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Italian general elections: a concern for the EU ?

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By Giammarco Petrone

The 2018 Italian general election will take place on 4th of March 2018 (Credit Image: IEG Policy)

International commentators have presented the Italian general election – which will be held on the 4th of March 2018 – as a big test not only for Italy but also for the European Union (EU). Over the course of the current legislative period (2013-18),  Italians have witnessed several major events. First, the Parliament had no outright majority. Then, no less than three grand coalition governments held power, in which parties of completely different political ideologies united. Also, Giorgio Napolitano was re-elected President, which marked an historic moment for Italy as no President had never been re-elected before. The fourth occurrence was the election of the new President, Sergio Mattarella. Finally, a radical revision of the constitution was implemented, which the electorate then rejected in a referendum in December 2016.  Even after all these events, the country is still grappling with the same thorny issues, such as low GDP growth, high youth unemployment and the second highest debt in the EU. This article will address the different views the Italian parties have about the relationship with the European Union, which will be followed by the examination of the relation between Italy and the EU. This article’s overall argument will hold that Italian general elections do not represent a threat for the stability of the EU.

Italian political parties have somewhat different approaches towards Brussels, which are reflected by in their different electoral manifestos. However, there is a fil rouge that connects all of them: the call for change, either towards more or less integration, depending on the political ideology. Besides this, the relationship with the EU has arguably become an established matter of the political campaign. This is not specific to Italy, it occurred in other European states. For instance, the EU is a fundamental topic in French domestic politics, as illustrated during last year’s Presidential election.

The Democratic Party, which has been in power since 2013, is led by the former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. It is a pro-European party that supports the creation of a United States of Europe, as recently proposed by Martin Schulz, former President of the European Parliament. Furthermore, it campaigns for the direct election of the European Commission’s President, the unification of the European Commission’s and the European Council’s presidencies, and the creation of a European Ministry of Finance. However, the Democratic Party criticizes the Dublin Regulation, which considers the state through which asylum seekers first enter the EU as responsible to examine their applications for international protection (in 2017 Italy received almost 120,000 migrants), as well as the EU’s austerity policies, since they are seen as negatively impacting on investments.

The Five Star Movement, often referred to as Italy’s anti-establishment party, has a bold program and its leader is Luigi Di Maio, current Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies. It campaigns to increase the powers of the European Parliament, as it is the only institution elected by citizens, to introduce an opt-out clause from the monetary union, and to modify the aforementioned Dublin Regulation. The Five Star Movement also supports the empowerment of national parliaments to set the agenda of European priorities, in line with its membership of the Eurosceptic group ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’ in the European Parliament. Yet, further proposals such as the abolition of any ‘unproductive’ (or deemed so) European agency, or that of the triple institutional seats (Brussels-Strasburg-Luxemburg) seem hardly feasible, as they are outlined in the treaties of the European Union.

The centre-right coalition, which is composed of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, The League, and Brothers of Italy, is likely to pursue a tough line on the EU’s austerity policies. According to their unified manifesto, the centre-right parties campaign to revise the EU treaties in order to strengthen national sovereignty, so that the Italian constitution can prevail over European laws and regulations. Even if the coalition comprises Forza Italia, a party which has recently taken a pro-Europe stance, laying emphasis on the Italian interests in Brussels is considered as a top priority on its agenda. Despite this, it is highly unlikely that cornerstones of the EU legal and institutional framework, such as both the primacy of the European law as well as the common interests of its member countries, will be unilaterally questioned.

The Italian electors, who can hardly identify themselves with any political party able to answer their problems, have two main concerns, the economy and immigration that do influence their opinions on the European Union. Firstly, Italy has not completely recovered from the economic crisis and such stagnation inevitably impacts on the unemployment rate, that is even more severe among young people, especially in the south. Secondly, immigration is thought to be mishandled, which is the reason why the presence of illegal immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers is perceived as higher than it really is. Although Italy sets an example for its ‘compassionate and courageous response to the biggest refugee and migration crisis since the end of the Second World War’, the population feels that other countries should bear more responsibility. In this regard, according to Eurobarometer, which is a series of opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the EU, only 39 percent of the population considers being part of the EU as beneficial, whereas the percentage is around 64 percent in the other EU countries.

European leaders have hardly expressed any comments about the potential outcome of the Italian elections, probably due to the fact that at present any kind of comment during a political campaign in a different country might be seen as interference. However, last January French President Emmanuel Macron, widely regarded as the  main proponent of political integration in the EU, did not hesitate to praise Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, and also to express his view by stating ‘Can I say that the European Union is positive for Italy, and can I also say that an Italy which believes in Europe is positive for Europe’. This should come as no surprise, since the Democratic Party is currently the less hostile party towards the EU and Macron’s and Renzi’s political views are quite similar. More recently, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, warned that the EU should prepare for the worst-case scenario after the Italian elections, as no operational government will be formed.

However, he retracted only a few hours later, making clear that he was misunderstood and that Italy  will continue to play a pivotal role in the EU. In this regard, at present the most likely scenario is either a fragmented Parliament with no uniform majority, which would lead to new elections, or a minority government, where the support to the bipartisan government is given to guarantee stability to the country. Nevertheless, both options do not necessarily mean prolonged political paralysis, which is what seems to worry the EU.

Given that Italy is the third largest economy in the Eurozone as well as the third most populated country in the EU, what implications the Italian elections might have? If either the Democratic Party or a Forza Italia led coalition takes power, sweeping changes are unlikely to be brought about to the current approach. However, a push for more flexibility concerning the fiscal policies as well as more pressure on immigration policies cannot be excluded. Conversely, it is even possible (but highly unlikely) that, if the Five Star Movement performed well in the elections, it might consider forming a government with The League, and this would be the worst scenario for the EU since both parties have criticised its handling of mass migration as well as the common currency.

In conclusion, as instability will probably be the winner of the Italian elections, it is unlikely that the results will significantly affect the EU. Although Italy was among the founding members of the European Economic Community in 1957, and it has always been at the forefront of the European integration process, which has been a pillar of its foreign policy, at present it has little regional influence and even less authority in negotiations. In all likelihood, Brussels will land on its feet.

 

Giammarco has been working in the security field for almost ten years, with experiences in Asia and Latin America. He holds an MA in International Relations from Italy, and is currently an MA candidate in Intelligence & Intelligence Security at King’s College London. His main interests include corporate espionage, cybercrime, and OSINT.

Image Source: https://iegpolicy.agribusinessintelligence.informa.com/PL019152/Italy-takes-over-EU-Presidency-from-Greece

Strife Interview – Benedetto Della Vedova, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs: Europe’s uneasy path

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief in discussion with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 28, 2014, serving in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments; he has also been a Member of the Italian Senate since 2013. He is currently competing in the Italian national elections with the +Europa (“More Europe”) political party, headed by former Foreign Affairs minister Emma Bonino and campaigning on a strong pro-European platform. Strife’s Editor-in-Chief, Andrea Varsori, met with him at King’s, where he participated in the KCL Italian Society’s debate “The Road towards the United States of Europe”. On that occasion, they spoke on the future prospects for the EU, its internal divisions, and the Italian take on Brexit.

AV: 2017 was a year of important national elections in four European countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria. Do you think that the European Union emerged stronger from this?

BDV: Absolutely. Especially concerning the French elections. I would like to highlight, however, that although this battle was won, and it was surely a hard one, the war is far from over. And this war consists in a considerable political struggle: that between those who support openness and those who support different varieties of closeness. In this regard, the Austrian elections demonstrated that this fight is not over yet. Van der Bellen’s victory [in the 2016 presidential elections] had seemingly given good reasons to many to hope for a pro-European turn in the country. In last year’s political elections, however, Sebastian Kurz’s ÖVP won and formed a government that has as its junior partner the nationalist FPÖ party. The match, thus, is not over yet.

AV: In this context, then, where can a new impulse to European integration come from? Maybe from the reform of a particular domain of EU governance?

BDV: Actually, I think that elections are the most important factor, with all their natural limits. We need to be aware of how people are voting in Poland, in Austria, in France, where the electoral results were fundamental, and of course in Italy, where there are reasons to be worried. Most importantly, we need to acknowledge the fact that the European Union is a recurring topic in several national campaigns. Different nationalist discourses are engaged in criticising the EU. It is necessary to build an effective counter-narrative, first of all on a political and symbolical level.

AV: Do you currently see any examples of this counter-narrative in Europe?

BDV: The foremost example I can think of is Macron’s electoral campaign. Most importantly, the French president has kept saying the same things after being elected, for example in his Sorbonne speech [on September 26, 2017]. Macron won exactly because he confronted nationalism directly, arguing, against the prevailing common sense, that there is a need for shared sovereignty, the only possible type of sovereignty.

AV: It was surely a controversial choice of terms. A sizeable portion of European citizens probably sees the very expression “shared sovereignty” as a contradiction in terms.

BDV: I think that the main fault of making this idea popular lies primarily on political leaders. They have often decided to use emotional arguments to their advantage, on the assumption that they would have benefited from them for a long time. This often did not happen, but those same ideas that they disseminated among the population stayed and took roots. Brexit is an example of this phenomenon.

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: As far as Brexit is concerned, what do you think of the current state of UK-EU negotiations?

BDV: In my opinion, the EU has been doing very well. Up to now, Brussels managed to act without allowing internal divisions to have too much of an impact. Of course, within the Union there is a variety of positions, depending on what is at stake in each country. Besides this, the Union’s position has remained tightly knit and every member state is respecting it. Actually, the United Kingdom has the most unclear position. London must decide what endpoint it desires to achieve. On a continuum that goes from Canada to Norway, the United Kingdom should decide where to end up.

AV: Does Italy have a preferred endpoint in the current negotiations?

BDV: I can only tell you which my favourite endpoint is. Personally, I would prefer that Brexit negotiations ended by leaving room for a potential British change of mind. This change of mind can take place with a referendum, just like the one that was had in June 2016, and can express the opposite political choice. I am convinced that such a great democracy as Britain can reconsider the decision that it took.

AV: In this context, Italy is often described as sympathetic to the UK on Brexit. This impression is particularly evident in the Italian press. Do you agree with it?

BDV: This impression may be appropriate for the current government. Prime Minister Gentiloni has surely been very ‘friendly’ towards London – and rightly so. Personally, I am convinced that the relation between Italy and the UK should consist in an outspoken friendship. Outspokenness in mutual relations should not prevent cooperation between the two countries – on the contrary, it can be conducive to that. Actually, my dream is to set a way to have the UK not leave the European Union. Having said that, those who say that ‘Brexit is Brexit’ are right: it is a serious and historical move that we simply cannot ignore. Surely, it is impossible to have ‘business as usual’ after this referendum. The fundamental point that must be clarified in Europe now, in the Brexit negotiations and in general, is that the European single market, its flows, and its positive consequences could not survive the end of political integration. It is impossible to imagine a real single market without its governing institutions: economic and political integration support each other. For them, the Latin brocard aut simul stabunt, aut simul cadent [they will either stand together, or fall together] applies. This must be reaffirmed, of course, to fight nationalism, which is an enemy of both political and economic integration, as it often implies the adoption of protectionist policies. It should also be reaffirmed, however, to Central European countries.

AV: In this regard, how should the EU deal with the more sceptical position of some Central European member states, like the Visegrád Four [Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic]?

BDV: With the Central European countries, we need to engage in a political confrontation that should be solved in political terms. Of course, inside the Union each country is free to make a choice regarding the type of policies that they want to implement internally. But it should be clear that belonging to the single market means sharing not only its rights, but also all the duties and responsibilities that follow from them. From this point of view, the refusal of some member states to share the burden of migrant hospitality is inacceptable. Central European countries receive, and rightly so, structural funds that helped and still help them to reach a level of development that is comparable to that of Western Europe. As for structural funds, Italy is a net contributor. Benefitting from the EU budget through structural funds, however, entails the need to take part in the Union’s common efforts, including sharing the burden of immigration policies. The two things are inseparable: accepting the former means accepting the latter too.

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The Italian version is available here.

Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview.

Intervista con Benedetto Della Vedova, Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri del Governo italiano – Il difficile cammino dell’Europa

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief discusses with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova è Sottosegretario di Stato agli Affari Esteri e alla Cooperazione Internazionale dal 28 febbraio 2014, nei governi di Matteo Renzi e Paolo Gentiloni; è Senatore della Repubblica dal 2013. È attualmente candidato per la lista pro-europeista “+Europa”, assieme all’ex-ministro agli Esteri Emma Bonino, per il collegio uninominale di Prato. Andrea Varsori, Editor-in-chief di Strife, gli ha parlato al King’s College, dove della Vedova ha partecipato al dibattito “The Road towards the United States of Europe”, organizzato dalla King’s Italian Society. Nell’intervista, si è discusso delle future prospettive dell’Unione Europea, delle sue divisioni interne, e della posizione italiana riguardo a Brexit.

 

AV: Col 2017, ci siamo lasciati alle spalle quattro grandi elezioni nazionali: Paesi Bassi, Francia, Germania, Austria. Lei pensa che l’UE ne sia uscita più forte?

BDV: Sicuramente sì. È uscita più forte soprattutto dalle elezioni francesi. Vorrei sottolineare, però, che si tratta di vittoria in una battaglia, magari quella principale, ma non nella guerra. E questa guerra consiste in uno scontro politico sostanziale: quello tra i fautori dell’apertura e i fautori di varie modalità di chiusura. A questo proposito, le elezioni austriache ci hanno dimostrato che lo scontro non è finito. Poteva sembrare, all’inizio, che la vittoria di Van der Bellen lasciasse ben sperare per un esito a favore dell’Europa. Alle ultime elezioni politiche, però, l’ÖVP di Sebastian Kurz ha vinto e ha formato un governo che ha come azionista di primaria importanza i nazionalisti dell’FPÖ. La partita, dunque, non è chiusa.

AV: In questo contesto, allora, da cosa può passare un eventuale rilancio dell’integrazione europea? Forse da una decisiva riforma di un settore dell’Unione?

BDV: In realtà credo che a contare di più siano le elezioni. Con tutti i difetti che possono avere. Dobbiamo tenere conto di come si vota in Polonia, in Austria, in Francia, dove l’esito è stato decisivo, e ovviamente in Italia, dove c’è da avere preoccupazione. Soprattutto, dobbiamo accettare il fatto che l’Unione Europea sia oggetto delle campagne elettorali nazionali. Da un lato, è oggetto di critiche da parte delle varie narrative nazionaliste. La necessità è quella di costruire una contro-narrativa efficace, soprattutto sul piano politico e simbolico.

AV: Lei vede degli esempi di questa contro-narrativa in questo momento in Europa?

BDV: Sicuramente la campagna elettorale di Macron è uno di questi. Soprattutto, il presidente francese ha continuato a dire le stesse cose anche dopo essere stato eletto, ad esempio nel discorso che ha fatto alla Sorbona. Macron ha vinto proprio perché ha affrontato direttamente il nazionalismo, sostenendo, contro la vulgata comune, la necessità di costruire una sovranità condivisa, l’unico tipo possibile di sovranità.

AV: Sicuramente una mossa controversa. Una parte consistente dei cittadini europei probabilmente vede l’espressione “sovranità condivisa” come un controsenso.

BDV: In questo, penso che la responsabilità decisiva nella diffusione di questa idea sia delle leadership politiche. Spesso, hanno deciso di cavalcare l’emotività, nella falsa convinzione che una tale mossa potesse pagare ben al di là del voto. Così spesso non è stato, ma le idee propagandate in campagna elettorale sono rimaste e hanno attecchito tra i votanti. Brexit ne è un esempio.

 

Benedetto Della Vedova has been Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: Parlando di Brexit, lei cosa pensa dello stato attuale dei negoziati tra Gran Bretagna e Unione Europea?

BDV: Trovo molto positivo l’atteggiamento tenuto dall’Unione Europea sinora. Per ora, a Bruxelles ci si è mossi senza prestare il fianco a troppe divisioni interne. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione le posizioni sono differenziate tra diversi Paesi. Nonostante questo, la posizione coesa dell’Unione nel negoziato è rispettata da tutti. Il punto della questione, in realtà, è il Regno Unito. È Londra che deve decidere che obiettivo vuole raggiungere. Su un continuum che va dal Canada alla Norvegia, il Regno Unito deve decidere dove posizionarsi.

AV: L’Italia ha un esito preferito dei negoziati in corso sulla Brexit?

BDV: Io le posso dire quale esito preferirei io. Personalmente, io vorrei che i negoziati sulla Brexit finissero in modo da lasciare spazio e modalità per un ripensamento. Questo ripensamento può avvenire con una modalità uguale e una decisione contraria a quella avvenuta nel giugno 2016. Sono convinto che una grande democrazia come quella britannica possa benissimo ritornare sui propri passi.

AV: In questo contesto, la posizione dell’Italia, soprattutto nella stampa domestica, è spesso descritta come simpatetica alle istanze britanniche nel negoziato. Lei è d’accordo con questa visione?

BDV: Questa impressione può essere adeguata per il presente governo. Il Primo Ministro Gentiloni è sicuramente molto friendly nei confronti di Londra – ed è giusto così. Personalmente, sono convinto che il rapporto tra Italia e Regno Unito debba essere una amicizia nella franchezza. La franchezza nei rapporti reciproci non deve impedire, ma anzi può aiutare la collaborazione tra i due Paesi. Il mio sogno, in realtà, è quello di impostare delle modalità per ottenere un esito diverso dall’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione. Detto questo, ha ragione chi dice che Brexit is Brexit: è una cosa seria, di portata storica, che è impossibile ignorare. Sicuramente, dopo il referendum non è possibile avere del business as usual. La questione fondamentale che va riaffermata in questo momento in Europa, nell’ambito dei negoziati su Brexit ma non solo, è che il mercato unico europeo, i suoi flussi e i suoi benefici non sopravvivrebbero alla fine dell’integrazione politica. Non è possibile immaginare un vero single market senza un complesso di istituzioni che lo governi: integrazione economica e politica si sostengono a vicenda. Per esse, vale la formula latina simul stabunt, simul cadent. Questo va ribadito, ovviamente, per combattere il nazionalismo, che è un nemico sia per l’integrazione politica, sia per quella economica, dato che spesso implica il protezionismo. Ma andrebbe ribadito anche ai Paesi dell’Est.

AV: A questo proposito, come affrontare le posizioni più scettiche di certi Paesi dell’Europa Centrale, come quelli del Gruppo di Visegrád (Polonia, Ungheria, Cechia, Slovacchia)?

BDV: Quello con i Paesi dell’Europa Centrale è uno scontro politico da affrontare in termini politici. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione tutti i Paesi sono in condizione di fare una scelta riguardo al tipo di politiche che essi preferiscono condurre internamente. Però il punto che va chiarito è che l’appartenenza al mercato unico implica una condivisione totale dei diritti, ma anche dei doveri e delle responsabilità che ne conseguono. Da questo punto di vista, è inammissibile che certi Paesi si siano rifiutati di partecipare alla condivisione dei migranti. Le nazioni dell’Europa Centrale ricevono, giustamente, fondi strutturali dall’Unione che le hanno aiutate e le stanno aiutando a raggiungere livelli di sviluppo economico comparabili a quelli dell’Europa Occidentale. Per i fondi strutturali, l’Italia è un contributore netto. Beneficiare di voci di bilancio europee quali le politiche di sviluppo strutturale, però, significa anche dover prender parte agli sforzi comuni dell’Unione, inclusa l’accoglienza di migranti. Le due cose si accompagnano: accettare una significa accettare anche l’altra.

 

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The English version is available here

Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview

Grand Coalition Deal: What to Expect from Germany’s next Government in Foreign and Security Policy

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By Felix Manig

German soldier part of the UN-led MINUSMA mission in Mali (Credit image: Michael Kappeler/dpa)

Five months after the September 2017 elections, the ‘grand coalition’ deal between Angela Merkel’s centre-right CDU, her sister-party CSU and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) is set to end unprecedented political stalemate in Germany. While the deal hinges on a final approval by the 460,000 members of the SPD base in early March, observers are already examining the negotiation agreement for clues of what to expect from Germany’s next government. Given new geopolitical realities in Europe’s neighbourhood, uncertainty about transatlantic relations, and repeated calls for Berlin to take on a more proactive role in international affairs, what does the new proposal hold for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy? The coalition paper builds on Germany’s latest strategic military document, the so-called “White Paper” of 2016, and places a primary focus on developing an integrated approach to European foreign and security policy, increasing Germany’s commitment to multilateral alliances, and the modernization of its armed forces.

Interestingly, the current paper mandates a sense of urgency and reckoning rarely found among German lawmakers in shaping security and defence policy. (Note: A link to the full version of the coalition proposal will be provided at the end of this article.) Commitments to multilateral approaches to conflict resolution, including mechanisms at the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and along the European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are recurrent German priorities which appeared in previous coalition deals. However, parties involved in the coalition discussions now describe today’s world as “less secure and less predictable”. The paper identifies geopolitical tensions, climate change, intractable civil conflicts, as well as a new form of aggressive nationalism within and outside of Europe as key threats to international peace, security, and democracy.

 

European Foreign and Security Policy 

Decision-makers in the potential coalition are promoting the clear message that Europe needs a new narrative and must take on more responsibility to ensure its own security. The proposal identifies the need for EU states to adopt an integrated approach in foreign affairs and security issues, and to strengthen existing CSDP mechanisms. The parties’ commitment to the European Defence Union, which would see joint procurement among member states and the establishment of multinational forces within the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) framework, would be an important first step in this direction. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the paper is the call for an “Army of Europeans”, an idea EU members had previously discarded due to the reluctance to cede sovereignty on defence policy.

The potential new government also plans to strengthen German capacities for strategic analysis and communication, both on the military and civilian front. This includes increased funding for the Federal Academy for Security Policy, an education and training institution under guidance of the Ministry of Defence, as well as key German security and foreign policy think tanks such as the German Council on Foreign Relations or the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Furthermore, the coalition suggests the creation of a “European Council on Global Responsibilities”, an independent institution tasked, somewhat vaguely, to promote a European signature on questions of international order.  Equally, there is room for interpretation from what is not mentioned in the paper. While Russian meddling in the US general election continues to make headlines across the Atlantic, the coalition partners appear, at least publicly, less concerned about disinformation campaigns within Germany and its periphery. This omission is likely part of Germany’s strategy to keep wires open to Moscow in order to reach an agreement on Ukraine.

 

International and European Alliances and Partnerships 

Germany continues to view multilateral initiatives and alliances as the best tools for maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, the country is set to expand its role in these forums, harnessing the German government’s forecasts for increasing federal budgetary margins for 2018-2021. These revenues are earmarked to increase defence spending and funding for conflict prevention tools, humanitarian and development aid but also cultural and educational programs abroad. Yet, while the 2016 “White Paper” pledged to reach the NATO target for defence spending of 2% of GDP, this commitment is missing in the new coalition proposal.

As part of NATO’s strategic upgrade in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Germany is also expected to host a new alliance headquarters for troop and equipment transports near the former capital of Bonn. At the UN, Germany is applying for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council for 2019/2020 and advocates for structural reform of the UN organ, which it hopes would pave the way for a permanent seat for the EU. The authors of the coalition proposal also appear willing to increase Germany’s voluntary contributions to various UN programmes, including peacekeeping and crisis management.

 

Modernizing the Bundeswehr 

Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, have long made negative headlines about equipment shortages and poor performance. Some of these stories seem borderline comical, including reports that a German battalion in 2015 found itself without weapons during a NATO exercise in Norway, leaving soldiers to holster broomsticks to their armoured vehicles. A more recent report characterised the shortfalls as “dramatically hindering combat readiness”. In reality, the Bundeswehr is in desperate need of modernization, something the next government aims to take on.

The coalition proposal highlights digitalisation as a key priority for the armed forces in the coming years. Extra funding from a higher defence budget would be used for optimizing and harmonizing existing equipment, as well as developing new innovative capacities, such as weaponized drone capabilities. To promote technological innovation, the Ministry of Defence also plans to establish an “Agency for Disruptive Innovation in Cybersecurity and Key Technologies”.

The Bundeswehr will continue participating in most existing theatres, most notably the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as the UN-peacekeeping operation MINUSMA in Mali, where Germany has stationed roughly 1,000 troops respectively. Given the recent tactical defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, the deal sees Germany likely ending its training mission and weapons supplies to the Peshmerga forces operating across the Levant.

 

A Slowly Changing German Self-Image?

It would be far-fetched to characterise the coalition proposal as a complete departure from previous government statements regarding issues of peace and security. The new government will likely continue to place a premium on diplomacy and dialogue, while at the same time strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms in foreign and security policy.

Yet whilst it may be premature to diagnose a paradigm shift in German foreign and security policy, the proposal does contain the underlying narrative of growing European responsibility and posture. This approach will inevitably mean a more active role for Germany in shaping international affairs. At the same time, as any preliminary guiding document, the paper contains vague language and promises that can be walked back on. Bearing in mind that voter support for the SPD and grand coalition have recently dropped to a record low, there is no guarantee that the rank and file members of the Social Democrats will sign off on the coalition pact in the special ballot. If the deal fails, Germany would likely have to hold new general elections, which would plunge the country into a true political crisis.

 

Click here to access the full version of the coalition proposal (in German).

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2017/01_en/bilder/2017-01-10-bundeswehr-mali.jpg?__blob=bpaTopmeldung&v=4  

How might Europe react to Trump’s Iran Deal policy?

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By Lélia Rousselet and Jackson Webster

Mohammad Javad Zarif , the Iranian Foreign Minister, and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Brussels in February 2016 (Credit: Olivier Hoslet/EPA)

 

The Iran Deal – former American President Barack Obama’s defining diplomatic accomplishment – may soon be coming to an end. The “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015 and marked the end of eight years of intense multilateral diplomatic efforts, conducted by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Germany, and the EU, and spearheaded largely by Secretary of State John Kerry.

This central piece of the Obama legacy has been endangered by President Donald Trump, who repeatedly expressed his disdain for the agreement on the campaign trail, and has now officially ‘de-certified‘ Iranian compliance with the deal’s conditions to Congress on Friday, October 13. European diplomats had tried for months to convince the Trump administration to avoid de-certifying the deal. Much has already been said about the potential political fallout in Washington, most strikingly the possibility that US Defence Secretary James Mattis and others could be pushed out of the administration following a decertification of the Iran Deal. This article will review the knock-on effects of these possibilities in Europe, both politically and for business, and to evaluate how Europe might respond.

Its important here to note that Trump’s de-certification does not necessarily lead to the end of the JCPOA. The US Congress now has less than two months to decide whether or not to reimpose sanctions. Though Obama faced trouble in getting the agreement past Congressional muster, it’s uncertain if Congress will reimpose sanctions, effectively killing the deal. Kicking the ball to Congress creates more unpredictability in the coming weeks, all in the knowledge that the process might repeat itself in three months for the next certification. To stop this cycle, Congress must pass a new law ending Washington’s internal certification process, so that the only organization which has the legitimacy to assess Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be the IAEA. And since the deal’s signing, all of the IAEA’s reports are clear: Iran is respecting its part of the deal.

Political consequences for Europe

As is often the case, there will not likely be a unified “European response”, rather several “European responses”. Now that Trump has “de-certified” the deal, Europeans must react in three different dimensions.

First, France, Germany, and the UK must clearly and continually state their disagreement with Trump’s decision and support for the deal. As French President Emmanuel Macron did in his “Make our planet great again” speech after Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the European members of the JCPOA will have to employ a strong rhetorical rebuke of Trump’s policy. This seems to be the path chosen thus far by European leaders — shortly after Trump’s announcement, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British PM Theresa May, and Macron released a joint statement reaffirming their support to the JCPOA. Similarly, the Chief of the EU External Action Service, Federica Mogherini, issued a strong declaration in support of the deal and against a unilateral American withdrawal.

Second, the most significant concern would obviously be the reaction towards Washington, as Europeans must express a clear disagreement without endangering transatlantic relations. That is exactly what Macron did during a TV interview on October 15, when he reaffirmed the necessity to maintain dialogue with Trump to avoid entering a “zero-sum game”, to be open to broader negotiations on Iran, and to recognize the deal’s importance to regional security and stability. Macron stated that European governments should look more closely into Iran’s role in the region. This approach could help Europeans to convince Trump that controlling Iranian nuclear enrichment actually means being tough on Iran and having full access to its nuclear facilities. Furthermore, should this approach preserves diplomatic ties with Tehran, Europeans could agree to re-negotiate only on specific aspects of the deal such as the “sunset clauses”. A title change, and the use of tougher language, with minimal substantive modifications might even be enough for Trump to take political ownership of the agreement.

Third, the bilateral reaction towards Iran. Europe’s main objective should be to contain escalation. European leaders, in particular those in Paris and London, have invested significant time and resources into the deal and opening the Iranian economy. To de-escalate, Europeans will need to reaffirm their commitment to dialogue to keep the door open for diplomacy with their Iranian counterparts.

As for now, the main long-term risk to the agreement would be an Iranian withdrawal in response to US threat, achieving in the process a victory for hard-liners in Tehran. This key factor is, unfortunately, out of European policymakers’ control. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif took to Twitter after Trump’s announcement, taking two interesting positions. First, he singled out Trump personally. He claimed that “Trump’s friendship is for sale to the highest bidder”, but did not seem to associate the overall American government with Trump’s personal vendetta against Iran. Second, he reiterated an oft-used line of President Hassan Rouhani, calling Trump’s actions worthy of the label of a “rogue state”. The Iranian government also reacted strongly by promising a “crushing response” to Trump’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. There is no word thus far from Tehran as to how Iran might respond to broader Congressional sanctions, particularly where it endangers relations with Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels.

 

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Head of the EU External Action Service Federica Mogherini (C) and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during the talks for the signature of the JCPOA (Credit photo: Herbert Neubauer/EPA)

 

Business consequences for Europe

Economic fallout from reinstated American sanctions would follow an initial political shockwave. However, this would likely have limited impact on Europe with greater political implications than economic ones.

Following the signing of the 2015 deal, and the ensuing lifting of sanctions, a flurry of foreign investment was expected to rush into Iran. Despite the country’s attempts to lure European investors, takers were few and far between. Doing business in Iran remains costly and dangerous, mainly due to targeted sanctions on Iranian nationals with certain political or organizational ties. Particularly surprising has been the near-complete absence of banks investing in Iran. BNP Paribas, for its part, has been shy in recent years, owing to a €9B (£8.1B) fine imposed by American authorities after the bank’s connections to Iran, Sudan, and Cuba were exposed.

Most of the companies which invested were either French, most notably PSA Citroën and Total, or have a significant amount of their manufacturing base in France. This second case refers to Airbus, who signed deals in December 2016 and July 2017 for 170 of their A321 and A330 aircraft, a deal worth over $11B (£8.5B). These deals underscore France’s economic self-interest in keeping Iranian markets open.

The Airbus deal is particularly vulnerable in the face of potential American sanctions. Were Trump to pull the US out of the deal, re-imposing sanctions on Iran, the Airbus deal would inevitably be off. Airbus aircraft are made using parts from all over Europe and the globe, including the US. Under US Treasury Department rules, because at least some components of the A320 family of airframes are made in the US, Airbus must obtain authorization for every deal it makes to export. This authorization can be revoked at any time. Furthermore, the Airbus deal is especially tenuous, given the manufacturer’s recent quarrels with American regulators. Moreover, the US is increasingly important to Airbus’ supply chain, given its recent acquisition of the Bombardier C-Series assembly process based in Alabama.

Despite European resolve to maintain the deal, there will not likely be a single ‘European’ response in the long-term. Governments and companies have begun engaging with Iran in different ways and to varying degrees since 2015. For example, the EKF, Denmark’s export credit agency, signed an agreement with the Iranian Finance Ministry,  providing a 100% guarantee for financing exports of Danish goods to Iran. Austrian and Italian creditors have followed suit. By contrast, with the exception of German stake in Airbus, German companies have generally stayed away from Iran, perhaps due in large part to the precarious fiscal and regulatory state of many major German banks.

A second key factor in play is the question of Iran’s reaction. Tehran has not indicated how much it values European economic involvement in a context of escalation with Washington. The Guardian’s Saeed Kamali claims that “other Iranian officials have hinted that Iran may continue adhering to the deal provided that the US does not obstruct European investments.”

The White House has already announced new sanctions on the IRGC. Despite being a military organization, the IRGC also has a significant stake in the Iranian economy and its leadership is filled with political hard-liners. Sanctions on this organization may impact European companies engaging in Iran. In compliance with existing prohibitions on conducting business with the IRGC, these companies do not work directly with the IRGC itself, but it is highly likely that they engage with companies at least partially controlled by them; 35-40% of the Iranian economy is estimated to belong to the “semi-state-controlled” category, a large portion of which falls under various wings of the IRGC.

Once again, the Iranian reaction is key. Should Tehran flaunt its missile program in the face of what it perceives as American deception, it will likely scare away European business.

 

 

Lélia Rousselet is a research and program coordinator at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Paris Office. Her work includes research on security and defense issues, French and American foreign policy, and Middle-Eastern and North African affairs. She holds  master’s degrees from the Doctoral School of Sciences Po and and La Sorbonne University. She is the author of Négocier l’atome (L’Harmattan, 2017). You can follow her @LeliaRousselet

 Jackson Webster is a native of Southern California and a graduate of the Department of War Studies, where he was President of the King’s College London United Nations Association. He is currently reading for a master’s in International Security with a focus on Russian/Eastern Europe and cyber security from Sciences Po Paris. You can follow him @joliverwebster 

Images sources: 

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