EU

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part IV – Hard Brexit & Europe’s Foreign Policy Challenges

March 27, 2017 by Strife Staff

By Aaron Burnett

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe” – British Prime Minister Theresa May. Photo credit: Jason Alden/Bloomberg

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe,” British Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her lengthy Brexit speech before heading to Washington, where she tried to secure Donald Trump’s support for the NATO Alliance he called “obsolete” only weeks before. Indeed, as Mrs. May sets out her plans for “a Global Britain” while paradoxically announcing that the UK would leave the world’s largest single market, i.e. the European Union (EU), she emphasized her wish for continued UK-EU security cooperation.

Coming to practical terms with such an agreement is both complex and unprecedented. The EU has signed ten Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) with countries like Canada and Brazil. But negotiations for a similar SPA between the UK and EU will not involve deepening existing diplomatic ties, but loosening them— with profoundly negative implications for British foreign policy.

As May’s early White House visit suggests, the UK remains resolutely committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even as it stumbles out of the EU. Other than the UK, 21 NATO states are also EU members, allowing Britain to retain multilateral military cooperation with its European allies even in a post-Brexit era. However, many foreign policy decisions are increasingly made at the EU-level. These include European sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea, sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program, and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens to incentivize that country towards greater democratization and political reform. The monthly meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council will soon function without the UK in the room. Britain will also lose its vote in the council meetings once Article 50 — Britain’s exit clause from the EU – is triggered on 29th March 2017. As such, major decisions regarding European security will likely be made in Paris or Berlin in the future. The question is the degree with which London will be consulted when its agreement is no longer required to carry an EU-level vote.

The “Canada Model,” referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently agreed to by both the EU and Canada following seven years of negotiations, is often cited as a potential template for a future EU-UK free trade deal. Similarly, the EU-Canada SPA gives us some clues as to what the future EU-UK security cooperation might look like. The EU-Canada SPA outlines common positions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Court, counterterrorism, and other areas of declared mutual interests. It also establishes bilateral consultation mechanisms such as an annual EU-Canada Summit and Joint Ministerial Committee co-chaired by the Canadian Foreign Minister and EU High Representative. Unlike Canada however, the UK maintains the sixth-strongest military in the world, a permanent UN Security Council seat and, rather obviously, remains geographically part of Europe. Thus, EU-UK security cooperation will remain higher than the EU-Canada level.

Months after the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May followed in the footsteps of previous British prime ministers vowing to veto increased EU military cooperation. It’s a rather peculiar statement from May especially considering that she will lose that veto right as soon as Article 50 is triggered. For its part, the remaining EU-27 will maintain that any deal the UK receives post-Brexit will have to leave it worse off than if it was an EU member. “Whoever wishes to leave this family cannot expect to give up all its obligations while holding on to its privileges,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before her Parliament shortly after the June referendum, receiving widespread applause. To achieve pragmatic security cooperation, the UK will have to accept an EU that makes decisions without it—including choices it may have vetoed had it still been a member. That may be difficult for a government that sees itself as implementing a referendum decision won on the basis of “taking back control”. On the continental side, one can expect increased influence from France, Spain, and Italy. Germany, as the EU’s reluctant leader, will be expected to increase its foreign policy leadership further yet.

On security cooperation, the UK is likely to continue sharing intelligence with its European allies to thwart terrorist attacks, implying that Britain will retain membership in Europol. The UK has made the decision to opt into Europol even after Brexit, despite Denmark’s recent withdrawal from the agency. It would be unprecedented for a non-EU member to enjoy full Europol membership, but British withdrawal from Europol would be a setback for counterterrorism in Europe. One estimate holds that Britain is involved in sharing intelligence for nearly 40 percent of all cases that pass through Europol. Non-EU states also maintain liaison offices with Europol. The United States liaison office boasts around 20 officers, while it’s estimated that Norway enjoys roughly 80 percent of the agency’s membership benefits. Although not guaranteed, negotiations on internal security are less likely to descend into acrimony than other aspects of the Brexit talks.

All this considered, Brexit is highly unlikely to make Europe safer. The UK is set to lose a major source of its global influence and it’s not clear yet exactly how the remaining EU-27 will step in to fill that vacuum. Common decision-making and even counterterrorism coordination are likely to be more difficult in the future. On foreign policy especially, Brexit negotiations will not be about creating a stronger security partnership, but about minimizing the damage from the current arrangements.

Aaron Burnett is a current International Peace & Security MA student at King’s College London. He has previously interned with the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, United Nations, and German Council on Foreign Relations. He also holds a Master in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Journalism.

Notes:

“Brexit: The Security Dilemma”. Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP, Conservatives in the European Parliament (ECR Group). February 2017.

Do we need a European Army?

March 4, 2017 by Strife Staff

By: Sarah Katharina Kayß

The EU Parliament passed a resolution in November 2016 to create a defense union in the wake of numerous threats to the continent and also calling for increased defence spending.

The 2016 White Paper[1], concerning the development of German defensive interests, defined an inter-European military coalition to be at the centre of Germany’s role within the European Union (EU). The opinions of young officer cadets in the United Kingdom and Germany, however, were highly divergent in relation to a European defence alliance. The results of a study carried out in 2014 with 755 officer cadets from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Military Officer School (Offizierschule des Heeres) in Dresden did not only reflect the Euro-skeptic position of the British people (which reached its peak in 2016 with “Brexit”), but also the German soldiers’ sceptical position in regards to a Europeanisation of military matters.

Approaches Towards a European Army

More than half of the British and German army officer cadets were unable to imagine the creation of a transnational European army serving as a supplement to their existing national forces. Although more British than German cadets were able to imagine the creation of a European army, considerably more British (65%) than German cadets (40%) opposed such an enterprise overall.

The majority of British cadets who were not in favour of the establishment of a European army referred to language and educational barriers between Europe’s soldiers and were not able to imagine being commanded by officers from other European nations. Many of them also questioned the fighting strength of a European army, since they believed that most of their comrades’ occupational motivation was nationally focused, making it difficult for them to represent European and not primarily British interests. The majority of the German cadets, in contrast, felt no potential conflict of interest regarding this matter and referred to already existing commitments to NATO as well as collective interests within the EU.

Both British and German cadets reckoned that logistical and conceptual problems would hinder the realisation of a European army: soldiers from both countries referred to problems in terms of sovereignty, deployment issues, and the balance between family and work just as much as the cultural and economic differences within the EU, possibly hindering international cooperation in a European Army framework.

Noticeably, many of the British soldiers referred to Britain’s “special relationship with the continent”–“geographically we do belong to Europe, but mentally I feel that Britain is a separate state,” one of the British cadets explained, adding that many British people feared the establishment of a European super state. In such a state, according to the aspiring British officer, Britain would only be one of many countries, which would not do justice to Britain’s imperial history as a world power. Furthermore, the officer cadets at Sandhurst feared that increased cooperation on a European level could amount to the dissolution of British military traditions that have existed for centuries.

Although in total, more German than British officer cadets were positive about the establishment of a European army, the German soldiers also referred to cultural differences between European nations and their fear of a unified military due to the EU still being in its infancy. One German cadet noted that “many Europeans don’t perceive themselves as European and therefore cannot cooperate on a European [army].”

Joint Combat Training for EU officer cadets?

Regarding the costs and benefits of a European Army and the budget cuts in many European forces, the attitude of the British cadets was considerably more dismissive than that of their German counterparts. The biggest difference between the soldiers’ approaches related to the joint combat training of EU junior leadership staff–whereas more than half of the German cadets welcomed joint combat training, the same proportion of British cadets strongly opposed it.

The British cadets were only willing to accept a merging of the aspiring European officers’ training in the framework of direct operational preparation for deployment in missions abroad. Many of the German cadets, in contrast, welcomed joint military training within the EU in order to improve their level of interoperability. Officer cadets from both nations who advocated the merging of combat training on a European level referred to the chance to learn from the strengths of their counterparts in order to develop a better understanding of the culturally-shaped conduct of their future coalition partners.

Only German cadets, however, spoke about the development of a multinational camaraderie and the attainment of equal standards in the framework of this training. The British cadets referred to the dangers of potentially losing national identity through joint training and the danger of disclosing sensitive information and specific army tactics towards a potential enemy nation. The last point was also picked up by the German cadets, implying that some British and German cadets can still imagine a potential war between EU states.

The British cadets’ critical attitude towards joint military training was, however, not always attributable to a collective disinterest in cooperating with soldiers from other European nations, but rather directed towards their perceptions of a dysfunctional EU. One of the British cadets explained his generally critical attitude towards military cooperation on a European level by stating that, “everyone wants to do what they are accustomed to and barely anyone wants to give up their own traditions just to work as part of a collective.”

The officer cadets’ views of Europe’s past did account for a large proportion of their different perceptions towards the EU today. Whereas a large proportion of the British cadets saw the European community as a quarrelsome, unstable construct, the majority of the German cadets considered the growing European community as profitable and empowering.

The Perception of Europe and the EU

What first came to mind when the majority of British soldiers talked about European history was war, violence and destruction, as well as disunity and chaos. The German cadets, by contrast, placed concepts such as community, cooperation, and a strengthening of the continent after the Second World War at the centre of their perceptions of European history. Although the majority of the German cadets, like the British soldiers, did not class themselves primarily as Europeans, the German junior leaders considered themselves as a part of Europe, and interpreted the collective growth of European states within the EU to be a result of the continent’s history stamped out of war. Only a few Sandhurst cadets shared this attitude. For example, one cadet stated that his “perception of Europe is entirely based on my knowledge of European history, a (…) continent transfixed in a vicious circle of crises”.

The aspiring British officers frequently indicated that they lacked an understanding of and were confused about European history ̶ seemingly always pervading to claims of power and competitiveness. “What I have learned about Europe seems to me like a big mess. It could be said: British history went back and forth – but I see more durability here than with European history. (…) Perhaps the Europeans have a crisis of identity resulting from all these wars, crises, and conflicts, which they try to fill with their notion of a United Europe,” one of the British cadets explained.

Regarding the British people’s decision to leave the EU, the outcome of the referendum—the so-called “Brexit”—in June 2016 had already been alluded to in 2014. That is, in contrast to the majority of German cadets (71%), only one in four British cadets acted on the assumption that their country’s relationship with the EU would grow in the coming years. The result was similar regarding the EU’s role in military affairs. Whereas 62% of the German cadets assumed that the EU would play a bigger role in future military affairs, 44% of the British cadets dismissed such a change.

“Britain increasingly isolates itself from Europe. Unfounded anxieties are the basis for this. It has become trendy to talk negatively about the EU and to demand that we are able to trade and act with self-determination”, one British cadet reported in an interview in winter 2014. Whereas the cadets at Sandhurst considered British history to be the foundation of their national pride, the majority of the German cadets considered German history as a lesson. For example, “I believe history helps us to recognise what we do not want again; namely a war between the nations of Europe,” one of the aspiring German officers explained. One of his comrades added, “I simply have to listen to the history of my parents and grandparents, and compare it with the current positive situation – the EU is a peace project.”

It remains to be analysed whether the ongoing refugee crisis, Brexit, the rise of nationalism in different European states, and the uncertain role of NATO after the election of Donald Trump to the White House have changed the British and German cadets’ perceptions towards European military defence. Should European politicians continue to call for a European army, not only should the possibility of implementing this army in the future be examined more thoroughly, but it should also be ascertained whether the soldiers and officers of European nations are actually willing to serve in such an army.

Dr. Sarah Katharina Kayß studied History and Comparative Religion at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Modern History at King’s College London. Her PhD research at the War Studies Department at King’s College London examined British and German army officer cadets perceptions of history and their influence on the professional identity . She is currently teaching in the War and Conflict Studies Masters programme at the University of Potsdam, Germany.

This article was translated from German by Harry Prestwich (harry_prestwich@yahoo.co.uk) who is a student at the University of Manchester, studying History and German. You can read the article in the German version here.

Notes:

[1] http://bit.ly/2m5tNIf

[2] https://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image source: http://www.awdnews.com/images/14670245351.jpg

Schengen and free circulation at the crossroads: lessons for the East African Community?

October 6, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille:

Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)

In many parts of the world, geopolitics is confronted with two contending trends. On the one hand, numerous countries are engaged in a process of regional economic integration, epitomised by the more advanced model of the European Union (EU), which requires ‘internal’ borders between participating states to become more fluid to facilitate the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, borders are regaining momentum. Inherited from colonisation, the post-war or post-cold war status quo, the validity of these borders is now a moot point. From Ukraine to Iraq, Syria, Mali, South Sudan or Nigeria, old borders are questioned, new demarcation lines appear. In Europe, the large influx of refugees has led to very different approaches across EU member states, with some overtly questioning the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Events currently taking place in Europe are of great significance to the East African Community (EAC) and Africa as a whole. Indeed, the EU is not only an important trade and development partner that can potentially provide an alternative to China, it is also a prosperous example of regional economic integration that can serve as an advanced model to African countries involved in a similar regional process. The five EAC member states, in particular, are currently on a path towards regional integration that bears striking resemblance with the process undergone by the EU.

In 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed the EAC Treaty to enhance trade cooperation and political relations. In 2005 a Customs Union was launched, followed in 2010 by a common market with zero internal tariffs. Talks about setting up an East African Currency Union with an EAC-wide Shilling started in 2011. Furthermore, the EAC has its own Legislative Assembly and Court of Justice. Plans to create an East African Tourist Passport are on the way. Establishing a sustainable economic and political bloc in the form of an East African Federation is also high on the EAC agenda. What’s more, in October 2014, the EAC and the EU signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that supports the EAC’s ambitious integration project and gives EAC member states extensive access to the EU Single Market.

Among these many parallels between the European and East African contexts, it is also important to note that the EAC is considering measures to establish free circulation between its five members, at a time when it is facing the challenge of a growing influx of refugees, mainly from Somalia. Before thinking of the feasibility of setting up an East African ‘Schengen’, it is therefore worth looking into the European model of free circulation: its strengths, weaknesses and limitations.

Abolishing borders has been one of the utmost achievements of the European project, and free movement is one of the dynamics of European prosperity. The dismantling of internal borders among Schengen participating countries was backed up by a strengthening of external borders. Article 25 of the agreement allows national authorities to re-establish border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for a period of time limited to ten days, which can be prolonged to two months. The current reintroduction of controls on several internal borders of the EU is therefore not the beginning of the end of the Schengen agreement, but rather a procedure faithful to the letter of the agreement.

It follows that Germany’s reintroduction of border controls in the aftermath of chaotic scenes at train stations and reports of bed shortages at refugee camps is more an attempt to process refugees in a more orderly fashion and better identify those deserving of help than an attack on European principles. This came after Germany reasserted important European values and Europe’s international commitments to host refugees, particularly those coming from war zones.

Despite this, tensions between member states, overwhelmed by the scale of refugees in search of a safe haven, have put Schengen‘s principle of free movement under strain. This has revealed a lack of solidarity towards member states more exposed geographically to the refugee crisis, as well as showing the generosity on the part of Germany, Sweden and a few others. Crucially, the tensions have also revealed very different attitudes from the East and the West towards traditional European values.

The reason why Schengen is questioned today is not Schengen per se, but rather the weakness – or lack – of policies that should have been adopted or consolidated to accompany Schengen and make it work better. Does Europe have a coherent EU asylum policy? No. Does Europe have a European police? No. Is the EU agency Frontex sufficient to guarantee European border management? Clearly not, in view of the human tragedies in the Mediterranean and of the Hungarian reaction to the influx of refugees, to cite only two examples.

By the end of the year the EU Commission will at last propose measures to set up a European corps of border guards to consolidate Frontex, which coordinates cooperation between national border guards on external borders to prevent illegal immigration, terrorist infiltration and human trafficking. But does Europe have a real foreign security and defence policy capable of stabilizing its close neighbourhood? No. Its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy is a shambles.

Europeans assumed that they would be able to enjoy a common area of freedom, in which people, goods, and labour would circulate freely, whilst keeping most features of their national systems. Today, Schengen is the victim of member states’ lack of a coherent vision. The so-called four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour) can only work efficiently with a set of rules and policies at the supranational level. Inward-looking attitudes will not solve the challenges Europe faces in view of the extent of Africa’s migration potential. In areas where European integration is more advanced, where Europeans share the currency, the market, the freedom to trade, work and travel across this market, full sovereignty belongs in the past. Without sharing more sovereignty, all these envied attributes are threatened by crises such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis, none of which, surprisingly, Europeans anticipated.

As is often the case in Europe when populists spot imperfections in the way that a new European framework has been designed, Schengen has been presented as a threat to internal security. And yet, to make up for the abolition of internal controls, member states are expected to cooperate in order to maintain a high level of security. First, by exchanging information to fight borderless organised crime and terrorism. Second, by intensifying policy cooperation. Finally, by using the Schengen Information System (SI).

Schengen is by no means a ‘wide open door’ to illegal migrants. Indeed, the Dublin agreements require the country of arrival to register migrants, take fingerprints, and consider their asylum application. But in the wake of vast flows of refugees, this rule has reached its limits. Nonetheless, it is not in the Europeans’ interest to dismantle the Schengen area and the freedom that it provides to EU citizens. Rather, this joint public area has to be managed by joint public action.

What lessons can be drawn by the EAC in the light of European developments? First, that free circulation leads to more wealth and not the opposite. All economists agree on these great advantages, which is in itself exceptional. Second, that an agreement on free circulation implies not only benefits, albeit significant ones, but also constraints in terms of sharing sovereignty in areas hitherto regarded as national prerogatives. Third, that any weakness in the design of the free circulation agreement will, one day, be subject to a random shock that tests its resilience. This happened with the Eurozone. This is now the case with Schengen.

Schengen is currently being challenged, though primarily by populist misrepresentations. It continues to work. But it faces some reluctance among certain member states and is not sufficiently backed up by effective policies. Its long-term survival will depend on EU member states’ ability to consolidate its design and back it up with more integrated policies in the fields of asylum, police and border management, foreign security and defence, particularly with regard to stabilizing the EU’s neighbourhood.

More generally, any step towards integration, whichever area is concerned, requires sharing sovereignty. This will be a substantial challenge. EAC member states would clearly benefit from a system like Schengen, it would potentially bring the shared reward of increased prosperity for each member state and for the region as a whole. But such a system must be accompanied by effective policies, joint public action, and greater integration in terms of shared sovereignty. Otherwise it may end up finding itself in a similar crisis to that faced by the EU today.

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

The incommensurable loss of the little drowned boy, Aylan Kurdi

September 10, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Ana Flamind

Photo: “I hope humanity finds a cure for visas.” Published with the permission of the author

This article seeks to explore the particular affectivity provoked by the publication on 3 September 2015, of the picture of a little drowned boy in Bodrum, Turkey.

Why does the image of this little boy seem to provoke a stronger affectivity, one of shame most particularly, prompting us to scream “that’s it, this is really too much!” when other recent pictures seem to have triggered a remediable guilt (for example recent pictures juxtaposing tourists and refugees on the beaches of Turkey, Greece, etc.)? This stronger affectivity could very well be the result of a cumulative effect, of our hearts growing more pained with each and every story we read and picture we see, of the incremental realisation of what tragic fate awaits refugees, of reading headlines calling the recent displacement of people “the worst refugee crisis since World War II.’’ But it could also be that this specific picture does something, undoes us, as Judith Butler would put it, in a specific way.

Butler’s essay “Precarious life”, in the book of the same title, explores the Levinasian ethic of the face to interrogate the link between representation and humanisation.[1] Butler cautions us that the link is not as straightforward as one might think. A picture seeking to humanise should vocalise grief or agony, a sense of the precariousness of life.[2] Yet giving a face to some tragic event does not necessarily require the seeing of a face, which at times comes to symbolise dehumanisation, such as the picture of Osama bin Laden, Butler reminds us. The face that humanises “will be that for which no words really work; the face (that) seems to be a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense.”[3] This face “is not explicitly a human face” and can be any bodily parts that “are said to cry, to sob and to scream.”[4] The little drowned boy lies face down in the sand, his back prompting us to respond, yet already prefiguring a response lacking the possibility of uttering sense, a response akin to the sound of grief. Butler writes:

“To respond to the face, to understanding its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself. This cannot be an awakeness, to use his words (Levinas), to my own life, and then an extrapolation from an understanding of my own precariousness to an understanding of another’s precarious life. It has to be an understanding of the precariousness of the Other.”[5]

Furthermore, for Levinas, the injunction of the face, testifying to the Other’s vulnerability, provokes in us a struggle between “the temptation to kill and the call to peace, the You shall not kill.”[6] For Butler, this struggle is foundational of ethics:

“If the Other, the Other’s face, which after all carries the meaning of this precariousness, at once tempts me with murder and prohibits me from acting upon it, then the face operates to produce a struggle for me, and establishes this struggle at the heart of ethics. (…) The face makes various utterances at once: it bespeaks an agony, an injurability, at the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition against killing.”[7]

Paradoxically, the picture hurts us by keeping grief outside of the frame. Unlike other pictures depicting the absurd barbarity of children losing their lives in and to horrible conditions, with parents seen holding dead and/or wounded bodies, their faces contorted by pain, hopelessness and anger the little drowned boy is seen in his utter vulnerability, as the unaccompanied body of a three-years old who has no one left to protect him or grieve his disappearance. We do not expect little boys and girls to be left alone, unprotected. We cannot accept little boys and girls to be dead alone, either. This picture thus speaks of what is left outside of the frame, of the innumerable and unfathomable decisions parents face when they put their children’s fate into the hands of smugglers and board a flimsy boat with dim hopes of survival. The picture also speaks of the parents’ probable death, the death of those who could most feel the incommensurable loss of three-years old Aylan Kurdi.[8] For if we want to mourn his death, and the death of all refugees seeking to reach our European shores, we need to hear those who have known them and loved them, attempt to speak of their bereavement, of their incommensurable loss. The picture of three-years old Aylan Kurdi, of the man standing next to him, and, in equal measure, of the photographer who has witnessed the bareness of the little boy’s body, commands us to question why his parents cannot be there to mourn him; it compels us to apprehend the precariousness of life itself.

This, for me, speaks of a different kind of pain sweeping away the foundations of our being: That in acknowledging the vulnerability of Aylan’s dead body, we are forced to face our shared precariousness, our interdependence, if we are to ‘overcome’ the vulnerability that always already puts our fate into the hands of others. The picture of 3-year old Aylan Kurdi, the little drowned boy, establishes the ground of our ethical struggle in plain sight: that of a choice between the fear for our own survival or the disavowal of more suffering. It is now our duty to testify of the incommensurability of Aylan’s life and to the bereavement left by his death. This pain must be seen.

Ana Flamind just completed reading for a MA in International Conflict Studies at King’s College London. Her main interest lies in critical IR and security scholarship.

[1] Butler, Judith; “Precarious life” in Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence (London: Verso, 2004), p 128 – 151.

[2] Rephrased from ibid, p. 141

[3] Ibid p. 135

[4] Ibid p. 133

[5] Ibid p. 134

[6] Emmanuel Levinas as cited by Butler, ibid p. 134

[7] Ibid p.135

[8] The little boy’s father did survive but his older brother and mother did not. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drowned-syrian-toddler-sparking-global-outrage-named-aylan-kurdi-1671698816

Remembering the Vienna Congress: lessons for the EU

June 25, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Lucile Dussoubs:

Le gateau des rois, / tiré au Congrès de Vienne en 1815. Depicts the leaders of Europe squabbling over the map of Europe at the Vienna Congress. Photo: British Museum (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

This month marks 200 years since the end of the Vienna Congress. This bicentennial should give the European Union (EU) the opportunity to dive back into the study of what has long been regarded as a golden age for European diplomacy. It could also help the EU draw out useful conclusions about its current efforts in foreign policy.

The Vienna Congress, which took place from September 1814 to June 1815, had as its aim the settlement of the borders of Europe to establish a stabilised order in a continent deeply shocked by the Napoleonic wars. This question was solved thanks to personal – sometimes friendly – relationships between the famous old aristocratic diplomats Metternich, Talleyrand and Castlereagh. The ‘personal factor’ had a major impact during the conference. It helped Talleyrand to not only impose France’s wishes at the negotiating table, but to preserve her status as a great European power. This he achieved despite both Napoleon’s surrender and the crisis caused by the Hundred Days, which saw Napoleon return from exile on Elba in March, right in the midst of the conference, and raise an army.

Organisers of international conferences no longer appreciate the importance of interpersonal relationships and the personality of each negotiator when planning a meeting. The European Union High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have always been openly nominated based on their knowledge of international relations, but also thanks to their discretion, lack of charisma and their not-too-openly affirmed opinions. Of course, it is a major struggle to find an individual able to embody the specificities of each member state. But that should not come at the expense of ambitious choices.

Another major lesson of the Congress of Vienna is that the demonisation of a traditional partner is not a useful tool to achieve diplomatic goals. Post-Napoleonic France was a major threat for the stability of all states present. But none of those states were tempted to humiliate France. This strategic choice was in opposition to their respective publics. Nevertheless, it allowed the European countries to synchronise their actions when the next major crisis emerged with Napoleon leaving the Island of Elba.

In the case of today’s EU strategy towards one of its major threats, Russia, the lessons of Vienna seem to have been forgotten. Countering Russia’s propaganda around its invasion of Crimea and its presence in the battlefield with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine required the EU to develop and reinforce a counter-narrative. The EU engaged rapidly in an information war that it has won, at least on its own territory. But the European leaders have not realised the risks of a rising wave of anti-Russia sentiment. For historic, geographic and cultural reasons, Russia still is and will remain an unavoidable partner and a strategic neighbour. Further demonisation will only lead to more incomprehension and resentment. If hostility towards Russia is latent in many European countries – especially in the Baltic states – it has definitely been increased by politicized top-down discourses for which the EU is largely responsible.

What’s more, the Congress of Vienna is one of the most exuberant demonstrations of European ‘total’ diplomacy. Total diplomacy is defined by a context in which foreign policy efforts are constant and supported by any means possible from state-to-state negotiations to the arts. In Vienna, the conference was a success in large part due to parallel activities aimed at facilitating the talks. One of the main examples of this ‘total’ diplomacy was the organisation of what would now be considered outrageously extravagant meals, concerts, and entertainment. But far from being anachronistic, this recreational approach to diplomacy was of the utmost modernity.

The European Union should not be afraid to engage more in ‘total’ diplomacy. While this may be difficult at a time when the EU is trying to reduce its expenses, and the EU has no interest in organising meetings that would be mere copies of G7 conferences, there is definitely a middle ground between its current – very traditional – approach to diplomacy ‘on the phone’ or ‘around a table’, and this more ambitious approach.

The EU should also be more willing to use its ‘smart power’ more openly. The Union has unique know-how on how to balance hard and soft power, military effectiveness and the world’s strongest policy for cooperation and partnership: it should not be ashamed of using its historic background to gain influence.

Another major diplomatic innovation of the Congress of Vienna was the establishment of the ‘Concert of Nations’ among the European states. The coordination and reinforcement of the relations between the major countries of the continent was not strong enough to avoid the First World War but can still be considered as a lasting first attempt to normalise the constant exchanges among traditional partners. The ‘Concert of Nations’ preserved the stability of the region and helped to coordinate the agendas of all the actors. Of course, this stability came at the expense of a continued validation for imperialist regimes.

It is interesting to consider that contemporary European international relations principles are based on the legacy of the Congress of Vienna. The EU has taken pride in pushing for better relations with all partners and sharing the same values, such as the respect for democracy and civil rights. It is also trying to help all countries wishing to strengthen these values, and to push them when these values are too little or non-existent through programs of development, human rights education efforts or grants for political reforms. At the same time, and even if all EU citizens should take pride and continue to stand up for these values, the legacy of the Concert of Nations is that of successful ‘global’ diplomacy, including emerging countries that are often less keen on moral guidance in international relations.

Finally, the Congress of Vienna is a clear demonstration of the State being the major diplomatic actor. The negotiating table was filled with representatives of well-established governments who were credited with the intentions of the heads of their respective states, often kings. The institution of the State was not suffering from the competition of other actors such as journalists, who were not present in the room, or by civilians interests.

Two centuries later, the emergence of new actors in the international arena represents the major change regarding diplomacy in its power and means. Various groups have been challenging the traditional representation of diplomacy as being reserved for the State. The Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, the Ukrainian separatists or terrorist groups all pretend to deserve the right to be as legitimate as the State to act on the international sphere, and to represent a sufficiently important part of the population to be regarded as unavoidable interlocutors. The declarations by the European Union that it is not considering talks with non-established groups like those risk weakening the institution’s reputation for transparency, but also comes with moral dilemmas.

A new paradigm is thus needed to make sense of all the European efforts in foreign policy. Both ‘post-Westphalian diplomacy’ (to emphasise the recognition of the state as the main actor of diplomacy) and ‘post-Vienna diplomacy’ (to highlight the emergence of the ‘European Concert’) are not satisfactory benchmarks anymore. The emergence of new players – almost always competing with the European bloc – requires the affirmation of a new reflective space and institutional mechanisms. After all, two hundred years have passed.

Lucile Dussoubs is currently completing her MA in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

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