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Energy

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

June 2, 2016 by Harris Kuemmerle

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

Filed Under: Interview Tagged With: #COIN, Al Shabab, al-Qaeda, Brexit, Counter-Extremism, counterterrorism, Energy, Environment, Europe, extremism, feature, foreign policy, ISIL, ISIS, RUSI, Russia, security, UK, USA

Petro-state: After Hugo Chávez’s tumultuous presidency, how can Nicolás Maduro avert disaster in Venezuela?

February 5, 2014 by Strife Staff

by Ethan K.F. Brooks

Oil-Well-Sunset

Although it may not be something that immediately comes to mind, President Maduro’s Venezuela possesses the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with, by some estimates, just under 297,570 billion barrels of oil, or nearly 20% of global reserves. [1] The Bolivarian Republic has reserves greater than Saudi Arabia, and more than Iran and Iraq combined. At the moment due to the poor conditions of its fields, the weaknesses of its state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and the low grade of the oil, Venezuela accounts for less than 5% of global oil production at just over 3 million barrels a day.

Venezuelans should be among the richest in the world. Indeed, by 1978 it seemed that this was going to be the case, but today the country is still a poor and unequal one.  Its per capita wealth is around $13,000. [2] When we compare this indicator to another oil endowed country, albeit one even less democratic, we see that it is three times poorer than Saudi Arabia. Even this sad figure obscures many of the country’s problems. In recent years the price of oil has been high, sweetening the figures.

Did it have to be this way? Maybe. I would argue though that Venezuela is the archetypal resource-cursed petro-state. Its story illuminates the difficulties faced by the many countries that fall into this category, Nigeria and Russia among them.

For countries who do not rely on oil exports for income, a fall in global oil prices acts as an economic stimulus. People pay less to fuel their cars and heat their homes. Fuel takes such great importance in the average basket of goods that inflation is low allowing an increase in consumer spending. Life is good.

The fortunes of the major oil exporters are even more tied to the price of oil. For petro-states like Venezuela, oil exports make up to 90% of export earnings and the vast bulks of their economies. Therefore when crude prices plummet, GDP follows.

The industry is capital-intensive and creates few jobs, so during ‘oil booms’ governments have an incentive to create many jobs as they wish to share the wealth. When these states are poor to begin with, governments tend to build large-state controlled economies to marshal growth as quickly as possible. Outlining his vision for ‘La Gran Venezuela’ in the 70s, this was clear to President Pérez. ‘We couldn’t lose time.’[3] The state becomes a battleground for the distribution of oil wealth and rent-seeking behaviour, allowing strong-men like Chávez to entrench cronies and weaken democracy. A phenomena known as ‘Dutch Disease’ also strikes. This is a combination of currency appreciation that renders exports uncompetitive and the ‘business’ of getting a share of the oil wealth replacing hard work, innovation and entrepreneurship. When prices drop, what follows can only be spiralling deficits and sudden budget cuts. When the state threatens to turn off the taps, unrest and great political change follow. It was one such episode that brought Chávez to national prominence in Venezuela.

Nearly a year on from his death after a 14-year presidency, Chávez’s economic legacy is laid bare. Even with oil prices just under $100 a barrel, public spending is out of control. In 2013 the budget deficit was 8.5% of GDP and growth scant. [4] The country’s infrastructure is crumbling and disorder is spreading. But Venezuela has been here once before and its experience of economic hardship and political turmoil twenty years ago can teach us a lot about how Maduro can fare in averting disaster.

During the first oil boom, President Carlos Andrés Pérez oversaw a transformation of the country and the first nationalisation of the oil industry in 1976. Unlike other nations in a developing world swept by resource nationalism, Pérez’s government carried out the nationalisations well. Most jobs in the industry were already held by Venezuelans so nationalisation meant a change of control, not personnel. [5]

In 1979 Pérez left the presidency and while money flowed things seemed fine. However as prices fell, the country tumbled into crisis. The deep state built on the mirage of oil wealth was suddenly unaffordable and debt crippled the state as huge swathes of revenues were diverted to fund payments to foreign creditors. Slums grew around Caracas. Initial populist reactions involved a complex array of price controls which caused distortion and hardship. By the time Pérez returned to the presidency in 1989, incomes had returned to 1973 levels. He sought a way out of the crisis, but the unpopularity of his budget cuts and liberalisation sparked riots and political opposition. This was the climate in which Chávez arose. This is the choice Maduro faces today.

Despite Lieutenant-Colonel Chávez’s coup failing in 1992, Pérez’s unpopularity allowed him to be ousted by political enemies in 1993 after a Supreme Court ruling for embezzlement went against him. This should also provide a lesson for Maduro. Factional fighting is also rife in his government.

By the middle of the 1990s the only way out was to increase oil production. To facilitate this, the PDVSA head proposed an opening or la apertura of Venezuela’s oil industry. Rather than a rolling back of nationalisation, the international companies were to be invited to invest in joint ventures with the PDVSA. [6] The state required expertise and money only the oil majors possessed. It seemed that ideology was to be done away with, but as things turned out, la apertura proved too controversial.

Caldera, Chávez’s predecessor, was sold on la apertura, but Chávez, a deeply ideological man, saw la apertura as selling out to ‘the foreigner’. After his election in 1999, Caldera fired Luis Guisti, the head of the PDVSA behind la apertura and reversed the changes. Under a new law, royalties paid by private companies dramatically increased and by 2007 he announced the industry’s re-nationalisation.

The government took a majority share in the ventures being operated by the international oil firms. Chevron, Total and BP agreed to the plan which allowed them to continue operating as minority shareholders. However as a result of a failure to agree terms, the PDVSA took over projects owned by ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil.

The policy saw oil production in Venezuela fall from 3.2 million barrels per day in 1998 to 2.4 million by 2004 and keep falling until 2010. It was noted that the PDVSA couldn’t increase production to deliver people the riches they expected of an oil-rich state.

The problems are as linked to refinement as drilling and thus there is a bottleneck in Venezuelan production. US experts estimate that it would take investment of up to $32 billion to build the upgrading units necessary for the country’s heavy crude and unconventional oil reserves. [7] In order to bring this investment to Venezuela, Maduro would need to discard chavismo, betraying the legacy of the man whose popularity won him the presidency. He would also need to review the possibility of another la apertura. This would be politically toxic, as would rolling back the price controls that have caused distortions and left the economy in ruins. Without the necessary reforms the economic crisis will only deepen. This not only weakens the position of Maduro’s government in the long-run as people lose faith in Chávez’s vision. It also hamstrings Venezuela’s diplomatic objectives, which during the boom years had led to the country being discussed alongside Brazil as the preeminent Latin American power.

Even though it has experienced a decade-long oil boom and has the resources it does, Venezuela has the worst-performing economy in South America. This is Chávez’s legacy and the reason Maduro ought to abandon his ‘Socialism for the 21st Century’. [8]

Today we can see the parallels with Venezuela’s position twenty years ago. Pérez’s ousting exists as the example of what happens to reformists who defy the popular ideology. If Maduro follows Chávez the hardship will only grow, but if he follows Pérez’s two-decade-old example, he will be seen as betraying Chávez, who is still revered. [9] Despite his impeccable chavista credentials, economic necessity is pushing him toward reform. In the short-term, were Maduro to abandon Chávez’s legacy he might lose power. However if he could manoeuvre through that phase both he and Venezuela will be more secure. We must wait and see if he can be the man to rescue Venezuela or whether the country will continue its downward spiral. For Venezuela’s sake, let’s hope he succeeds.

 

Ethan Brooks is currently studying International Relations at King’s College London. You can follow him on Twitter @EthanKFBrooks.

________________________
 NOTES
[1] http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6
[2]http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
[3]Daniel Yergin, (2012), The Quest , pp. 113.
[4]http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21576399-narrow-tainted-election-victory-fitting-epitaph-his-rotten-predecessor-venezuela
[5]Daniel Yergin, Ibid.
[6] Ibid. pp. 119.
[7] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/3183417/Venezuelas-oil-output-slumps-under-Hugo-Chavez.html
[8] http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21576399-narrow-tainted-election-victory-fitting-epitaph-his-rotten-predecessor-venezuela
[9] http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21586850-adjustment-and-reform-are-economically-essential-politically-impossible-maduros-balancing

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Energy, Ethan Brooks, nationalisation, Oil, Venezuela

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