EU

Schengen and free circulation at the crossroads: lessons for the East African Community?

October 6, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille:

Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)

In many parts of the world, geopolitics is confronted with two contending trends. On the one hand, numerous countries are engaged in a process of regional economic integration, epitomised by the more advanced model of the European Union (EU), which requires ‘internal’ borders between participating states to become more fluid to facilitate the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, borders are regaining momentum. Inherited from colonisation, the post-war or post-cold war status quo, the validity of these borders is now a moot point. From Ukraine to Iraq, Syria, Mali, South Sudan or Nigeria, old borders are questioned, new demarcation lines appear. In Europe, the large influx of refugees has led to very different approaches across EU member states, with some overtly questioning the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Events currently taking place in Europe are of great significance to the East African Community (EAC) and Africa as a whole. Indeed, the EU is not only an important trade and development partner that can potentially provide an alternative to China, it is also a prosperous example of regional economic integration that can serve as an advanced model to African countries involved in a similar regional process. The five EAC member states, in particular, are currently on a path towards regional integration that bears striking resemblance with the process undergone by the EU.

In 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed the EAC Treaty to enhance trade cooperation and political relations. In 2005 a Customs Union was launched, followed in 2010 by a common market with zero internal tariffs. Talks about setting up an East African Currency Union with an EAC-wide Shilling started in 2011. Furthermore, the EAC has its own Legislative Assembly and Court of Justice. Plans to create an East African Tourist Passport are on the way. Establishing a sustainable economic and political bloc in the form of an East African Federation is also high on the EAC agenda. What’s more, in October 2014, the EAC and the EU signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that supports the EAC’s ambitious integration project and gives EAC member states extensive access to the EU Single Market.

Among these many parallels between the European and East African contexts, it is also important to note that the EAC is considering measures to establish free circulation between its five members, at a time when it is facing the challenge of a growing influx of refugees, mainly from Somalia. Before thinking of the feasibility of setting up an East African ‘Schengen’, it is therefore worth looking into the European model of free circulation: its strengths, weaknesses and limitations.

Abolishing borders has been one of the utmost achievements of the European project, and free movement is one of the dynamics of European prosperity. The dismantling of internal borders among Schengen participating countries was backed up by a strengthening of external borders. Article 25 of the agreement allows national authorities to re-establish border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for a period of time limited to ten days, which can be prolonged to two months. The current reintroduction of controls on several internal borders of the EU is therefore not the beginning of the end of the Schengen agreement, but rather a procedure faithful to the letter of the agreement.

It follows that Germany’s reintroduction of border controls in the aftermath of chaotic scenes at train stations and reports of bed shortages at refugee camps is more an attempt to process refugees in a more orderly fashion and better identify those deserving of help than an attack on European principles. This came after Germany reasserted important European values and Europe’s international commitments to host refugees, particularly those coming from war zones.

Despite this, tensions between member states, overwhelmed by the scale of refugees in search of a safe haven, have put Schengen‘s principle of free movement under strain. This has revealed a lack of solidarity towards member states more exposed geographically to the refugee crisis, as well as showing the generosity on the part of Germany, Sweden and a few others. Crucially, the tensions have also revealed very different attitudes from the East and the West towards traditional European values.

The reason why Schengen is questioned today is not Schengen per se, but rather the weakness – or lack – of policies that should have been adopted or consolidated to accompany Schengen and make it work better. Does Europe have a coherent EU asylum policy? No. Does Europe have a European police? No. Is the EU agency Frontex sufficient to guarantee European border management? Clearly not, in view of the human tragedies in the Mediterranean and of the Hungarian reaction to the influx of refugees, to cite only two examples.

By the end of the year the EU Commission will at last propose measures to set up a European corps of border guards to consolidate Frontex, which coordinates cooperation between national border guards on external borders to prevent illegal immigration, terrorist infiltration and human trafficking. But does Europe have a real foreign security and defence policy capable of stabilizing its close neighbourhood? No. Its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy is a shambles.

Europeans assumed that they would be able to enjoy a common area of freedom, in which people, goods, and labour would circulate freely, whilst keeping most features of their national systems. Today, Schengen is the victim of member states’ lack of a coherent vision. The so-called four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour) can only work efficiently with a set of rules and policies at the supranational level. Inward-looking attitudes will not solve the challenges Europe faces in view of the extent of Africa’s migration potential. In areas where European integration is more advanced, where Europeans share the currency, the market, the freedom to trade, work and travel across this market, full sovereignty belongs in the past. Without sharing more sovereignty, all these envied attributes are threatened by crises such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis, none of which, surprisingly, Europeans anticipated.

As is often the case in Europe when populists spot imperfections in the way that a new European framework has been designed, Schengen has been presented as a threat to internal security. And yet, to make up for the abolition of internal controls, member states are expected to cooperate in order to maintain a high level of security. First, by exchanging information to fight borderless organised crime and terrorism. Second, by intensifying policy cooperation. Finally, by using the Schengen Information System (SI).

Schengen is by no means a ‘wide open door’ to illegal migrants. Indeed, the Dublin agreements require the country of arrival to register migrants, take fingerprints, and consider their asylum application. But in the wake of vast flows of refugees, this rule has reached its limits. Nonetheless, it is not in the Europeans’ interest to dismantle the Schengen area and the freedom that it provides to EU citizens. Rather, this joint public area has to be managed by joint public action.

What lessons can be drawn by the EAC in the light of European developments? First, that free circulation leads to more wealth and not the opposite. All economists agree on these great advantages, which is in itself exceptional. Second, that an agreement on free circulation implies not only benefits, albeit significant ones, but also constraints in terms of sharing sovereignty in areas hitherto regarded as national prerogatives. Third, that any weakness in the design of the free circulation agreement will, one day, be subject to a random shock that tests its resilience. This happened with the Eurozone. This is now the case with Schengen.

Schengen is currently being challenged, though primarily by populist misrepresentations. It continues to work. But it faces some reluctance among certain member states and is not sufficiently backed up by effective policies. Its long-term survival will depend on EU member states’ ability to consolidate its design and back it up with more integrated policies in the fields of asylum, police and border management, foreign security and defence, particularly with regard to stabilizing the EU’s neighbourhood.

More generally, any step towards integration, whichever area is concerned, requires sharing sovereignty. This will be a substantial challenge. EAC member states would clearly benefit from a system like Schengen, it would potentially bring the shared reward of increased prosperity for each member state and for the region as a whole. But such a system must be accompanied by effective policies, joint public action, and greater integration in terms of shared sovereignty. Otherwise it may end up finding itself in a similar crisis to that faced by the EU today.

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

The incommensurable loss of the little drowned boy, Aylan Kurdi

September 10, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Ana Flamind

Photo: “I hope humanity finds a cure for visas.” Published with the permission of the author

This article seeks to explore the particular affectivity provoked by the publication on 3 September 2015, of the picture of a little drowned boy in Bodrum, Turkey.

Why does the image of this little boy seem to provoke a stronger affectivity, one of shame most particularly, prompting us to scream “that’s it, this is really too much!” when other recent pictures seem to have triggered a remediable guilt (for example recent pictures juxtaposing tourists and refugees on the beaches of Turkey, Greece, etc.)? This stronger affectivity could very well be the result of a cumulative effect, of our hearts growing more pained with each and every story we read and picture we see, of the incremental realisation of what tragic fate awaits refugees, of reading headlines calling the recent displacement of people “the worst refugee crisis since World War II.’’ But it could also be that this specific picture does something, undoes us, as Judith Butler would put it, in a specific way.

Butler’s essay “Precarious life”, in the book of the same title, explores the Levinasian ethic of the face to interrogate the link between representation and humanisation.[1] Butler cautions us that the link is not as straightforward as one might think. A picture seeking to humanise should vocalise grief or agony, a sense of the precariousness of life.[2] Yet giving a face to some tragic event does not necessarily require the seeing of a face, which at times comes to symbolise dehumanisation, such as the picture of Osama bin Laden, Butler reminds us. The face that humanises “will be that for which no words really work; the face (that) seems to be a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense.”[3] This face “is not explicitly a human face” and can be any bodily parts that “are said to cry, to sob and to scream.”[4] The little drowned boy lies face down in the sand, his back prompting us to respond, yet already prefiguring a response lacking the possibility of uttering sense, a response akin to the sound of grief. Butler writes:

“To respond to the face, to understanding its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself. This cannot be an awakeness, to use his words (Levinas), to my own life, and then an extrapolation from an understanding of my own precariousness to an understanding of another’s precarious life. It has to be an understanding of the precariousness of the Other.”[5]

Furthermore, for Levinas, the injunction of the face, testifying to the Other’s vulnerability, provokes in us a struggle between “the temptation to kill and the call to peace, the You shall not kill.”[6] For Butler, this struggle is foundational of ethics:

“If the Other, the Other’s face, which after all carries the meaning of this precariousness, at once tempts me with murder and prohibits me from acting upon it, then the face operates to produce a struggle for me, and establishes this struggle at the heart of ethics. (…) The face makes various utterances at once: it bespeaks an agony, an injurability, at the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition against killing.”[7]

Paradoxically, the picture hurts us by keeping grief outside of the frame. Unlike other pictures depicting the absurd barbarity of children losing their lives in and to horrible conditions, with parents seen holding dead and/or wounded bodies, their faces contorted by pain, hopelessness and anger the little drowned boy is seen in his utter vulnerability, as the unaccompanied body of a three-years old who has no one left to protect him or grieve his disappearance. We do not expect little boys and girls to be left alone, unprotected. We cannot accept little boys and girls to be dead alone, either. This picture thus speaks of what is left outside of the frame, of the innumerable and unfathomable decisions parents face when they put their children’s fate into the hands of smugglers and board a flimsy boat with dim hopes of survival. The picture also speaks of the parents’ probable death, the death of those who could most feel the incommensurable loss of three-years old Aylan Kurdi.[8] For if we want to mourn his death, and the death of all refugees seeking to reach our European shores, we need to hear those who have known them and loved them, attempt to speak of their bereavement, of their incommensurable loss. The picture of three-years old Aylan Kurdi, of the man standing next to him, and, in equal measure, of the photographer who has witnessed the bareness of the little boy’s body, commands us to question why his parents cannot be there to mourn him; it compels us to apprehend the precariousness of life itself.

This, for me, speaks of a different kind of pain sweeping away the foundations of our being: That in acknowledging the vulnerability of Aylan’s dead body, we are forced to face our shared precariousness, our interdependence, if we are to ‘overcome’ the vulnerability that always already puts our fate into the hands of others. The picture of 3-year old Aylan Kurdi, the little drowned boy, establishes the ground of our ethical struggle in plain sight: that of a choice between the fear for our own survival or the disavowal of more suffering. It is now our duty to testify of the incommensurability of Aylan’s life and to the bereavement left by his death. This pain must be seen.

Ana Flamind just completed reading for a MA in International Conflict Studies at King’s College London. Her main interest lies in critical IR and security scholarship.

[1] Butler, Judith; “Precarious life” in Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence (London: Verso, 2004), p 128 – 151.

[2] Rephrased from ibid, p. 141

[3] Ibid p. 135

[4] Ibid p. 133

[5] Ibid p. 134

[6] Emmanuel Levinas as cited by Butler, ibid p. 134

[7] Ibid p.135

[8] The little boy’s father did survive but his older brother and mother did not. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drowned-syrian-toddler-sparking-global-outrage-named-aylan-kurdi-1671698816

Remembering the Vienna Congress: lessons for the EU

June 25, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Lucile Dussoubs:

Le gateau des rois, / tiré au Congrès de Vienne en 1815. Depicts the leaders of Europe squabbling over the map of Europe at the Vienna Congress. Photo: British Museum (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

This month marks 200 years since the end of the Vienna Congress. This bicentennial should give the European Union (EU) the opportunity to dive back into the study of what has long been regarded as a golden age for European diplomacy. It could also help the EU draw out useful conclusions about its current efforts in foreign policy.

The Vienna Congress, which took place from September 1814 to June 1815, had as its aim the settlement of the borders of Europe to establish a stabilised order in a continent deeply shocked by the Napoleonic wars. This question was solved thanks to personal – sometimes friendly – relationships between the famous old aristocratic diplomats Metternich, Talleyrand and Castlereagh. The ‘personal factor’ had a major impact during the conference. It helped Talleyrand to not only impose France’s wishes at the negotiating table, but to preserve her status as a great European power. This he achieved despite both Napoleon’s surrender and the crisis caused by the Hundred Days, which saw Napoleon return from exile on Elba in March, right in the midst of the conference, and raise an army.

Organisers of international conferences no longer appreciate the importance of interpersonal relationships and the personality of each negotiator when planning a meeting. The European Union High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have always been openly nominated based on their knowledge of international relations, but also thanks to their discretion, lack of charisma and their not-too-openly affirmed opinions. Of course, it is a major struggle to find an individual able to embody the specificities of each member state. But that should not come at the expense of ambitious choices.

Another major lesson of the Congress of Vienna is that the demonisation of a traditional partner is not a useful tool to achieve diplomatic goals. Post-Napoleonic France was a major threat for the stability of all states present. But none of those states were tempted to humiliate France. This strategic choice was in opposition to their respective publics. Nevertheless, it allowed the European countries to synchronise their actions when the next major crisis emerged with Napoleon leaving the Island of Elba.

In the case of today’s EU strategy towards one of its major threats, Russia, the lessons of Vienna seem to have been forgotten. Countering Russia’s propaganda around its invasion of Crimea and its presence in the battlefield with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine required the EU to develop and reinforce a counter-narrative. The EU engaged rapidly in an information war that it has won, at least on its own territory. But the European leaders have not realised the risks of a rising wave of anti-Russia sentiment. For historic, geographic and cultural reasons, Russia still is and will remain an unavoidable partner and a strategic neighbour. Further demonisation will only lead to more incomprehension and resentment. If hostility towards Russia is latent in many European countries – especially in the Baltic states – it has definitely been increased by politicized top-down discourses for which the EU is largely responsible.

What’s more, the Congress of Vienna is one of the most exuberant demonstrations of European ‘total’ diplomacy. Total diplomacy is defined by a context in which foreign policy efforts are constant and supported by any means possible from state-to-state negotiations to the arts. In Vienna, the conference was a success in large part due to parallel activities aimed at facilitating the talks. One of the main examples of this ‘total’ diplomacy was the organisation of what would now be considered outrageously extravagant meals, concerts, and entertainment. But far from being anachronistic, this recreational approach to diplomacy was of the utmost modernity.

The European Union should not be afraid to engage more in ‘total’ diplomacy. While this may be difficult at a time when the EU is trying to reduce its expenses, and the EU has no interest in organising meetings that would be mere copies of G7 conferences, there is definitely a middle ground between its current – very traditional – approach to diplomacy ‘on the phone’ or ‘around a table’, and this more ambitious approach.

The EU should also be more willing to use its ‘smart power’ more openly. The Union has unique know-how on how to balance hard and soft power, military effectiveness and the world’s strongest policy for cooperation and partnership: it should not be ashamed of using its historic background to gain influence.

Another major diplomatic innovation of the Congress of Vienna was the establishment of the ‘Concert of Nations’ among the European states. The coordination and reinforcement of the relations between the major countries of the continent was not strong enough to avoid the First World War but can still be considered as a lasting first attempt to normalise the constant exchanges among traditional partners. The ‘Concert of Nations’ preserved the stability of the region and helped to coordinate the agendas of all the actors. Of course, this stability came at the expense of a continued validation for imperialist regimes.

It is interesting to consider that contemporary European international relations principles are based on the legacy of the Congress of Vienna. The EU has taken pride in pushing for better relations with all partners and sharing the same values, such as the respect for democracy and civil rights. It is also trying to help all countries wishing to strengthen these values, and to push them when these values are too little or non-existent through programs of development, human rights education efforts or grants for political reforms. At the same time, and even if all EU citizens should take pride and continue to stand up for these values, the legacy of the Concert of Nations is that of successful ‘global’ diplomacy, including emerging countries that are often less keen on moral guidance in international relations.

Finally, the Congress of Vienna is a clear demonstration of the State being the major diplomatic actor. The negotiating table was filled with representatives of well-established governments who were credited with the intentions of the heads of their respective states, often kings. The institution of the State was not suffering from the competition of other actors such as journalists, who were not present in the room, or by civilians interests.

Two centuries later, the emergence of new actors in the international arena represents the major change regarding diplomacy in its power and means. Various groups have been challenging the traditional representation of diplomacy as being reserved for the State. The Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, the Ukrainian separatists or terrorist groups all pretend to deserve the right to be as legitimate as the State to act on the international sphere, and to represent a sufficiently important part of the population to be regarded as unavoidable interlocutors. The declarations by the European Union that it is not considering talks with non-established groups like those risk weakening the institution’s reputation for transparency, but also comes with moral dilemmas.

A new paradigm is thus needed to make sense of all the European efforts in foreign policy. Both ‘post-Westphalian diplomacy’ (to emphasise the recognition of the state as the main actor of diplomacy) and ‘post-Vienna diplomacy’ (to highlight the emergence of the ‘European Concert’) are not satisfactory benchmarks anymore. The emergence of new players – almost always competing with the European bloc – requires the affirmation of a new reflective space and institutional mechanisms. After all, two hundred years have passed.

Lucile Dussoubs is currently completing her MA in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

After Ukraine, Part II – Russian great power vs. EU normative hegemony: What is at stake in Eastern Europe?

May 6, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Conradin Weindl:

Demonstrators at a Euromaidan pro-EU rally in Kiev, Ukraine, 26 November 2013. Photo: Ivan Bandura (CC 2.0)

Since the start of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s determination to maintain a sphere of influence within the former Soviet Union has been the subject of an intense debate. Russia’s need for regional predominance is frequently attributed to the country’s great power identity. However, Russian domination of its ‘near abroad’ is not primarily an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to regain Russia’s position as a European great power. The battle over conflicting norms and values is central in this context.

Russia’s status as a great power stands at the heart of its identity and mandates an equal and independent role among the other major powers in Europe.[i] Such a role can only be pursued if accepted by Russia’s peers on the continent.[ii] Yet there are no longer any great powers in the traditional sense in Europe. In fact, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have to an important degree joined forces with the vast majority of European states within the structures of the European Union.

The EU has elevated liberal norms and values such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights to form the very core of its identity as a normative power.[iii] Even if it lacks the will and capacity to offer membership to all European states, the EU’s identity is pan-European in nature. Consequently, the EU is pursuing “normative hegemony in Europe”[iv]. It follows that all relationships between the EU and other European states, regardless of their size, are by definition asymmetrical.[v]

Thus, Russia has two options with regard to Europe. First, it can adopt the established norms through a process of integration. This was the intention of both Russia and the EU after the break-up of the Soviet Union, formalised in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement based on ‘common values’ concluded in 1994.[vi] Yet full EU membership and hence a real say for Russia on European matters was never seriously considered.[vii]

Second, Russia can refrain from playing a role in Europe. After Russia had abandoned the path towards normative convergence, and the gap in values became increasingly difficult to ignore, the EU offered Russia the title as one of its strategic partners alongside other major powers such as the US, China, Japan and India. Although this did some justice to Russia’s need to be officially recognised as a great power, it made it into less of a player within Europe itself.[viii]

Ultimately, both alternatives are irreconcilable with Russia’s self-perception as a European great power. The result has been a deadlock in Russia-EU relations for two decades, despite sincere efforts on both sides for engagement.

Since the return of Putin to the presidency in 2012, Russia has sought to resolve the impasse by breaking the EU’s monopoly on defining the ‘rules of the game’ in Europe, by challenging the Union’s hegemonic normative power. One tool has been to reinterpret many established norms, such as sovereignty, democracy and self-determination, in a fashion that is in line with the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy objectives.[ix] The Russian leadership’s decision to raise the stakes in the Western new independent states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the three Caucasus states) is closely related. These are the only states in Europe – apart from Russia itself – where the EU’s claim to normative predominance has not yet been fully realised.

Russia’s instrument of choice was to gather these states under the umbrella of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and thus prevent their path towards integration with the EU within the Eastern Partnership framework. Russia hopes that its alternative normative agenda might be more appealing to some of the states concerned, at least the ones where autocrats are eager to secure their positions.[x]

However, establishing an alternative regional grouping is not primarily an end in itself and the EEU is not a tool for the separate economic integration of its members. Indeed, the economic case for the EEU is rather weak.[xi] Instead, as Putin himself argued in an opinion article in 2011, the EEU will give Russia and other EEU member states better bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, and an ability to formulate new European norms between equals.[xii] The bet is that additional geopolitical weight on the European continent will strengthen the case for Russia’s desired equal and independent role in Europe. Once the EU’s normative hegemony is broken, Russia can make a legitimate “claim [to] an equal role in collective leadership and decision making”[xiii].

How will the EU respond to this challenge? Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the EU chose to largely ignore the EEU. Subsequent events have since forced the EU to acknowledge the challenge to its normative hegemony. The EU has responded in the familiar manner of strategic ambiguity.

Russia’s disrespect for national sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders has prompted the EU to impose political and economic sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, the EU has reaffirmed the right of Russia’s Western neighbours to choose the path of European integration by signing the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time the EU has been eager to keep Russia engaged by suddenly welcoming a future pan-European trade agreement between the EU and the EEU.

The EU will have to perform a delicate balancing act if it does not want to jeopardize its normative credibility and ultimately the entire normative foundations of the European governance mode in the process. The review of the Eastern Partnership and the European Security Strategy in the coming months should provide an indication of where we are heading.

Conradin Weindl is an MA student in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. His main focus is on EU and Russian foreign policy.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature two more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Then, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK.

NOTES

[i] Dimitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence’, The Washington Quarterly, 32:4 (2009), p. 4

[ii] Iver Neumann, ‘Russia as a great power, 1815-2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11 (2008), pp. 128-151

Hiski Haukkala, ‘A Norm Maker or a Norm taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia’s place in Europe’ in Russia’s European Choice, edited by Ted Topf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)

[iii] Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:2 (2002), pp. 235-258

[iv] Hiski Haukkala, ‘From cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23:1 (2015), p. 36

[v] Hiski Haukkala, ‘Explaining Russian Reactions to the European Neighbourhood Policy’ in The European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective context, implementation and impact, edited by Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.162

[vi] Haukkala 2015, pp. 25-28

[vii] Arkady Moshes, ‘Russia’s European Policy under Medvedev: How sustainable is a new Compromise?’, International Affairs, 88:1 (2012), p. 25.

[viii] Haukkala 2010, p. 166

[ix] Ruth Deyermond, The uses of sovereignty in 21st century Russian foreign policy, Europe-Asia Studies (2015) [forthcoming]

[x] Hiski Haukkala, ‘The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy’, The International Spectator, 43:2 (2008), pp. 40-42

[xi] Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, stagnation or Rivalry?’, Chatham House Briefing Paper (REP BP 2012/01), (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012)

[xii] Vladimir Putin, quoted in Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012, p. 15

[xiii] Derek Averre, ‘”Sovereign Democracy” and Russia’s Relations with the European Union’, Demokratizatsiya 15:2 (2007), p.183

Interview – Dr Carol Bohmer on the Mediterranean migrant crisis

April 21, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook:

An inflatable hard bottom craft carrying some 87 would be immigrant maily from Somalia is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa on June 15, 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0) — An inflatable hard-bottom craft carrying some 87 migrants is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa in June 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)

On Monday, yet another tragic story broke of a ship sinking off the coast of Libya en route to Europe. This time, however, there were a potential 900 fatalities – if confirmed this would represent the highest number in any single case yet. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) fears that 30,000 sea crossings of this sort could occur in 2015 – likely rife with continuing tragedies. EU Foreign Ministers are currently in Luxembourg discussing the issue and what response may be required to both manage criminal elements of this related to human smuggling, and preventing the increasing number of tragedies.

Strife talked to Dr. Carol Bohmer, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, about those trying to reach Europe and how to address the current crisis.

***

There seems to be a significant increase in the number of refugees trying to reach Europe from North Africa. Has there simply been more media coverage of this, or are the rates of these incidents significantly increasing?

The number of refugees drowning en route to Europe has increased exponentially over the last couple of years. So far this year, it is estimated that at least 1600 migrants have died, a 30-fold increase over the same period last year. There have been several incidents in the last couple of weeks, the latest one involving an estimated 800 or more deaths. Because of the magnitude of this tragedy, the media coverage has been intense.

Part of the media coverage has to do with the political implications of these disasters. Last October, Mare Nostrum, a programme of search and rescue, credited with saving 100,000 lives last year, was stopped. Several governments, including the British government, decided to end the operation because they believed that it encouraged migrants to flee to Europe. Not providing rescue was supposed to deter these desperate migrants from attempting the journey. These latest events have put the lie to the effectiveness of this deterrence argument.

Where do these refugees come from? What are the demographics?

The refugees come from places where there is war, civil strife and persecution. Not surprisingly, many come from Syria, Eritrea, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Others come from countries in the throes of unrest or economic stagnation. It is difficult to get exact numbers when the authorities do not even know how many have drowned, let alone where they came from. There is evidence that most of them are young with a number of children under 18, some as young as 10 or 12. It is unclear how many women are involved. There is also some evidence that as many as one million Syrians and Sub-Saharan Africans are waiting in Libya to cross into Europe.

What is likely to happen to these refugees if they reach Europe?

It should first be said that while many of the migrants are fleeing persecution, some of them are economic migrants looking for a better life. Even those fleeing the war and chaos of the Middle East do not all fit into the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which, with the follow up 1967 Protocol, provides the definition of refugee in the law.

It is very difficult to follow the path of those migrants and asylum seekers who make it to Europe. Many of them spend long periods of time in reception centres, waiting to be processed as refugees. Return to their countries of origin is extremely difficult, for both practical reasons and because of the international legal principle of “non-refoulement,” which forbids the return of someone to their country of origin if they have reason to fear persecution. Those who are granted asylum (and even those who aren’t) can move away from reception centres, to other parts of Italy or other parts of Europe, and no doubt some of them do, though statistics on this are hard to come by. Formal resettlement programmes appear to be rather limited, especially given Italy’s current financial difficulties.

What are some of the broader political implications (positive or negative) for increasing numbers of refugees travelling to Europe?

The increasing numbers of migrants travelling to Europe are grist for the mill for the far right political parties in many EU counties. The potential power of those parties affects the way those currently in power deal with the issue, focusing on punitive measures rather than more measured efforts as solutions. They are therefore more likely to respond, as Philip Hammond did this week, by supporting efforts to catch traffickers, rather than restart Mare Nostrum to prevent the migrants from drowning at sea.

It is possible that these tragedies will spur the EU to promulgate unified policies to deal with the crisis, and also to provide funding to do so. The Italian government, as well as others who receive migrants from the Mediterranean, argue that they are being forced to accept an unfair share of the burden with insufficient financial support from the rest of the EU.

Migration has the benefit of providing young workers in the EU countries that have ageing populations; the disadvantage of this type of irregular, usually unskilled, migration is that it may not provide the type of workers needed. It also has the disadvantage of indicating a lack of control of borders by those in power.

For those departing from conflict areas is there any evidence that these could be former combatants, or what security risks could be posed?

I don’t know of any evidence that some migrants are former combatants, but there is no reason to suppose they are not. The security risks are well known, and involve possible terrorist acts, though it is hard to imagine terrorists resorting to leaky boats as a means of transport to the EU so they can commit acts of terrorism once there.

In your opinion, how should the international community respond to these cases? What steps do you believe could be taken to avoid further tragedies?

The international community should restart Mare Nostrum. It is painfully clear that this deterrence does not work, given that the number of people risking crossing the Mediterranean have increased so markedly since Mare Nostrum was abandoned. It is inhumane not to try to save the lives of those who cross to Europe in a futile attempt to reduce the numbers. The reason that people are coming in increased numbers has to do with the situation in the places they are fleeing. Until the various crises are resolved we can expect migrant numbers to remain high. International efforts to this end could have some effect on the number of refugees who flee.

Given that not all the migrants are refugees but rather those seeking a better life than the barren and economically disastrous one in their places of origin, efforts to improve the economic outlook in those countries would also reduce the incentive for migrants to try to reach Europe.

Going after the traffickers would have some effect, but would not stop the transit of desperate people such as have been risking their lives recently. The desperation is too great and the rewards for the traffickers who are not caught are too high to deter them.

Dr. Carol Bohmer is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, and is a Visiting Associate Professor at Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, USA. She is also the author of numerous books and publications including “The Politics of Invisibility and the Stigmatized Vernacular: The Case of Political Asylum Seekers” with Amy Shuman (forthcoming), and “Rejecting Refugees: Asylum in the US and the UK in the 21st Century”, with Amy Shuman” (2007).

Interview conducted by Joana Cook, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief.

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