democracy

Is democratic peace theory undermined on the cyber battlefield?

October 30, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Archie Jobson

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Remote Control is a project hosted by the London-based think tank Oxford Research Group, set up to examine changes in military engagement, in particular the use of drones, special forces, private military companies and cyber warfare. They recently hosted an essay competition for participants in response to the question ‘Is remote control effective in solving security problems?’ Both Chad Tumelty and Archie Jobson of King’s College London achieved runner up. Strife is proud to feature them as your long read of the week over the coming two weeks.

Democratic peace is a historically proven and appealing solution to the violent and anarchic nature of international relations. However, much of the statistical proof for claims of a democratic peace rest on constrained and narrow definitions of war. Cyberwar introduces a new method of war that negates many of the principles and parameters of democratic peace theory, subsequently putting the validity of a democratic peace in doubt. In order to conclusively assess whether democratic peace is applicable to cyberspace, I shall, firstly, define cyberwar in reference to current debate and the Clausewitzian understanding of war. Secondly I will contrast the characteristics of cyber war to the framework of democratic peace theory. Ultimately democratic peace theory has little applicability to the realm of cyberspace, but, importantly, to date the democratic peace has held, as two democratic states are yet to engage in cyberwar.

“Cyber war will not happen” and “cyber war will happen!” are, two conflicting arguments posed by Thomas Rid and John Stone respectively. Although, as the titles suggest, both are seeking to establish the likelihood of cyber war, the essential disagreement can be seen as does cyberwar constitute war. Thomas Rid claims that, due to the lack violence in a cyber attack it cannot equate to conventional understandings of war, and thus is not. Rid refers to Clausewitz’s definition, “war is an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will.” The crucial word for Rid is force, which he defines as violence and thus an action of war must pertain an element of lethality. However this seems to be a flawed understanding of war and, as John Stone points out, is historically unfounded. Stone highlights the 1943 bombings of the Bavarian town of Schweinfurt. The intended aim was to destroy German ball-bearing production capacity. Although over 400 civilians died in these raids, providing Rid’s lethality, it was seen as “incidental to the desired goal”. The proposition is that, these air raids had no aim of lethality but were clearly acts of war, and thus Rid’s requirement of lethal violence is restrictive, even by conventional understandings of war. It is possible to reinforce John Stone’s argument with the logic that, if an action of cyberwar results in the “compel(ling)” of an enemy to do the attackers “will” then it arguably constitutes war, at least by a Clausewitzian definition. Essentially, this means that if cyberwar achieves the same result as traditional warfare, it should be considered as war. This is reinforced by the idea that if “breaking and entering” in cyber space, the theft of personal or corporate information, is registered as an equal if not greater crime as physically breaking and entering, then cyberwar that achieves the submission of the opponents will, must equate to a conventional conflict that amounts to the same.

The cyber attacks on Estonia in April 2007 demonstrate this. As the result of the proposed removal of a Soviet war memorial from the centre of Tallinn, Estonia and its online infrastructure came under attack from computers of Russian origin. In context, Estonia was regularly called the “wired state of Europe”, with 90% of its domestic financial transactions taking place online. By May 19th Hansabank, Estonia’s largest bank, was forced offline. Ultimately to stop these attacks the Estonian government was forced to close down all external Internet traffic, essentially shutting itself off to the rest of the world. Although, clearly, this is not a cyberwar between two democracies, it demonstrates that a state can force another to act against its own will, by the use of a cyber attack. In this case Estonia closing itself off to the world, causing significant disruption and economic damage. Estonia’s cyber space was recognized by Russia as integral to the “wired state”, and was targeted for this reason. It is hard to deny, therefore, that cyberwar does not constitute war; if, as this example shows, it has the potential to achieve the same ends desired in a conventional conflict. The retort could be made that the memorial was still removed, demonstrating Estonia did not bow to Russian desires; but this seems naive to the nature of Russian intentions during this period. The attack on Estonia can be seen as a move by Russia to demonstrate its support of ethnic Russian communities in former soviet bloc states, this is highlighted by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war which also involved substantial cyber attacks. However, it should be noted that a cyber war such as this would not fall under the traditional definition of war utilized by democratic peace theory, the “correlates of war.” Thus the distinction should be established that either the correlates of war are outdated and cannot help in understanding the ever modernizing developments of war, or that cyber war does not constitute as a sufficient example of conflict; it seems on assessment of the above example the later is incorrect.

The logic of democratic peace theory prescribes that democracies do not engage one another in military conflict, due to the nature of democratic systems and the shared cultural norms that reject violence. Cyber warfare introduces several new elements that null these factors, and in so doing raise questions of the validity of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that the absence of war between democratic states is a result of “institutional constraints; the restraining effect of public opinion or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic structures.” In cyber warfare, however, the dynamics of conflict have fundamentally changed, negating these explanations. For example the battlefield of cyber war is not inhabited by soldiers but by servers. This subsequently removes the danger to life, and thus it must remove a strong element of public aversion to conflict. Secondly if the conventional elements of war are either removed entirely, or substantially reduced, it will be accompanied by a significant cost reduction. Thus if a nation will not loose “its treasure” (comparatively to conventional war), and there still remains the possibility of gain from a cyber conflict, in the form of prestige or a stronger global position; the assumption that democracies would be unwilling to commit to a conflict, lacks evidence. Ultimately, if “blood and treasure” were not applicable there would be little, if no, restraining effect. This is because these are two, fundamental, war retardants held by democratic peace theorists.

Christopher Layne points out that democratic peace theorist often argue “that the absence of war between democracies is more important than the absence of threats”. The validity of this argument, as a result of the weaknesses highlighted above, is now under much greater pressure. Democratic states can now threaten another international actor with cyberwar, without the restraints they were contained by before. The comparatively smaller cost of a cyber attack, in terms of “Blood” and “Treasure”, to a conventional one is demonstrated by “struxnet”. This was a virus, planted by the US, which infected the Iranian nuclear facilities’ computer network. This caused an internal explosion by disrupting the separation process of uranium-235. The conventional alternative, that could have caused the same level of damage, would have been an airstrike using special munitions, with estimate costs running into millions of dollars. Struxnet was cheap as it “capitalized on code expertise” that already existed. Furthermore no US personnel were put at risk to carry out the operation. Cyberwar thus challenges the assertion that substantial physical and economic loss prevents elected leaders from taking their countries to war with other democratic states. This is because the weight of public antipathy to these loses, is essentially non-applicable in cyberwar; rebuffing the claims that war will not happen between democratic states.

The transparency and legality of democratic states is also claimed by democratic peace theorist to demonstrate why democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict. As a result of this transparency and conformity to international legal norms it is argued that, democratic states have an innate level of trust amongst each other. However, in the cyber world such faith in another states intentions, especially those towards you, is challenged. This is due to the element of deniability that is possible with cyber attacks, that is not possible via conventional methods. For example, operation “Titan Rain”, as dubbed by the US, was a wide spread cyber attack on multiple US and UK government departments from 2003-07, that came from Chinese origin. The blame was put solely on PLA by British and American government officials; yet the Chinese government was able to plainly deny these claims due to the attacks untraceable nature. Although again this example is not a conflict between two democracies, it clearly shows that transparency and legality do not apply in cyber space. This is because a state could perpetrate an attack to disable a government’s infrastructure, an act that fulfils the parameters of war, but then deny any involvement. As Chinese government did by arguing they had no part in the attack. Crucially America and the UK were restricted in their response on these grounds, and could not pursue a legal course. Therefore, because the burden of proof in the cyber world is so much greater it could fog up the transparency of democratic states and thus trust in one another would dissipate. Cyberspace is therefore a domain in which, a state could attack another and not be held accountable to international legal norms. The situation has arisen where transparency and conformity to legal norms are no longer relevant, because states can act essentially anonymously. Ultimately, this will challenge democracies’ commitment to international law.

Maoz and Russet in “A Statistical Artifact?” state that democratic spirit of “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise” explains why democracies behave in a “qualatively” different manner towards each other than they do towards non-democracies. As the cyber world continues to develop this idea of peaceful competition, on which democratic peace’s foundations lie, is increasingly challenged. As a result it is possible to conclude that the apparent stability of democratic peace is not foreseeable. This can be demonstrated by the comparison of the 1923 Ruhr crisis with the 2013 United States National Security Agency’s espionage on the state owned Brazilian oil giant Petrobras. Historically the idea that democracies behave towards one another with a mutual respect has been regularly challenged. Christopher Layne in “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of the Democratic Peace” challenged such arguments with the example of the 1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis. Essentially Layne claims that, the occupation of the Ruhr valley by France is an example where the inherent respect that democracies have for one another, was not present. The occupation of the Ruhr showed that France’s war objective of crippling Wilhelm Germany remained the same, despite the fact that Germany was now a democratic republic. Up to 1923 France had rejected the idea of a new democratic Germany, as they did not believe their security situation had fundamentally changed. “What mattered to France was Germany’s latent power”, France’s attitude toward Germany “displayed none of the mutual respect based on democratic norms and culture” on which democratic peace theory rests. As a consequence the French PM Poincare had no option, if he was to maintain his prime ministerial position, but to occupy the Ruhr as anti-German sentiment was so high in France. The Ruhr crisis provides two problematic situations for democratic peace theorists. Firstly it demonstrates that, should it be politically expedient for one democracy to force itself upon another, as it was for Poincare, it will. Secondly, and more importantly for cyber war, when the situation arises that one democracy is inherently weaker than another (Germany 1923) then it becomes a viable target for other democracies. This is arguably the current situation in cyber space and consequently the cyber battlefield.

In September 2013 it emerged that the U.S had been spying on the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. This provides many parallels to 1923 and is essentially an act of corporate cyber espionage by the U.S, against a state owned oil producer. From this it is possible to conclude that the United States, in a similar fashion to France in 1923, does not conform to ideas of mutual respect; instead they sought to understand the “Latent” economic power of Petrobras, and thus the Brazilian government’s oil wealth. At this point it is important to acknowledge Moaz and Russet’s claim that democratic peace is generated by “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise”, thus the stability of the so called democratic peace, if Moaz and Russet are correct, is on unstable ground, as a result of an increasing turn to the realm of cyber space. The Petrobras incident demonstrates that in cyber space two essential pillars of democratic peace have been removed. This is because the United States has shown that democratic states do not have the inherent respect required of democratic peace theory, when they are operating in the cyber world. Furthermore on the evidence presented it is possible to conclude, if not predict, that democracies such as the U.S would be willing to perform a cyber attack if it enabled some kind of economic benefit. Therefore the growth of the cyber world has simultaneously eliminated the idea of trust between democracies. As a result the likelihood of (cyber)war is much greater.

The counter argument could be made here that Petrobras, despite its majority state ownership, does not amount to a democratic state, hence this example does not undermine democratic peace theory’s requisite that democracies hold mutual respect and compete peacefully. However this is one example of many. If, for example, you examine 2013-14 revelations that the CIA and NSA were exercising a “Special Collections Service”(SCS) unit in Berlin monitoring not only Angela Merkel’s phone conversations, but also the committee rooms of the Reichstag, the future for democratic peace in the cyber realm is bleak. This example demonstrates that not only do democracies not inherently trust democratically elected leaders, but also the legislative bodies within democratic states. Moreover the SCS program has been in operation across Europe operating in other capitals such as Madrid. What this demonstrates, is that if a democratic state has the ability to do something, as the U.S cyber dominance has allowed in this case, it will do it. Furthermore it demonstrates that it will not be restrained by the articulated parameters of democratic peace theory.

Cyberwar presents a decisive challenge to democratic peace theory. The developing nature of warfare allows the logic of the democratic peace to be disputed. This is because cyberwar is not restricted by the confinements of public opinion, this in turn defeats ideas of transparency and trust between democracies. However, as stated, an example of cyberwar, that in itself, disproves the democratic peace cannot be provided; only examples that indicate the likelihood of future cyberwars between democracies. When two democratic states come into collision on an issue divisive enough for them to question the trust on which democratic peace is orientated, the inherent harmony of democracies will collapse. This is beginning to emerge as the U.S utilizes its cyber hegemony to infiltrate other democratic states, in order to understand their intentions, and true capabilities. What cyberwar reinforces, therefore, is that democracy is still in its founding moments and to conclude that it will create a perpetual peace, is to ignore the possibility of development in what we define as peace and war.

Archie is currently a third year undergraduate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His dissertation focused on human rights and the war on terror. He is interested in the changing nature of warfare and how it is revealing our rigid definitions of conflict as inadequate and outdated. Archie is hoping to continue his studies within the War Studies Department with an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society.

Turkey in the Midst of the Syrian Crisis: Security, Democracy and Secularism

September 16, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal:

After years of civil war in Syria, that has caused more than 210,000 – mostly civilian – deaths, the international community has recently been shaken by videos of war crimes undertaken by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These have included beheadings and mass executions, sexual slavery, child soldiers and destruction of cultural heritage. Despite this, Turkey has not changed its rigid position against Bashar Assad, maintaining the doctrine of strategic depth outlined by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu. Moreover, the significant majority of international commentators, including scholars and journalists, continue to argue that Syrian rebel groups, particularly Islamists, have tried to reconcile liberal democracy with Islamism/political Islam.

Alongside the rise of radical political Islam in the Middle East, including in Turkey, there has been an apparent decline in support for the secularist principles that have long acted as the foundation of the Turkish state. This article argues that secularism should be reconfirmed as the founding principle of Turkey. This must be done in order to maintain the security of its democracy.

The tension between religion and secularism cannot be reduced to politico-cultural relativism, since secularism dictates the nature and boundaries of sovereignty, and thus the relationship between the state and its citizens as well as the relationship among citizens. Political Islam considers the spiritual sphere as sacred and grants sovereignty to divine rule. It also divides society into two antagonistic groups – believers and unbelievers – and claims the legitimacy of the former over the latter. Therefore, political Islam should be considered as a project which foresees the reconstruction of both state and society in accordance with the dictates of religion.

In various countries political Islam has been portrayed as being compatible with liberal democracy.[1] The result of this position is to veil class inequalities and the exploitation of the capitalist system, as well as the deepening dependence of national economies under the global capitalist system.[2] Such reconciliation between political Islam and liberal democracy is fundamentally in contradiction with the principle of equality of human beings,[3] and it has overruled any secular criticism that could overcome deficiencies of capitalism at the global, regional and domestic levels.

In the international sphere, Turkey served as a balance between the monopolist Western capital and the rising Gulf capital. Although the former remained cautious, it was still in alliance with the latter, for instance, by supporting Syrian rebel groups under the CIA long before the plan on training and equipping Syrian rebels took shape. However, in the face of ISIL’s war crimes and radicalisation among parts of the Western population, the West began to search for a way to legitimise the possibility of future cooperation with regional actors, such as Iran.

While a significant chunk of the international community began to discuss whether Assad could be a necessary evil, it also began to blame Turkey for encouraging ISIL by supplying military equipment and training, and medical care, and for fighting against the PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat –Democratic Union Party), which has an organic relationship with the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane –Kurdistan Workers’ Party). As long as the possibility of changing power dynamics between Iran and the Gulf capital has existed, the sympathy of the international community toward the PYD has risen. Consequently, in order to regain its image as a Western ally and a bulwark against radical political Islam in the eyes of international and domestic public opinion, Turkey has let the USA use Incirlik air base close to the Syrian border, and called NATO for a meeting on the basis of the Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey further agreed with the USA on an ISIL-free buffer-zone consisting of Syrian rebels, including a majority of the moderate Islamists.

However, since Turkey also contributed to the training and equipping of Syrian rebels, it still faces the possibility of the inadvertent radicalisation of Islamists,[4] similar to the case of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Any government’s tacit consent and arguably support for the so-called moderate Islamists would contribute to the deterioration of fundamental human rights and freedoms both in Turkey and in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, Turkey urgently needs to reformulate its foreign policy and respond to the Syrian crisis in accordance with the principle of secularism.

In the domestic sphere, although the AKP government had already passed the controversial omnibus domestic security bill in April 2015, the latest terrorist attack against socialist activists in Suruc in July 2015 could not be prevented. On the contrary, whereas the police used disproportionate use of force against labour demonstrations on 1^st May 2015 and the LGBT parade in June 2015, the police did not intervene in the Caliphate Parade, which called for the application of sharia in Turkey and which was organised by Hizbut Tahrir in June 2015.

In July 2015, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against left-oriented pro-Kurdish HDP for allegedly supporting PKK’s terrorism, and President Erdogan declared that ‘the peace process’ was terminated. Beginning in August, the armed conflict between the PKK and the constabulary forces has begun to escalate with the loss of tens of civilians and combatants, and practices of martial law have been implemented in particular towns in south-eastern Turkey.

In the meantime, protests against the PKK’s terrorism turned into acts of vandalism against the opposing political parties and newspapers while shouting takbir (‘Allah is the greatest’). Although Davutoglu assured that the interim election government would prevent fratricide, he did not publicly discuss what the peace process exactly consisted of and why it was terminated, and he failed to delegitimise the political use of religion. Indeed, neither the AKP government nor the political opposition were criticised for their inability and unwillingness to prevent the political use of religion, and thus the rise of political Islam, by underestimating the importance of secularism.

In the face of the rise of radical political Islam and conflicts alongside ethnic and sectarian cleavages in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries of the global capitalist system, Turkey should understand the importance of secularism for addressing security issues and preserving fundamental human rights and freedoms. Marx once said that the critique of religion was ‘the prerequisite of every critique’, necessary to dismantle social domination.[5]

Any ideological movement which calls for the superiority of religion over the worldly sphere cannot be reconciled with democratic principles, particularly fundamental human rights and freedoms, since it aims to politically use religion as a tool for power.

In the era of neoliberalism security issues, as well as both authoritarian political regimes and deficiencies of liberal democracy, can be overcome through a political agenda which accepts the primacy of secularism. Since Turkey remains a semi-peripheral country within the framework of the Bretton Woods system,[6] and since Turkey has a majority Muslim population, the quest for secularism is urgent. Only through secularism can Turkey solve its domestic security issues and respond to its regional security issues.

Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on the state discourse on secularism and its interaction with civil-military relations in Turkey.

NOTES

[1] For the relationship between periphery/semi-periphery countries and the global capitalist system: Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007)

[2] For the relationship between political Islam and capitalism: Samir Amin, Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism. (R. Moore and J. Membrez, Trans.) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009)

[3] For the paradoxical relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism: Ellen M. Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For neoliberalism: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

[4] For a comprehensive summary on rebel groups in Syria: Fehim Tastekin, “Egit-Donat: Bir Batak Hikaye Daha”, Radikal, October 10, 2014, accessed http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/fehim_tastekin/egit_donat_bir_batak_hikaye_daha-1217979

[5] Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. (A. Jolin and J. O’Malley, Trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.131

[6] For the semi-peripheral place of Turkey in the global capitalist system: Nesecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, The Ravages of Neo-Liberalism: Economy, Society and Gender in Turkey. Eds. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2002)

The triumph of secularism in Tunisia and the democratic challenges ahead

November 13, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Beatrice Tesconi:

Photo: Gwenael Piaser http://goo.gl/rhG0HR

Against the backdrop of dispiriting headlines about the rise of Islamism in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, recent political developments in Tunisia have been hailed as a beacon of hope for a region wracked by extremism and civil war.

On Sunday October 26, Tunisia held its second parliamentary elections since the ousting of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Securing 85 of the 217 seats in parliament, the main secular party Nidaa Tounes swept aside the once dominant Islamist party of Ennahda.[1]

Hailed as a regional success story and an “important milestone in Tunisia’s historic political transition” by US President Obama, the triumph of laïcité in Tunisia has gained the praise of governments worldwide.[2]

Bravo Tunisia. Well done.

Once again, this small olive-eyed North African country has set itself as an example to its Arab neighbours and restored some of the credibility behind the revolutionary aspirations of the Arab uprisings. The apparent triumph of secularism in Tunisia has also challenged the widely held perception that the Arab uprisings served as a mere gateway to Islamic fundamentalism. A season of change seems to be underway. Perhaps we can still talk about a genuine ‘Arab Spring’.

But we should not be too hasty in declaring Tunisia’s transition to democracy an unbridled success. Free and fair elections are only one of the indicators of democracy. The long queues of Tunisians outside polling stations and the flood of pictures on social networks of voters’ ink-stained fingers are in stark contrast to an allegedly growing disillusionment with democracy as a system of government. In a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre, 59% of the Tunisian public expressed its preference for a “leader with a strong hand” over a democratic government, up from the 37% of two years ago.[3] In this context, the familiar faces of Ben Ali-era politicians in the ranks of Nidaa Tounes raises the question of whether the electoral results reflect the genuine democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people, or a form of nostalgia for the certainty of authoritarianism.

Since the fall of Ben Ali many of the practices of the ancien regime have been revived. This is particularly evident in the context of the security forces’ attempt to re-establish the impunity they enjoyed under Ali. The death of Mohamed Ali Snoussi in October of this year seems to suggest that police brutality has become prevalent once again. Human Rights Watch launched an investigation into the case based on serious allegations that police officers tortured and abused Snoussi in broad daylight.[4] But the arbitrary arrests of journalists, bloggers and activists on account of the peaceful exercise of their freedom of expression are also reminiscent of the old regime’s tactics. That was the case for the politically motivated arrest of the revolutionary blogger and human rights activist Azyz Amami in May 2014 . After openly criticising the police, Amami was arrested on trumped-up charges of drug possession under the provisions of the infamous Law 52, a legal penal code tool often used to silence dissenting voices under Ben Ali’s regime.[5]

The deteriorating security situation in the country has played into the ‘anti-Islamist’ rhetoric used by the main secular party to garner support in the elections. But if the country is to avoid slipping back into authoritarianism, Nidaa Tounes must restrict the powers of the security forces and reorient the party’s focus towards the socio-economic issues that originally sparked the 2011 uprisings. These problems remain unresolved: Tunisians have seen their economy worsen, inequalities persist and frustrations mount since Ben Ali fled the country.

A waning economy combined with high unemployment rates amongst college graduates is ripping apart the hopes of the Tunisian youth and creating the perfect audience for jihadist propaganda. So far, more than 3,000 Tunisians have allegedly travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the fight of the Islamic State (IS), making Tunisia the world’s biggest exporter of jihadist fighters.[6] In the radical alternative preached by groups like IS, Tunisia’s disillusioned and marginalised youth find the economic security and the political recognition they are denied back home.

One of the biggest challenges for Nidaa Tounes will be forming a government. Despite winning the most votes in the elections, the party still fell short of an outright majority to govern and must therefore enter the fraught process of forging a coalition. The decisions Nidaa Tounes will take in the next few weeks will act as a litmus test for the party’s commitment to inclusive politics and democratic governance. The anti-Islamist rhetoric seems to suggest that the secularists will be reluctant to engage in any form of political dialogue with the defeated Ennahda party. But closing the door on what is still the second-largest party in parliament would jeopardize the new government’s ability to make the structural reforms the country desperately needs. If excluded from government, Ennahda will not shy away from mobilising its strong support base to oppose any reform measures introduced by a Nidaa Tounes-led coalition. A weak and divided government under threat of further social unrest seems unlikely to be able to effectively tackle the socio-economic issues plaguing the country.

Reconciling the Islamist and secular political forces in the government will therefore have to be a priority for the new government. Although the elections’ results have been framed in terms of a mere referendum on Islamism, they should be interpreted as an opportunity to form the national unity government necessary for the country’s stability. An inclusive and unified government will also be essential in helping to restore some faith in the institution of the state and eventually dampen the jihadist appeal. However, this can only be achieved if Tunisia’s vibrant youth is incorporated into the political process. Only a government that truly represents the Tunisian people will be able to tackle the country’s social and economic problems. If Nidaa Tounes succeeds in forming such a government, then we can genuinely start talking about a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia.

Despite the challenging path ahead, Tunisia has already proved itself to be a powerful catalyst for change in the region. The recent political developments suggest that Tunisia has the capacity to lead such a positive change again, shattering once and for all those popular misconceptions that portray Arab constituencies and democratic governments as two worlds too far apart.

Beatrice studied Politics and International Relations at the University of York, and is currently undertaking an MA in International Peace and Security at King’s College, London. Her research interests are in the field of radicalisation, International Human Rights Law and the Middle East and North Africa Region.

NOTES

[1] “Tunisia elction results: Nida Tunis wins most seats, sidelining Islamists”, TheGuardian, October 30, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/tunisia-election-results-nida-tunis-wins-most-seats-sidelining-islamists
[2] “Tunisia counts votes after historic poll”, Aljazeera, October 26, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/tunisia-counts-votes-after-historic-poll-20141026192241951958.html.
[3] “Tunisian Confidence in Democracy Wanes”, Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, October 15, 2014 http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/15/tunisian-confidence-in-democracy-wanes/.
[4] “Tunisia: Suspicious Death in Custody”, Human Rights Watch, October 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/13/tunisia-suspicious-death-custody-0
[5] Amna Guellali, “Tunisia:The human cost of the drug law”, Human Rights Watch News, May 19, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/19/tunisia-human-cost-drug-law
[6] David D. Kirkpatrick, “New Freedoms in Tunisia Drive Support for ISIS”, The New York Times, October 21, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/africa/new-freedoms-in-tunisia-drive-support-for-isis.html.

Call for papers: A world in flux? Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

September 17, 2014 by Strife Staff

A world in flux?
Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

Call for papers
US Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife first annual conference
March 4, 2015 at King’s College London

The world is in an increasing state of flux. Growing concerns over the rise of Islamic State and international tensions over Ukraine have compounded with ongoing dilemmas over North Korea’s nuclear program and international terrorism more broadly. Wikileaks has demonstrated gaps in state’s information security, while the growing problem of foreign fighters has showed how global events are linked increasingly with domestic concerns. The tools engaged to manage security are changing, as are partnerships and allies. The concept of security has also widened and deepened over recent decades, expanding from security between states, to areas such as individual and environmental security. At the forefront of these challenges, the United States has remained the hegemon, but how has this position changed and what role will it play in the future?

This one-day conference will bring together a diverse range of practitioners and academics who will critically analyze the shifting state of security and investigate the diverse ways in which the United States, as the continuing dominant force in global affairs has responded, and continues to respond to, these challenges.

The first annual joint United States Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife conference will survey the expansive terrain of global insecurity and the US response across its many diverse aspects. Held in the renowned Department of War Studies, at King’s College London, this conference is interested in theoretical explorations and empirical case studies, with particular emphasis on new approaches and cross-disciplinary dialogue. A selection of excellent papers will be included in a special spring edition of Strife Journal.

Under the conference theme, we welcome submissions of proposals for panels and papers, which address a number of the following cognate (though not exclusive) topics:

1. Military-to-military relations

Changing tactics of warfare (i.e. COIN and drones)
Counter-terrorism
Security sector and military reforms

2. Responses to recent and continuing conflicts

Middle East (Palestine-Israel, Iraq, Syria)
Europe (Ukraine)
Asia (South China Sea disputes, Afghanistan, Pakistan)

3. Emerging security concerns

Environment
Health care/epidemics
Cyber security

4. Homeland security

Detainees/Guantanamo/extraordinary rendition
Information security (i.e Wikileaks, the Bradley Manning case)
Impacts of the global on the domestic (i.e. civil liberties)

We welcome abstract submissions of 300 words and brief biographies from postgraduate research students. Consideration will also be made for exceptional graduate applications. Please submit to editors.strife@gmail.com by November 1, 2014 with the subject line “USFPRG-Strife Conference.”

The conference will take place on March 4, 2015 at King’s College London, Strand Campus. Attendance at the conference will be free and open to all.

___________________________

Downloadable version: Strife-USFP First Annual Conference – Call for Papers

‘It’s the brotherhood, stupid.’ Values and the Arab Spring

March 27, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Jill S. Russell:

I attended last week a very interesting panel discussion on the Arab Spring [1], its meanings and the response it deserves. A theme that was shared across the panel was that the West [2] owed the movement its support because the latter was promoting the values held to be sacred by the former.

Before going any further, I have to confess here that I am an unrepentant Kennanist and have a hard time letting go of his standard that interest and not values (or the morals which sustain them) must drive foreign policy. His summary of the essential problem for such a policy framework assays the fullness of the issue, and I think it a wise explication of the flaws and worth quoting here at length:

But at the heart of [a foreign policy based on morality] would lie the effort to distinguish at all times between the true substance and the mere appearance of moral behaviour. In an age when a number of influences…all tend to exalt the image over the essential reality to which that image is taken to relate, in such an age there is a real danger that we may lose altogether our ability to distinguish between the real and the unreal, and, in doing so, lose both the credibility of true moral behaviour and the great force such behaviour is, admittedly, capable of exerting. To do this would be foolish, unnecessary and self-defeating. There may have been times when the United States could afford such frivolity. This present age, unfortunately, is not one of them. [3]

Functionally I cannot argue with his formula that values abroad do not necessarily serve the responsibilities of the government in either domestic or foreign policy. Nor can I ignore the ghastly spectre of how such a basis for foreign policy could be horribly perverted. But I am willing for the sake of argument to live briefly in a world where Kennan might be wrong. [4]

Even in that world, I am troubled that the values of the Arab Spring on the ground, and in the swelling centres of grass-roots power, do not match my own. As it is a question of my support, not of the movement’s legitimacy, my values matter.

As the beacon of this piece, let us first consider the Muslim Brotherhood and its rise and – has it fallen or is this just ‘rise interrupted’? – in Egypt. How can you expect me to believe this group shares my values? From the outset the name excludes me. Insofar as they accept women, that role has been marginalised by the imposition of restraints based in the recourse to a traditional culture which define a woman’s role in public life. Even as women are even now on the front lines of the political struggle against the military junta [5], one worries (expects) that this sacrifice will be forgotten in the case of victory. Seriously, Egypt has been past such strictures upon women for decades. So whose culture is this? And if the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact the legitimate heir to Egyptian political culture it becomes extremely difficult to argue that my values are represented.

Moving abroad from Egypt, I worry even more that the conflict in Syria has been terminally overtaken by fundamentalists [6], and that should they oust Assad the future for women in Syria will be unpleasant. The status quo ante was brutal, but as far as women are concerned what could come next might be even worse, with political, legal, and social repression a distinct possibility. This would be the same perversion as in Egypt, where the service of women in the struggle will not translate to real power in the aftermath. I am reminded of the similar bait and switch played upon the African slaves who served honorably in the American War for Independence -8 years a soldier and a slave came well before 12 years a slave.

Finally, what of the initial Tunisian protest that has been enshrined as the spark of this movement? What of the revelations that the fateful act, the offending slap that is said to have driven Mohamed Buazzizi to self immolation in protest, never occurred that day in Tunisia? What if it was not a rejection of tyranny but a man angry at a woman in a position of authority, the police officer Fedia Hamdi? [7] If the latter were true, then what would this change in its origins mean for the terms of this revolution? What if the heart of the rebellion is really aimed at secular norms and not corruption? It is certainly the case that the rise of the Taliban was in part the result of their reversal of corrupt practices in governance. But that was only a small part of what they sought to ‘reform’. Nevertheless, and quite importantly, even as this information on the event has been in the public domain for nearly three years, the apocryphal slap remains in the legend. An indictment of the former system’s corruption does not require this detail, so why does it figure so prominently in the retelling still?

And so, as I sat in the audience, one of only a handful of women, and part of an even smaller group that eschewed a head scarf, I felt distinctly odd. I am not unused to the predominance of men in my professional life. Nor am I unfamiliar with men who think I should not be there. I do not begrudge them their dislike of me. But in the West, the accepted value is that legal sanction based on gender is not an option. The Arab world, across its broad political and religious spectrum, does not fully hold to this belief. And it is important, if the question is whether to support the Arab Spring on the matter of values, to recognize that these are also our values, and they are what make ‘democracy’ something more than tyranny by vote.

Looking only at this one issue it becomes clear that selling the Arab Spring on a perversion of Western values merely for the sake of gaining the latter’s support will not, in the end, serve the cause. Attracting the West on the basis of interest – mutual interest – is the approach that will best serve both sides. That it has been defined as crass, and demonized as selfish, is unfortunate and serves no ultimate purpose.

Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently a doctoral candidate at King’s College London, researching military history.

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Notes

[1] I had a long discussion with colleagues as to the validity or usefulness of the collection of these many events under a single banner. I absolutely take their point that events on the ground in each theatre must be addressed singly, specifically and uniquely. And while I am likely in agreement that no single name could describe the individual events well, it is certainly the case that there now exists, in the world’s consciousness, an idea, an event, known as ‘the Arab Spring’. It could aptly be considered as the foreign policy/diplomatic international face of the movement. It packages the ideals, broad message and news to the world.
[2] And here we have more problems with mass or meta categories. The matter of what constituted “the West” arose, and for the purposes of that evening’s discussion the understanding was that it was meant to denote the states of the EU, North America, and the Anglophone Pacific.
[3] George Kenann, ‘Morality and Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter, 1985), pp. 205-218.
[4] At the worst extremes of the moral spectrum I am happy to ignore Kennan completely. I am not a monster.
[5] Enas Hamed, ‘Egypt’s ‘Muslim Sisterhood’ moves from social work to politics‘, AL Monitor, 20 November 2013; Bulletin of the Oppression of Women, “Muslim Brotherhood” Category . Also worth a view, Mona Eltahawy’s appearance on Al Jazeera’s program, ‘Head to Head: Do Arab Men Hate Women?‘
[6] Let us be clear, I am no fan of Christian fundamentalism. This is not about Islam or Muslims, it is about extremism.
[7] Elizabeth Day, ‘The Slap That Sparked a Revolution’, The Observer, 15 May 2011.

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