• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
You are here: Home / Archives for EU

EU

Intervista con Benedetto Della Vedova, Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri del Governo italiano – Il difficile cammino dell’Europa

February 28, 2018 by Strife Staff

Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief discusses with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova è Sottosegretario di Stato agli Affari Esteri e alla Cooperazione Internazionale dal 28 febbraio 2014, nei governi di Matteo Renzi e Paolo Gentiloni; è Senatore della Repubblica dal 2013. È attualmente candidato per la lista pro-europeista “+Europa”, assieme all’ex-ministro agli Esteri Emma Bonino, per il collegio uninominale di Prato. Andrea Varsori, Editor-in-chief di Strife, gli ha parlato al King’s College, dove della Vedova ha partecipato al dibattito “The Road towards the United States of Europe”, organizzato dalla King’s Italian Society. Nell’intervista, si è discusso delle future prospettive dell’Unione Europea, delle sue divisioni interne, e della posizione italiana riguardo a Brexit.

 

AV: Col 2017, ci siamo lasciati alle spalle quattro grandi elezioni nazionali: Paesi Bassi, Francia, Germania, Austria. Lei pensa che l’UE ne sia uscita più forte?

BDV: Sicuramente sì. È uscita più forte soprattutto dalle elezioni francesi. Vorrei sottolineare, però, che si tratta di vittoria in una battaglia, magari quella principale, ma non nella guerra. E questa guerra consiste in uno scontro politico sostanziale: quello tra i fautori dell’apertura e i fautori di varie modalità di chiusura. A questo proposito, le elezioni austriache ci hanno dimostrato che lo scontro non è finito. Poteva sembrare, all’inizio, che la vittoria di Van der Bellen lasciasse ben sperare per un esito a favore dell’Europa. Alle ultime elezioni politiche, però, l’ÖVP di Sebastian Kurz ha vinto e ha formato un governo che ha come azionista di primaria importanza i nazionalisti dell’FPÖ. La partita, dunque, non è chiusa.

AV: In questo contesto, allora, da cosa può passare un eventuale rilancio dell’integrazione europea? Forse da una decisiva riforma di un settore dell’Unione?

BDV: In realtà credo che a contare di più siano le elezioni. Con tutti i difetti che possono avere. Dobbiamo tenere conto di come si vota in Polonia, in Austria, in Francia, dove l’esito è stato decisivo, e ovviamente in Italia, dove c’è da avere preoccupazione. Soprattutto, dobbiamo accettare il fatto che l’Unione Europea sia oggetto delle campagne elettorali nazionali. Da un lato, è oggetto di critiche da parte delle varie narrative nazionaliste. La necessità è quella di costruire una contro-narrativa efficace, soprattutto sul piano politico e simbolico.

AV: Lei vede degli esempi di questa contro-narrativa in questo momento in Europa?

BDV: Sicuramente la campagna elettorale di Macron è uno di questi. Soprattutto, il presidente francese ha continuato a dire le stesse cose anche dopo essere stato eletto, ad esempio nel discorso che ha fatto alla Sorbona. Macron ha vinto proprio perché ha affrontato direttamente il nazionalismo, sostenendo, contro la vulgata comune, la necessità di costruire una sovranità condivisa, l’unico tipo possibile di sovranità.

AV: Sicuramente una mossa controversa. Una parte consistente dei cittadini europei probabilmente vede l’espressione “sovranità condivisa” come un controsenso.

BDV: In questo, penso che la responsabilità decisiva nella diffusione di questa idea sia delle leadership politiche. Spesso, hanno deciso di cavalcare l’emotività, nella falsa convinzione che una tale mossa potesse pagare ben al di là del voto. Così spesso non è stato, ma le idee propagandate in campagna elettorale sono rimaste e hanno attecchito tra i votanti. Brexit ne è un esempio.

 

Benedetto Della Vedova has been Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: Parlando di Brexit, lei cosa pensa dello stato attuale dei negoziati tra Gran Bretagna e Unione Europea?

BDV: Trovo molto positivo l’atteggiamento tenuto dall’Unione Europea sinora. Per ora, a Bruxelles ci si è mossi senza prestare il fianco a troppe divisioni interne. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione le posizioni sono differenziate tra diversi Paesi. Nonostante questo, la posizione coesa dell’Unione nel negoziato è rispettata da tutti. Il punto della questione, in realtà, è il Regno Unito. È Londra che deve decidere che obiettivo vuole raggiungere. Su un continuum che va dal Canada alla Norvegia, il Regno Unito deve decidere dove posizionarsi.

AV: L’Italia ha un esito preferito dei negoziati in corso sulla Brexit?

BDV: Io le posso dire quale esito preferirei io. Personalmente, io vorrei che i negoziati sulla Brexit finissero in modo da lasciare spazio e modalità per un ripensamento. Questo ripensamento può avvenire con una modalità uguale e una decisione contraria a quella avvenuta nel giugno 2016. Sono convinto che una grande democrazia come quella britannica possa benissimo ritornare sui propri passi.

AV: In questo contesto, la posizione dell’Italia, soprattutto nella stampa domestica, è spesso descritta come simpatetica alle istanze britanniche nel negoziato. Lei è d’accordo con questa visione?

BDV: Questa impressione può essere adeguata per il presente governo. Il Primo Ministro Gentiloni è sicuramente molto friendly nei confronti di Londra – ed è giusto così. Personalmente, sono convinto che il rapporto tra Italia e Regno Unito debba essere una amicizia nella franchezza. La franchezza nei rapporti reciproci non deve impedire, ma anzi può aiutare la collaborazione tra i due Paesi. Il mio sogno, in realtà, è quello di impostare delle modalità per ottenere un esito diverso dall’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione. Detto questo, ha ragione chi dice che Brexit is Brexit: è una cosa seria, di portata storica, che è impossibile ignorare. Sicuramente, dopo il referendum non è possibile avere del business as usual. La questione fondamentale che va riaffermata in questo momento in Europa, nell’ambito dei negoziati su Brexit ma non solo, è che il mercato unico europeo, i suoi flussi e i suoi benefici non sopravvivrebbero alla fine dell’integrazione politica. Non è possibile immaginare un vero single market senza un complesso di istituzioni che lo governi: integrazione economica e politica si sostengono a vicenda. Per esse, vale la formula latina simul stabunt, simul cadent. Questo va ribadito, ovviamente, per combattere il nazionalismo, che è un nemico sia per l’integrazione politica, sia per quella economica, dato che spesso implica il protezionismo. Ma andrebbe ribadito anche ai Paesi dell’Est.

AV: A questo proposito, come affrontare le posizioni più scettiche di certi Paesi dell’Europa Centrale, come quelli del Gruppo di Visegrád (Polonia, Ungheria, Cechia, Slovacchia)?

BDV: Quello con i Paesi dell’Europa Centrale è uno scontro politico da affrontare in termini politici. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione tutti i Paesi sono in condizione di fare una scelta riguardo al tipo di politiche che essi preferiscono condurre internamente. Però il punto che va chiarito è che l’appartenenza al mercato unico implica una condivisione totale dei diritti, ma anche dei doveri e delle responsabilità che ne conseguono. Da questo punto di vista, è inammissibile che certi Paesi si siano rifiutati di partecipare alla condivisione dei migranti. Le nazioni dell’Europa Centrale ricevono, giustamente, fondi strutturali dall’Unione che le hanno aiutate e le stanno aiutando a raggiungere livelli di sviluppo economico comparabili a quelli dell’Europa Occidentale. Per i fondi strutturali, l’Italia è un contributore netto. Beneficiare di voci di bilancio europee quali le politiche di sviluppo strutturale, però, significa anche dover prender parte agli sforzi comuni dell’Unione, inclusa l’accoglienza di migranti. Le due cose si accompagnano: accettare una significa accettare anche l’altra.

 


This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The English version is available here


Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview

Filed Under: Interview Tagged With: Brexit, EU, feature, Italy, Strife Interview

Grand Coalition Deal: What to Expect from Germany’s next Government in Foreign and Security Policy

February 26, 2018 by Felix Manig

 

By Felix Manig

German soldier part of the UN-led MINUSMA mission in Mali (Credit image: Michael Kappeler/dpa)

Five months after the September 2017 elections, the ‘grand coalition’ deal between Angela Merkel’s centre-right CDU, her sister-party CSU and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) is set to end unprecedented political stalemate in Germany. While the deal hinges on a final approval by the 460,000 members of the SPD base in early March, observers are already examining the negotiation agreement for clues of what to expect from Germany’s next government. Given new geopolitical realities in Europe’s neighbourhood, uncertainty about transatlantic relations, and repeated calls for Berlin to take on a more proactive role in international affairs, what does the new proposal hold for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy? The coalition paper builds on Germany’s latest strategic military document, the so-called “White Paper” of 2016, and places a primary focus on developing an integrated approach to European foreign and security policy, increasing Germany’s commitment to multilateral alliances, and the modernization of its armed forces.

Interestingly, the current paper mandates a sense of urgency and reckoning rarely found among German lawmakers in shaping security and defence policy. (Note: A link to the full version of the coalition proposal will be provided at the end of this article.) Commitments to multilateral approaches to conflict resolution, including mechanisms at the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and along the European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are recurrent German priorities which appeared in previous coalition deals. However, parties involved in the coalition discussions now describe today’s world as “less secure and less predictable”. The paper identifies geopolitical tensions, climate change, intractable civil conflicts, as well as a new form of aggressive nationalism within and outside of Europe as key threats to international peace, security, and democracy.

 

European Foreign and Security Policy 

Decision-makers in the potential coalition are promoting the clear message that Europe needs a new narrative and must take on more responsibility to ensure its own security. The proposal identifies the need for EU states to adopt an integrated approach in foreign affairs and security issues, and to strengthen existing CSDP mechanisms. The parties’ commitment to the European Defence Union, which would see joint procurement among member states and the establishment of multinational forces within the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) framework, would be an important first step in this direction. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the paper is the call for an “Army of Europeans”, an idea EU members had previously discarded due to the reluctance to cede sovereignty on defence policy.

The potential new government also plans to strengthen German capacities for strategic analysis and communication, both on the military and civilian front. This includes increased funding for the Federal Academy for Security Policy, an education and training institution under guidance of the Ministry of Defence, as well as key German security and foreign policy think tanks such as the German Council on Foreign Relations or the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Furthermore, the coalition suggests the creation of a “European Council on Global Responsibilities”, an independent institution tasked, somewhat vaguely, to promote a European signature on questions of international order.  Equally, there is room for interpretation from what is not mentioned in the paper. While Russian meddling in the US general election continues to make headlines across the Atlantic, the coalition partners appear, at least publicly, less concerned about disinformation campaigns within Germany and its periphery. This omission is likely part of Germany’s strategy to keep wires open to Moscow in order to reach an agreement on Ukraine.

 

International and European Alliances and Partnerships 

Germany continues to view multilateral initiatives and alliances as the best tools for maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, the country is set to expand its role in these forums, harnessing the German government’s forecasts for increasing federal budgetary margins for 2018-2021. These revenues are earmarked to increase defence spending and funding for conflict prevention tools, humanitarian and development aid but also cultural and educational programs abroad. Yet, while the 2016 “White Paper” pledged to reach the NATO target for defence spending of 2% of GDP, this commitment is missing in the new coalition proposal.

As part of NATO’s strategic upgrade in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Germany is also expected to host a new alliance headquarters for troop and equipment transports near the former capital of Bonn. At the UN, Germany is applying for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council for 2019/2020 and advocates for structural reform of the UN organ, which it hopes would pave the way for a permanent seat for the EU. The authors of the coalition proposal also appear willing to increase Germany’s voluntary contributions to various UN programmes, including peacekeeping and crisis management.

 

Modernizing the Bundeswehr 

Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, have long made negative headlines about equipment shortages and poor performance. Some of these stories seem borderline comical, including reports that a German battalion in 2015 found itself without weapons during a NATO exercise in Norway, leaving soldiers to holster broomsticks to their armoured vehicles. A more recent report characterised the shortfalls as “dramatically hindering combat readiness”. In reality, the Bundeswehr is in desperate need of modernization, something the next government aims to take on.

The coalition proposal highlights digitalisation as a key priority for the armed forces in the coming years. Extra funding from a higher defence budget would be used for optimizing and harmonizing existing equipment, as well as developing new innovative capacities, such as weaponized drone capabilities. To promote technological innovation, the Ministry of Defence also plans to establish an “Agency for Disruptive Innovation in Cybersecurity and Key Technologies”.

The Bundeswehr will continue participating in most existing theatres, most notably the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as the UN-peacekeeping operation MINUSMA in Mali, where Germany has stationed roughly 1,000 troops respectively. Given the recent tactical defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, the deal sees Germany likely ending its training mission and weapons supplies to the Peshmerga forces operating across the Levant.

 

A Slowly Changing German Self-Image?

It would be far-fetched to characterise the coalition proposal as a complete departure from previous government statements regarding issues of peace and security. The new government will likely continue to place a premium on diplomacy and dialogue, while at the same time strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms in foreign and security policy.

Yet whilst it may be premature to diagnose a paradigm shift in German foreign and security policy, the proposal does contain the underlying narrative of growing European responsibility and posture. This approach will inevitably mean a more active role for Germany in shaping international affairs. At the same time, as any preliminary guiding document, the paper contains vague language and promises that can be walked back on. Bearing in mind that voter support for the SPD and grand coalition have recently dropped to a record low, there is no guarantee that the rank and file members of the Social Democrats will sign off on the coalition pact in the special ballot. If the deal fails, Germany would likely have to hold new general elections, which would plunge the country into a true political crisis.

 

Click here to access the full version of the coalition proposal (in German).

 


Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig


Image Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2017/01_en/bilder/2017-01-10-bundeswehr-mali.jpg?__blob=bpaTopmeldung&v=4  

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: EU, Europe, European Defence, feature, Germany

How might Europe react to Trump’s Iran Deal policy?

October 26, 2017 by Jackson Oliver Webster and Lélia Rousselet

By Lélia Rousselet and Jackson Webster

Mohammad Javad Zarif , the Iranian Foreign Minister, and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Brussels in February 2016 (Credit: Olivier Hoslet/EPA)

 

The Iran Deal – former American President Barack Obama’s defining diplomatic accomplishment – may soon be coming to an end. The “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015 and marked the end of eight years of intense multilateral diplomatic efforts, conducted by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Germany, and the EU, and spearheaded largely by Secretary of State John Kerry.

This central piece of the Obama legacy has been endangered by President Donald Trump, who repeatedly expressed his disdain for the agreement on the campaign trail, and has now officially ‘de-certified‘ Iranian compliance with the deal’s conditions to Congress on Friday, October 13. European diplomats had tried for months to convince the Trump administration to avoid de-certifying the deal. Much has already been said about the potential political fallout in Washington, most strikingly the possibility that US Defence Secretary James Mattis and others could be pushed out of the administration following a decertification of the Iran Deal. This article will review the knock-on effects of these possibilities in Europe, both politically and for business, and to evaluate how Europe might respond.

Its important here to note that Trump’s de-certification does not necessarily lead to the end of the JCPOA. The US Congress now has less than two months to decide whether or not to reimpose sanctions. Though Obama faced trouble in getting the agreement past Congressional muster, it’s uncertain if Congress will reimpose sanctions, effectively killing the deal. Kicking the ball to Congress creates more unpredictability in the coming weeks, all in the knowledge that the process might repeat itself in three months for the next certification. To stop this cycle, Congress must pass a new law ending Washington’s internal certification process, so that the only organization which has the legitimacy to assess Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be the IAEA. And since the deal’s signing, all of the IAEA’s reports are clear: Iran is respecting its part of the deal.

Political consequences for Europe

As is often the case, there will not likely be a unified “European response”, rather several “European responses”. Now that Trump has “de-certified” the deal, Europeans must react in three different dimensions.

First, France, Germany, and the UK must clearly and continually state their disagreement with Trump’s decision and support for the deal. As French President Emmanuel Macron did in his “Make our planet great again” speech after Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the European members of the JCPOA will have to employ a strong rhetorical rebuke of Trump’s policy. This seems to be the path chosen thus far by European leaders — shortly after Trump’s announcement, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British PM Theresa May, and Macron released a joint statement reaffirming their support to the JCPOA. Similarly, the Chief of the EU External Action Service, Federica Mogherini, issued a strong declaration in support of the deal and against a unilateral American withdrawal.

Second, the most significant concern would obviously be the reaction towards Washington, as Europeans must express a clear disagreement without endangering transatlantic relations. That is exactly what Macron did during a TV interview on October 15, when he reaffirmed the necessity to maintain dialogue with Trump to avoid entering a “zero-sum game”, to be open to broader negotiations on Iran, and to recognize the deal’s importance to regional security and stability. Macron stated that European governments should look more closely into Iran’s role in the region. This approach could help Europeans to convince Trump that controlling Iranian nuclear enrichment actually means being tough on Iran and having full access to its nuclear facilities. Furthermore, should this approach preserves diplomatic ties with Tehran, Europeans could agree to re-negotiate only on specific aspects of the deal such as the “sunset clauses”. A title change, and the use of tougher language, with minimal substantive modifications might even be enough for Trump to take political ownership of the agreement.

Third, the bilateral reaction towards Iran. Europe’s main objective should be to contain escalation. European leaders, in particular those in Paris and London, have invested significant time and resources into the deal and opening the Iranian economy. To de-escalate, Europeans will need to reaffirm their commitment to dialogue to keep the door open for diplomacy with their Iranian counterparts.

As for now, the main long-term risk to the agreement would be an Iranian withdrawal in response to US threat, achieving in the process a victory for hard-liners in Tehran. This key factor is, unfortunately, out of European policymakers’ control. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif took to Twitter after Trump’s announcement, taking two interesting positions. First, he singled out Trump personally. He claimed that “Trump’s friendship is for sale to the highest bidder”, but did not seem to associate the overall American government with Trump’s personal vendetta against Iran. Second, he reiterated an oft-used line of President Hassan Rouhani, calling Trump’s actions worthy of the label of a “rogue state”. The Iranian government also reacted strongly by promising a “crushing response” to Trump’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. There is no word thus far from Tehran as to how Iran might respond to broader Congressional sanctions, particularly where it endangers relations with Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels.

 

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Head of the EU External Action Service Federica Mogherini (C) and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during the talks for the signature of the JCPOA (Credit photo: Herbert Neubauer/EPA)

 

Business consequences for Europe

Economic fallout from reinstated American sanctions would follow an initial political shockwave. However, this would likely have limited impact on Europe with greater political implications than economic ones.

Following the signing of the 2015 deal, and the ensuing lifting of sanctions, a flurry of foreign investment was expected to rush into Iran. Despite the country’s attempts to lure European investors, takers were few and far between. Doing business in Iran remains costly and dangerous, mainly due to targeted sanctions on Iranian nationals with certain political or organizational ties. Particularly surprising has been the near-complete absence of banks investing in Iran. BNP Paribas, for its part, has been shy in recent years, owing to a €9B (£8.1B) fine imposed by American authorities after the bank’s connections to Iran, Sudan, and Cuba were exposed.

Most of the companies which invested were either French, most notably PSA Citroën and Total, or have a significant amount of their manufacturing base in France. This second case refers to Airbus, who signed deals in December 2016 and July 2017 for 170 of their A321 and A330 aircraft, a deal worth over $11B (£8.5B). These deals underscore France’s economic self-interest in keeping Iranian markets open.

The Airbus deal is particularly vulnerable in the face of potential American sanctions. Were Trump to pull the US out of the deal, re-imposing sanctions on Iran, the Airbus deal would inevitably be off. Airbus aircraft are made using parts from all over Europe and the globe, including the US. Under US Treasury Department rules, because at least some components of the A320 family of airframes are made in the US, Airbus must obtain authorization for every deal it makes to export. This authorization can be revoked at any time. Furthermore, the Airbus deal is especially tenuous, given the manufacturer’s recent quarrels with American regulators. Moreover, the US is increasingly important to Airbus’ supply chain, given its recent acquisition of the Bombardier C-Series assembly process based in Alabama.

Despite European resolve to maintain the deal, there will not likely be a single ‘European’ response in the long-term. Governments and companies have begun engaging with Iran in different ways and to varying degrees since 2015. For example, the EKF, Denmark’s export credit agency, signed an agreement with the Iranian Finance Ministry,  providing a 100% guarantee for financing exports of Danish goods to Iran. Austrian and Italian creditors have followed suit. By contrast, with the exception of German stake in Airbus, German companies have generally stayed away from Iran, perhaps due in large part to the precarious fiscal and regulatory state of many major German banks.

A second key factor in play is the question of Iran’s reaction. Tehran has not indicated how much it values European economic involvement in a context of escalation with Washington. The Guardian’s Saeed Kamali claims that “other Iranian officials have hinted that Iran may continue adhering to the deal provided that the US does not obstruct European investments.”

The White House has already announced new sanctions on the IRGC. Despite being a military organization, the IRGC also has a significant stake in the Iranian economy and its leadership is filled with political hard-liners. Sanctions on this organization may impact European companies engaging in Iran. In compliance with existing prohibitions on conducting business with the IRGC, these companies do not work directly with the IRGC itself, but it is highly likely that they engage with companies at least partially controlled by them; 35-40% of the Iranian economy is estimated to belong to the “semi-state-controlled” category, a large portion of which falls under various wings of the IRGC.

Once again, the Iranian reaction is key. Should Tehran flaunt its missile program in the face of what it perceives as American deception, it will likely scare away European business.

 


 

Lélia Rousselet is a research and program coordinator at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Paris Office. Her work includes research on security and defense issues, French and American foreign policy, and Middle-Eastern and North African affairs. She holds  master’s degrees from the Doctoral School of Sciences Po and and La Sorbonne University. She is the author of Négocier l’atome (L’Harmattan, 2017). You can follow her @LeliaRousselet

 Jackson Webster is a native of Southern California and a graduate of the Department of War Studies, where he was President of the King’s College London United Nations Association. He is currently reading for a master’s in International Security with a focus on Russian/Eastern Europe and cyber security from Sciences Po Paris. You can follow him @joliverwebster 


Images sources: 

Image 1: https://assets.euractiv.com/lazy-load/img/crop/16×9/800/https://www.euractiv.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/10/Mogherini-Zarif-800×450.jpg

Image 2: https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/EU-Iran-714×437.jpg

Feature: Wikimedia Commons 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Donald Trump, EU, feature, Iran, nuclear, USA

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part IV – Hard Brexit & Europe’s Foreign Policy Challenges

March 27, 2017 by Aaron Burnett

By Aaron Burnett

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe” – British Prime Minister Theresa May. Photo credit: Jason Alden/Bloomberg

 

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe,” British Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her lengthy Brexit speech before heading to Washington, where she tried to secure Donald Trump’s support for the NATO Alliance he called “obsolete” only weeks before. Indeed, as Mrs. May sets out her plans for “a Global Britain” while paradoxically announcing that the UK would leave the world’s largest single market, i.e. the European Union (EU), she emphasized her wish for continued UK-EU security cooperation.

Coming to practical terms with such an agreement is both complex and unprecedented. The EU has signed ten Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) with countries like Canada and Brazil. But negotiations for a similar SPA between the UK and EU will not involve deepening existing diplomatic ties, but loosening them— with profoundly negative implications for British foreign policy.

As May’s early White House visit suggests, the UK remains resolutely committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even as it stumbles out of the EU. Other than the UK, 21 NATO states are also EU members, allowing Britain to retain multilateral military cooperation with its European allies even in a post-Brexit era. However, many foreign policy decisions are increasingly made at the EU-level. These include European sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea, sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program, and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens to incentivize that country towards greater democratization and political reform. The monthly meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council will soon function without the UK in the room. Britain will also lose its vote in the council meetings once Article 50 — Britain’s exit clause from the EU – is triggered on 29th March 2017. As such, major decisions regarding European security will likely be made in Paris or Berlin in the future. The question is the degree with which London will be consulted when its agreement is no longer required to carry an EU-level vote.

The “Canada Model,” referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently agreed to by both the EU and Canada following seven years of negotiations, is often cited as a potential template for a future EU-UK free trade deal. Similarly, the EU-Canada SPA gives us some clues as to what the future EU-UK security cooperation might look like. The EU-Canada SPA outlines common positions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Court, counterterrorism, and other areas of declared mutual interests. It also establishes bilateral consultation mechanisms such as an annual EU-Canada Summit and Joint Ministerial Committee co-chaired by the Canadian Foreign Minister and EU High Representative. Unlike Canada however, the UK maintains the sixth-strongest military in the world, a permanent UN Security Council seat and, rather obviously, remains geographically part of Europe. Thus, EU-UK security cooperation will remain higher than the EU-Canada level.

Months after the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May followed in the footsteps of previous British prime ministers vowing to veto increased EU military cooperation. It’s a rather peculiar statement from May especially considering that she will lose that veto right as soon as Article 50 is triggered. For its part, the remaining EU-27 will maintain that any deal the UK receives post-Brexit will have to leave it worse off than if it was an EU member. “Whoever wishes to leave this family cannot expect to give up all its obligations while holding on to its privileges,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before her Parliament shortly after the June referendum, receiving widespread applause. To achieve pragmatic security cooperation, the UK will have to accept an EU that makes decisions without it—including choices it may have vetoed had it still been a member. That may be difficult for a government that sees itself as implementing a referendum decision won on the basis of “taking back control”. On the continental side, one can expect increased influence from France, Spain, and Italy. Germany, as the EU’s reluctant leader, will be expected to increase its foreign policy leadership further yet.

On security cooperation, the UK is likely to continue sharing intelligence with its European allies to thwart terrorist attacks, implying that Britain will retain membership in Europol. The UK has made the decision to opt into Europol even after  Brexit, despite Denmark’s recent withdrawal from the agency. It would be unprecedented for a non-EU member to enjoy full Europol membership, but British withdrawal from Europol would be a setback for counterterrorism in Europe. One estimate holds that Britain is involved in sharing intelligence for nearly 40 percent of all cases that pass through Europol. Non-EU states also maintain liaison offices with Europol. The United States liaison office boasts around 20 officers, while it’s estimated that Norway enjoys roughly 80 percent of the agency’s membership benefits. Although not guaranteed, negotiations on internal security are less likely to descend into acrimony than other aspects of the Brexit talks.

All this considered, Brexit is highly unlikely to make Europe safer. The UK is set to lose a major source of its global influence and it’s not clear yet exactly how the remaining EU-27 will step in to fill that vacuum. Common decision-making and even counterterrorism coordination are likely to be more difficult in the future. On foreign policy especially, Brexit negotiations will not be about creating a stronger security partnership, but about minimizing the damage from the current arrangements.


Aaron Burnett is a current International Peace & Security MA student at King’s College London. He has previously interned with the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, United Nations, and German Council on Foreign Relations. He also holds a Master in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Journalism.


Notes:

“Brexit: The Security Dilemma”. Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP, Conservatives in the European Parliament (ECR Group). February 2017.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Brexit, EU, feature, ma, Strife series

Do we need a European Army?

March 4, 2017 by Dr Sarah Katharina Kayß

By: Sarah Katharina Kayß

The EU Parliament passed a resolution in November 2016 to create a defense union in the wake of numerous threats to the continent and also calling for increased defence spending.

The 2016 White Paper[1], concerning the development of German defensive interests, defined an inter-European military coalition to be at the centre of Germany’s role within the European Union (EU). The opinions of young officer cadets in the United Kingdom and Germany, however, were highly divergent in relation to a European defence alliance. The results of a study carried out in 2014 with 755 officer cadets from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Military Officer School (Offizierschule des Heeres) in Dresden did not only reflect the Euro-skeptic position of the British people (which reached its peak in 2016 with “Brexit”), but also the German soldiers’ sceptical position in regards to a Europeanisation of military matters.

Approaches Towards a European Army

More than half of the British and German army officer cadets were unable to imagine the creation of a transnational European army serving as a supplement to their existing national forces. Although more British than German cadets were able to imagine the creation of a European army, considerably more British (65%) than German cadets (40%) opposed such an enterprise overall.

The majority of British cadets who were not in favour of the establishment of a European army referred to language and educational barriers between Europe’s soldiers and were not able to imagine being commanded by officers from other European nations. Many of them also questioned the fighting strength of a European army, since they believed that most of their comrades’ occupational motivation was nationally focused, making it difficult for them to represent European and not primarily British interests. The majority of the German cadets, in contrast, felt no potential conflict of interest regarding this matter and referred to already existing commitments to NATO as well as collective interests within the EU.

Both British and German cadets reckoned that logistical and conceptual problems would hinder the realisation of a European army: soldiers from both countries referred to problems in terms of sovereignty, deployment issues, and the balance between family and work just as much as the cultural and economic differences within the EU, possibly hindering international cooperation in a European Army framework.

Noticeably, many of the British soldiers referred to Britain’s “special relationship with the continent”–“geographically we do belong to Europe, but mentally I feel that Britain is a separate state,” one of the British cadets explained, adding that many British people feared the establishment of a European super state. In such a state, according to the aspiring British officer, Britain would only be one of many countries, which would not do justice to Britain’s imperial history as a world power. Furthermore, the officer cadets at Sandhurst feared that increased cooperation on a European level could amount to the dissolution of British military traditions that have existed for centuries.

Although in total, more German than British officer cadets were positive about the establishment of a European army, the German soldiers also referred to cultural differences between European nations and their fear of a unified military due to the EU still being in its infancy. One German cadet noted that “many Europeans don’t perceive themselves as European and therefore cannot cooperate on a European [army].”

Joint Combat Training for EU officer cadets?

Regarding the costs and benefits of a European Army and the budget cuts in many European forces, the attitude of the British cadets was considerably more dismissive than that of their German counterparts. The biggest difference between the soldiers’ approaches related to the joint combat training of EU junior leadership staff–whereas more than half of the German cadets welcomed joint combat training, the same proportion of British cadets strongly opposed it.

The British cadets were only willing to accept a merging of the aspiring European officers’ training in the framework of direct operational preparation for deployment in missions abroad. Many of the German cadets, in contrast, welcomed joint military training within the EU in order to improve their level of interoperability. Officer cadets from both nations who advocated the merging of combat training on a European level referred to the chance to learn from the strengths of their counterparts in order to develop a better understanding of the culturally-shaped conduct of their future coalition partners.

Only German cadets, however, spoke about the development of a multinational camaraderie and the attainment of equal standards in the framework of this training. The British cadets referred to the dangers of potentially losing national identity through joint training and the danger of disclosing sensitive information and specific army tactics towards a potential enemy nation. The last point was also picked up by the German cadets, implying that some British and German cadets can still imagine a potential war between EU states.

The British cadets’ critical attitude towards joint military training was, however, not always attributable to a collective disinterest in cooperating with soldiers from other European nations, but rather directed towards their perceptions of a dysfunctional EU. One of the British cadets explained his generally critical attitude towards military cooperation on a European level by stating that, “everyone wants to do what they are accustomed to and barely anyone wants to give up their own traditions just to work as part of a collective.”

The officer cadets’ views of Europe’s past did account for a large proportion of their different perceptions towards the EU today. Whereas a large proportion of the British cadets saw the European community as a quarrelsome, unstable construct, the majority of the German cadets considered the growing European community as profitable and empowering.

The Perception of Europe and the EU

What first came to mind when the majority of British soldiers talked about European history was war, violence and destruction, as well as disunity and chaos. The German cadets, by contrast, placed concepts such as community, cooperation, and a strengthening of the continent after the Second World War at the centre of their perceptions of European history. Although the majority of the German cadets, like the British soldiers, did not class themselves primarily as Europeans, the German junior leaders considered themselves as a part of Europe, and interpreted the collective growth of European states within the EU to be a result of the continent’s history stamped out of war. Only a few Sandhurst cadets shared this attitude. For example, one cadet stated that his “perception of Europe is entirely based on my knowledge of European history, a (…) continent transfixed in a vicious circle of crises”.

The aspiring British officers frequently indicated that they lacked an understanding of and were confused about European history ̶ seemingly always pervading to claims of power and competitiveness. “What I have learned about Europe seems to me like a big mess. It could be said: British history went back and forth – but I see more durability here than with European history. (…) Perhaps the Europeans have a crisis of identity resulting from all these wars, crises, and conflicts, which they try to fill with their notion of a United Europe,” one of the British cadets explained.

Regarding the British people’s decision to leave the EU, the outcome of the referendum—the so-called “Brexit”—in June 2016 had already been alluded to in 2014. That is, in contrast to the majority of German cadets (71%), only one in four British cadets acted on the assumption that their country’s relationship with the EU would grow in the coming years. The result was similar regarding the EU’s role in military affairs. Whereas 62% of the German cadets assumed that the EU would play a bigger role in future military affairs, 44% of the British cadets dismissed such a change.

“Britain increasingly isolates itself from Europe. Unfounded anxieties are the basis for this. It has become trendy to talk negatively about the EU and to demand that we are able to trade and act with self-determination”, one British cadet reported in an interview in winter 2014. Whereas the  cadets at Sandhurst considered British history to be the foundation of their national pride, the majority of the German cadets considered German history as a lesson. For example, “I believe history helps us to recognise what we do not want again; namely a war between the nations of Europe,” one of the aspiring German officers explained. One of his comrades added, “I simply have to listen to the history of my parents and grandparents, and compare it with the current positive situation – the EU is a peace project.”

It remains to be analysed whether the ongoing refugee crisis, Brexit, the rise of nationalism in different European states, and the uncertain role of NATO after the election of Donald Trump to the White House have changed the British and German cadets’ perceptions towards European military defence. Should European politicians continue to call for a European army, not only should the possibility of implementing this army in the future be examined more thoroughly, but it should also be ascertained whether the soldiers and officers of European nations are actually willing to serve in such an army.


Dr. Sarah Katharina Kayß studied History and Comparative Religion at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Modern History at King’s College London. Her PhD research at the War Studies Department at King’s College London examined British and German army officer cadets perceptions of history and their influence on the professional identity . She is currently teaching in the War and Conflict Studies Masters programme at the University of Potsdam, Germany.

This article was translated from German by Harry Prestwich (harry_prestwich@yahoo.co.uk) who is a student at the University of Manchester, studying History and German. You can read the article in the German version here.


Notes:

[1] http://bit.ly/2m5tNIf

[2] https://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F


Image source: http://www.awdnews.com/images/14670245351.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: British Military, Defence policy, EU, feature, Germany, Sarah Katharina Kayß

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Go to page 1
  • Go to page 2
  • Go to page 3
  • Go to page 4
  • Go to page 5
  • Go to page 6
  • Go to Next Page »

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

blog@strifeblog.org

 

Recent Posts

  • Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems
  • Preventing Coup d’Étas: Lessons on Coup-Proofing from Gabon
  • The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria
  • How UN Support for Insider Mediation Could Be a Breakthrough in the Kivu Conflict
  • Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa – Introduction

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma Myanmar NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework