Diplomacy

Transboundary rivers and climate change: Testing times for hydro-diplomacy to attain and maintain cooperation

March 24, 2016 by Professor Ashok Swain

EDITORS NOTE: This is the third article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first and second articles in the series can be found here, and here, respectively.

By: Professor Ashok Swain

The_Aral_sea_is_drying_up._Bay_of_Zhalanash,_Ship_Cemetery,_Aralsk,_Kazakhstan — Source: Wikimedia

Water is a basic condition for life and it also plays a fundamental role in human development. The global water crisis is of such magnitude that it is growing into an issue of global common concern. This perspective puts the focus on transboundary rivers: approximately half of global fresh water is available through 276 international basins around the world. Overall, 145 countries have territories that include at least one shared river basin. However, national politics complicates the policies towards the enhanced “river basin management” of such shared rivers. Thus, while dealing with the management of the transboundary rivers, political issues are often overshadowed by integrated water resources management (IWRM) terminology that has contributed to a failure of achieving global water governance .[1]

The management of transboundary rivers in different parts of the world cannot follow a particular golden principle of the value of water — its demand and supply varies from one basin to another.[2] Thus, it can be safely argued that “one-shot approach of management within the context of IWRM is far too simplistic to be useful, or applicable” for sustainable management of international rivers.[3] In spite of its huge significance for global peace and development, the available knowledge on how to manage transboundary waters is quite weak.[4] Moreover, the existing knowledge and institutions on governance of international rivers are becoming increasingly volatile because of greater demand and a decreased supply of fresh water. Adding further to the problem, the threat of global climate change has started undermining the on-going regimes and institutions of water sharing and management of transboundary rivers.[5]

The Climate Change and Transboundary Water

The controversy over the science of global warming and the procedures adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in collecting data fails to undermine the decades of climate research confirming the overall global climate change. Doubts and denial have given way to debates about the scale and impact of climate change, particularly in the developing countries. Agricultural production in the Southern hemisphere may become highly vulnerable to climate change, given the other multiple stresses that affect food systems in these regions. Moreover, some countries and societies are better in formulating adaptation strategies for land- and water-use practices that buffers them against the negative consequences of climate change. To address the adverse effects of climate change, the effectiveness and coping abilities of existing institutions also matter. Within this context, there is a general recognition that the developing countries will be the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change, as they tend to depend more on the natural environment for their livelihoods and have limited coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity.

While the exact impact of climate change is not yet known, it will have a clear bearing upon access to shared water resources as it affects hydrological cycles at all geographical scales, from global to local. Some regions will become much drier, some wetter. Variations in precipitation are already leading to more and severe droughts and floods, changes in the groundwater recharge, high evaporation from fresh water systems, and alteration in river runoff. Increasing number of high and untimely floods will threaten the safety of dams and other water infrastructure projects; severe droughts will drastically reduce water supply, irrigation and hydropower generation. Climate change is thus set to make water management challenges more complicated in terms of providing safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, improved food production, and in generating hydropower and ecosystem protection. Moreover, climate change may have a serious impact on overall availability of river water flow in international basins. Some parts of the basin will experience higher flows and others lower flows placing significant strain on existing agreements and structures for the management of shared water resources — whether at local, national or international level – and thereby increasing the need for serious conflict management institutions and practices. As can be seen, the ongoing climatic changes will make it impossible for a ‘business as usual’ approach, which emphasizes building large projects to increase water supply in managing shared river systems. Increased freshwater variability will introduce a greater uncertainty, which can pose serious new challenges to the on-going practices of water sharing and management in transboundary river basins.

New challenges for hydro-diplomacy

The influence of hydro diplomacy has helped several disputing countries to not only agree on their portions of shared river water, but also to look other areas of cooperation.[6] In 1994, water played a critical role in the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. India and Pakistan, in spite of more than six decades of bitter rivalry, have only had lasting cooperation over the sharing of Indus River water resources. Thus, international rivers are not only expected to induce riparian conflict, its water resource can also bring engagement and cooperation in the basin. Many competing riparian countries in the South, most notably the basin countries of the Mekong, Amur, Jordan, Syr Darya, Ganges, Mahakali, Nile, Komati, Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, and Zambezi rivers have signed sharing arrangements in the 1990s. The signing of these river agreements had brought a fundamental shift over the possible impact of shared water on riparian relations, a likely phase of cooperation rather than conflict. Hydro-diplomacy is still being endorsed to take precedence over state-centric politics and decision-making over international water resources.[7]

Most of these recently concluded river agreements have been possible as the riparian countries saw advantages in cooperating to pursue further development of shared water resource to meet their growing demand. In some cases like the Nile, Mekong, Jordan and Zambezi rivers, diplomatic pressures and financial aid and grants from the international community had also facilitated the success of hydro-diplomacy. However, these river water agreements are in grave danger if they fail to receive institutional support for proper water management at the basin level.

Global climate change has added increased uncertainties to the smooth functioning and survival of these recent transboundary water agreements. As Arnell argues, climate change may affect both the demand and supply sides of the balance.[8] With increasing temperatures, sizeable reductions in precipitation, and the melting of glacial sources of major river systems, less water supplies will be available to the agricultural sector. Climate change will not only decrease the supply of river water, it may also enhance its demand in domestic, irrigation, industrial and ecological use. Thus, climate change induced scarcity and uncertainly of shared water resource in the arid and semi-arid regions can possibly limit the potential of hydro-diplomacy. It is true that the projected impacts of global climate change over fresh water supply might be huge and dramatic, but in a transboundary basin, the effects on the runoff might vary depending on the location. This further enhances the uncertainties and anxieties over the water availability in the shared river systems. Most of the existing river agreements do have provisions to meet near-term shortfalls in the river flow. However, climate change can potentially bring long-term changes to water availability, which requires water regimes and institutions to be flexible and robust enough to cope with the emerging situation.

Climate induced changes in water supply might demand comprehensive adjustments in the on-going water sharing arrangement of shared rivers. The institutions overseeing water sharing must be adaptable enough in re-allocating fluctuating water flow for various sectors. Thus, the task of hydro-diplomacy amid climate change entails both getting the disputing riparian countries to sign river sharing agreements but also to ensure these countries support establishing regimes and institutions which will have the provisions for information sharing, conflict management mechanisms, and flexibility to adjust to the runoff variations in the long term. Moreover, mitigating or adaptive actions at bilateral or even sub-basin levels to address the impacts of climate change in a transboundary river basin are unlikely to achieve the objective of sustainable peace and cooperation over shared water resources. The emerging and unprecedented situation demands basin countries to cooperate and act collectively and jointly. In the face of global climate change, a successful basin-based initiative is required to facilitate better integration of demand and supply and to promote meaningful participatory processes. Business as usual for hydro-diplomacy and a singular focus upon bilateral negotiation and arrangements is no longer an option in the transboundary river basins.

Responding to new challenges

The unfolding effects of climate change will further increase water scarcity, in the form of long-lasting drought and seasonal variation. People need a responsive state to attend to their basic need for water. When climate change makes it difficult for the state to meet demand for water, conflicts over a narrowing resource base are less readily resolved; instability and violent conflict within states may feed instability and conflict between states within the basin. Efficient and good water management in the face of climate change is also part of peace-building effort – both in preventing countries from returning to armed conflict, and in helping avoid relapse after a period of violence. Despite the risk that climate change induced water scarcity poses to social wellbeing and economic growth, in most countries there has been alarmingly little progress towards managing freshwater sustainably. Significant economic and political resources are needed to develop technologies and infrastructure that provide better water management at the basin, national, and transboundary level.

To reach agreement on meeting the competing and fluctuating demands for water in a transboundary basin is, in fact, not an easy task. Hydro-diplomacy thus needs to adopt a total resource view where river water is seen as a key input for development and growth in the basin. The challenges are not only limited to the technical and economic sectors, but also include crucial water sector reform, which is political in nature. Moreover, the task of hydro-diplomacy will not be anymore limited to basin-based regimes and institutions, but also entails achieving effective water governance in the face of climate change and influencing the supporting pathways from local, national and international policies and practices.

In the past, river-sharing issues could be effectively covered by a few negotiators trained specifically to deal with water issues. But today, hydro-diplomacy needs to involve itself not only in an increasing range of fields (such as energy generation, food production, human rights, and health issues) but also hydro-diplomacy should also reflect sufficient knowledge about possible impacts of climate change (such as precipitation pattern, glacier melting, temperature increase, rising sea water encroaching fresh water system). Many developing riparian countries, not only have to survive with the existing power asymmetry vis-à-vis regional powers in the basins, they also suffer from a lack of competent ‘hydro-diplomats’ who can address climate change issues while carrying out negotiation over shared water resources.

Hydro-diplomacy is needed to acquaint itself well with increasingly diversified climate change policy processes. River water negotiators are required to have sufficient knowledge of the climate change phenomenon and the possible impact of climate change on human, society, country and region. They also need to have an overview of the existing and emerging schools of thought regarding climate change and its impact on water availability and demand. It is also crucial to identify and classify important actors and groupings and their positions on climate change and water management issues. Moreover, hydro-diplomacy must have overview of increasing legal and policy documents, which are coming out by international and regional organizations on the impact of climate change on water resources and possible mitigation and adaption measures.

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research, and the director of the Research School of the International Center for Water Cooperation at Uppsala University in Sweden

[1] Conca, Ken 2006. Governing Water. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

[2] Swain, Ashok 2004. Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. London: Routledge

[3] Varis, O., C. Tortajada, and A.K. Biswa. 2008. Management of Tranboundary Rivers and Lakes. Berlin: Springer.

[4] Earle, A., A. Jägerskog, and J. Öjendal, eds. 2010. Transboundary Water Management: Principles and Practice: London: Earthscan.

[5] Earle, A, A. E. Cascao, S. Hansson, A. Jägerskog, A. Swain, and J. Öjendal, 2015. Transboundary Water Management and the Climate Change Debate: London: Routledge.

[6] Conca, Ken, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds. 2002. Environmental Peacemaking. Washington, Baltimore and London: Woodrow wilson Centre Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[7] Pohl, B, A. Carius, K. Conca, G. D. Dabelko, A. Kramer, D. Michel, S. Schmeier, A. Swain and A. Wolf, 2014. The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy. Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters: Berlin: Adelphi.

[8] Arnell, Nigel W. 1999. Climate Change and Global Water Resources. Global Environmental Change 9:31-49.

Why is Saudi Arabia Helping Iran’s Hardliners?

January 21, 2016 by Alexander Decina

By: Alexander Decina

Iranian_presidential_election,_2009,_protests_(2) — Protester’s in Iran’s presidential elections on 13 June, 2009. Source: Wikimedia

There is an abundance of Middle East analysts and experts drawn to the idea of eternal conflicts. After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, they learned the words “Sunni” and “Shia” and decided that this “1,400 year-old fight” is the defining conflict in the Middle East, disregarding the nuance of the important issues of the region. As Saudi Arabia and Iran recently rowed over the execution of a prominent Shiite sheikh and the subsequent storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, and as the two countries continue their proxy war in Syria, the experts have re-invoked the Sunni-Shia conflict, positing that Saudi Arabia and Iran—the purported champions of Sunnism and Shiism respectively—have always hated each other. This grand sentiment distracts from what is actually a petty fight: Saudi Arabia is giving Iranian hardliners ammunition to undermine the moderates and prevent Iran from getting close to the West, thus protecting Saudi Arabia’s place in the region.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have indeed been rivals since well before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. From the days of the shah, the two countries argued over regional dominance and oil policy—the same issues they continue to squabble over today. But just because these countries have been rivals it does not mean they have always been mortal enemies. Even after the Iranian Revolution, there have been multiple periods in which Riyadh and Tehran have worked to improve relations and attempt rapprochement—all in the midst of ongoing tensions and conflicts.

In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—a prominent opponent of Supreme Leader Khamenei—worked with then-King Fahd and then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to increase the number of Iranian pilgrims on the hajj and to improve Iran’s relations not only with Riyadh but also with the other countries in the Gulf. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then-President Khatami made more progress than Rafsanjani, holding amicable talks on oil policy and even forming a security pact in April 2001, pledging to cooperate in fighting terrorism and to keep out of each other’s internal affairs.

As Rafsanjani and Khatami have reached out, they have always been constrained by Iran’s hardliners in the Principalist party and the Supreme Leader. With the Supreme Leader’s veto power over every move they might make, the moderates’ attempts at rapprochement have only existed to the extent that Khomeini and now Khamenei have allowed. The Supreme Leaders’ decisions on this have been based on ensuring their own survival. Today, Khamenei wants to do whatever he can to reduce the level of volatility against him and the clerical establishment in Iran. He balances improving oil policy and Iran’s economy, which keeps protestors off the streets, with appeasing Iran’s hardline Principalists, who have always viewed him skeptically due to his lack of religious credentials.

Khamenei’s biggest appeasement to the hardline Principalists was entering the fray in support of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections. This backfired after 2009 when demonstrators protested not only against the president but also against the Supreme Leader himself—a rare sight in Iran.

Khamenei could have nullified President Hassan Rouhani’s surprise win in 2013. Rouhani’s plans for moderation and rapprochement with regional neighbours and the West were, and still are, a threat to the hardliners in Iran. But with the combination of the possibility of sanctions relief and fear that quashing Rouhani would lead to demonstrations like the ones in 2009, Khamenei allowed Rouhani to take office. Iranian forces loyal to the Supreme Leader could surely have put down another round of protests, but at what cost? A repeat of 2009 would have led to even more animosity directed at Khamenei and the establishment.

Since coming to power, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, have made attempts at outreach similar to those of Rafsanjani and Khatami. The two have made requests for official visits and have urged dialogue with the other Gulf countries. And yet Saudi Arabia has been far less receptive to their efforts than it has been towards the previous Iranian leaders—especially since King Salman took power. Rather than entering talks in earnest as it did in decades past, Saudi Arabia has taken more aggressive Syria and oil policies to bleed Iran. The Gulf monarchy has also engaged in an extensive campaign in Yemen to open a new front against its rival (though Tehran’s support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen has always been fairly inexpensive, so the Saudi-led campaign does very little to actually hurt Iran).

Why is Saudi Arabia rebuffing Rouhani and Zarif? After last year’s nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran, for the first time since 1979, stands a real chance to reintegrate into the international community—possibly giving the United States and the West the option of another powerful ally in the Middle East besides Saudi Arabia. The likelihood that Iran’s moderates will be able to accomplish this is still quite low. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia perceives this as a real enough possibility that it is willing to act on it to protect its standing.

Calling reform and moderation in Iran an uphill battle is an understatement. The Saudis, of course, know this and are using it to their advantage. In its aggressive Syria, Yemen, and oil policies, and now in executing Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Riyadh is strengthening the position of Iran’s hardliners, giving the clerical establishment ammunition to undermine Iran’s moderates without inciting protests against it like the ones in 2009.

This ammunition gives the hardliners good footing for the upcoming Majlis and Assembly of Experts elections on February 26. They are able to frame the moderates’ efforts to improve Iran’s relations with the world as weakening the country at a time when the region is more unstable than ever before. Furthermore, if lower oil prices undermine the benefits of sanctions relief on the economy, they can argue that the moderates have weakened Iran’s position with no real payoff. The announcement that Iran’s Guardian Council—which is controlled by the hardliners—has just disqualified an unprecedented number of moderate and reformist candidates, including the late Supreme Leader Khomeini’s grandsons, Hassan Khomeini and Morteza Eshraghi, shows the hardliners are feeling particularly bold—a bad sign for Iran’s moderates.

The Saudis are all too happy to strengthen Iran’s hardliners and have shown they can do so successfully, but they do this at their own peril. If Saudi Arabia continues its aggressive Syria and Yemen policies, it will create more radicalism and more terrorism that will spill out of those countries and will affect not only other countries and the West, but also the kingdom itself. According to the IMF last October, if Riyadh continues its aggressive oil policies and keeps the price below $50 per barrel, it will run out of cash reserves in fewer than 5 years. Earlier this month, crude fell below $30 per barrel, the lowest it’s been since 2003. Saudi Arabia’s new direction under King Salman is recklessly shortsighted and is making its traditional allies in the West and in the region uncomfortable—even if they’re not ready to voice this publicly yet. If Riyadh is truly worried about maintaining its positioning, it should look on itself rather than Iran.

Alexander Decina is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He previously worked for the Tripoli, Libya-based Sadeq Institute and for the Sustainable Democracy Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

The embattled and weary Two-State Solution is still the only game in town

November 2, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Charles P. Kirchofer

The West Bank barrier near Bethlehem. Photo by Marc Venezia, creative commons license, 2007

With the Oslo Accords all but dead and support for a two-state solution declining among both Israelis and Palestinians, it is tempting to abandon the idea altogether. There is no conceivable alternative, however. The longer two states are not a reality in Israel/Palestine, the worse things will become—especially for Israel.

In a book whose very title accepted that it would be controversial, the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argues: ‘History shows that walls, provided people are prepared to do what is necessary to defend them and prevent other people from crossing them, by using lethal force if necessary, work.’ This is controversial because, as the photo above suggests, people tend to associate walls with oppression and, above all, Cold War Berlin. Yet the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as promulgated by the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, implies separation. Given the tensions between Israelis and Palestinians, such a separation would almost certainly involve additional wall and fence building, unless more creative, but unlikely, solutions are found. Wall or not, the Oslo Accords were a reaction to the recognition that the status quo in Israel/Palestine had become untenable. Recent violence shows that the status quo is once again, or more accurately still, untenable. It also shows that the two-state solution is still the only game in town.

The arguments against the two-state solution sometimes come from ideology, but more often from shear exasperation. There was great hope for two states in the 1990s. But as the former head of Israel’s internal security service puts it: ‘There was no good faith. […] We wanted security and we got more terrorism. They wanted a state and got more settlements.’ Gaza is now controlled by a group that Israel, the United States, and most European governments consider to be a terrorist group and that launches rockets on Israeli communities. With this in mind, many Israelis have concluded that ‘land for peace’ does not work. After all, the West Bank is much closer to the bulk of Israel’s population. If a group like Hamas took over there and decided to attack Israelis, their ability to do so would be much greater than it is from Gaza.

Palestinians, meanwhile, hear platitudes about two states but see little change since the 1990s, except for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. Furthermore, As Kobi Michael, former Deputy Director and head of the Palestinian desk at Israel’s Ministry for Strategic Affairs points out, many Palestinians have concluded that that withdrawal came about as a result of the violence of the Second Intifada.[1] Some therefore question the wisdom of ‘peace for land’, as little seems to have come from it. Finally, on a purely technical basis, the spread of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the growth in the number of settlers there has made agreeing on borders devilishly difficult.

All of these arguments are true, and yet they are essentially irrelevant without an alternative. The only other possibility would be a one-state solution. This would lead Israel to become either a state with a minority Jewish population, the very situation Israel was founded to avoid, or an apartheid state, with Palestinians as second-class citizens. As difficult as a two-state solution seems, both of those alternatives are worse for Israelis (though arguably not for Palestinians). A binational state with fewer rights for Palestinians would also be unacceptable to Israel’s European and US allies because they could not be seen presiding over a slide to an overtly racist form of government. As US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman warned in April: If Israel ‘is seen to be stepping back from its commitment to a two-state solution that will make our job in the international arena much tougher… it will be harder for us to prevent internationalizing the conflict’. Israel’s very survival and legitimacy are therefore predicated on an eventual two-state solution.

All is not lost. Israelis and Palestinians have come close to agreement before, including on what is perhaps the most contentious issue: Jerusalem. They came closest in 2000, when US President Clinton presented them with the so-called ‘Clinton Parameters’, which called for the partition of Jerusalem, including its holy sites, between Israelis and Palestinians. Most Israelis do not live in settlements and most (still) support a two-state solution in principle, as is the case with Palestinians. Palestinians’ faith in ‘peace for land’ would increase if they saw progress on gaining sovereignty over more of it. Israelis’ faith in ‘land for peace’ would increase if they saw less violence. Unfortunately, violence is currently riding high, with 11 Israelis and 62 Palestinians killed since September, and shows no sign of abating. Israelis will rightly be concerned that picking up negotiations again now will reward violence.

The time to move would ideally have been during a period of relative calm. Israel is now building a wall to separate two sections of Jerusalem from each other, one Jewish, one Arab. If van Creveld is right and such measures eventually bring down tensions, such a calm could return. Both parties would be wise to seize upon the opportunity to settle the issue once and for all. As hard as it would be all involved, the alternatives are either horrid or the products of wishful thinking. ‘Two states for two peoples’ is the only way.

Charles Kirchofer is finishing up his PhD on Israel’s deterrence policies towards Hamas at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He can be found on Twitter @CPKirchofer and his blog: www.charles-kirchofer.com

Remembering the Vienna Congress: lessons for the EU

June 25, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Lucile Dussoubs:

Le gateau des rois, / tiré au Congrès de Vienne en 1815. Depicts the leaders of Europe squabbling over the map of Europe at the Vienna Congress. Photo: British Museum (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

This month marks 200 years since the end of the Vienna Congress. This bicentennial should give the European Union (EU) the opportunity to dive back into the study of what has long been regarded as a golden age for European diplomacy. It could also help the EU draw out useful conclusions about its current efforts in foreign policy.

The Vienna Congress, which took place from September 1814 to June 1815, had as its aim the settlement of the borders of Europe to establish a stabilised order in a continent deeply shocked by the Napoleonic wars. This question was solved thanks to personal – sometimes friendly – relationships between the famous old aristocratic diplomats Metternich, Talleyrand and Castlereagh. The ‘personal factor’ had a major impact during the conference. It helped Talleyrand to not only impose France’s wishes at the negotiating table, but to preserve her status as a great European power. This he achieved despite both Napoleon’s surrender and the crisis caused by the Hundred Days, which saw Napoleon return from exile on Elba in March, right in the midst of the conference, and raise an army.

Organisers of international conferences no longer appreciate the importance of interpersonal relationships and the personality of each negotiator when planning a meeting. The European Union High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have always been openly nominated based on their knowledge of international relations, but also thanks to their discretion, lack of charisma and their not-too-openly affirmed opinions. Of course, it is a major struggle to find an individual able to embody the specificities of each member state. But that should not come at the expense of ambitious choices.

Another major lesson of the Congress of Vienna is that the demonisation of a traditional partner is not a useful tool to achieve diplomatic goals. Post-Napoleonic France was a major threat for the stability of all states present. But none of those states were tempted to humiliate France. This strategic choice was in opposition to their respective publics. Nevertheless, it allowed the European countries to synchronise their actions when the next major crisis emerged with Napoleon leaving the Island of Elba.

In the case of today’s EU strategy towards one of its major threats, Russia, the lessons of Vienna seem to have been forgotten. Countering Russia’s propaganda around its invasion of Crimea and its presence in the battlefield with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine required the EU to develop and reinforce a counter-narrative. The EU engaged rapidly in an information war that it has won, at least on its own territory. But the European leaders have not realised the risks of a rising wave of anti-Russia sentiment. For historic, geographic and cultural reasons, Russia still is and will remain an unavoidable partner and a strategic neighbour. Further demonisation will only lead to more incomprehension and resentment. If hostility towards Russia is latent in many European countries – especially in the Baltic states – it has definitely been increased by politicized top-down discourses for which the EU is largely responsible.

What’s more, the Congress of Vienna is one of the most exuberant demonstrations of European ‘total’ diplomacy. Total diplomacy is defined by a context in which foreign policy efforts are constant and supported by any means possible from state-to-state negotiations to the arts. In Vienna, the conference was a success in large part due to parallel activities aimed at facilitating the talks. One of the main examples of this ‘total’ diplomacy was the organisation of what would now be considered outrageously extravagant meals, concerts, and entertainment. But far from being anachronistic, this recreational approach to diplomacy was of the utmost modernity.

The European Union should not be afraid to engage more in ‘total’ diplomacy. While this may be difficult at a time when the EU is trying to reduce its expenses, and the EU has no interest in organising meetings that would be mere copies of G7 conferences, there is definitely a middle ground between its current – very traditional – approach to diplomacy ‘on the phone’ or ‘around a table’, and this more ambitious approach.

The EU should also be more willing to use its ‘smart power’ more openly. The Union has unique know-how on how to balance hard and soft power, military effectiveness and the world’s strongest policy for cooperation and partnership: it should not be ashamed of using its historic background to gain influence.

Another major diplomatic innovation of the Congress of Vienna was the establishment of the ‘Concert of Nations’ among the European states. The coordination and reinforcement of the relations between the major countries of the continent was not strong enough to avoid the First World War but can still be considered as a lasting first attempt to normalise the constant exchanges among traditional partners. The ‘Concert of Nations’ preserved the stability of the region and helped to coordinate the agendas of all the actors. Of course, this stability came at the expense of a continued validation for imperialist regimes.

It is interesting to consider that contemporary European international relations principles are based on the legacy of the Congress of Vienna. The EU has taken pride in pushing for better relations with all partners and sharing the same values, such as the respect for democracy and civil rights. It is also trying to help all countries wishing to strengthen these values, and to push them when these values are too little or non-existent through programs of development, human rights education efforts or grants for political reforms. At the same time, and even if all EU citizens should take pride and continue to stand up for these values, the legacy of the Concert of Nations is that of successful ‘global’ diplomacy, including emerging countries that are often less keen on moral guidance in international relations.

Finally, the Congress of Vienna is a clear demonstration of the State being the major diplomatic actor. The negotiating table was filled with representatives of well-established governments who were credited with the intentions of the heads of their respective states, often kings. The institution of the State was not suffering from the competition of other actors such as journalists, who were not present in the room, or by civilians interests.

Two centuries later, the emergence of new actors in the international arena represents the major change regarding diplomacy in its power and means. Various groups have been challenging the traditional representation of diplomacy as being reserved for the State. The Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, the Ukrainian separatists or terrorist groups all pretend to deserve the right to be as legitimate as the State to act on the international sphere, and to represent a sufficiently important part of the population to be regarded as unavoidable interlocutors. The declarations by the European Union that it is not considering talks with non-established groups like those risk weakening the institution’s reputation for transparency, but also comes with moral dilemmas.

A new paradigm is thus needed to make sense of all the European efforts in foreign policy. Both ‘post-Westphalian diplomacy’ (to emphasise the recognition of the state as the main actor of diplomacy) and ‘post-Vienna diplomacy’ (to highlight the emergence of the ‘European Concert’) are not satisfactory benchmarks anymore. The emergence of new players – almost always competing with the European bloc – requires the affirmation of a new reflective space and institutional mechanisms. After all, two hundred years have passed.

Lucile Dussoubs is currently completing her MA in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

Call for papers: A world in flux? Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

September 17, 2014 by Strife Staff

A world in flux?
Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

Call for papers
US Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife first annual conference
March 4, 2015 at King’s College London

The world is in an increasing state of flux. Growing concerns over the rise of Islamic State and international tensions over Ukraine have compounded with ongoing dilemmas over North Korea’s nuclear program and international terrorism more broadly. Wikileaks has demonstrated gaps in state’s information security, while the growing problem of foreign fighters has showed how global events are linked increasingly with domestic concerns. The tools engaged to manage security are changing, as are partnerships and allies. The concept of security has also widened and deepened over recent decades, expanding from security between states, to areas such as individual and environmental security. At the forefront of these challenges, the United States has remained the hegemon, but how has this position changed and what role will it play in the future?

This one-day conference will bring together a diverse range of practitioners and academics who will critically analyze the shifting state of security and investigate the diverse ways in which the United States, as the continuing dominant force in global affairs has responded, and continues to respond to, these challenges.

The first annual joint United States Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife conference will survey the expansive terrain of global insecurity and the US response across its many diverse aspects. Held in the renowned Department of War Studies, at King’s College London, this conference is interested in theoretical explorations and empirical case studies, with particular emphasis on new approaches and cross-disciplinary dialogue. A selection of excellent papers will be included in a special spring edition of Strife Journal.

Under the conference theme, we welcome submissions of proposals for panels and papers, which address a number of the following cognate (though not exclusive) topics:

1. Military-to-military relations

Changing tactics of warfare (i.e. COIN and drones)
Counter-terrorism
Security sector and military reforms

2. Responses to recent and continuing conflicts

Middle East (Palestine-Israel, Iraq, Syria)
Europe (Ukraine)
Asia (South China Sea disputes, Afghanistan, Pakistan)

3. Emerging security concerns

Environment
Health care/epidemics
Cyber security

4. Homeland security

Detainees/Guantanamo/extraordinary rendition
Information security (i.e Wikileaks, the Bradley Manning case)
Impacts of the global on the domestic (i.e. civil liberties)

We welcome abstract submissions of 300 words and brief biographies from postgraduate research students. Consideration will also be made for exceptional graduate applications. Please submit to editors.strife@gmail.com by November 1, 2014 with the subject line “USFPRG-Strife Conference.”

The conference will take place on March 4, 2015 at King’s College London, Strand Campus. Attendance at the conference will be free and open to all.

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Downloadable version: Strife-USFP First Annual Conference – Call for Papers

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