EU

The buck passing stops here on European norms for drones

October 11, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Delina Goxho

The nEUROn, an experimental drone currently developed under an international cooperation, led by the French company Dassault Aviation, and involving France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. (Credit Image: Dassault Aviation)

The most recent Trump administration changes to the policies regulating drone strikes are still secret, but what we do know sets a dangerous precedent on the use of armed drones and the use of force broadly, with strong implications to the USA as well as Europe. . The current U.S. policy reportedly removes the condition of immediacy of the targeted threat, among other things, challenging the limits of international standards regulating the use of force[1]. Most European states are not willing to regulate their acquisition and the use of armed drones in ways that would preserve compliance with both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), blaming lack of consensus internationally and at home. Indeed, the UK has so far admitted one civilian casualty in an air campaign (through both conventional and drones strikes) in Syria that started four years ago and has no end in sight[2]. France is currently acquiring armed drones to be deployed in the G5 Sahel countries, but has no safeguards[3] in place to prevent the use of such weapons contravening international law. In addition, Italy, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are all aiding the US drone war in the Middle East and Africa both with intelligence and infrastructure.

European states should challenge the US precedent of drone use and establish norms that are accountable, transparent and legal. This article will first clarify why armed drones can be considered to be a controversial weapon, it will then outline what is currently unfolding at the EU level in terms of defence budget and it will delve into the buck passing game that is occurring at the UN, EU and Member state levels and finally recommend that the EU finds a Common Position on the use of armed drones that is respectful of international norms.

A controversial tool

Despite allowing for potentially more precise strikes, presenting a strategic advantage and minimising risk to troops’ lives, armed drones are particularly controversial because they facilitate escalation of a conflict: by making war a less costly resort, armed drones are a powerful means for states to intervene where they would not have the political support, resources on the ground or a legal mandate to do so[4]. The proliferation of armed drones within and outside Europe, including their use to execute targeted killings and complicity in US strikes, as recently pointed out in Amnesty International report[5], presents a challenge to the international legal order. Drones are not only used in battlefield theatres, where IHL applies, but also outside of areas of armed conflict, where IHRL applies, which implies that strikes are paramount to extrajudicial executions[6][7]. In addition, from a more counterterrorism perspective, there has not been enough debate on whether drones may be “creating more terrorists than we’re killing”, as former Defence Secretary Rumsfeld famously put it[8]. Discussions around a Common European Position[9] regarding the acquisition and use of armed drones are of vital importance[10], especially after reports of targeted killings as a counter-terrorism technique[11] have become the norm. New European Union spending in the field of defence risks exacerbating these worrisome developments.

New European defence budget and Multilateral buck-passing

On 13 June 2018, the European Commission released its proposals for the Security and Defence heading under the next EU long-term budget. The new “militarised” EU Multi Annual Financial Framework foresees an increase of the Defence Fund by 2200%.[12] Additionally, the EU will allow companies developing the so-called ‘lethal autonomous weapons’ to apply for EU funding. The European Parliament had originally wanted to bar controversial new weapons, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines and fully autonomous weapons from receiving EU subsidies, but without success. The proposed regulation simply stated that projects would not be eligible for funding if their end product was “prohibited by international law”. This is a matter of controversy becuase the UAV platform itself would not be prohibited, but its uses outside international law would be. In exchange, the Council of Ministers of the EU offered the European Parliament a formal rationale for the norm, in which “the eligibility of actions … should also be subject to developments in international law”[13]. In other words, controversial weapons could be banned from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme once agreement is found at the international level.

This presents two issues: first, that armed drones, despite their negative impacts on the battlefield, are not even mentioned in the document and secondly that State representatives at various UN fora are only willing to reach an agreement if there is the political desire to do so within their respective governments. The same happens within the EU, where state representatives are not willing to make decisions if there is no lead from their political leaders. European member states on the other hand play rebound, and suggest that consensus should be reached multilaterally before they can come to an agreement internally. This buck passing game is slowing down the decision making process, while drone technology rapidly improves and drones are used by more and more states and non-state armed groups globally, in ways that are often unlawful, as recently explained in a PAX report on new drone producers and users[14].

Trump’s Shadow War

All this buck-passing is operated against the backdrop of the new US Principles, Standards and Procedures (PSP), which further loosens policies around the use of armed drones in the US[15]. Fears that Trump would tear up Obama-era regulations governing the use of direct military action were justified[16]: Trump removed the condition that a terrorist target has to pose an imminent threat to U.S. persons to be individually targeted, which lowered the ‘threat standard’[17] applied to people the United States can kill. The Trump administration is yet to provide information on the new threshold for action and whether this threshold is uniform. Additionally, proposed drone strikes and counterterrorism raids no longer undergo the same vetting they did under Obama. Instead, Trump will permit the delegation of decision-making to lower levels of seniority before conducting a strike[18].

Towards a European Common position?

Against this backdrop in the US, more UAV investment at the EU level is especially problematic: if the US modus operandi has been the most common policy for the use of armed drones in the West, why should the EU behave differently? It is thoroughly understandable that the EU would want to prioritise European industries and move away from US dependency as far as its own defence is concerned, given the security challenges within the Union and US disengagement. ‘With this agreement, we are building the EU’s strategic autonomy and boosting the competitiveness of the EU defence industry’ said industry Commissioner Bienkowska[19]. This however must be done without sacrificing what the Union is founded upon, i.e. a shared understanding of human rights principles. According to Catalan Research Institute Centre Delas, by 2027, the EU will have spent more on military research than on humanitarian aid[20]. If we look at US policy regarding the use of military drones, it is of vital importance to ask EU member states not to follow that path blindly but instead to distance themselves from a policy which is unlawful – as far as IHRL and IHL principles are concerned – and which sets a dangerous precedent.

A similar issue can be identified with regard to European arms exports: different Member states apply different principles when exporting weapons to third countries who violate international law, making the European Common Position on arms exports disharmonic. As stated in the Call to Action of the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD)[21] European states should articulate clear policies, prevent complicity, ensure transparency, establish accountability and finally control proliferation.

On armed drones Europe has only achieved a Parliamentary Resolution and does not have a Common Position yet. The EU was built on a set of values that would end up becoming empty words if Europe does not put in place safeguards and choose rules of engagement on the battlefield different from those of its transatlantic ally.

Delina is the consultant on armed drones and targeted killing at the Open Society Foundations office in Brussels. Prior to this, Delina worked for the European External Action Service in the Task Force Iran, focusing on Security and Humanitarian issues, the Defence and Security and the Economic and Social Committees at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, focusing on the Syrian civil conflict and CT operations against Daesh and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, doing research on the humanitarian intervention in Libya.

Delina holds a B.A. in French and English literature from the University of Verona and the University of Cambridge and an M.A. in International Security from the University of Bologna and the University of California, Berkeley. She speaks English, French, Italian, Albanian and is currently learning Arabic.

Notes:

[1]https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson%20Action%20Plan%20on%20US%20Drone%20Policy.pdf

[2] http://appgdrones.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/INH_PG_Drones_AllInOne_v25.pdf

[3] The French government refuse to confirm or put policies in place to clarify that they will not be adopting practices/legal interpretations deployed in the use of drones that have been legally controversial and caused considerable civilian harm.

[4] Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, The New Press, New York, 2015 [“drones project power without projecting vulnerability”]

[5] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/european-assistance-to-deadly-us-drone-strikes/

[6] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ArmedDrones.aspx

[7] https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-us-military-came-to-embrace-extrajudicial-killings/

[8] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/killing-more-innocents-we-admit-23266

[9] Document can be found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578032/EXPO_STU(2017)578032_EN.pdf

[10] The European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) represents an interesting tool to monitor and challenge current practices around the use of armed drones: https://www.efadrones.org

[11]Bruno Oliveira Martins, Global Affairs: The European Union and armed drones: framing the debate, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2015.1080930?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[12] The fund has two strands: Research (€90 million until the end of 2019 and €500 million per year after 2020) and Development & Acquisition (€500 million in total for 2019-20 then €1 billion per year after 2020); EU Observer https://euobserver.com/science/141885

[13] https://euobserver.com/science/141885

[14] https://www.paxforpeace.nl/stay-informed/news/global-military-drone-industry-expands-rapidly

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html

[16] A group of NGOs (Center for Civilians in Conflict, Airwars, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Amnesty International, American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Center for Constitutional Rights, Reprieve amongst others) have warned against the increased use of strikes and the loosening up of norms: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/trump-deadly-drone-policy-ngos-180307204617166.html

[17] https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/07/ngo-statement-reported-changes-us-policy-use-armed-drones-and-other-lethal-force

[18] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html

[19] http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-23-05-2018.htm

[20] http://www.centredelas.org/en/press/news/3641-the-european-defence-fund-will-merely-benefit-the-industry-and-trigger-arms-race-in-autonomous-weapons-says-enaat

[21] EFAD is a civil society network of organisations working to promote human rights, respect for the rule of law, disarmament and conflict prevention https://www.efadrones.org/call-to-action/

Image Source: https://euobserver.com/news/115283

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

July 12, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

If you have come to the end of this piece, we are interested in what you think about our Blog. We have launched our first readers survey just so that you can tell us how we are doing and what we can do better. You will find the survey here. It takes just a few minutes, but your help will be much appreciated. Thanks in advance!

Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.

Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm

L’impeachment che non fu. Tre appunti per i mesi a venire

June 10, 2018 by Strife Staff

by Andrea Varsori

Il Presidente della Repubblica Sergio Mattarella arriva nella sala stampa del Quirinale la sera di domenica 27 maggio (Image Credit: LaPresse)

Per l’Italia, gli ultimi giorni del mese scorso sono stati estremamente movimentati, anche per gli standard a cui la politica nazionale e internazionale ci ha abituato negli ultimi anni. Tra il 28 e il 29 maggio, abbiamo assistito all’impennarsi di tensioni interne e esterne. Politici, osservatori e cittadini hanno preso parte a uno scontro senza precedenti tra il Presidente della Repubblica e le due forze politiche che stavano formando il governo, la Lega e il Movimento 5 Stelle. Quest’ultima ha seriamente proposto la messa in stato d’accusa del Presidente. Alla chiamata nelle piazze da parte del M5S ha risposto il Partito Democratico, in una escalation di mobilitazione. Nel frattempo, esponenti politici nazionali si sono scontrati con membri della Commissione Europea e parlamentari europei. Investitori stranieri hanno perso fiducia nella capacità italiana di ripagare il debito, con immediate conseguenze sul valore dei titoli bancari e sul costo pagato dal Paese per rifinanziarsi sui mercati. Almeno in questo senso, sembrava di essere tornati nel caos del novembre 2011.

A vedere, invece, quello che è successo nei giorni successivi, c’è di che stupirsi. Una frattura che, lunedì e martedì, sembrava insanabile e capace di dividere il Paese, si è ricomposta con il semplice spostamento di Paolo Savona, economista fortemente critico della partecipazione italiana all’euro, dal Ministero dell’Economia al meno importante Ministero agli Affari Europei. Il veto del Presidente è stato così superato. Tra giovedì sera e venerdì pomeriggio, un governo tecnico nato morto è stato accantonato, e un governo politico è nato e ha giurato fedeltà alla Repubblica. Quello stesso sabato, Giuseppe Conte, il neo-premier, sedeva sorridente al fianco di Mattarella. E ora, con la fiducia ottenuta in entrambe le camere, il governo Conte è una realtà solida, al contrario di quello che si poteva pensare solo qualche giorno prima.

Sarebbe sbagliato, però, pensare che tutto questo non conti più. Gli eventi degli ultimi giorni di maggio possono ora sembrare sepolti dalle dichiarazioni di quelli che adesso sono esponenti di Governo, soprattutto considerando quanto poco durino le notizie nel clima mediatico in cui viviamo. Per quanto la nascita del governo Conte abbia cambiato la situazione politica nazionale, però, non ha cambiato di certo alcuni fattori strutturali. Questi fattori persistono, e riguardano l’instabilità politica interna, che può tornare in qualsiasi momento; la debolezza economica italiana, che conta ancora moltissimo; e il rapporto tra Italia ed Unione Europea, ormai più di scontro che di confronto.

Politica italiana: mai davvero stabile

La prima osservazione che si può fare è che, almeno per i prossimi mesi, non potremo dire che la situazione politica italiana si sia davvero stabilizzata. Questo punto di vista può sembrare molto pessimista, considerato che il governo Conte è nato e ha una maggioranza relativamente solida e un contratto di governo già pronto. La mia risposta a queste obiezioni si limita a evidenziare due eventi accaduti dopo che è emerso il veto di Sergio Mattarella su Paolo Savona. Il primo è la scelta di Matteo Salvini di abbandonare il tavolo dei negoziati e far saltare, in un primo momento, il governo Conte. Sull’opportunità politica della mossa di Mattarella, ovviamente, si può discutere: ma non è quello che interessa qui. La crisi tra M5S, Lega e Quirinale, infatti, si poteva benissimo evitare, soprattutto nel caso sia vera l’ipotesi che Mattarella avesse proposto Giancarlo Giorgetti, storico esponente leghista, come alternativa a Savona. È probabile che la mossa di Salvini sia stata motivata dalla crescita in popolarità che ne sarebbe seguita per la Lega, fotografata da molti recenti sondaggi. Anche se questo non fosse vero, però, la crisi di rapporti si poteva benissimo evitare. La nascita del governo Conte con Savona agli Affari Europei dimostra che un’alternativa era possibile. La reazione di Salvini ha mostrato, nel caso peggiore, opportunismo, nel caso migliore mancanza di capacità di gestire negoziati politici.

Ancora più grave è stata la reazione di Luigi Di Maio, con l’immediata proposta di mettere Mattarella in stato d’accusa. Questa idea, infatti, è stata chiaramente lanciata senza pianificazione alcuna. Ne è testimone il fatto che la Lega da subito si sia dimostrata scettica, pur criticando fortemente il Presidente, e se ne sia tirata fuori già lunedì 28 maggio. Di Maio ha scommesso una parte rilevante del suo capitale politico e delle possibilità di successo del suo partito su una mossa rischiosa, polarizzante, e senza molte possibilità di ottenere risultati tangibili. Ha perfino convocato una manifestazione a Roma che, man mano che la settimana passava, ha dovuto assistere a una paradossale inversione di toni. Chiedere la messa in stato d’accusa è stata una mossa autolesionista per Di Maio e il M5S; il che è grave, dato che denota, come nel caso di Salvini, opportunismo oppure mancanza di capacità di gestire delle crisi.

Queste dimostrazioni di inabilità politica non fanno ben sperare, viste le differenze di storia e retorica tra Lega e M5S. La coordinazione tra le due forze, nei giorni peggiori della crisi istituzionale, è stata scarsa, per non dire inesistente. Questo aspetto potrebbe migliorare se le due forze politiche sapranno imparare a coordinarsi e a guadagnare una la fiducia dell’altra. Ma, stante come si sono comportate la settimana scorsa, questo non succederà certo nel breve periodo. Ancora per qualche mese non potremo dire che l’Italia sia davvero stabile. Un qualsiasi inciampo può accadere di nuovo, con tutte le conseguenze negative che abbiamo visto.

Economia italiana: una continua debolezza

Le conseguenze negative sono state, principalmente, di natura economica e hanno dimostrato che l’Italia è ancora molto fragile sotto questo punto di vista. Questa affermazione è basata su dati, piuttosto che pregiudizi. La situazione attuale di moderata crescita non deve infatti mascherare il fatto che i fondamentali economici sono ancora deboli. Innanzitutto, la crescita economica italiana è ancora minore di quella degli altri Paesi dell’Eurozona e, secondo stime del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, probabilmente rallenterà l’anno prossimo. La produttività italiana è bassa e stagnante ormai da decenni. L’Italia non è considerata un buon ambiente per fare impresa e non ha molto successo nell’attrarre investimenti esteri, con Regno Unito, Francia e Germania in una posizione molto migliore, nonostante alcuni miglioramenti recenti. La pressione fiscale è tra le più alte d’Europa; il tasso di povertà è in aumento; il tasso di disoccupazione è ancora relativamente alto, specialmente per i giovani, e anche la sua recente diminuzione è dovuta perlopiù a creazione di posti di lavoro a tempo determinato. Infine, la crescita economica italiana è principalmente trainata dalle esportazioni, che saranno particolarmente vulnerabili alle guerre commerciali che gli Stati Uniti stanno iniziando con l’Unione Europea.

Tutto questo aggrava la situazione del debito pubblico. L’Italia ha il secondo rapporto tra debito e PIL più alto d’Europa, superata in questo solo dalla Grecia, e il quinto più alto nel mondo. Il 32% del debito sovrano italiano è in mano a investitori esteri. Questo è un fatto fondamentale, poiché, nel momento in cui questi hanno ragioni per temere che l’Italia non possa o non voglia ripagare il suo debito, il costo che il Paese affronta per finanziarsi sui mercati si alza, limitando immediatamente la disponibilità di soldi del governo. A partire dalla crisi del debito sovrano del 2011, in realtà, la quota di debito in mano a investitori esteri è progressivamente diminuita. È passata dal 51% del 2010 al 36.1% del 2016; in questo, le operazioni di Quantitative Easing della BCE hanno costituito un’occasione che gli investitori esteri hanno sfruttato per liberarsi di circa 78 miliardi di euro di titoli di stato italiani tra il 2015 e l’inizio di quest’anno. Da una parte, questa diminuzione è un fenomeno positivo, poiché riduce in una certa misura il rischio di contagio tra Italia e Unione Europea e rende Roma meno dipendente dai mercati esteri. Dall’altra parte, però, le banche italiane ora possiedono una porzione maggiore del debito sovrano nazionale. Questo significa che qualsiasi crisi del debito italiano si traduce immediatamente in una crisi bancaria, comportando minore accesso al credito per imprese e famiglie.

È molto difficile che questi fondamentali economici cambino nel breve periodo.

Rapporto Italia-UE: i pregiudizi hanno la meglio

Infine, gli eventi della scorsa settimana ci hanno dimostrato che il rapporto tra Italia e Unione Europea probabilmente sarà di scontro, piuttosto che di cooperazione. Si tratta di uno scontro che riguarda innanzitutto le regole europee. Per quanto ci siano notevoli differenze tra Lega e Movimento 5 Stelle, queste due forze politiche hanno un obbiettivo comune: convincere Bruxelles ad allentare i limiti sulla spesa pubblica e a rimandare qualsiasi tentativo di riduzione del debito sovrano italiano. Carlo Cottarelli, qualche giorno prima di essere coinvolto nello sfortunato tentativo di formare un governo tecnico, aveva pubblicato con l’Osservatorio Conti Pubblici dell’Università Cattolica di Milano uno studio in cui analizzava costi e coperture del contratto di programma M5S-Lega. Lo studio evidenziava che le proposte avanzate dalle forze di governo costeranno tra i 108.7 e i 125.7 miliardi di euro, con coperture previste per solo mezzo miliardo. Anche se il neonato governo Conte dovesse decidere di realizzare solo parte del suo contratto, difficilmente risolverà questo problema. È probabile allora che il nuovo esecutivo cerchi di ottenere, anche con metodi energici e poco ortodossi, un allentamento dei vincoli europei.

Non sembra, però, che a Bruxelles ci sia molta voglia di concedere ciò. Anche se altri Paesi mediterranei dovessero unirsi al tentativo italiano (cosa affatto scontata), alcuni Stati settentrionali, come Paesi Bassi e Finlandia, si opporranno alle richieste di Roma. La Germania farà altrettanto. Concedere tempo e margine economico all’Italia, infatti, sarebbe visto come una resa nei confronti di un Paese che poco ha fatto per rimettere i conti a posto, nonostante il massiccio aiuto offerto dalla Banca Centrale col Quantitative Easing. Una mossa conciliatoria nei confronti dell’Italia sarebbe dunque immediatamente criticata dal partito euroscettico Alternativa per la Germania, il principale rivale della CDU, il partito della cancelliera Angela Merkel. Per quanto riguarda la Francia, l’impulso del Presidente Emmanuel Macron sembra essersi per ora esaurito. Le sue proposte di riforma hanno trovato più ostacoli del previsto, soprattutto nei Paesi citati sopra, e sono state considerevolmente ridimensionate da Merkel domenica scorsa. Il nuovo governo italiano può fare poco per cambiare questa situazione, anche se decidesse di abbandonare il progetto di alcuni suoi esponenti di usare la minaccia di uscire dall’euro come strumento per ottenere concessioni.

Lo scontro tra Italia e Unione, però, non sarà solo di regole, ma anche di idee e pregiudizi. Lo abbiamo già visto nei giorni successivi al veto di Mattarella alla nomina di Savona. A Bruxelles, esponenti politici europei si sono lasciati andare a commenti di dubbia utilità politica, con commentatori, giornalisti e politici italiani pronti a brandirli come prova che l’Europa stesse condizionando la politica nazionale. Tra gli episodi più noti c’è senza dubbio la frase “i mercati insegneranno agli italiani come votare per il lato giusto”, attribuita al commissario europeo Günther Oettinger martedì 29 maggio. La frase, però, era solo una sintesi molto semplicistica scritta dall’intervistatore in un tweet. Il giorno dopo, un membro tedesco del parlamento europeo, esponente della CSU, partito alleato alla CDU di Angela Merkel, ha dichiarato in un’intervista che, in caso di bancarotta italiana, “bisognerebbe invadere Roma e prendere possesso del Ministero dell’Economia”. Anche questo commento, certamente eccessivo e irrispettoso, è stato denunciato in Italia, col risultato di ingigantirne l’importanza. Allo stesso modo, dall’altro lato delle Alpi, stereotipi sui tedeschi hanno cominciato a riemergere. L’esempio più famoso ha riguardato Milena Gabanelli, che, in un video per la Dataroom del Corriere della Sera, ha usato un copricapo militare nazista per rappresentare i tedeschi. Accomunare la Germania di oggi a quella degli anni ’30 e ’40, però, viene fatto in maniera più esplicita da molti, incluso il nuovo Ministro agli Affari Europei. È evidente che, in questo contesto, è molto facile per tutt’e due le parti non solo lasciarsi andare a dichiarazioni colme di pregiudizi, ma anche denunciarle e amplificarle, dando così l’impressione che l’intera nazione le condivida.

Questo contribuisce ad accrescere la distanza tra Italia e Germania, oltre che tra Italia e Unione Europea. Questo avviene in un terreno già fertile. Studi annuali dell’Eurobarometro, che si occupa di registrare l’evoluzione dell’opinione pubblica europea, mostrano che l’Italia è tra i Paesi meno convinti dell’appartenenza all’Unione. In un sondaggio di quest’anno, solo il 44% degli italiani crede che l’Italia abbia beneficiato dal fare parte dell’Unione Europea. In un altro studio recente, la maggioranza relativa degli italiani (il 46%) ritiene che l’Italia avrebbe un futuro migliore fuori dall’Unione; in questo, sorpassata solo dal Regno Unito. Questo non vuol dire, ovviamente, che Roma seguirà le orme di Londra. Lo scetticismo verso Bruxelles, però, è ormai un fatto conclamato. E il risvegliarsi di rivalità nazionali, che vanno dai semplici stereotipi a un vero e proprio nazionalismo, può rendere il contrasto tra Italia e Unione ancora più difficile da risolvere.

Lo scontro a venire

A mio parere, è proprio questo scontro il fattore più importante per i prossimi mesi. I primi giorni della crisi lo hanno rivelato, con il pronto ricorso a pregiudizi da ambedue le parti. Sappiamo da tempo che le rivalità nazionali in Europa non sono scomparse. In Italia, la loro esistenza era stata mascherata per anni da una retorica europeista ideologica, e forse un po’ ingenua, adottata dalle maggiori istituzioni nazionali. Il velo di questo europeismo è stato probabilmente squarciato nel novembre 2011, con il governo Monti. A quell’epoca, l’idea che l’Unione Europea consista in restrizioni e interferenze, piuttosto che libertà e benefici, ha cominciato a farsi strada. È un’idea, questa, portata avanti con forza dalla Lega e, in passato, anche dal Movimento 5 Stelle. Ora che queste due forze politiche tenteranno di realizzare il loro contratto di governo, può farsi ancora più forte.

Si può già delineare un possibile scenario. Prima o dopo le elezioni europee del 2019, Lega e M5S cercheranno di fare più deficit per avverare le proprie promesse elettorali. Facendo questo, si scontreranno con l’Unione e, in particolare, con i Paesi del Nord, più fiscalmente conservatori. In questo contesto, sarà difficile resistere alla tentazione di ricorrere alla retorica delle rivalità nazionali per ottenere voti e consenso in patria. Naturalmente, è possibile che Salvini e Di Maio si fermino prima, consci dei rischi a cui esporrebbero il Paese andando a uno scontro frontale. Da come si sono comportati la scorsa settimana, però, è lecito dubitarne. Si correrà dunque il rischio di cadere in una spirale di accuse reciproche. Convincere gli italiani che la colpa è della Germania e di Bruxelles, però, può colpire la partecipazione italiana all’Unione nelle sue fondamenta ideali.

The English version of this piece is available here.

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

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Strife Feature – Italy’s short circuit week and the fight over Europe

June 7, 2018 by Strife Staff

by Andrea Varsori

The President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella (Image Credit: LaPresse)

Italy’s short circuit week

Last week, Italy’s political system went into short circuit. 84 days after the last national elections, an apparently successful attempt at forming a government unexpectedly collapsed at the last minute. Ten days earlier, the two political forces behind the attempt, the right-wing League and the anti-politics Five Star Movement (5SM), had already produced a joint manifesto, a “government contract”. Their members had already approved it: the League had organised voting at hundreds of stands across Italy, while the Movement, coherently with its calls for direct democracy, let its members vote on its online platform, Rousseau. The two forces had already chosen someone for the role of Prime Minister: Giuseppe Conte, a little-known lawyer and professor. They had already agreed on the future ministers. In short, everything seemed ready to go.

Italy’s political system, however, proved to be an obstacle for their plans. In Italy, the President of the Republic nominates the ministers, while the Prime Minister proposes the names. In the days before the collapse of government formation, the President, Sergio Mattarella, had signalled informally that he would not approve the prospective choice for the Minister of Economy. The League wanted Paolo Savona for that role; however, Savona, an economist and former minister, is a hardline Eurosceptic, known for his statements on the euro as a “cage” for the Italian economy and as an instrument of German economic domination. On few occasions, he had stated that Merkel’s Germany amounted to a new version of Hitler’s Third Reich. Most importantly, on May 26, the Italian Huffington Post showed that, in 2015, Savona had presented a Powerpoint presentation proposing a secret plan to leave the euro. On May 27, Mattarella formally declared that he would not accept Savona as Minister, due to the risks he posed to the savings of Italian citizens.

This decision set off what was to be defined as Italy’s deepest constitutional crisis. The League, in fact, reacted by stating that they would never accept to form a government without Savona as the Economy Minister. Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, claimed that Savona was rejected because “he would have defended the interests of Italians, not Germans”. Luigi Di Maio, political leader of the 5SM, went even further, declaring that the Movement would propose Mattarella’s impeachment. If enacted, this would have constituted an unprecedented move in Italian politics. Due to the role of the President as the symbol of the Italian state, rather than a political actor, impeachment was considered seriously only twice in the past, and on both the occasions the Presidents resigned before the process could even start. On May 28, however, Di Maio, in a Facebook video, confirmed the intention to proceed with impeachment and called for a general mobilisation to respond to the President’s decision. On May 29 the Democratic Party, Italy’s main left-of-centre party, organised counter-demonstrations to support Mattarella. In the meantime, most parties were agreeing on holding elections as soon as late July.

What ended the short circuit?

Considering that this was happening as early as the morning of Tuesday 29, it seems incredible that, on Friday afternoon, the same Giuseppe Conte was swearing the oath as Prime Minister, with Savona on his government team. In little more than two days, Italy went from a high-level political crisis to successful government formation; from early elections to political stability (of sorts); from the delegitimisation of the head of State to smiles and toasts with him. What had happened in the meantime? The answer is a mix of economic and political events.

Earlier, on May 27, just after having vetoed Savona, Mattarella tried to form a “neutral”, caretaker government, led by former IMF Departmental Director Carlo Cottarelli. Mattarella had already announced a similar initiative on May 7, when negotiations for a political government had seemed to stall. The prospective Cottarelli government seemed to follow in those steps; besides, the institutional and technocratic character of its components was expected to reassure the markets. This, however, did not happen. In the following two days (May 28-29), the difference in yield between Italian and German government bonds skyrocketed from 191 points to 306 points, pointing out to investors considering Italian sovereign debt as a riskier asset. Stock markets in Europe, Asia, and North America fell, with Italian banks the most hit. This backlash seemed to defy the purpose of the Cottarelli government. The latter also seemed condemned to fail from the start, as only a handful of MPs were ready to vote in its favour.

On the other hand, Di Maio soon understood that he had gone too far, as even the League was refusing to support the impeachment process. He let go of that on the evening of Tuesday 29 and started to pressure Salvini into modifying the government team, moving the controversial Savona to another portfolio. On his part, Salvini was looking forward to new elections, as fresh polls said that his party was due to achieve strong gains; however, a new election would have posed financial problems for the League. Moreover, while Salvini could market himself as the defender of Italian democracy, his continued refusal to form a government without Savona as Economy Minister risked to attract the blame on him. Besides, the opportunity of being part of the government and becoming the Home Minister seemed an acceptable outcome.

Consequently, at the end of a frantic week, Italy received a political government. Notwithstanding the fact that the Five Star Movement is not pro-business at all, and that the League still has a decidedly Eurosceptic tone, investors seem to have valued this development positively. Starting from May 30, global stock markets, including Italian bank shares, recovered. On June 1, the same day as Conte was sworn in as PM, the difference between German and Italian government bonds continued to fall, although to this day it continues to be higher than in April. There seems to be relative harmony between the Five Star Movement and the League, as well as between political parties and the President, notwithstanding the calls for his impeachment a few days earlier and the demonstrations against the President’s decision that were due to take place on June 2. Instead, on that day, also observed as Italy’s Republic Day, Conte was sitting next to Mattarella at the celebrations taking place in Rome.

The three main takeaways

If this were the end of Italy’s short circuit week, all these events would be relatively uninteresting; just another episode in the national political drama. Instead, they are tremendously important, not only for the country, but also for the whole continent. There are, in fact, three main conclusions to be taken from all this.

The first takeaway is that, after this week, the Italian political system cannot be really seen as stable, regardless of the existence of a government. This judgment is not based on prejudice: rather, it flows from the behaviour of the governing parties and their leaders. Italy, in fact, could have at least partly avoided the turmoil in the markets. There is a distinct possibility that Matteo Salvini engineered the collapse of the negotiations because the veto on Savona was a great opportunity to go to early elections and gain a larger share of votes. That would amount to an irresponsible act of political opportunism that exposed the instability of the country. Even if that was not true, however, the knee-jerk reaction of the 5SM, Italy’s largest political force, is an even more serious event. Instead of keeping in touch with the President, Luigi Di Maio opted to propose impeachment, without even knowing if the League would have followed him. He was then forced to withdraw that idea. This mix of opportunism, radical tones, and lack of coordination is, potentially, the sign of further instability to come. It may happen again.

The second insight is that Italy is still economically weak and exposed to the opinion of investors. The relatively good economic situation of the country must not mask Italy’s long-standing issues. Italy’s growth is still smaller than most other countries in the Eurozone, and it is expected to slow down next year. The country also has a historically low productivity and a mediocre environment for doing business, beyond being relatively unattractive to foreign investments, lagging behind the UK, Germany, and France, despite recent improvements. Taxes are among the highest in Europe; poverty is increasing; unemployment rate is still high, especially for people between 25 and 34; and the country’s extant growth is dependent on exports, which may be hard hit by the potential U.S.-EU trade wars.

Most importantly, Italy has the 2nd largest sovereign debt in Europe as a percentage of GDP and 5th largest in the world. A 32% share of this debt is owned by external investors. This is important, as any concern regarding the country’s ability or will to repay its debts translates quickly into a higher cost of obtaining funds on the markets, which in turn restricts greatly the government’s ability to spend money for its policies. Foreign ownership of the Italian sovereign debt has been steadily declining in the past years: the share of foreign investors-held debt was 36.1% in 2016, and around 51% in 2010; the ECB’s quantitative easing has been an opportunity for these investors to shed a reported €78 billion of Italian bonds between 2015 and early 2018. On the one hand, decline in foreign ownership is a positive development, as it lowers the risk of contagion between Italy and the EU and makes Italy less dependent on foreign markets. This also means, however, that domestic banks now hold a comparatively larger share of debt. Every sovereign debt crisis, then, translates quickly into a bank crisis, restricting access to credit for firms and families. All these economic fundamentals are unlikely to change anytime soon.

The third insight is that there is still a battle being waged over the common currency and the future of the European Union. It is, first of all, a battle of rules. The new Italian government, although relatively divided on several topics, shares a common goal: relaxing European rules regarding the reduction of debt and restrictions on deficit spending. Cottarelli, a few days before being nominated PM designate, published with his Observatory on Public Budget, a study outlining that the prospective costs of the 5SM-League government amounted to at least €108.7 ($126.8 or £95) billion, with prospective revenues for only €0.5 billion. Although it is likely that the government will enact only some of these policies, it is clear that the 5SM-League executive will try to negotiate, even forcefully, more freedom for Italian economic policy. However, there seems to be scarce appetite for that in Brussels. Although Spain and Greece may join Italy in this battle, Northern countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Finland, will oppose all such moves. The German government will also ward off such requests. Surrendering to Italy’s demands would attract fierce criticism from the right-wing, Eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany, the main rival to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU. As for France, President Emmanuel Macron’s reform drive seems to have stalled months ago. His ideas have found formidable obstacles in the countries cited above and have been considerably downsized by Merkel just on last Sunday. The Italian government can scarcely change that, even if it abandoned Savona’s brinkmanship, with his project of obtaining concessions in Brussels by threatening to leave the euro.

This is, however, a battle of feelings as well. In the first half of the past week, the tension between Italy and the European Union skyrocketed. In Italy, politicians, pundits, and citizens instantly and vehemently condemned statements coming from Brussels. In a famous episode, on Tuesday 29, Deutsche Welle journalist Bernd Riegert attributed the sentence ‘the markets will teach the Italians to vote for the right thing’ to EU Budget Commissioner Günther Oettinger. This then was confirmed to be a very simplistic synthesis of Oettinger’s words, written by Riegert himself. The following day, an MEP for the German CSU party was quoted in an interview saying that, in case of Italian bankruptcy, ‘it would be necessary to invade Rome and take over the Ministry of Finance’. On the other hand, in Italy, older German stereotypes started surfacing again. In a video explaining Italy’s relationship with the EU and the ECB, Milena Gabanelli, one of the country’s most famous journalists, used a Nazi military hat to represent Germany (while the French were portrayed with a less controversial, but still stereotypical, Napoleonic hat). In general, Matteo Salvini quickly seized the comments reported above to convince Italians that Germany and the EU had pressured Mattarella into vetoing Savona’s nomination as Minister. This happens in a country where only 44% of the citizens think that they benefited from EU membership, one of the lowest results in Europe. In another recent poll, the relative majority of Italians (46%) believes that the country would have a better future outside the Union: only the UK showed a higher percentage. In the next months, then, the relation between the EU and Italy risks to become the terrain for a battle between opposed national rivalries and prejudices.

Italy’s new government: a wedge into a divided Europe

This outbreak of contrast between Italy and the EU is the most important part of this week of instability and constant turnarounds. National rivalries within the European Union are all but gone. In the case of Italy, they have been waking up for quite some time: at least since the birth of the technocratic government of Mario Monti, in November 2011, when Italians started believing that the EU membership entailed more interferences and restrictions than benefits. This is an idea that the League is enthusiastically embracing. It may become stronger as the two governing parties try to enact the government contract. They will seek to cover its expenses with more public debt, thus clashing with European rules. In this contrast, both governing parties will find politically convenient to accuse Germany of imposing its will on Italy. National rivalries will then take centre stage, shaking the ideational foundations of Italy’s EU membership to their core.

The article is now available in Italian! Link

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The Winners and Losers of the 2018 Italian General Election

March 12, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Giulia Monteleone

The land of political uncertainty – once again. The 2018 Italian general election confirms the failure of traditional parties to address voters’ concerns (Credit Image: Camera dei deputati)

On the 4^th of March, Italians made their way to the polling stations to choose their next government, knowing that the results would most likely confirm the polls’ predictions of a hung parliament.

A turnout of 73.66% is surprising, as the election took place in times of high disillusionment with the political establishment and slight economic growth. The runners of this general election were the following: the centre-left coalition led by Renzi’s Democratic Party; the centre-right coalition formed by Berlusconi’ s Forza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s League and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and single runners such as Five Stars Movement (M5S) and Free and Equals. This article will analyse the winners and losers of the election.

The new electoral law

A new electoral law was passed last September – the so-called ‘Rosatellum” (after the MP Ettore Rosato who drafted it) – to replace its predecessor, the “Porcellum”, declared unconstitutional by the Italian Highest Court in early 2014. The new law consists of a parallel voting system, whereby 61% of the seats are allocated through a proportional method, and the remaining ones are assigned on a first-past-the-post basis. According to Professor Stefano Vassallo, the Rosatellum requires parties to win at least 38-39% of total votes in order to ensure a working majority. However, due to the fragmented nature of the Italian party system, the likelihood of any party achieving that result appeared quite dim. As such, parties running in coalitions appeared to be favoured over single runners. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the Rosatellum is also the product of a political agreement between the Democratic Party and its right-wing counterparts to offset the M5S. One of the Movement’s pillars, in fact, consists in the refusal to align with any other party. This is in line with their utter disdain toward political elites and their will to fundamentally break away from those ‘corrupt politicians who value the financial benefits entailed with their roles over the public good’.

The results

The election results confirmed fears of a hung parliament. In the Lower House, 32.68% of votes went to the M5S, making it Italy’s first party. Yet the centre-right coalition obtained an overall share of 37%. Neither one won the 314 seats necessary to rule. The outcome was similar in the Senate. The centre-right (37.49%) did slightly better than the M5S (32.22%), yet neither reached the 161 seats threshold required to obtain a vote of confidence.

Amidst political uncertainty – so well-rooted in Italian politics – Italians will need to rely on the neutral figure of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, to facilitate talks amongst political forces so to give the country a government.

A split country

The elections have proven that Italy has fallen victim to populism and anti-immigrant feelings, like several other Western democracies. The results have also confirmed a country deeply divided between a developed North – the industrial powerhouse of the nation – and a traditionally underdeveloped South – victim of parochialism, cronyism and high unemployment rates. For decades, many Italians voted on the basis of the “lesser evil”. The prevailing impression being that of a lack of real political alternatives, with the same old faces filling sofas on television’s talk shows. De facto, a report by the research institute Demos & Pi showed how, in 2017, only 5% of the Italian population said to trust political parties.

Long deaf to grievances affecting a vast portion of the population, the mainstream political establishment – left a vacuum that the M5S and the far-right parties – such as “The League” (the former secessionist Northern League), and Brothers of Italy – could fill. An analysis of the Financial Times shows how Sunday’s vote appears to have been primarily driven by socio-economic factors, with provinces with “lower income per capita and higher unemployment rates” voting in block for the “grillini” (a popular moniker for M5S members).

(Credit Image: Financial Times and La Repubblica)

The winners

The first exit polls prefigured the bashing success of the M5S, outdoing predictions. Now, strong of this success, its leader, Luigi Di Maio, aims to be the next Prime Minister. On Monday, he stated the Movement’s intention to start negotiations to form a coalition and he declared the beginning of a new political era, the “Third Republic”.

By overcoming Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the League managed to achieve an unforeseen result. This is even more considerable given that, in the last election, the League had merely obtained 4% of the votes. Salvini’s success – largely due to his anti-immigration stance and a rhetoric highly critical of Eurozone policies – has been hailed positively by Marine Le Pen, one of Salvini’s inspirational figures.

For the European Union, the victory of two highly euro-sceptic forces in a founding member is very worrisome, further holding back any prospect of a further political integration. A coalition government formed by these two parties cannot be ruled out. However, this option appears unlikely as of now, as both leaders desire to become the next head of government. Thus, they would hardly co-exist under the same government, also considering their diverging views on the economy and taxation (see flat tax and national citizenship income).

The losers

If anything, this election has confirmed the end of “Berlusconismo” in Italy. Berlusconi’s political career had already seen an end in 2011, when he was forced to resign in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, leaving the country on the edge of bankruptcy.
It now sees its final death knell. From signing a new “contract with the Italians” on television (famously signed in 2001), to the mantra of cutting taxes and introducing a universal flat tax at 23% (effectively only cutting taxes for the richest), Berlusconi seemed like that persistent ex who wants to take a walk down memory lane.

Dulcis in fundo, the greatest single example of political suicide in Italian modern politics: the Democratic Party, and its soon-to-be former, leader Matteo Renzi. In the last European elections of May 2014, his party received a stunning victory, with 40% of the votes. At that time, Renzi was at the peak of his political career. Elected party leader in December 2013, in early 2014 he had managed to become Prime Minister. The Italian centre-left seemed to have finally found a leader which could counter its many centrifugal forces that seemed prone to infinite splits. However, Renzi’s 1000 days in power ended in resignation following a 60% “No” vote in the December 2016 constitutional referendum. Since then, Renzi – who had previously affirmed that he would take time off politics had he lost – remained victim of the same curse which cost him the victory in the referendum: the personalization of his party. After calling new party elections – and winning them again in May 2017 – the party underwent an internal split, which alienated many electors and eventually led to the formation of Free and Equals. After the mild 19% result, Renzi submitted a letter of resignation as party leader, however postponing it until a new government has been installed. In so doing, it appears evident that Renzi aims to monitor this period of intensified talks, to ensure that the Democratic Party will not join forces with either Di Maio or Salvini. With him immediately out of the picture, in fact, both options could have been possible.

Conclusion

Italy, once again, embarks upon a frictious period of political instability. The next crucial date will be March 23^rd, when both Houses are supposed to convey for the first time and their presidents be elected (respectively, the second and third highest institutional roles in the country). On such day, perhaps an agreement will have been reached. Shouldn’t this be the case, other options may include a tentative minority government led by the M5S, an – unlikely – grand-coalition government or, as a measure of last resort, a new election.

Giulia is Editor and MA Representative with Strife. She is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security and Development in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she completed her BA in International Relations in 2017. She works as Graduate Research Assistant in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at KCL, researching on the Egyptian uprising and the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. She previously gained work experience in foreign affairs at governmental level and broadcasting at community media level.
Her academic interests focus on social movements and popular politics, Arab Uprisings, diaspora & migration studies. You can follow her on Twitter: @GiuliaMonteleon.

Images Sources:

Banner: http://www.camera.it/leg17/1?active_tab_27537=27548&active_slide_27561=1&active_tab_32120=32134

Images 1 & 2: http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/politica.shtml

Image 3: https://www.ft.com/content/d11902f6-2062-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11 and http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2017/03/10/news/istat_occupazione_quarto_trimestre_2016-160200545/

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