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david cameron

A tale of two elections: UK, Canada and lacklustre foreign policy

April 30, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

David Cameron in conversation with US President Barack Obama and Canadian PM Stephen Harper, 25 June 2010. Crown copyright (CC 2.0).
David Cameron in conversation with US President Barack Obama and Canadian PM Stephen Harper, 25 June 2010. Crown copyright (CC 2.0)

A Conservative Prime Minister is fighting against a left-wing opponent about which the electorate has continued doubts. At the same time this Prime Minister is faced with challenges from within his own party: attempting to prevent the right-wing elements from pulling away from the moderate image he has sought to project. Despite weathering what seems to be the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, he continues to face the repercussions of the crisis alongside Russian aggression, instability in the Middle East and broader socioeconomic issues such as rising economic inequality, all the while faced with US leadership that has adopted a relatively passive foreign policy.

The above description fits Conservative Prime Ministers on both sides of the Atlantic. Both David Cameron in the UK and Stephen Harper in Canada are fighting to retain control of Parliament and their position in it. In both countries the governments have made significant attempts to shrink the role of the state and, in Canada’s case, an effort to redefine its national worldview. The result of these elections could see a departure from the ‘austerity’ leadership that has characterised both countries since the 2008 financial crisis. This would alter the dynamics of the transatlantic sphere and, vitally, each country’s relationship with the USA.

While many of the specifics vary, both men are faced by restless electorates who are increasingly willing to examine alternative options, be they as extreme as Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party or, in Canada, as mainstream as Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party. Either way, the political landscape seems likely to shift.

In terms of the UK election’s international dynamics it seems clear that regardless of who wins, addressing British voters’ apprehension towards immigration from the EU is a chief concern. Should the UK’s relationship with the EU chill further, it will have serious consequences: the US has voiced a clear preference for the UK to stay in the EU. The impending US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could alter the dynamics of the way in which US businesses view the utility of the UK as a European entry point, particularly if Britain were shut out of this agreement by leaving the EU. The US leadership desires a stable Eurozone, but it also wants a close ally with influence in the heart of Brussels.

On the Canadian side, it remains hard to discern the various parties’ stances on foreign policy, but if trends continue as they have under the Harper government, Canada’s international voice and standing will continue to diminish. Both Harper and Cameron have stepped back from seeking to lead on foreign policy initiatives and seem content to follow the US’ reluctant leadership, as they did in tackling ISIS/L and Russia.

Pressures at the US domestic level, including budgetary restraints, an intransigent Republican presence in Congress, and a lack of overarching strategic vision, are to blame for a relatively diminished American role in international affairs. During this time, Canada-US relations can best be described as transactional and tepid, due in no small part to the mismatched personalities and ideologies of Stephen Harper and Barack Obama.

Conversely, while the US-UK relationship has been positive under Cameron, the possibility of a European referendum or another Scottish referendum means that the UK is no longer the predictable pillar of support for US relations with Europe. Moreover, neither Harper nor Cameron have been very proactive with their foreign policy initiatives meaning that foreign policy leadership is left in the hands of a passive US administration seeking to ‘lead from behind’, the consequences of which have become apparent as crises continue throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe.

So both Canada and the UK under their Conservative leaders have stepped back from taking the lead in global affairs at a time when the US has also stepped back. This has been a mistake. There are no other countries as capable of putting constructive pressure on the US leadership as Canada and the UK. The ‘special relationship’ between these three north Atlantic members of the anglosphere has been invoked time and again to justify support for military actions under US leadership, such as Iraq in 2003 (and at present), Libya in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2001. Given the current state of international affairs, a British or Canadian leader with a clearer foreign policy vision could constructively influence US foreign policy towards certain strategic ends.

Indeed, in this election cycle the main UK parties have scarcely gone into depth on foreign policy and, while in Canada the election is not slated until later this year, opposition parties have focused largely on domestic issues.

Whoever ends up in 10 Downing Street or 24 Sussex Drive needs to be ready to be more proactive on issues of foreign policy. Both countries claim a ‘special relationship’ with the US; however, thus far neither Canada nor the UK has used this to substantially exercise influence in the Obama White House. This is symptomatic of a failure of foreign policy vision on the part of both Conservative leaders.

Whoever is elected this year will need to think critically about the nature of their relationship with the USA. By doing so, they will have an opportunity to help shape the nature of future US foreign policy initiatives. If they fail to do so, they risk leaving themselves at the mercy of international events and, ultimately, to be swept along with whatever future actions the US administration undertakes.


Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Canada, david cameron, foreign policy, Stephen Harper, UK, USA

Putting ‘brains on the ground’: why is Britain sending military advisors to Ukraine?

February 25, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Thomas Colley:

David Cameron with President Poroshenko of Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Wales, September 2014. Photo: Paul Shaw / Crown copyright (CC)
David Cameron with President Poroshenko of Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Wales, September 2014. Photo: Paul Shaw / Crown copyright (CC 2.0)

One month after the US announced its decision to send a military training mission to the Ukraine, the British government has announced that 75 military advisors will also be sent to support the Ukrainian military. Backing the US is unsurprising for those familiar with British foreign policy in recent decades. Yet this decision, taken without parliament or the explicit backing of Europe, has surprised some.

But how significant is the decision to send military advisors to Ukraine, and what is its primary purpose? Is it a genuine attempt to alter the strategic situation in Ukraine or more a move for domestic political gain? Are the military advisors a serious attempt to deter further Russian aggression and if so, what can 75 military advisors be expected to achieve?

A domestic political move?

Despite the artificiality of separating the domestic and international effects of foreign policy decisions, it is tempting to view Cameron’s decision to send military advisors as domestically driven, rather than a genuine attempt to alter the strategic situation. Domestically, limiting military intervention to sending advisors polls well. Yougov recently found that almost two-thirds of people supported sending military advisors to Iraq to support forces fighting the Islamic State; less than a third supported sending regular troops.

There are several reasons for this relative popularity of sending military advisors. A primary military concern of many British citizens remains the risk of combat casualties for causes not deemed sufficiently justified. Direct combat with Russia would clearly be extremely costly, it was avoided throughout the Cold War for good reason.

Sending military advisors resonates with those on the right who believe Britain should take an active military role in world affairs, but baulk at the idea of combat casualties. Far from shying away from its consistently interventionist role, Britain can make a military contribution, supposedly enhancing Ukrainian military performance at minimal human cost. This reinforces the notion that Britain can still ‘punch above its weight’, the overused metaphor that is the explicit cornerstone of British foreign policy.

Even better, it demonstrates that Britain is willing to go a step further than Europe, for whom economic sanctions have been the limit thus far. This reinforces the narrative that Britain is the power willing to do what needs to be done, to act decisively while Europe dithers – from Europe in 1940 to Libya in 2011, Britain will act. This narrative is particularly significant after Britain was conspicuously excluded from the recent peace negotiations between Russia, France and Germany, after which many predictably bemoaned Britain’s waning international influence.

It is hard then not to read Cameron’s military response as an attempt to reassert Britain’s power and influence domestically and internationally, rather than a genuine attempt to alter the strategic calculus in Ukraine. In this sense, the 75 advisors hold a symbolic power far beyond their material capability. With the ceasefire faltering they symbolise, however erroneously, Britain’s wisdom and Europe’s naivety in thinking Putin could be negotiated with; they reinforce Britain’s international relevance domestically, and theoretically they signal to Putin (some of) NATO’s willingness to escalate matters if necessary.

Will the military advisors change anything?

Despite the domestic benefits of the decision, it is unlikely that the decision will have a significant impact on the military situation or on Putin’s strategic thinking. What can a meagre 75 advisors be expected to deter? After all, deliberately placing advisors ‘well away from the conflict zone’ could be read as signalling fear that they might come under attack as much as a demonstration of resolve.

The hope, of course, is that the move signals to the pro-Russian side that Western nations are prepared to escalate their actions to protect their allies. Yet it is doubtful how such a meagre move successfully does this. During the Vietnam War, the US’s steady escalation of targeted airstrikes was thought to be signalling to North Vietnam that the costs of continuing to fight would become unbearable if they refused to negotiate. Instead, they signalled that America was not willing to fully commit the resources required to overwhelmingly defeat the North Vietnamese.

The presence of British ‘brains on the ground’ also does little to alter Putin’s strategy of plausible deniability. The presence of distant military advisors cannot affect the involvement of Russian forces if, as Putin claims, they are not involved anyway. Even in the unlikely event that the advisors were harmed, Putin’s plausible deniability strategy remains intact.

Furthermore, arguably the main issue facing the Ukrainian military is not their lack of training but that they are simply being outgunned. This brings the issue of sending arms to the fore, but it also raises the important question of exactly how this latest British move is expected to actually change anything.

Again, domestic perceptions in Britain may matter more than reality on the ground. The assumption common in British public discourse of the superior capability of the British military implies that the advisors should significantly bolster the Ukrainian military effort. They will no doubt help, but the effect of such a small number is overstated, based as it is on the assumption of an incapable Ukrainian military that was losing until ‘our boys’ (and girls) turned up. This reinforces narratives of British military exceptionalism, but will not have a significant effect on the conflict.

Despite these concerns, Britain’s move is significantly bolder than the economic sanctions so derided by Putin, which have done little to alter his actions despite damaging the Russian economy. It should also not be seen in isolation, but part of a number of moves designed to steadily deter further aggression. With fears of Russia’s eye turning towards the Baltic States, a firm military signal of NATO’s intent to defend its member states decisively is important. In that sense Britain’s decision to send military advisors to Ukraine is a cautious, if insufficient, step in the right direction.


Thomas Colley is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and Senior Editor of Strife Blog. Twitter: @ThomasColley

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: david cameron, NATO, poroshenko, Russia, UK, Ukraine

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