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L’impeachment che non fu. Tre appunti per i mesi a venire

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by Andrea Varsori

Il Presidente della Repubblica Sergio Mattarella arriva nella sala stampa del Quirinale la sera di domenica 27 maggio (Image Credit: LaPresse)

Per l’Italia, gli ultimi giorni del mese scorso sono stati estremamente movimentati, anche per gli standard a cui la politica nazionale e internazionale ci ha abituato negli ultimi anni. Tra il 28 e il 29 maggio, abbiamo assistito all’impennarsi di tensioni interne e esterne. Politici, osservatori e cittadini hanno preso parte a uno scontro senza precedenti tra il Presidente della Repubblica e le due forze politiche che stavano formando il governo, la Lega e il Movimento 5 Stelle. Quest’ultima ha seriamente proposto la messa in stato d’accusa del Presidente. Alla chiamata nelle piazze da parte del M5S ha risposto il Partito Democratico, in una escalation di mobilitazione. Nel frattempo, esponenti politici nazionali si sono scontrati con membri della Commissione Europea e parlamentari europei. Investitori stranieri hanno perso fiducia nella capacità italiana di ripagare il debito, con immediate conseguenze sul valore dei titoli bancari e sul costo pagato dal Paese per rifinanziarsi sui mercati. Almeno in questo senso, sembrava di essere tornati nel caos del novembre 2011.

A vedere, invece, quello che è successo nei giorni successivi, c’è di che stupirsi. Una frattura che, lunedì e martedì, sembrava insanabile e capace di dividere il Paese, si è ricomposta con il semplice spostamento di Paolo Savona, economista fortemente critico della partecipazione italiana all’euro, dal Ministero dell’Economia al meno importante Ministero agli Affari Europei. Il veto del Presidente è stato così superato. Tra giovedì sera e venerdì pomeriggio, un governo tecnico nato morto è stato accantonato, e un governo politico è nato e ha giurato fedeltà alla Repubblica. Quello stesso sabato, Giuseppe Conte, il neo-premier, sedeva sorridente al fianco di Mattarella. E ora, con la fiducia ottenuta in entrambe le camere, il governo Conte è una realtà solida, al contrario di quello che si poteva pensare solo qualche giorno prima.

Sarebbe sbagliato, però, pensare che tutto questo non conti più. Gli eventi degli ultimi giorni di maggio possono ora sembrare sepolti dalle dichiarazioni di quelli che adesso sono esponenti di Governo, soprattutto considerando quanto poco durino le notizie nel clima mediatico in cui viviamo. Per quanto la nascita del governo Conte abbia cambiato la situazione politica nazionale, però, non ha cambiato di certo alcuni fattori strutturali. Questi fattori persistono, e riguardano l’instabilità politica interna, che può tornare in qualsiasi momento; la debolezza economica italiana, che conta ancora moltissimo; e il rapporto tra Italia ed Unione Europea, ormai più di scontro che di confronto.

 

Politica italiana: mai davvero stabile

La prima osservazione che si può fare è che, almeno per i prossimi mesi, non potremo dire che la situazione politica italiana si sia davvero stabilizzata. Questo punto di vista può sembrare molto pessimista, considerato che il governo Conte è nato e ha una maggioranza relativamente solida e un contratto di governo già pronto. La mia risposta a queste obiezioni si limita a evidenziare due eventi accaduti dopo che è emerso il veto di Sergio Mattarella su Paolo Savona. Il primo è la scelta di Matteo Salvini di abbandonare il tavolo dei negoziati e far saltare, in un primo momento, il governo Conte. Sull’opportunità politica della mossa di Mattarella, ovviamente, si può discutere: ma non è quello che interessa qui. La crisi tra M5S, Lega e Quirinale, infatti, si poteva benissimo evitare, soprattutto nel caso sia vera l’ipotesi che Mattarella avesse proposto Giancarlo Giorgetti, storico esponente leghista, come alternativa a Savona. È probabile che la mossa di Salvini sia stata motivata dalla crescita in popolarità che ne sarebbe seguita per la Lega, fotografata da molti recenti sondaggi. Anche se questo non fosse vero, però, la crisi di rapporti si poteva benissimo evitare. La nascita del governo Conte con Savona agli Affari Europei dimostra che un’alternativa era possibile. La reazione di Salvini ha mostrato, nel caso peggiore, opportunismo, nel caso migliore mancanza di capacità di gestire negoziati politici.

Ancora più grave è stata la reazione di Luigi Di Maio, con l’immediata proposta di mettere Mattarella in stato d’accusa. Questa idea, infatti, è stata chiaramente lanciata senza pianificazione alcuna. Ne è testimone il fatto che la Lega da subito si sia dimostrata scettica, pur criticando fortemente il Presidente, e se ne sia tirata fuori già lunedì 28 maggio. Di Maio ha scommesso una parte rilevante del suo capitale politico e delle possibilità di successo del suo partito su una mossa rischiosa, polarizzante, e senza molte possibilità di ottenere risultati tangibili. Ha perfino convocato una manifestazione a Roma che, man mano che la settimana passava, ha dovuto assistere a una paradossale inversione di toni. Chiedere la messa in stato d’accusa è stata una mossa autolesionista per Di Maio e il M5S; il che è grave, dato che denota, come nel caso di Salvini, opportunismo oppure mancanza di capacità di gestire delle crisi.

Queste dimostrazioni di inabilità politica non fanno ben sperare, viste le differenze di storia e retorica tra Lega e M5S. La coordinazione tra le due forze, nei giorni peggiori della crisi istituzionale, è stata scarsa, per non dire inesistente. Questo aspetto potrebbe migliorare se le due forze politiche sapranno imparare a coordinarsi e a guadagnare una la fiducia dell’altra. Ma, stante come si sono comportate la settimana scorsa, questo non succederà certo nel breve periodo. Ancora per qualche mese non potremo dire che l’Italia sia davvero stabile. Un qualsiasi inciampo può accadere di nuovo, con tutte le conseguenze negative che abbiamo visto.

 

Economia italiana: una continua debolezza

Le conseguenze negative sono state, principalmente, di natura economica e hanno dimostrato che l’Italia è ancora molto fragile sotto questo punto di vista. Questa affermazione è basata su dati, piuttosto che pregiudizi. La situazione attuale di moderata crescita non deve infatti mascherare il fatto che i fondamentali economici sono ancora deboli. Innanzitutto, la crescita economica italiana è ancora minore di quella degli altri Paesi dell’Eurozona e, secondo stime del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, probabilmente rallenterà l’anno prossimo. La produttività italiana è bassa e stagnante ormai da decenni. L’Italia non è considerata un buon ambiente per fare impresa e non ha molto successo nell’attrarre investimenti esteri, con Regno Unito, Francia e Germania in una posizione molto migliore, nonostante alcuni miglioramenti recenti. La pressione fiscale è tra le più alte d’Europa; il tasso di povertà è in aumento; il tasso di disoccupazione è ancora relativamente alto, specialmente per i giovani, e anche la sua recente diminuzione è dovuta perlopiù a creazione di posti di lavoro a tempo determinato. Infine, la crescita economica italiana è principalmente trainata dalle esportazioni, che saranno particolarmente vulnerabili alle guerre commerciali che gli Stati Uniti stanno iniziando con l’Unione Europea.

Tutto questo aggrava la situazione del debito pubblico. L’Italia ha il secondo rapporto tra debito e PIL più alto d’Europa, superata in questo solo dalla Grecia, e il quinto più alto nel mondo. Il 32% del debito sovrano italiano è in mano a investitori esteri. Questo è un fatto fondamentale, poiché, nel momento in cui questi hanno ragioni per temere che l’Italia non possa o non voglia ripagare il suo debito, il costo che il Paese affronta per finanziarsi sui mercati si alza, limitando immediatamente la disponibilità di soldi del governo. A partire dalla crisi del debito sovrano del 2011, in realtà, la quota di debito in mano a investitori esteri è progressivamente diminuita. È passata dal 51% del 2010 al 36.1% del 2016; in questo, le operazioni di Quantitative Easing della BCE hanno costituito un’occasione che gli investitori esteri hanno sfruttato per liberarsi di circa 78 miliardi di euro di titoli di stato italiani tra il 2015 e l’inizio di quest’anno. Da una parte, questa diminuzione è un fenomeno positivo, poiché riduce in una certa misura il rischio di contagio tra Italia e Unione Europea e rende Roma meno dipendente dai mercati esteri. Dall’altra parte, però, le banche italiane ora possiedono una porzione maggiore del debito sovrano nazionale. Questo significa che qualsiasi crisi del debito italiano si traduce immediatamente in una crisi bancaria, comportando minore accesso al credito per imprese e famiglie.

È molto difficile che questi fondamentali economici cambino nel breve periodo.

 

Rapporto Italia-UE: i pregiudizi hanno la meglio

Infine, gli eventi della scorsa settimana ci hanno dimostrato che il rapporto tra Italia e Unione Europea probabilmente sarà di scontro, piuttosto che di cooperazione. Si tratta di uno scontro che riguarda innanzitutto le regole europee. Per quanto ci siano notevoli differenze tra Lega e Movimento 5 Stelle, queste due forze politiche hanno un obbiettivo comune: convincere Bruxelles ad allentare i limiti sulla spesa pubblica e a rimandare qualsiasi tentativo di riduzione del debito sovrano italiano. Carlo Cottarelli, qualche giorno prima di essere coinvolto nello sfortunato tentativo di formare un governo tecnico, aveva pubblicato con l’Osservatorio Conti Pubblici dell’Università Cattolica di Milano uno studio in cui analizzava costi e coperture del contratto di programma M5S-Lega. Lo studio evidenziava che le proposte avanzate dalle forze di governo costeranno tra i 108.7 e i 125.7 miliardi di euro, con coperture previste per solo mezzo miliardo. Anche se il neonato governo Conte dovesse decidere di realizzare solo parte del suo contratto, difficilmente risolverà questo problema. È probabile allora che il nuovo esecutivo cerchi di ottenere, anche con metodi energici e poco ortodossi, un allentamento dei vincoli europei.

Non sembra, però, che a Bruxelles ci sia molta voglia di concedere ciò. Anche se altri Paesi mediterranei dovessero unirsi al tentativo italiano (cosa affatto scontata), alcuni Stati settentrionali, come Paesi Bassi e Finlandia, si opporranno alle richieste di Roma. La Germania farà altrettanto. Concedere tempo e margine economico all’Italia, infatti, sarebbe visto come una resa nei confronti di un Paese che poco ha fatto per rimettere i conti a posto, nonostante il massiccio aiuto offerto dalla Banca Centrale col Quantitative Easing. Una mossa conciliatoria nei confronti dell’Italia sarebbe dunque immediatamente criticata dal partito euroscettico Alternativa per la Germania, il principale rivale della CDU, il partito della cancelliera Angela Merkel. Per quanto riguarda la Francia, l’impulso del Presidente Emmanuel Macron sembra essersi per ora esaurito. Le sue proposte di riforma hanno trovato più ostacoli del previsto, soprattutto nei Paesi citati sopra, e sono state considerevolmente ridimensionate da Merkel domenica scorsa. Il nuovo governo italiano può fare poco per cambiare questa situazione, anche se decidesse di abbandonare il progetto di alcuni suoi esponenti di usare la minaccia di uscire dall’euro come strumento per ottenere concessioni.

Lo scontro tra Italia e Unione, però, non sarà solo di regole, ma anche di idee e pregiudizi. Lo abbiamo già visto nei giorni successivi al veto di Mattarella alla nomina di Savona. A Bruxelles, esponenti politici europei si sono lasciati andare a commenti di dubbia utilità politica, con commentatori, giornalisti e politici italiani pronti a brandirli come prova che l’Europa stesse condizionando la politica nazionale. Tra gli episodi più noti c’è senza dubbio la frase “i mercati insegneranno agli italiani come votare per il lato giusto”, attribuita al commissario europeo Günther Oettinger martedì 29 maggio. La frase, però, era solo una sintesi molto semplicistica scritta dall’intervistatore in un tweet. Il giorno dopo, un membro tedesco del parlamento europeo, esponente della CSU, partito alleato alla CDU di Angela Merkel, ha dichiarato in un’intervista che, in caso di bancarotta italiana, “bisognerebbe invadere Roma e prendere possesso del Ministero dell’Economia”. Anche questo commento, certamente eccessivo e irrispettoso, è stato denunciato in Italia, col risultato di ingigantirne l’importanza. Allo stesso modo, dall’altro lato delle Alpi, stereotipi sui tedeschi hanno cominciato a riemergere. L’esempio più famoso ha riguardato Milena Gabanelli, che, in un video per la Dataroom del Corriere della Sera, ha usato un copricapo militare nazista per rappresentare i tedeschi. Accomunare la Germania di oggi a quella degli anni ’30 e ’40, però, viene fatto in maniera più esplicita da molti, incluso il nuovo Ministro agli Affari Europei. È evidente che, in questo contesto, è molto facile per tutt’e due le parti non solo lasciarsi andare a dichiarazioni colme di pregiudizi, ma anche denunciarle e amplificarle, dando così l’impressione che l’intera nazione le condivida.

Questo contribuisce ad accrescere la distanza tra Italia e Germania, oltre che tra Italia e Unione Europea. Questo avviene in un terreno già fertile. Studi annuali dell’Eurobarometro, che si occupa di registrare l’evoluzione dell’opinione pubblica europea, mostrano che l’Italia è tra i Paesi meno convinti dell’appartenenza all’Unione. In un sondaggio di quest’anno, solo il 44% degli italiani crede che l’Italia abbia beneficiato dal fare parte dell’Unione Europea. In un altro studio recente, la maggioranza relativa degli italiani (il 46%) ritiene che l’Italia avrebbe un futuro migliore fuori dall’Unione; in questo, sorpassata solo dal Regno Unito. Questo non vuol dire, ovviamente, che Roma seguirà le orme di Londra. Lo scetticismo verso Bruxelles, però, è ormai un fatto conclamato. E il risvegliarsi di rivalità nazionali, che vanno dai semplici stereotipi a un vero e proprio nazionalismo, può rendere il contrasto tra Italia e Unione ancora più difficile da risolvere.

 

Lo scontro a venire

A mio parere, è proprio questo scontro il fattore più importante per i prossimi mesi. I primi giorni della crisi lo hanno rivelato, con il pronto ricorso a pregiudizi da ambedue le parti. Sappiamo da tempo che le rivalità nazionali in Europa non sono scomparse. In Italia, la loro esistenza era stata mascherata per anni da una retorica europeista ideologica, e forse un po’ ingenua, adottata dalle maggiori istituzioni nazionali. Il velo di questo europeismo è stato probabilmente squarciato nel novembre 2011, con il governo Monti. A quell’epoca, l’idea che l’Unione Europea consista in restrizioni e interferenze, piuttosto che libertà e benefici, ha cominciato a farsi strada. È un’idea, questa, portata avanti con forza dalla Lega e, in passato, anche dal Movimento 5 Stelle. Ora che queste due forze politiche tenteranno di realizzare il loro contratto di governo, può farsi ancora più forte.

Si può già delineare un possibile scenario. Prima o dopo le elezioni europee del 2019, Lega e M5S cercheranno di fare più deficit per avverare le proprie promesse elettorali. Facendo questo, si scontreranno con l’Unione e, in particolare, con i Paesi del Nord, più fiscalmente conservatori. In questo contesto, sarà difficile resistere alla tentazione di ricorrere alla retorica delle rivalità nazionali per ottenere voti e consenso in patria. Naturalmente, è possibile che Salvini e Di Maio si fermino prima, consci dei rischi a cui esporrebbero il Paese andando a uno scontro frontale. Da come si sono comportati la scorsa settimana, però, è lecito dubitarne. Si correrà dunque il rischio di cadere in una spirale di accuse reciproche. Convincere gli italiani che la colpa è della Germania e di Bruxelles, però, può colpire la partecipazione italiana all’Unione nelle sue fondamenta ideali.

 

The English version of this piece is available here.

 

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

Image Source: https://www.repstatic.it/content/nazionale/img/2018/05/28/034107183-8b461394-435c-4763-beaa-fa88f54be243.jpg

Strife Feature – Italy’s short circuit week and the fight over Europe

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by Andrea Varsori

The President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella (Image Credit: LaPresse)

 

Italy’s short circuit week

Last week, Italy’s political system went into short circuit. 84 days after the last national elections, an apparently successful attempt at forming a government unexpectedly collapsed at the last minute. Ten days earlier, the two political forces behind the attempt, the right-wing League and the anti-politics Five Star Movement (5SM), had already produced a joint manifesto, a “government contract”. Their members had already approved it: the League had organised voting at hundreds of stands across Italy, while the Movement, coherently with its calls for direct democracy, let its members vote on its online platform, Rousseau. The two forces had already chosen someone for the role of Prime Minister: Giuseppe Conte, a little-known lawyer and professor. They had already agreed on the future ministers. In short, everything seemed ready to go.

Italy’s political system, however, proved to be an obstacle for their plans. In Italy, the President of the Republic nominates the ministers, while the Prime Minister proposes the names. In the days before the collapse of government formation, the President, Sergio Mattarella, had signalled informally that he would not approve the prospective choice for the Minister of Economy. The League wanted Paolo Savona for that role; however, Savona, an economist and former minister, is a hardline Eurosceptic, known for his statements on the euro as a “cage” for the Italian economy and as an instrument of German economic domination. On few occasions, he had stated that Merkel’s Germany amounted to a new version of Hitler’s Third Reich. Most importantly, on May 26, the Italian Huffington Post showed that, in 2015, Savona had presented a Powerpoint presentation proposing a secret plan to leave the euro. On May 27, Mattarella formally declared that he would not accept Savona as Minister, due to the risks he posed to the savings of Italian citizens.

This decision set off what was to be defined as Italy’s deepest constitutional crisis. The League, in fact, reacted by stating that they would never accept to form a government without Savona as the Economy Minister. Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, claimed that Savona was rejected because “he would have defended the interests of Italians, not Germans”. Luigi Di Maio, political leader of the 5SM, went even further, declaring that the Movement would propose Mattarella’s impeachment. If enacted, this would have constituted an unprecedented move in Italian politics. Due to the role of the President as the symbol of the Italian state, rather than a political actor, impeachment was considered seriously only twice in the past, and on both the occasions the Presidents resigned before the process could even start. On May 28, however, Di Maio, in a Facebook video, confirmed the intention to proceed with impeachment and called for a general mobilisation to respond to the President’s decision. On May 29 the Democratic Party, Italy’s main left-of-centre party, organised counter-demonstrations to support Mattarella. In the meantime, most parties were agreeing on holding elections as soon as late July.

 

What ended the short circuit?

Considering that this was happening as early as the morning of Tuesday 29, it seems incredible that, on Friday afternoon, the same Giuseppe Conte was swearing the oath as Prime Minister, with Savona on his government team. In little more than two days, Italy went from a high-level political crisis to successful government formation; from early elections to political stability (of sorts); from the delegitimisation of the head of State to smiles and toasts with him. What had happened in the meantime? The answer is a mix of economic and political events.

Earlier, on May 27, just after having vetoed Savona, Mattarella tried to form a “neutral”, caretaker government, led by former IMF Departmental Director Carlo Cottarelli. Mattarella had already announced a similar initiative on May 7, when negotiations for a political government had seemed to stall. The prospective Cottarelli government seemed to follow in those steps; besides, the institutional and technocratic character of its components was expected to reassure the markets. This, however, did not happen. In the following two days (May 28-29), the difference in yield between Italian and German government bonds skyrocketed from 191 points to 306 points, pointing out to investors considering Italian sovereign debt as a riskier asset. Stock markets in Europe, Asia, and North America fell, with Italian banks the most hit. This backlash seemed to defy the purpose of the Cottarelli government. The latter also seemed condemned to fail from the start, as only a handful of MPs were ready to vote in its favour.

On the other hand, Di Maio soon understood that he had gone too far, as even the League was refusing to support the impeachment process. He let go of that on the evening of Tuesday 29 and started to pressure Salvini into modifying the government team, moving the controversial Savona to another portfolio. On his part, Salvini was looking forward to new elections, as fresh polls said that his party was due to achieve strong gains; however, a new election would have posed financial problems for the League. Moreover, while Salvini could market himself as the defender of Italian democracy, his continued refusal to form a government without Savona as Economy Minister risked to attract the blame on him. Besides, the opportunity of being part of the government and becoming the Home Minister seemed an acceptable outcome.

Consequently, at the end of a frantic week, Italy received a political government. Notwithstanding the fact that the Five Star Movement is not pro-business at all, and that the League still has a decidedly Eurosceptic tone, investors seem to have valued this development positively. Starting from May 30, global stock markets, including Italian bank shares, recovered. On June 1, the same day as Conte was sworn in as PM, the difference between German and Italian government bonds continued to fall, although to this day it continues to be higher than in April. There seems to be relative harmony between the Five Star Movement and the League, as well as between political parties and the President, notwithstanding the calls for his impeachment  a few days  earlier and the demonstrations against the President’s decision that were due to take place on June 2. Instead, on that day, also observed as Italy’s Republic Day, Conte was sitting next to Mattarella at the celebrations taking place in Rome.

 

The three main takeaways

If this were the end of Italy’s short circuit week, all these events would be relatively uninteresting; just another episode in the national political drama. Instead, they are tremendously important, not only for the country, but also for the whole continent. There are, in fact, three main conclusions to be taken from all this.

The first takeaway is that, after this week, the Italian political system cannot be really seen as stable, regardless of the existence of a government. This judgment is not based on prejudice: rather, it flows from the behaviour of the governing parties and their leaders. Italy, in fact, could have at least partly avoided the turmoil in the markets. There is a distinct possibility that Matteo Salvini engineered the collapse of the negotiations because the veto on Savona was a great opportunity to go to early elections and gain a larger share of votes. That would amount to an irresponsible act of political opportunism that exposed the instability of the country. Even if that was not true, however, the knee-jerk reaction of the 5SM, Italy’s largest political force, is an even more serious event. Instead of keeping in touch with the President, Luigi Di Maio opted to propose impeachment, without even knowing if the League would have followed him. He was then forced to withdraw that idea. This mix of opportunism, radical tones, and lack of coordination is, potentially, the sign of further instability to come. It may happen again.

The second insight is that Italy is still economically weak and exposed to the opinion of investors. The relatively good economic situation of the country must not mask Italy’s long-standing issues. Italy’s growth is still smaller than most other countries in the Eurozone, and it is expected to slow down next year. The country also has a historically low productivity and a mediocre environment for doing business, beyond being relatively unattractive to foreign investments, lagging behind the UK, Germany, and France, despite recent improvements. Taxes are among the highest in Europe; poverty is increasing; unemployment rate is still high, especially for people between 25 and 34; and the country’s extant growth is dependent on exports, which may be hard hit by the potential U.S.-EU trade wars.

Most importantly, Italy has the 2nd largest sovereign debt in Europe as a percentage of GDP and 5th largest in the world. A 32% share of this debt is owned by external investors. This is important, as any concern regarding the country’s ability or will to repay its debts translates quickly into a higher cost of obtaining funds on the markets, which in turn restricts greatly the government’s ability to spend money for its policies. Foreign ownership of the Italian sovereign debt has been steadily declining in the past years: the share of foreign investors-held debt was 36.1% in 2016, and around 51% in 2010; the ECB’s quantitative easing has been an opportunity for these investors to shed a reported €78 billion of Italian bonds between 2015 and early 2018. On the one hand, decline in foreign ownership is a positive development, as it lowers the risk of contagion between Italy and the EU and makes Italy less dependent on foreign markets. This also means, however, that domestic banks now hold a comparatively larger share of debt. Every sovereign debt crisis, then, translates quickly into a bank crisis, restricting access to credit for firms and families. All these economic fundamentals are unlikely to change anytime soon.

The third insight is that there is still a battle being waged over the common currency and the future of the European Union. It is, first of all, a battle of rules. The new Italian government, although relatively divided on several topics, shares a common goal: relaxing European rules regarding the reduction of debt and restrictions on deficit spending. Cottarelli, a few days before being nominated PM designate, published with his Observatory on Public Budget, a study outlining that the prospective costs of the 5SM-League government amounted to at least €108.7 ($126.8 or £95) billion, with prospective revenues for only €0.5 billion. Although it is likely that the government will enact only some of these policies, it is clear that the 5SM-League executive will try to negotiate, even forcefully, more freedom for Italian economic policy. However, there seems to be scarce appetite for that in Brussels. Although Spain and Greece may join Italy in this battle, Northern countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Finland, will oppose all such moves. The German government will also ward off such requests. Surrendering to Italy’s demands would attract fierce criticism from the right-wing, Eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany, the main rival to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU. As for France, President Emmanuel Macron’s reform drive seems to have stalled months ago. His ideas have found formidable obstacles in the countries cited above and have been considerably downsized by Merkel just on last Sunday. The Italian government can scarcely change that, even if it abandoned Savona’s brinkmanship, with his project of obtaining concessions in Brussels by threatening to leave the euro.

This is, however, a battle of feelings as well. In the first half of the past week, the tension between Italy and the European Union skyrocketed. In Italy, politicians, pundits, and citizens instantly and vehemently condemned statements coming from Brussels. In a famous episode, on Tuesday 29, Deutsche Welle journalist Bernd Riegert attributed the sentence ‘the markets will teach the Italians to vote for the right thing’ to EU Budget Commissioner Günther Oettinger. This then was confirmed to be a very simplistic synthesis of Oettinger’s words, written by Riegert himself. The following day, an MEP for the German CSU party was quoted in an interview saying that, in case of Italian bankruptcy, ‘it would be necessary to invade Rome and take over the Ministry of Finance’. On the other hand, in Italy, older German stereotypes started surfacing again. In a video explaining Italy’s relationship with the EU and the ECB, Milena Gabanelli, one of the country’s most famous journalists, used a Nazi military hat to represent Germany (while the French were portrayed with a less controversial, but still stereotypical, Napoleonic hat). In general, Matteo Salvini quickly seized the comments reported above to convince Italians that Germany and the EU had pressured Mattarella into vetoing Savona’s nomination as Minister. This happens in a country where only 44% of the citizens think that they benefited from EU membership, one of the lowest results in Europe. In another recent poll, the relative majority of Italians (46%) believes that the country would have a better future outside the Union: only the UK showed a higher percentage. In the next months, then, the relation between the EU and Italy risks to become the terrain for a battle between opposed national rivalries and prejudices.

 

Italy’s new government: a wedge into a divided Europe

This outbreak of contrast between Italy and the EU is the most important part of this week of instability and constant turnarounds. National rivalries within the European Union are all but gone. In the case of Italy, they have been waking up for quite some time: at least since the birth of the technocratic government of Mario Monti, in November 2011, when Italians started believing that the EU membership entailed more interferences and restrictions than benefits. This is an idea that the League is enthusiastically embracing. It may become stronger as the two governing parties try to enact the government contract. They will seek to cover its expenses with more public debt, thus clashing with European rules. In this contrast, both governing parties will find politically convenient to accuse Germany of imposing its will on Italy. National rivalries will then take centre stage, shaking the ideational foundations of Italy’s EU membership to their core.

 

The article is now available in Italian! Link 

 

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

Image Source: https://www.repstatic.it/content/nazionale/img/2018/05/28/034107183-8b461394-435c-4763-beaa-fa88f54be243.jpg

The Winners and Losers of the 2018 Italian General Election

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By Giulia Monteleone

The land of political uncertainty – once again. The 2018 Italian general election confirms the failure of traditional parties to address voters’ concerns (Credit Image: Camera dei deputati)

On the 4th of March, Italians made their way to the polling stations to choose their next government, knowing that the results would most likely confirm the polls’ predictions of a hung parliament.

A turnout of 73.66% is surprising, as the election took place in times of high disillusionment with the political establishment and slight economic growth.  The runners of this general election were the following: the centre-left coalition led by Renzi’s Democratic Party; the centre-right coalition formed by Berlusconi’ s Forza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s League and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and single runners such as Five Stars Movement (M5S) and Free and Equals. This article will analyse the winners and losers of the election.

 

The new electoral law

A new electoral law was passed last September – the so-called ‘Rosatellum” (after the MP Ettore Rosato who drafted it) – to replace its predecessor, the “Porcellum”, declared unconstitutional by the Italian Highest Court in early 2014.  The new law consists of a parallel voting system, whereby 61% of the seats are allocated through a proportional method, and the remaining ones are assigned on a first-past-the-post basis. According to Professor Stefano Vassallo, the Rosatellum requires parties to win at least 38-39% of total votes in order to ensure a working majority. However, due to the fragmented nature of the Italian party system, the likelihood of any party achieving that result appeared quite dim. As such, parties running in coalitions appeared to be favoured over single runners. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the Rosatellum is also the product of a political agreement between the Democratic Party and its right-wing counterparts to offset the M5S. One of the Movement’s pillars, in fact, consists in the refusal to align with any other party.  This is in line with their utter disdain toward political elites and their will to fundamentally break away from those ‘corrupt politicians who value the financial benefits entailed with their roles over the public good’.

 

The results

The election results confirmed fears of a hung parliament. In the Lower House, 32.68% of votes went to the M5S, making it Italy’s first party. Yet the centre-right coalition obtained an overall share of 37%. Neither one won the 314 seats necessary to rule. The outcome was similar in the Senate. The centre-right (37.49%) did slightly better than the M5S (32.22%), yet neither reached the 161 seats threshold required to obtain a vote of confidence.

Amidst political uncertainty – so well-rooted in Italian politics – Italians will need to rely on the neutral figure of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, to facilitate talks amongst political forces so to give the country a government.

(Credit Image: ANSA)

 

 

(Credit Image: ANSA)

 

A split country

The elections have proven that Italy has fallen victim to populism and anti-immigrant feelings, like several other Western democracies. The results have also confirmed a country deeply divided between a developed North – the industrial powerhouse of the nation – and a traditionally underdeveloped South – victim of parochialism, cronyism and high unemployment rates. For decades, many Italians voted on the basis of the “lesser evil”. The prevailing impression being that of a lack of real political alternatives, with the same old faces filling sofas on television’s talk shows. De facto, a report by the research institute Demos & Pi showed how, in 2017, only 5% of the Italian population said to trust political parties.

Long deaf to grievances affecting a vast portion of the population, the mainstream political establishment – left a vacuum that the M5S and the far-right parties – such as “The League” (the former secessionist Northern League), and Brothers of Italy – could fill. An analysis of the Financial Times shows how Sunday’s vote appears to have been primarily driven by socio-economic factors, with provinces with “lower income per capita and higher unemployment rates” voting in block for the “grillini” (a popular moniker for M5S members).

(Credit Image: Financial Times and La Repubblica)

 

The winners

The first exit polls prefigured the bashing success of the M5S, outdoing predictions. Now, strong of this success, its leader, Luigi Di Maio, aims to be the next Prime Minister. On Monday, he stated the Movement’s intention to start negotiations to form a coalition and he declared the beginning of a new political era, the “Third Republic”.

By overcoming Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the League managed to achieve an unforeseen result. This is even more considerable given that, in the last election, the League had merely obtained 4% of the votes. Salvini’s success – largely due to his anti-immigration stance and a rhetoric highly critical of Eurozone policies – has been hailed positively by Marine Le Pen, one of Salvini’s inspirational figures.

For the European Union, the victory of two highly euro-sceptic forces in a founding member is very worrisome, further holding back any prospect of a further political integration. A coalition government formed by these two parties cannot be ruled out. However, this option appears unlikely as of now, as both leaders desire to become the next head of government. Thus, they would hardly co-exist under the same government, also considering their diverging views on the economy and taxation (see flat tax and national citizenship income).

 

The losers

If anything, this election has confirmed the end of “Berlusconismo” in Italy. Berlusconi’s political career had already seen an end in 2011, when he was forced to resign in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, leaving the country on the edge of bankruptcy.
It now sees its final death knell. From signing a new “contract with the Italians” on television (famously signed in 2001), to the mantra of cutting taxes and introducing a universal flat tax at 23% (effectively only cutting taxes for the richest), Berlusconi seemed like that persistent ex who wants to take a walk down memory lane.

Dulcis in fundo, the greatest single example of political suicide in Italian modern politics: the Democratic Party, and its soon-to-be former, leader Matteo Renzi. In the last European elections of May 2014, his party received a stunning victory, with 40% of the votes. At that time, Renzi was at the peak of his political career. Elected party leader in December 2013, in early 2014 he had managed to become Prime Minister. The Italian centre-left seemed to have finally found a leader which could counter its many centrifugal forces that seemed prone to infinite splits. However, Renzi’s 1000 days in power ended in resignation following a 60% “No” vote in the December 2016 constitutional referendum. Since then, Renzi – who had previously affirmed that he would take time off politics had he lost – remained victim of the same curse which cost him the victory in the referendum: the personalization of his party. After calling new party elections – and winning them again in May 2017 – the party underwent an internal split, which alienated many electors and eventually led to the formation of Free and Equals. After the mild 19% result, Renzi submitted a letter of resignation as party leader, however postponing it until a new government has been installed. In so doing, it appears evident that Renzi aims to monitor this period of intensified talks, to ensure that the Democratic Party will not join forces with either Di Maio or Salvini. With him immediately out of the picture, in fact, both options could have been possible.

 

Conclusion

Italy, once again, embarks upon a frictious period of political instability. The next crucial date will be March 23rd, when both Houses are supposed to convey for the first time and their presidents be elected (respectively, the second and third highest institutional roles in the country). On such day, perhaps an agreement will have been reached. Shouldn’t this be the case, other options may include a tentative minority government led by the M5S, an – unlikely – grand-coalition government or, as a measure of last resort, a new election.

 

Giulia is Editor and MA Representative with Strife. She is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security and Development in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she completed her BA in International Relations in 2017. She works as Graduate Research Assistant in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at KCL, researching on the Egyptian uprising and the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. She previously gained work experience in foreign affairs at governmental level and broadcasting at community media level.
Her academic interests focus on social movements and popular politics, Arab Uprisings, diaspora & migration studies. You can follow her on Twitter: @GiuliaMonteleon.

Images Sources:

Banner: http://www.camera.it/leg17/1?active_tab_27537=27548&active_slide_27561=1&active_tab_32120=32134

Images 1 & 2:   http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/politica.shtml

Image 3: https://www.ft.com/content/d11902f6-2062-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11 and http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2017/03/10/news/istat_occupazione_quarto_trimestre_2016-160200545/

Italian general elections: a concern for the EU ?

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By Giammarco Petrone

The 2018 Italian general election will take place on 4th of March 2018 (Credit Image: IEG Policy)

International commentators have presented the Italian general election – which will be held on the 4th of March 2018 – as a big test not only for Italy but also for the European Union (EU). Over the course of the current legislative period (2013-18),  Italians have witnessed several major events. First, the Parliament had no outright majority. Then, no less than three grand coalition governments held power, in which parties of completely different political ideologies united. Also, Giorgio Napolitano was re-elected President, which marked an historic moment for Italy as no President had never been re-elected before. The fourth occurrence was the election of the new President, Sergio Mattarella. Finally, a radical revision of the constitution was implemented, which the electorate then rejected in a referendum in December 2016.  Even after all these events, the country is still grappling with the same thorny issues, such as low GDP growth, high youth unemployment and the second highest debt in the EU. This article will address the different views the Italian parties have about the relationship with the European Union, which will be followed by the examination of the relation between Italy and the EU. This article’s overall argument will hold that Italian general elections do not represent a threat for the stability of the EU.

Italian political parties have somewhat different approaches towards Brussels, which are reflected by in their different electoral manifestos. However, there is a fil rouge that connects all of them: the call for change, either towards more or less integration, depending on the political ideology. Besides this, the relationship with the EU has arguably become an established matter of the political campaign. This is not specific to Italy, it occurred in other European states. For instance, the EU is a fundamental topic in French domestic politics, as illustrated during last year’s Presidential election.

The Democratic Party, which has been in power since 2013, is led by the former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. It is a pro-European party that supports the creation of a United States of Europe, as recently proposed by Martin Schulz, former President of the European Parliament. Furthermore, it campaigns for the direct election of the European Commission’s President, the unification of the European Commission’s and the European Council’s presidencies, and the creation of a European Ministry of Finance. However, the Democratic Party criticizes the Dublin Regulation, which considers the state through which asylum seekers first enter the EU as responsible to examine their applications for international protection (in 2017 Italy received almost 120,000 migrants), as well as the EU’s austerity policies, since they are seen as negatively impacting on investments.

The Five Star Movement, often referred to as Italy’s anti-establishment party, has a bold program and its leader is Luigi Di Maio, current Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies. It campaigns to increase the powers of the European Parliament, as it is the only institution elected by citizens, to introduce an opt-out clause from the monetary union, and to modify the aforementioned Dublin Regulation. The Five Star Movement also supports the empowerment of national parliaments to set the agenda of European priorities, in line with its membership of the Eurosceptic group ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’ in the European Parliament. Yet, further proposals such as the abolition of any ‘unproductive’ (or deemed so) European agency, or that of the triple institutional seats (Brussels-Strasburg-Luxemburg) seem hardly feasible, as they are outlined in the treaties of the European Union.

The centre-right coalition, which is composed of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, The League, and Brothers of Italy, is likely to pursue a tough line on the EU’s austerity policies. According to their unified manifesto, the centre-right parties campaign to revise the EU treaties in order to strengthen national sovereignty, so that the Italian constitution can prevail over European laws and regulations. Even if the coalition comprises Forza Italia, a party which has recently taken a pro-Europe stance, laying emphasis on the Italian interests in Brussels is considered as a top priority on its agenda. Despite this, it is highly unlikely that cornerstones of the EU legal and institutional framework, such as both the primacy of the European law as well as the common interests of its member countries, will be unilaterally questioned.

The Italian electors, who can hardly identify themselves with any political party able to answer their problems, have two main concerns, the economy and immigration that do influence their opinions on the European Union. Firstly, Italy has not completely recovered from the economic crisis and such stagnation inevitably impacts on the unemployment rate, that is even more severe among young people, especially in the south. Secondly, immigration is thought to be mishandled, which is the reason why the presence of illegal immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers is perceived as higher than it really is. Although Italy sets an example for its ‘compassionate and courageous response to the biggest refugee and migration crisis since the end of the Second World War’, the population feels that other countries should bear more responsibility. In this regard, according to Eurobarometer, which is a series of opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the EU, only 39 percent of the population considers being part of the EU as beneficial, whereas the percentage is around 64 percent in the other EU countries.

European leaders have hardly expressed any comments about the potential outcome of the Italian elections, probably due to the fact that at present any kind of comment during a political campaign in a different country might be seen as interference. However, last January French President Emmanuel Macron, widely regarded as the  main proponent of political integration in the EU, did not hesitate to praise Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, and also to express his view by stating ‘Can I say that the European Union is positive for Italy, and can I also say that an Italy which believes in Europe is positive for Europe’. This should come as no surprise, since the Democratic Party is currently the less hostile party towards the EU and Macron’s and Renzi’s political views are quite similar. More recently, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, warned that the EU should prepare for the worst-case scenario after the Italian elections, as no operational government will be formed.

However, he retracted only a few hours later, making clear that he was misunderstood and that Italy  will continue to play a pivotal role in the EU. In this regard, at present the most likely scenario is either a fragmented Parliament with no uniform majority, which would lead to new elections, or a minority government, where the support to the bipartisan government is given to guarantee stability to the country. Nevertheless, both options do not necessarily mean prolonged political paralysis, which is what seems to worry the EU.

Given that Italy is the third largest economy in the Eurozone as well as the third most populated country in the EU, what implications the Italian elections might have? If either the Democratic Party or a Forza Italia led coalition takes power, sweeping changes are unlikely to be brought about to the current approach. However, a push for more flexibility concerning the fiscal policies as well as more pressure on immigration policies cannot be excluded. Conversely, it is even possible (but highly unlikely) that, if the Five Star Movement performed well in the elections, it might consider forming a government with The League, and this would be the worst scenario for the EU since both parties have criticised its handling of mass migration as well as the common currency.

In conclusion, as instability will probably be the winner of the Italian elections, it is unlikely that the results will significantly affect the EU. Although Italy was among the founding members of the European Economic Community in 1957, and it has always been at the forefront of the European integration process, which has been a pillar of its foreign policy, at present it has little regional influence and even less authority in negotiations. In all likelihood, Brussels will land on its feet.

 

Giammarco has been working in the security field for almost ten years, with experiences in Asia and Latin America. He holds an MA in International Relations from Italy, and is currently an MA candidate in Intelligence & Intelligence Security at King’s College London. His main interests include corporate espionage, cybercrime, and OSINT.

Image Source: https://iegpolicy.agribusinessintelligence.informa.com/PL019152/Italy-takes-over-EU-Presidency-from-Greece

Strife Interview – Benedetto Della Vedova, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs: Europe’s uneasy path

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief in discussion with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 28, 2014, serving in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments; he has also been a Member of the Italian Senate since 2013. He is currently competing in the Italian national elections with the +Europa (“More Europe”) political party, headed by former Foreign Affairs minister Emma Bonino and campaigning on a strong pro-European platform. Strife’s Editor-in-Chief, Andrea Varsori, met with him at King’s, where he participated in the KCL Italian Society’s debate “The Road towards the United States of Europe”. On that occasion, they spoke on the future prospects for the EU, its internal divisions, and the Italian take on Brexit.

AV: 2017 was a year of important national elections in four European countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria. Do you think that the European Union emerged stronger from this?

BDV: Absolutely. Especially concerning the French elections. I would like to highlight, however, that although this battle was won, and it was surely a hard one, the war is far from over. And this war consists in a considerable political struggle: that between those who support openness and those who support different varieties of closeness. In this regard, the Austrian elections demonstrated that this fight is not over yet. Van der Bellen’s victory [in the 2016 presidential elections] had seemingly given good reasons to many to hope for a pro-European turn in the country. In last year’s political elections, however, Sebastian Kurz’s ÖVP won and formed a government that has as its junior partner the nationalist FPÖ party. The match, thus, is not over yet.

AV: In this context, then, where can a new impulse to European integration come from? Maybe from the reform of a particular domain of EU governance?

BDV: Actually, I think that elections are the most important factor, with all their natural limits. We need to be aware of how people are voting in Poland, in Austria, in France, where the electoral results were fundamental, and of course in Italy, where there are reasons to be worried. Most importantly, we need to acknowledge the fact that the European Union is a recurring topic in several national campaigns. Different nationalist discourses are engaged in criticising the EU. It is necessary to build an effective counter-narrative, first of all on a political and symbolical level.

AV: Do you currently see any examples of this counter-narrative in Europe?

BDV: The foremost example I can think of is Macron’s electoral campaign. Most importantly, the French president has kept saying the same things after being elected, for example in his Sorbonne speech [on September 26, 2017]. Macron won exactly because he confronted nationalism directly, arguing, against the prevailing common sense, that there is a need for shared sovereignty, the only possible type of sovereignty.

AV: It was surely a controversial choice of terms. A sizeable portion of European citizens probably sees the very expression “shared sovereignty” as a contradiction in terms.

BDV: I think that the main fault of making this idea popular lies primarily on political leaders. They have often decided to use emotional arguments to their advantage, on the assumption that they would have benefited from them for a long time. This often did not happen, but those same ideas that they disseminated among the population stayed and took roots. Brexit is an example of this phenomenon.

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: As far as Brexit is concerned, what do you think of the current state of UK-EU negotiations?

BDV: In my opinion, the EU has been doing very well. Up to now, Brussels managed to act without allowing internal divisions to have too much of an impact. Of course, within the Union there is a variety of positions, depending on what is at stake in each country. Besides this, the Union’s position has remained tightly knit and every member state is respecting it. Actually, the United Kingdom has the most unclear position. London must decide what endpoint it desires to achieve. On a continuum that goes from Canada to Norway, the United Kingdom should decide where to end up.

AV: Does Italy have a preferred endpoint in the current negotiations?

BDV: I can only tell you which my favourite endpoint is. Personally, I would prefer that Brexit negotiations ended by leaving room for a potential British change of mind. This change of mind can take place with a referendum, just like the one that was had in June 2016, and can express the opposite political choice. I am convinced that such a great democracy as Britain can reconsider the decision that it took.

AV: In this context, Italy is often described as sympathetic to the UK on Brexit. This impression is particularly evident in the Italian press. Do you agree with it?

BDV: This impression may be appropriate for the current government. Prime Minister Gentiloni has surely been very ‘friendly’ towards London – and rightly so. Personally, I am convinced that the relation between Italy and the UK should consist in an outspoken friendship. Outspokenness in mutual relations should not prevent cooperation between the two countries – on the contrary, it can be conducive to that. Actually, my dream is to set a way to have the UK not leave the European Union. Having said that, those who say that ‘Brexit is Brexit’ are right: it is a serious and historical move that we simply cannot ignore. Surely, it is impossible to have ‘business as usual’ after this referendum. The fundamental point that must be clarified in Europe now, in the Brexit negotiations and in general, is that the European single market, its flows, and its positive consequences could not survive the end of political integration. It is impossible to imagine a real single market without its governing institutions: economic and political integration support each other. For them, the Latin brocard aut simul stabunt, aut simul cadent [they will either stand together, or fall together] applies. This must be reaffirmed, of course, to fight nationalism, which is an enemy of both political and economic integration, as it often implies the adoption of protectionist policies. It should also be reaffirmed, however, to Central European countries.

AV: In this regard, how should the EU deal with the more sceptical position of some Central European member states, like the Visegrád Four [Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic]?

BDV: With the Central European countries, we need to engage in a political confrontation that should be solved in political terms. Of course, inside the Union each country is free to make a choice regarding the type of policies that they want to implement internally. But it should be clear that belonging to the single market means sharing not only its rights, but also all the duties and responsibilities that follow from them. From this point of view, the refusal of some member states to share the burden of migrant hospitality is inacceptable. Central European countries receive, and rightly so, structural funds that helped and still help them to reach a level of development that is comparable to that of Western Europe. As for structural funds, Italy is a net contributor. Benefitting from the EU budget through structural funds, however, entails the need to take part in the Union’s common efforts, including sharing the burden of immigration policies. The two things are inseparable: accepting the former means accepting the latter too.

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The Italian version is available here.

Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview.