrocketed. In Italy, politicians, pundits, and citizens instantly and vehemently condemned statements coming from Brussels. In a famous episode, on Tuesday 29, Deutsche Welle journalist Bernd Riegert attributed the sentence ‘the markets will teach the Italians to vote for the right thing’ to EU Budget Commissioner Günther Oettinger. This then was confirmed to be a very simplistic synthesis of Oettinger’s words, written by Riegert himself. The following day, an MEP for the German CSU party was quoted in an interview saying that, in case of Italian bankruptcy, ‘it would be necessary to invade Rome and take over the Ministry of Finance’. On the other hand, in Italy, older German stereotypes started surfacing again. In a video explaining Italy’s relationship with the EU and the ECB, Milena Gabanelli, one of the country’s most famous journalists, used a Nazi military hat to represent Germany (while the French were portrayed with a less controversial, but still stereotypical, Napoleonic hat). In general, Matteo Salvini quickly seized the comments reported above to convince Italians that Germany and the EU had pressured Mattarella into vetoing Savona’s nomination as Minister. This happens in a country where only 44% of the citizens think that they benefited from EU membership, one of the lowest results in Europe. In another recent poll, the relative majority of Italians (46%) believes that the country would have a better future outside the Union: only the UK showed a higher percentage. In the next months, then, the relation between the EU and Italy risks to become the terrain for a battle between opposed national rivalries and prejudices.

 

Italy’s new government: a wedge into a divided Europe

This outbreak of contrast between Italy and the EU is the most important part of this week of instability and constant turnarounds. National rivalries within the European Union are all but gone. In the case of Italy, they have been waking up for quite some time: at least since the birth of the technocratic government of Mario Monti, in November 2011, when Italians started believing that the EU membership entailed more interferences and restrictions than benefits. This is an idea that the League is enthusiastically embracing. It may become stronger as the two governing parties try to enact the government contract. They will seek to cover its expenses with more public debt, thus clashing with European rules. In this contrast, both governing parties will find politically convenient to accuse Germany of imposing its will on Italy. National rivalries will then take centre stage, shaking the ideational foundations of Italy’s EU membership to their core.

 

The article is now available in Italian! Link 

 

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

Image Source: https://www.repstatic.it/content/nazionale/img/2018/05/28/034107183-8b461394-435c-4763-beaa-fa88f54be243.jpg

The West needs to wake up to Information Warfare

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By Will Bisset

UK investigators working on the Skripal poisoning case in Salisbury (Credit Image: Ben Stansall/AFP/Getty Images)

 

“No amount of propaganda can make right something that the world knows is wrong” – Barak Obama, POTUS, 2014

“In information warfare, the side that tells the truth loses.” – Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of Collective Security Treaty Organisation, 2014

 

The aftermath of the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury has demonstrated how vulnerable Western society is to Russia’s recent acts of ‘information war’ (IW). It divides, distracts and demoralises, eroding critical faculties and attacking the notion of objective truth. With instant, mass communication afforded by the Internet, this legacy of Soviet Cold War strategy acts as an asymmetric enabler and represents an existential threat to the West. Theresa May’s premature declaration of victory over Russian ‘fake news’ is symptomatic of our politicians’ failure to fully understand its aims. Events after Skripal’s poisoning illustrate how social media trolls and ‘useful idiots’, led by the Russian government, exert influence over public perception and domestic politics. This article will outline the perception gap between Western politicians’ understanding, and the reality of Russian IW’s aims and strategic objectives.

 

IW

IW represents the attempt to intervene in an enemy’s ‘information space’, to influence their behaviour. The ultimate aim is to establish ‘reflexive control’. This essentially means that the target’s perception of the world is manipulated to the extent that it makes decisions advantageous to Russian objectives and against its own self-interest.[i] While Western doctrine views it as an accompaniment to military operations, Russian documents describe it as a continuous, omnipresent process.[ii]

The example of RT news (formerly Russia Today) is instructive. The editor, Margarita Simonyan, has outlined the channel is actively conducting, “an information war against the whole Western world”. She says the channel’s raison d’etre is to utilise information and communication for traditionally military purposes and political goals. Numerous studies have consistently shown that it fails to adhere to standards of impartial reporting. Social media activity from RT figures both before and after the Brexit referendum demonstrates this agenda. Max Keiser, host of a weekly show, tweeted in February 2016, “UK Should leave EU and learn to stand on its own two feet. Brits would be the stronger for it and UK economy would improve”. After Brexit however, he changed his tune, “Brits thought they could fool the world into thinking they could drop out of the EU and still be relavant (typo included). They failed”. Clearly, this is not a serious news channel.

 

Salisbury

The Salisbury attack is a useful case study to examine. Sergei Skripal, an ex-MI6 double agent, was poisoned with the ‘novichok’ nerve agent, historically produced by the USSR. This narrative was aggressively swamped by various conspiracies run by state media or Russian government officials. That they were often contradictory is reminiscent of similar propaganda drives after the downing of flight MH17, or chemical weapons attacks by Russian allies. This is by design, to exhaust ones critical faculties, and, according to chess champion turned Russian exile Gary Kasparov, “to annihilate truth”. There have been more than thirty conspiracy theories suggested by Russian state organs and media since the Skripal attack. The Russian EU ambassador suggested that the poison came from a UK military base Porton Down nearby, while their embassy to the UK consistently pointed to a lack of available evidence, even claiming that Yulia Skripal was abducted by the British government.

State-sponsored troll farms and twitter bots have served to amplify this effect. Analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab (DFL) illustrates a sharp increase of social media activity pushing conspiracy theories with ‘#falseflag’ attached. It documents that much of this is likely to stem from state-sponsored troll farms under US indictment for interference in its political process.

To be sure, it is important to recognise that this activity does not entirely stem from Russia, and IW seizes on ‘useful idiots’ from the West to undermine their own governments. George Galloway outlined that Russia was last on his list of suspects, unless he could personally review all classified evidence relating to the case. Moreover, ex-Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, insinuated  on RT that Russia were being framed by another actor in regard to Skripal.

 

Western confusion

Farfetched and demonstrably false narratives serve a genuine purpose. A critical mistake by Western leaders is to assume that debunking disinformation makes it go away. Former US President Barack Obama betrayed naivety when he said, “No amount of propaganda can make right something that the world knows is wrong,” in response to Russian disinformation in Ukraine. This Western assumption that one empirical truth will prevail against numerous falsehoods is in fact false. It misunderstands IW’s aim; to create an atmosphere in which there are no reliable facts, and therefore no objective truth.[iii] Moscow does not aim to convince, but to confuse. This misinterpretation reduces the credibility of western media and officials, which in turn reinforces the impact of disinformation, as traditional fact-checking sources are doubted.[iv] If you cannot effectively work out the truth, you cannot prosecute wrongdoing. Russian General Nikolay Bordyuzha succinctly underlines this perspective, “in information warfare, the side that tells the truth loses”.

Further, perpetuating an atmosphere of distrust also serves to erode the ‘credibility advantage’ enjoyed by democracies over their autocratic contemporaries.[v] Russian government documents demonstrate the thinking behind this, that a government without the trust of its society cannot effectively govern.[vi] This is especially true in democracies, that are ultimately accountable to their populace.

Theresa May has used the comprehensive expulsion of Russian diplomats by over twenty countries to indicate the failure of Russia’s programme of propaganda after Salisbury. This is premature. Similar to George Bush pontificating ‘Mission Accomplished’ aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1st 2003, she needs to recognise the Skripal affair as just a prelude to a long-term war. Russian IW is a continuous process, and has long-term strategic goals that appear not to have been understood by Western leaders such as Mrs May. The aim of Russian fake news is the long-term erosion of objective truth, not just the short term diplomatic convincing of well-informed and briefed allied intelligence services.

 

Will is a postgraduate student reading International Peace and Security at King’s College London, while working as a political consultant. He has a broad interest in international security issues, with a specific interest in trans-national organised crime, cyber security and information warfare. You can follow him on Twitter: @Bil93Bis

Notes: 

[i] Can Kasapoglu, Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-linear Warfare and Reflexive Control. (NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2015) p.2.

[ii] Ulricke Franke, War by non-military means. Understanding Russian Information Warfare (2015) p.4.

[iii] Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘new’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power (Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, 2016), p.39.

[iv] Ibid., p.39.

[v] Ibid., p.40.

[vi] Ulricke Franke, War by non-military means. Understanding Russian Information Warfare (2015), p.30.

Turkey’s Growing Military Influence

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By Gorkem Dirik & Selcuk Aydin

Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

 

 

Turkey views itself increasingly compelled to generate new strategies in foreign and security policy by combining both soft and hard power instruments because of the changing dynamics during the post-Arab Spring period. While Turkey was seen as a role model during the Arab Spring for neighboring countries that were in transition from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, this model lost its appeal due to violent toppling of democratically elected regimes as well as the escalation of conflicts in the wider Middle East. For instance, Turkey lost its political and economic ties in Egypt after the coup d’état in 2013. The Syrian civil war bears economic, social and security implications for Turkey. Hence, in order to preserve its political and economic power in the region in the wake of hostile developments around the country, Turkey began to search for other mechanisms to wield its influence. As a result, Turkey has found itself launching military bases in Qatar and Somalia and military intervention in Syria.

 

Military Journey of Turkey

Turkey was established by Kemalist military cadres who conducted top-down modernist reforms and threatened the civilian governments by coup d’états that encountered strong opposition from the social and political movements throughout Turkish political history.

Several events played a significant role in decreasing the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic politics during the Justice and Development Party era since 2002. Such factors include the EU negotiation process during the first decade of 2000, the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer cases respectively in 2008 and 2010 as well as the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 committed by the FETO (Gülenists). The consolidation of civilian politics against the TAF establishment during the Justice and Development Party era enabled the civilian government to use hard power as a diplomatic instrument. Consequently, there TAF were once identified as the determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy,  however they have undergone a drastic transformation and they have now turned into the instrument of Turkey’s Foreign policy.

As Turkey entered a new era of foreign policy implementation, this reflected upon the country’s efforts to diversify its options in this matter. For instance, Turkey established new embassies in twelve countries across the African continent to bolster economic relations. Most significantly, this change in foreign policy has positively resulted in a spill-over effect from economic to political and then security fields of relations and impacts.

Historical experiences have also played a key role in empowering the defence industry in guaranteeing the security of the country. In 1974, for instance, when Turkey conducted military operations in Cyprus, the country faced an arms embargo by the US. Ankara was also prohibited from purchasing some specific arms from its NATO allies in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s.

Along with these historical experiences, the conflict in Syria and Iraq accelerated the urgency of empowering the defence industry. Having realized this, Turkey chose to nationalise its defence industry and proceeded with the diversification of its security alliance. As part of this process, Ankara has become cautious on its relations with NATO, whilst signing the S-400 missile agreement with Russia.  Turkey also took a leading role in the Syrian peace process alongside Russia and Iran. These advancements in its defence industry allowed the country to undergo a transition from an absolute weapon-importer state to a weapon-exporter state. One illustration is this shift comes with an arms sell to Pakistan  selling arms to Pakistan.

 

Turkey’s Military Expansion

By investing in its defence industry and expanding its network of military bases, Turkey aims to become a more active player in the Middle East, Africa, and Caucasus.

This is evident when looking at the Turkish incursion in Syria, which became a showcase for Ankara to evaluate its military capacity. President Tayyip Erdogan understood the necessity of using military power as a foreign policy instrument in the Syrian war, with the statement “We are not war-lovers, but we are not far from war either” in 2012.  In this regard, the Turkish military deterrence has visibly altered the security dynamics in Syria against the ISIS and PKK affiliated groups since the beginning of Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016. As the efforts via soft power means to form a safe-zone in Northern Syria had proven fruitless, Turkey felt obligated to take the necessary steps to create a zone of influence. In addition to this, the recent Turkish-Russian-Iranian tripartite cooperation has indeed aimed to decrease conflict in Syria with agreeing on the four de-escalation zones. Thus, this underlined the prominence of Turkey’s military deterrence capabilities and its growth as a regional power.

As part of Turkey’s new strategy, Turkey has established military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Iraq, and it is expected that the number of Turkish soldiers serving in the oversea military bases will surpass 60,000 by 2022.  Moreover, Turkish military activities are not only limited to military bases. Additionally, the TAF train and equip the armies of allied countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

In Somalia, Turkey has opened dockyards, built international airports and numerous hospitals, and established a military base on 30 September 2017. With more than 10,000 soldiers serving, Turkey`s main role is to train and equip the Somali forces in their fight against terrorist groups such as Al-Shaabab. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence has been improving Somalia`s ability to secure its coastline, particularly against pirates that threaten the maritime trade route.

The sharing of common interests, especially in the foreign policy arena, has brought Qatar and Turkey together. This led Ankara to establish another military base in Qatar at the request of the Qatari government in October 2015. With 3,000 troops deployed in the Tariq bin-Ziyad military base, Turkey has further strengthened its position in the Gulf and altered the regional status quo. For instance, during the Gulf crisis, Turkey has played a key role in dissuading the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) decision to isolate and castigate Qatar for its rapprochement with Turkey, thereby underlining how the latter has increasingly shifted regional power dynamics in its favor.

Furthermore, Turkey`s security cooperation with Azerbaijan has allowed both countries holding periodic joint military exercises to evaluate the Azerbaijani Army’s potential. Turkey also assists in the modernization of Azerbaijani military education by trying to bring it in line with NATO standards. As a result, Azerbaijani military officers participate with Turkey`s peacekeeping missions abroad, for instance, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ultimately, Turkish military capability has been further solidified via an unofficial agreement between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials on `Casus Foederis`, which signifies that an attack against one country is an attack against both.

 

In conclusion, Turkey has accelerated its military activity in the Middle East in an attempt to alter the regional balance of power in its favor. Apart from Qatar and Somalia, Turkish military bases as well as its deterrence capabilities can be observed in Northern Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, Ankara provides military training as well as equipping to the military of key Central Asian countries, which also enables increased Turkish influence in this region. Moreover, Turkey`s recent incursion into northern Syria has also illustrated technological advances in its defense industry. Taking all of these developments into consideration, it can be said that Turkey has transformed itself into a crucial player whose influence impacts not only the Middle East but also farther afield, stretching from the Caucasus to Sub-Saharan Africa.

 

Gorkem Dirik

Gorkem is an Assistant Researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He previously worked at Turkish Embassies in Malta and Barcelona, Spain which enabled him to observe the inner dealings of diplomacy. Before he moved back to Turkey he carried out his studies in languages and diplomacy in Kaliningrad (Russia), Malta, Belgrade (Serbia), Barcelona (Spain), Buenos Aires (Argentina), London (United Kingdom), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). He holds a Master of Science in Conflict Studies and Nationalism from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Besides Turkish, he is fluent in English, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Spanish and Portuguese for which he holds certificates from reputable universities that he can speak them all on a diplomatic level. His book on Turkish foreign policy, titled Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st century – A Comparative Study: Turkey between East and West was published in 2012 by the University of Malta. Moreover, his dissertation on the Ukrainian Crisis, “The Role of Nationalism in the De-Facto Dissolution of Ukraine” has been awarded as the best dissertation of the year by the LSE. His research and specialisation area is Russian and Turkish foreign policies and their implications on the Balkans and the Central Asia.

 

Selcuk Aydin

Selcuk is a Researcher at the TRT World Research Centre, and a PhD Candidate, Defence Studies, School of Security Studies, King’s College London. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, Turkish diaspora in the UK, Kurdish Studies and Middle East. His research interests are colonialism, Middle Eastern politics and history, Islamic and Kurdish movements, diaspora, institutional, and security studies. Selçuk holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, a Master’s Degree in Political Economy of the Middle East from King’s College London. His PhD thesis’ title is “Post-Ottoman States and Kurdish Movements: A Comparatively Analysis of Single Party Regime in Turkey (1923-1945), British Mandate Regime in Iraq (1920-1932) and French Mandate Regime in Syria (1923-1946).”

 

Image Source: https://qz.com/1093011/turkey-opens-its-largest-overseas-military-base-in-somalia-to-train-somali-soldiers/ 

Strife Interview – Antonio Moscatello on “Megumi”

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Antonio Moscatello is an Italian journalist who graduated in Japanese language and translated many texts from Japanese. He became a professional journalist in 2001 and worked as foreign correspondent in Tokyo, Iraq, and Budapest. In 2012 he investigated North-Korean kidnappings, which is also the theme of “Megumi”, his latest book. Strife’s Editor Andrea Fischetti met with Mr Moscatello to discuss the issues raised in “Megumi”.

All Enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to Strife Blog.

 

AF: Let’s start with “Megumi”, who inspired the title of your book. Who is Megumi? What does her case tell us about North-Korean kidnappings?

AM: Megumi Yokota was kidnapped when she was 13 years old, in November 1977, on her way home after school. Everything happened within around 500 meters. For about 20 years her disappearance remained a mystery, until, almost by chance, the truth came up: she was kidnapped and taken to North Korea by agents working for Pyongyang.

Her story became the most emblematic case among the many North Korean kidnappings in Japan, South Korea, and further afield. Moreover, the story of Megumi has yet to come to an end, after more than 40 years.

I believe a remarking characteristic of Megumi’s case is the reason behind her disappearance. This wasn’t a planned operation, like many others conducted by Pyongyang in those years. In fact, Megumi was kidnapped due to her physical appearance, since she looked older than her actual age. This is also an emblematic case of Kim Jong Il’s strategy. At that time, for the North Korean regime there was no difference between normal people and those who held official roles in government and parties: everyone was believed to be an “agent” of a government, be it ally or enemy. For example, when 30 years later five Japanese citizens were returned to Japan after being kidnapped, they were presented as part of an official delegation.

The lack of a difference between normal citizens and government officials in the eyes of North Korea explains a lot about the North-Korean view of power; it also highlights the cohesiveness of the regime and, possibly, of the whole North-Korean society.

 

AF: Megumi is not the only case you analyse in your book. Is there another one you want to tell us about?

AM: There are many stories, and each one could make for a great espionage movie. However, there is one specific case that I wish to mention; one that took place in the United Kingdom, and more precisely in London. In 1983, a young exchange student from Japan, Keiko Arimoto, disappeared. Similarly to Megumi’s case, Keiko’s whereabouts remained unknown for many years, until another Japanese citizen, who was also detained in North Korea following his kidnapping, managed to send a letter saying that Keiko was in that country. This was the starting point of a series of investigations.

The last time she had been seen, Arimoto was at Copenhagen airport. She appeared in pictures together with a man believed to be a North Korean diplomat or spy. Keiko Arimoto has been approached by another young Japanese woman, who appeared to be the wife of a member of the Yodo-go group. This group was made of far left political activists who hijacked a Japanese plane in 1970, taking it to Pyongyang. The group, which was initially headed towards Cuba, remained in North Korea and played a role in at least three kidnappings of young Japanese in Europe (although they deny these accusations). Among these three kidnappings, there was Keiko, brought to North Korea with false promises regarding a job in the import-export field.

 

AF: You have been investigating North Korean kidnappings for years. What have you learned about their modus operandi? What is their purpose, and how do the victims live afterwards, once they are in North Korea?

AM: Each kidnapping was unique and there are many differences among them. I could divide them, focusing on those I have the best knowledge of, in sub-categories with opposing themes: casual targets / specific targets, violence / lies and tricks, couples / singles. The kidnappings that took place in Japan provide good examples of all categories. Spies would intercept people in isolated seaside places, ideally beaches. They would capture the targets, putting them inside of sacks, then running away with rubber boats. From there, they would reach the motherships, which were used to go back to North Korea.

The purposes of these kidnappings are various. Some of them are random, such as Megumi’s, while others had specific targets in mind. This is the case, for example, of a famous film director and an actress, both from South Korea, which were both kidnapped to develop the North-Korean cinema scene. Another instance of kidnappings of specific targets is the case of four young Lebanese women and a Romanian girl. They were kidnapped to become wives of American deserters who were used in national cinematic propaganda.

When it comes to Japanese victims, they were used in a number of different ways. Megumi, for example, was employed as teacher of Japanese language and culture to prepare North-Korean agents, and subsequently was married to a South-Korean who was also possibly a victim of kidnapping. Other Japanese were forced to marry among them, but no clear explanation emerged about this.

Generally, those who were kidnapped enjoyed higher living standards than the average North-Korean when it comes to food and nutrition. Even in the 1990s, when the country experienced a severe shortage of food, the victims of kidnappings that were living in North Korea were given proper food rations, at least compared to those of the North-Korean population. They did not have any external contacts with North-Korean citizens, and only met with those who took care of them, their guards, and government spies.

 

AF: You met with family members of the victims. How do they make sense of these events and what do they think about the Japanese government’s take on the kidnappings?

AM: Their families have been wishing for decades to meet again their dearest ones, and for them it is very hard to make sense of these events. Some of the families developed a radicalised political stance on this theme, which is often part of the rhetoric of right-wing politicians in Japan. Understandably, they have an extremely negative vision of Pyongyang, as they believe it has been hiding the truth for decades.

It is Pyongyang’s silence and lies that make North-Korean kidnappings even more worrying. In fact, there is no clear figure about the number of kidnapped Japanese citizens, which could amount to several hundreds. However, only 17 have been proved by the Japanese government.

Many families who experienced a kidnapping have been criticising the Japanese government. Until 2001, despite the public had been aware of this phenomenon for several years, Japanese governments appeared to negate the existence or understate the gravity of this issue and even preferred realpolitik to a tough line in their talks with Pyongyang. During the second half of the 1990s, Tokyo was supporting the Clinton administration with their efforts to resolve the North-Korean nuclear crisis through dialogue and a normalisation of diplomatic relations. This stance was also due to the economic interests in reaching a dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington and, through that, between Pyongyang and Tokyo.

It was under Junichiro Koizumi’s administration that the Japanese approach to the problem of North-Korean kidnappings began to change. Nowadays, especially thanks to Shinzo Abe, the issue became a priority for Japan. The current Prime Minister has been very concerned with the issue of North-Korean kidnappings, and even wears the blue-ribbon [which is a symbol of support for those who were kidnapped and their families – AF] in many occasions.

However, families, and especially the elderly, remain skeptic about the government: they fear that the destiny of their sons could be subject to realpolitik, and that ultimately they could be exchanged for a solution to the North-Korean crisis.

 

AF: America, Europe, Asia: to different extents and in different contexts, kidnappings have been a reality to deal with in many countries. However, in these cases a sovereign state such as North Korea recognised its involvement in kidnappings operations: should we treat these cases differently from other kidnappings?

AM: These kidnappings are definitely different from those carried by organisations such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. In this case, we are looking at a series of kidnappings that are part of a detailed program planned by a sovereign state. Although we should take into account that, as Kim Jong Il stated when he was still the leader of the country, there had been an excess of zeal among North-Korean officials, there is no doubt that official branches of the North-Korean government planned, and carried out, the kidnappings, organised the imprisonment of those who were kidnapped, and produced false documents regarding the victims.

Terroristic groups usually tend to make their kidnappings public in order to have an economic or ideological return. North-Korean kidnappings have been kept secret and the victims were ultimately used for the regime’s benefit. These kidnappings are more similar to the forced labour that Korea experienced during the colonial period. Pyongyang itself used this example in an attempt to legitimise their kidnappings.

 

AF: Despite the recent North Korean tensions resulted in ballistic missiles flying over Japan, also triggering missile alerts in the country, I argued that Japan’s involvement in the North Korean tensions will remain marginal due to legal, military, and political reasons. So far this has been the case, but many kidnappings are currently unresolved, and cannot be officially attributed to North Korea. What are their implications for Japan-DPRK relations and East Asian Security?

AM: It is hard to say. Japan tried to keep the North-Korean kidnappings issue on the agenda using Abe’s relation with U.S. President Donald Trump as leverage. There were positive results, and Trump cited Megumi in his first speech at the UN, and even met with families of the kidnapped Japanese during his first visit to Japan.

However, Trump’s behaviour is hard to predict and this is especially annoying for Japanese politicians. Trump’s will to meet Kim Jong Un, for example, seemed to worry Abe, who is still determined to keep a tough line on North Korea.

The issue of North-Korean kidnappings may once again be overshadowed by the international need to overcome the North-Korean crisis and denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, this is far from certain: in the past, Pyongyang often simulated an openness to dialogue just to earn precious time and soften international pressure. Trump’s will is also still to be clearly verified, even in the context of South-Korean openness to cooperation.

Furthermore, despite Abe appeared to be determined to achieve a resolution to this issue, it is possible that the kidnappings will eventually end up being bargaining chips in international talks. This would not necessarily be a negative change for the victims’ families, but it could make the situation even more complex or deprioritise its resolution. What happened in the past, unfortunately, doesn’t suggest that the victims of kidnappings will have priority.

 

AF: “Megumi” is currently available in Italian, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone who has an interest in this specific topic, but also International Relations and East Asia in general. At this point I am sure many of our readers would ask the same question: will an English version be available in the future?

AM: The book has been published by Rogiosi in Italy, a small publishing house based in Naples. They recently notified me of their willingness to discuss an English edition, and I am awaiting to see whether this could actually happen. I really wish it could, because the literature on this topic is currently very scarce in the West, and surprisingly in Japan too, where despite the many books published by victims, families, and North-Korean defectors, nothing has been written by an external observer.

 

Image Credit: Antonio Moscatello

‘For the Ashes of his Fathers, And the Temples of his Gods’. Or is it something else that makes a soldier fight? – Part II

by

By Sonia Bhatia and Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

The ritual of training and leadership works best for a military group (Credit Image: CC0 Creative Commons)

 

Introduction

Part I of this article had argued that shared political views and motivations do not shape soldiers’ actions in battlefield. Instead, their actions are defined by more immediate things such as the group survival, deprivation, fatigue and fear for life and limb. In addition, it argued that the combat effectiveness of a squad, section, platoon or a company is derived from its cohesiveness and training, which does not depend upon any cultural or linguistic basis. Part II of the article will highlight that groups are formed through rituals, and that the ritual of training and leadership works best for a military group.

 

Group formation through Rituals

Ardant du Picq, a nineteenth century French army officer wrote that

‘From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment and above all unity’.[1]

One of the most effective ways to form cohesive groups is through ‘Rituals’. Tarak Barkawi rightly states that living and acting like a group, in daily and periodic rituals, creates group feeling. Groups do not require an outside social basis or an essentialised identity like nation, religion or caste to account for their solidarity or common behaviour. Rituals exercise their power when a group simply participates in them. Tarak also mentions the Australian concept of Mana – a ‘vague power’ or ‘force’ that seems to flow through and among participants in ritual, conjoining group members, their totems and their god, and inspiring sentiments of unity, cooperation and sacrifice. Fed by daily and periodic ritual activities performed under common symbols and identities, formal and informal, mana is what military professionals call esprit de corps. Thus, rituals are a ‘strategic form of socialisation’. In military terms it boils down to nothing else but ‘effective training’.

Training, which occupies a great deal of time in military calendars, achieves a dual purpose of both ritualised solidarity-building as well as disciplinary instruction in taking the correct actions in combat.[2] Training may be more technically grounded, focusing on the geography and climate of the area of operation. Training can also be superimposed with the principles and ideals, such as ‘fighting for the common good of the population’ and ‘the victory of good over evil’ and are common to everyone irrespective of their religion or social background. Soldiers easily identify with these principles and ideals as they were a part of their upbringing and may have been a reason why they chose to join the army.

 

Leadership

Besides training, another crucial factor that kneads any military sub-unit together, irrespective of its social composition is effective leadership. Officers, and in particular, commanders, play a crucial role as personified symbols of collective groups. Commanders, such as Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Napoleon Bonaparte, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw and many others, can also symbolise the identity and spirit of military formations.[3] War time historiography is full of military leaders who, through trust, character, courage and competence, have brought out the highest virtues of all who followed them. Since early years of warfare, irrespective of the nature of armaments in use, tactics and strategy, organisational structure, training and discipline, the political construction of states and the social makeup of the armies, the characteristics of leadership have not changed. Group solidarity rituals are just as important as creating strong leaders whom soldiers can follow.

 

Conclusion: War and Political Rationality

The primary group theory (as explained in Part I of this  article) and the national narratives of sacrifice, the two sources of fighting spirit of a soldier, are often connected through a historical framework. The martial antagonism towards an adversary is invoked through the way national histories of war and armies are written. Unfortunately, the inquiry, whether the adversary is real or perceived, is left to current political narratives, also often used to justify the rationality of the government’s actions. This is where the magical language of national sacrifice becomes necessary and the belief in such narratives important, simply because the population finds it appealing. Whether this is correct approach or not, remains debatable and varies from one region to another and from one society to another.

Nevertheless, it is always better to generate battlefield effectiveness from strong primary groups created from rituals of training and leadership rather than from any other source. Once trained, a soldier is motivated enough to do his job as long his/her primary group is strong and intact and there is a strong leader to follow. The battlefield generated sources are good enough to shape a soldier’s combat behaviour. A soldier’s personal idea of nationalism and politics alone may not work, as each man all by himself may just contribute as much as a cog in the wheel. It is however, the coordinated action of each cog that makes the wheel turn. Same is true for any formation. This coordination is only possible with an institutionalised training program. An effective training program focusses on tactics and operations rather than on ideologies or political narratives. Tarak Barkawi sums it up appropriately by saying that

To represent soldiers and their actions in the service of one or another nationalist cause is to reduce war to a political rationality. The problem is that war, and the fate of people caught up in it, exceeds politics.[4]

 

Raised in an army household, Sonia Bhatia is a Post Graduate Diploma holder in Public Relations and Human Resource Management from the University of Madras. She graduated in BA, Health and Nutrition from Delhi University. She has been brought up in a traditional Army family which has seen generations of men and women serving in the Army and the Air Force. Her experiences and interests have been close to the social structure of the Army Regimental life. She also has five years of work experience in Human Resource Management in the corporate sector, which enriched her with the contrast of the social structure that exists outside the army.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. He is currently researching on India’s defence diplomacy in the 21st century. His other research interests include South Asian security and military culture. Kamaldeep is an alumni of National Defence Academy, Pune as well as Army War College, Mhow. He has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. Thereafter he graduated in MA, ‘War in the Modern World’ from the department of War Studies at King’s College London in 2014. You can find him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78

 

Notes

[1] Barkawi, Tarak, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p.166 and (Du Picq, Battle Studies, p. 96)

[2] (Barkawi, 2017), p.179

[3] (Barkawi, 2017), p.181

[4] (Barkawi, 2017), p. 119

 

Image Source: 

https://pixabay.com/en/military-paratroopers-airborne-582356/