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You are here: Home / Archives for defence

defence

Book Review: ‘In Defence of America’

September 23, 2020 by Antonia Marie Sheppard

by Antonia Marie Sheppard

Bronwen Maddox. In Defence of America. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, London, 2009. ISBN  978-0715637920 Pp. 208. Paperback. 

In Defence of America: Amazon.co.uk: Bronwen Maddox: Books

In 2013, a parody Twitter account of the American actor Bill Murray (@BillMurray) caused global confusion, after tweeting:

I’m sick of people saying America is ‘the stupidest country in the world’. Personally, I think Europe is the stupidest country in the world.

Perhaps a comment on the American education system; this confusion twinned with frustration offers an amusing illustration of just one internationally recognised stereotype of the United States.

It is precisely this stereotypical, ‘unfair’ portrayal of the United States which Bronwen Maddox, former Foreign Editor of The Times, seeks to challenge in her book, In Defence of America. Her central charge is that the global perception of the United States as a neoimperialist hegemon, characterised by the breath-taking arrogance and misjudgements of its leaders is a misrepresentation deserving of a retrial. While acknowledging that the US is ‘comically’ bad at making a case for itself, Maddox attempts to re-caricature these ‘fat, trigger-happy, Christian fundamentalists’ into more appealing allies. Through an analysis of shared values, capitalist successes, the promotion of democratic principles, and the invasion of Iraq, Maddox argues that anti-Americanism is ill-founded and outdated in our globalised world. However, plagued by illogical methodology, sweeping generalisations, and a by-product of audience alienation, Maddox’s myopic perspective does not withstand scrutiny.

Hailing from an Anglo-American background, Maddox presents herself as an objective commentator. Unfortunately, this does not translate in practice. Portraying the United States as a victim, Maddox adopts the position of attorney, presumably in a case regarding defamation of character. The legitimacy of this stance is questionable. The United States does not need an apologist when it has chosen to exert its power on the global stage, nor does it have any evidence for victimisation, following its position as the predominant author of Western geopolitics. Furthermore, the employment of the English definition of the term ‘liberal’ is paradoxical. By imposing British language etic upon a study of America, does erroneous methodology not mark this interpretation void? The case would likely be thrown out in court.

Despite this, Maddox’s argument that anti-Americanism was inevitable following the fall of the Soviet Union is commendable. After half a century of Cold War animosity, the bipolar nature of the international system collapsed, and the Eastern power bloc that the West had united against disappeared. The primal urge to ‘know your enemy’ meant that this void needed to be filled. Who better to unite against than arguably the most powerful hegemon in history? Fuelled by a combination of American triumphalism and a reignition of nationalism, Western Europeans were free to vocally criticise the United States, without having to depend upon them for defence against the Soviet Union. It was from this freedom that anti-Americanism flourished. However, the United States has not helped its case. The growth of anti-Americanism is not surprising after George W. Bush’s reduction of global politics to a contest of good versus evil; the ‘good’ guys have since perpetrated around 1,000 civilian deaths in Pakistan alone. Defence of the International Liberal Order by illiberal means (see D. Stokes, American hegemony and the future of the Liberal International Order) has undermined America’s virtuous persona on the international stage, and preceded its retreat to isolationism.

Moreover, the charge that America is essentially benevolent is an unpopular opinion. Simply reaffirming that idealism is a ‘guiding inspiration’ of all American policy is an idealistic and distorted representation of the land of the free’s foreign interventions, which lacks a basic foundation in history. The argument that the United States should be applauded for ‘three decades of democracy spreading’ fundamentally ignores the nationalist aims for global hegemony that dictated the Cold War. More recently, the Bush doctrine’s call to impose democracy on the Middle East was not only a selfish pursuit of national security, but disregarded the national interests of the occupied countries. It is these national interests, under the guise of idealism, that continue to define the foreign policy of the United States today.

While America might have been the victim of anti-Americanism in 1991, their conduct in Iraq, and more recently under the Trump administration, continues to alienate international perception. Much like European opinion of America, the perspective of this book has not aged well.

Furthermore, the characterisation of the European powers as the ‘losers’ from American dominance does little to serve Maddox’s argument that America does not deserve misrepresentation, but rather perpetuates her hypocritical perception of European stereotypes. Any Englishmen and women reading this will likely relish in the French-bashing of the book, sticking two fingers up at the French, as though on the fields of Agincourt. Maddox’s argument that any political affinity with the United States in France is like signing your own warrant for the guillotine reads as ill-informed prejudice. With American ratings of France reaching a record-high of 87 per cent in 2016, and Obama’s paralleling of himself and Francois Hollande as the ‘Jefferson and Lafayette’ of our time (a duo portrayed as the personification of Franco-American amity, despite the two men having no contact during the Revolutionary years (see Tom Chaffin’s Revolutionary Brothers: Thomas Jefferson, the Marquis de Lafayette, and the Friendship That Helped Forge Two Nations)), it is difficult to defend this projection of anti-Americanism against reality. While the French may be angry about Trump’s lack of common decency, following his cancelation of a centenary visit to the French battlefields due to a spot of rain, it is hardly likely that this antipathy, as Maddox argues, originates from the Treaty of Versailles.

Maddox’s incapability to garner sympathy from her target audience continues. The implication that Britain’s lack of a constitution is due to the recognition that ‘the best words have already been taken’, is not only a matter of opinion, but functions counterproductively to further alienate those she attempts to ‘defend’ America against. Additionally, while attempting to challenge the Anglican perception of the United States’ role as the world’s policeman, Maddox does not just succeed in undermining its legitimacy, but accidentally illustrates (rather effectively) the destructive authority that the ‘world’s policeman’ has exercised this side of the millennium. One is provoked to wonder why US armed forces are rarely subject to scrutiny for their actions, with accountability being an ‘orphan’, to paraphrase JFK. Who gave them license to kill? Therefore, by recognising the position of Europeans as mere agents, under the authority of this stand-alone superpower, one is ironically left to stomach the bitter taste of American exceptionalism.

Littered with generalisations and double-standards, In Defence of America ironically struggles to defend its central argument throughout. If this book was three pages, or three volumes, it could have the potential to do the central argument some justice. Ultimately, this book would be suitable for the general readership, due to its accessibility of language and concise length. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to have an intelligent debate regarding America’s changing relationship with Europe within global politics. Nevertheless, readers of this book should take every sentence with a pinch of salt. It would be wrong to suggest that it is not worth reading – it is – but purely as an exercise in futility, or for the sole function of criticism. Moreover, a word of warning to any fellow Europeans who wish to read this book, a catch-22 presents itself: if this book is not agreeable with yourself, is this as a result of your own anti-American bias?


Antonia Marie Sheppard is an MA Intelligence and International Security student at King’s College London. Specialising in counter-terrorism and deradicalisation, Antonia is a member of the ‘MPOWER Project (NY), conducting research into radicalisation and prevention through intervention. Her research focuses on the UK-USA presence in Cyprus and more specifically at Ayios Nikolaos, the largest GCHQ base outside of the UK.

Filed Under: Book Review, Feature Tagged With: America, anti-americanism, antonia marie sheppard, Book Review, bronwen Maddox, defence, in defence of america

Turkey’s Growing Military Influence

May 23, 2018 by Gorkem Dirik and Selcuk Aydin

By Gorkem Dirik & Selcuk Aydin

Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

 

 

Turkey views itself increasingly compelled to generate new strategies in foreign and security policy by combining both soft and hard power instruments because of the changing dynamics during the post-Arab Spring period. While Turkey was seen as a role model during the Arab Spring for neighboring countries that were in transition from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, this model lost its appeal due to violent toppling of democratically elected regimes as well as the escalation of conflicts in the wider Middle East. For instance, Turkey lost its political and economic ties in Egypt after the coup d’état in 2013. The Syrian civil war bears economic, social and security implications for Turkey. Hence, in order to preserve its political and economic power in the region in the wake of hostile developments around the country, Turkey began to search for other mechanisms to wield its influence. As a result, Turkey has found itself launching military bases in Qatar and Somalia and military intervention in Syria.

 

Military Journey of Turkey

Turkey was established by Kemalist military cadres who conducted top-down modernist reforms and threatened the civilian governments by coup d’états that encountered strong opposition from the social and political movements throughout Turkish political history.

Several events played a significant role in decreasing the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic politics during the Justice and Development Party era since 2002. Such factors include the EU negotiation process during the first decade of 2000, the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer cases respectively in 2008 and 2010 as well as the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 committed by the FETO (Gülenists). The consolidation of civilian politics against the TAF establishment during the Justice and Development Party era enabled the civilian government to use hard power as a diplomatic instrument. Consequently, there TAF were once identified as the determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy,  however they have undergone a drastic transformation and they have now turned into the instrument of Turkey’s Foreign policy.

As Turkey entered a new era of foreign policy implementation, this reflected upon the country’s efforts to diversify its options in this matter. For instance, Turkey established new embassies in twelve countries across the African continent to bolster economic relations. Most significantly, this change in foreign policy has positively resulted in a spill-over effect from economic to political and then security fields of relations and impacts.

Historical experiences have also played a key role in empowering the defence industry in guaranteeing the security of the country. In 1974, for instance, when Turkey conducted military operations in Cyprus, the country faced an arms embargo by the US. Ankara was also prohibited from purchasing some specific arms from its NATO allies in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s.

Along with these historical experiences, the conflict in Syria and Iraq accelerated the urgency of empowering the defence industry. Having realized this, Turkey chose to nationalise its defence industry and proceeded with the diversification of its security alliance. As part of this process, Ankara has become cautious on its relations with NATO, whilst signing the S-400 missile agreement with Russia.  Turkey also took a leading role in the Syrian peace process alongside Russia and Iran. These advancements in its defence industry allowed the country to undergo a transition from an absolute weapon-importer state to a weapon-exporter state. One illustration is this shift comes with an arms sell to Pakistan  selling arms to Pakistan.

 

Turkey’s Military Expansion

By investing in its defence industry and expanding its network of military bases, Turkey aims to become a more active player in the Middle East, Africa, and Caucasus.

This is evident when looking at the Turkish incursion in Syria, which became a showcase for Ankara to evaluate its military capacity. President Tayyip Erdogan understood the necessity of using military power as a foreign policy instrument in the Syrian war, with the statement “We are not war-lovers, but we are not far from war either” in 2012.  In this regard, the Turkish military deterrence has visibly altered the security dynamics in Syria against the ISIS and PKK affiliated groups since the beginning of Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016. As the efforts via soft power means to form a safe-zone in Northern Syria had proven fruitless, Turkey felt obligated to take the necessary steps to create a zone of influence. In addition to this, the recent Turkish-Russian-Iranian tripartite cooperation has indeed aimed to decrease conflict in Syria with agreeing on the four de-escalation zones. Thus, this underlined the prominence of Turkey’s military deterrence capabilities and its growth as a regional power.

As part of Turkey’s new strategy, Turkey has established military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Iraq, and it is expected that the number of Turkish soldiers serving in the oversea military bases will surpass 60,000 by 2022.  Moreover, Turkish military activities are not only limited to military bases. Additionally, the TAF train and equip the armies of allied countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

In Somalia, Turkey has opened dockyards, built international airports and numerous hospitals, and established a military base on 30 September 2017. With more than 10,000 soldiers serving, Turkey`s main role is to train and equip the Somali forces in their fight against terrorist groups such as Al-Shaabab. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence has been improving Somalia`s ability to secure its coastline, particularly against pirates that threaten the maritime trade route.

The sharing of common interests, especially in the foreign policy arena, has brought Qatar and Turkey together. This led Ankara to establish another military base in Qatar at the request of the Qatari government in October 2015. With 3,000 troops deployed in the Tariq bin-Ziyad military base, Turkey has further strengthened its position in the Gulf and altered the regional status quo. For instance, during the Gulf crisis, Turkey has played a key role in dissuading the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) decision to isolate and castigate Qatar for its rapprochement with Turkey, thereby underlining how the latter has increasingly shifted regional power dynamics in its favor.

Furthermore, Turkey`s security cooperation with Azerbaijan has allowed both countries holding periodic joint military exercises to evaluate the Azerbaijani Army’s potential. Turkey also assists in the modernization of Azerbaijani military education by trying to bring it in line with NATO standards. As a result, Azerbaijani military officers participate with Turkey`s peacekeeping missions abroad, for instance, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ultimately, Turkish military capability has been further solidified via an unofficial agreement between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials on `Casus Foederis`, which signifies that an attack against one country is an attack against both.

 

In conclusion, Turkey has accelerated its military activity in the Middle East in an attempt to alter the regional balance of power in its favor. Apart from Qatar and Somalia, Turkish military bases as well as its deterrence capabilities can be observed in Northern Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, Ankara provides military training as well as equipping to the military of key Central Asian countries, which also enables increased Turkish influence in this region. Moreover, Turkey`s recent incursion into northern Syria has also illustrated technological advances in its defense industry. Taking all of these developments into consideration, it can be said that Turkey has transformed itself into a crucial player whose influence impacts not only the Middle East but also farther afield, stretching from the Caucasus to Sub-Saharan Africa.


 

Gorkem Dirik

Gorkem is an Assistant Researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He previously worked at Turkish Embassies in Malta and Barcelona, Spain which enabled him to observe the inner dealings of diplomacy. Before he moved back to Turkey he carried out his studies in languages and diplomacy in Kaliningrad (Russia), Malta, Belgrade (Serbia), Barcelona (Spain), Buenos Aires (Argentina), London (United Kingdom), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). He holds a Master of Science in Conflict Studies and Nationalism from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Besides Turkish, he is fluent in English, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Spanish and Portuguese for which he holds certificates from reputable universities that he can speak them all on a diplomatic level. His book on Turkish foreign policy, titled Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st century – A Comparative Study: Turkey between East and West was published in 2012 by the University of Malta. Moreover, his dissertation on the Ukrainian Crisis, “The Role of Nationalism in the De-Facto Dissolution of Ukraine” has been awarded as the best dissertation of the year by the LSE. His research and specialisation area is Russian and Turkish foreign policies and their implications on the Balkans and the Central Asia.

 

Selcuk Aydin

Selcuk is a Researcher at the TRT World Research Centre, and a PhD Candidate, Defence Studies, School of Security Studies, King’s College London. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, Turkish diaspora in the UK, Kurdish Studies and Middle East. His research interests are colonialism, Middle Eastern politics and history, Islamic and Kurdish movements, diaspora, institutional, and security studies. Selçuk holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, a Master’s Degree in Political Economy of the Middle East from King’s College London. His PhD thesis’ title is “Post-Ottoman States and Kurdish Movements: A Comparatively Analysis of Single Party Regime in Turkey (1923-1945), British Mandate Regime in Iraq (1920-1932) and French Mandate Regime in Syria (1923-1946).”


 

Image Source: https://qz.com/1093011/turkey-opens-its-largest-overseas-military-base-in-somalia-to-train-somali-soldiers/ 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: defence, feature, industry, post-Arab Spring, Turkey

Defence undermined?

February 21, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Hal Wilson
800px-Gulf_of_Aden_-_disabled_pirate_boat

One of the greatest threats to global stability is US defence policy – but not for the reasons we usually hear. Typical allusions to sinister neo-cons or ‘American imperialism’ are both misleading and prejudiced. But current policy – specifically the cuts of January’s Defence Strategic Guidance – reflects a dangerous ignorance of history.

That this came about is no great surprise. Consider trends in US politics and discourse. The final US presidential debate saw a highly symbolic illustration of this. Mitt Romney’s remark on numerical decline in the US fleet was instantly met by Barack Obama’s scornful quip about “horses and bayonets.” Alternatively, observe the opening scene of Aaron Sorkin’s The Newsroom. The protagonist decries the idea of America as the world’s greatest nation, snapping that one of the few areas it leads in is defence spending – surpassing the next twenty-six countries combined. (The clear implication being ‘how pointless!’) Similar observations abound, sharing a similar theme: US military spending is bloated and useless; opponents of cuts are old-fashioned or dangerous.

A deeper investigation quickly highlights the problems. Obama’s quip emboldened liberal allies – but it also highlighted simplistic, worrying thinking about defence in the modern era. Equally, Sorkin’s piece in The Newsroom strikes me as childishly trite – reeling off numbers sounds convincing until you put them in context. Namely, US defence spending reigns supreme largely because so many have relied so long on America for cheap defence: the results are self-evident.

Note that Operation Ocean Shield, NATO’s anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, rests primarily on American naval power. Even so, too few ships are committed to adequately patrol the area. Likewise, while France and Britain provided major impetus toward a NATO mission against Colonel Gadaffi, the US again bore the brunt of the effort. Conversely, many European states made risible contributions to that mission – or in Germany’s case, none at all. Britain’s recent Strategic Defence and Security Review neatly underlines this: the Royal Navy is now too small to properly patrol the Somalian coast. Accordingly, when UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond urged a stronger German approach to defence, it was hard to take him seriously, but his stance was valid. Europe has largely grown complacent behind an American shield that now threatens to disappear.

This takes us back to the contentious statement beginning this article. The risk to global stability comes from the fact that the cuts threaten to hamstring the most meaningful force behind its maintenance: American power. Already, US planners find it a “struggle to preserve the necessary forces in CENTCOM to address all the possible conflicts and crises.” In 2011, a bipartisan commission found the US Navy “would need 346 ships to meet its global commitments. But, as a result of budget cuts, the fleet is going to decline from 282 ships today to fewer than 250…”. Indeed, declining numbers “means longer cruises with less time… [for] maintenance and for sailors to recuperate” – a deceptively simple yet crucial point.

Suddenly, Obama’s scornful comment to Romney seems rather ill-considered.

History warns us against such a policy as that in January’s Strategic Guidance. When European war loomed due to a Middle East crisis in 1832, overwhelming British naval power underscored Palmerston’s effort to prevent it. Likewise, it was the Royal Navy’s strength that helped it overcome terrible attrition in suppressing the slave trade. It was a strategic reserve in both cases that allowed Britain to deliver on key policies – a crucial reserve that bolstered diplomacy in the former; that absorbed losses in the latter. And it is just such a military reserve that would be compromised by January’s outlines: a dangerous prospect in the face of a challenging international outlook.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: defence, government spending, Hal Wilson, piracy, security, UK, us

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