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Challenges to the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis Series: Peace in the Time of Pandemic 2 – A Clash of Rights and Security

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Photo by Martin Sanchez on Unsplash

This article is part of our series on Challenges to the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis. Read the series introduction at this link.

Likely since the creation of the concept of human rights, and certainly in its modern understanding that emerged after the devastation of World War II, protection of human rights has continuously found itself at odds with the security priorities that many scholars would argue are at the centre of what a state is, and what underlies the social contract between citizen and government. Namely, it is easier to ensure strong security for the citizens of a state if they are permitted fewer freedoms, but these freedoms are foundational to many modern – and in particular liberal democratic – states. The COVID-19 pandemic has done much more than complicate our personal and professional lives; it has had a profound impact on our identity as members of a society, and on the social fabric that keeps communities together, precisely because it has intensified this clash of rights and security.

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), with research support from the UN Special Rapporteur Fionnuala Ní Aoláin[1], have developed the COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker. This tracker notes that states of exception, or states of emergency, have been applied in 107 countries due to the pandemic, while 56 countries have enacted measures that affect freedom of expression, 139 countries have enacted measures that affect freedom of assembly, and 59 countries have enacted measures that affect privacy. 31 countries have measures formally enhancing militarization, including through enforcement of public health measures, while many others are de facto using their militaries or increasingly militarized police, in many places hired as a surge force, to enforce measures and in some places to assist with vaccine distribution logistics.

Indeed, in its COVID-19 Guidelines for Law Enforcement, INTERPOL notes not only the significant role of the police in managing this pandemic and addressing a possible increase in criminality, but also highlights the importance of ensuring “the centrality of human rights in shaping the pandemic response” for law enforcement. It notes that the pandemic has led to the adoption and use of “exceptional measures limiting or suspending the full and effective exercise of certain fundamental human rights”, among these freedom of movement and freedom of peaceful assembly. These exceptional measures, according to INTERPOL, are purely taken for the purpose of emergency response, and protecting societal health and well-being.

However, the reality that is emerging is a more threatening one to many societies. Ní Aoláin explains the risk of this intensified securitization and of a generalized adoption of these exceptional measures: that “states and security sector institutions will find emergency powers attractive because they offer shortcuts, and that such powers will, therefore, tend to persist and become permanent.”  UN Secretary General António Guterres in fact calls this a “pandemic of human rights abuses”. To be clear, these rights are not a question of the staggering egotism of the anti-mask movement. This is a question of gender equality, in which women are leaving the workforce in huge numbers compared to men, primarily due to lack of support for child care, and which has seen domestic violence against women and girls skyrocket. This is a question of income inequality and poverty, not least as evidenced by vaccine distribution, in which just “10 countries have administered more than 75% of all Covid-19 vaccines. Meanwhile, more than 130 countries have not received a single dose.” (Guterres, as of February 2021) – an inequality that could prolong both the pandemic as well as economic recovery. And, critically, “the virus has been used as a pretext in many countries to crush dissent, criminalise freedoms and silence reporting” (Guterres), all in the name of security. Human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, NGO workers, activists, and even medical professionals “have been detained, prosecuted and subjected to intimidation and surveillance for criticising government responses to the pandemic. Pandemic-related restrictions have been used to subvert electoral processes and weaken opposition voices.” (Guterres)

Of course, to ensure the security – in this case, the health, or human security – of citizens, and to manage public health resources and capacity, some restrictive measures are inevitable to mitigate the risk and potential damage of this pandemic. Even under normal circumstances, human rights necessarily are subject to certain lawful restrictions, in order to respect the rights of others, and public order and health more generally. However, in this context of information manipulation, suppressed freedoms, and the primacy of security, it should perhaps be of no surprise that what has also emerged is increased resistance: protests around key political and social issues have emerged globally and with great force and intensity during a time when a majority of governments are trying to limit, among other rights, freedom of assembly. Some of these protests relate to inequalities arising from the pandemic itself – as King’s College London Professor Funmi Olonisakin argues, in countries where people have experienced great inequality as a result of COVID-19, vocal dissent is “on the rise, and it creates a transnational pattern.” In addition, protests have also emerged in many countries protesting prolonged COVID-19 movement restrictions or pandemic mismanagement.

But other protests, that in many cases are powerful and far-reaching, concern fundamental social and political issues that have crystallised or reached a peak in tension during the pandemic: the Black Lives Matter movement in the U.S., pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong; farmer protests in India; protests against violence against women and sexual assault in Spain, Chile, and the UK; Lebanon’s protests responding to compounding crises; the popular struggle against the military coup in Myanmar; protests against political instability in Peru. Across the world, these all have a key characteristic in common – resistance against violent abuse of power and suppression of freedoms. Even if the pandemic did not start these movements, they have been intensified during this time. This finding is supported by ACLED[2]’s special coverage of COVID-19 Disorder, which has seen an overall increase in demonstrations in 2020 relative to the previous year, and found that “overall, state repression increased around the world” due to the pandemic.

In parallel, others are capitalizing on the social fragmentation resulting from the socio-political issues and inequalities described above – as seen during the Capitol riots on 6 January, where “extremists – including white supremacists and neo-Nazis – have exploited the pandemic to boost their ranks through social polarisation and political and cultural manipulation” (Guterres). All the while, countries like Germany, Argentina, Canada, and Portugal have encouraged (anonymous) citizen denunciation of those breaking COVID-19 restrictions, which will do nothing to improve social and community relations. Conflicts globally have barely if at all been affected, according to the International Crisis Group. At the domestic level, however, “The pandemic has tended to aggravate precisely the factors that were feeding discontent beforehand. In many countries, inequality is more extreme than ever. Living costs are rising. Public resources are scarcer. Middle classes are squeezed. Opportunities for young people, who’ve often sacrificed the most during lockdowns, are fewer. It’s easy to see populists thriving and storms ahead” (ICG). Indeed, Robert Malley, the former President of ICG and current U.S. Envoy to Iran, argues that “if the benefits of the recovery are not more equitably spread out, we are going to go into a much darker period yet”. He warns that if leaders do not try to understand the reasons for the emergence of populism, nativism, and xenophobia that intensified prior to the pandemic, and if recovery strategies do not take these factors into account, then these are going to return “with even greater intensity” in the post-pandemic world. This would present a great threat not just to political orders, but to social ones as well.

And so, while many are already bracing for the expected global economic downturn that may follow the pandemic, we should also be concerned about our state-society relations and, perhaps inevitably, prepare for a renegotiation of our social contract between citizen and government. As Olonisakin argues, the disruption created by COVID is a necessary and welcome opportunity for some leaders, countries, and societies to “rethink their relationships”. The social fabric of many states has been damaged, not just through social isolation and rising discontent, and those that would capitalize upon that polarization, but also through a state-supported fostering of distrust between citizens during this time. In the global prioritization of security during the pandemic, fundamental human rights have been strained, and the way that we view social contact and relationships have been radically altered as we have experienced what Federica Mogherini calls “unforeseeable circumstances, unimaginable for any of us just one year ago.” We must work to ensure that these will not cause lasting damage to the foundation of liberal democratic societies, or cause a slide back to greater repression in places where any gains in rights have been fraught and hard-won. This is especially true as we can now expect new, deadlier pandemics with greater frequency, if significant global environmental and economic reforms, reflecting more equitable economic priorities, are not urgently carried out.

[1] Fionnuala Ní Aoláin’s full title is UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

[2] ACLED is The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

Gender in Politics: Female leadership in times of the Covid-19 pandemic

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By Rixa Riess

New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Arden (https://images.app.goo.gl/28n8hZgHptbh4RdA8)

The Coronavirus crisis amplified the grievances of society through a burning glass. Women’s relapse into the traditional role as caretaker and housewife during the lockdowns received a lot of attention. It confirms that gender equality isn’t reality yet. 

At the same time, however, a more encouraging scientific finding seems to be proved: Women in government contribute more to security and prosperity. During the pandemic female stateswomen showed outstanding crisis management at the top of governments.   ,

First and foremost: New Zealand. Right at the beginning of the pandemic, on March 21st, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern introduced a clear guideline with a country-wide alert system. Four days later the country was put into a nationwide lockdown and by May didn’t record new cases. ‘Going hard and going early’, was the Prime Minister’s motto. She stood out for defensive action and honest communication. Although at this point New Zealand isn’t Coronavirus-free just yet, the style of governance gained respect internationally. It proved successful, besides having a low population density of 18 people per square kilometre. In comparison, the population density of the UK amounts to around 275 people per square kilometre. But, as the example of Taiwan shows (673 people per square kilometre), low population density does not always correlate with the success of virus control. Taiwan’s success story is also not only linked to its geographical advantage of being an island only, but to its rigorous and early actions. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, the government rigorously tracked travel and contact history and independently produced masks to prevent panic buys. 

Finland also managed the pandemic well. Under Prime Minister Sanna Marin, the government drove public life down to a minimum in spring, unlike their much-discussed Swedish neighbours. On May 16th, with less than 300 recorded cases, the country went into lockdown. The interior minister, Maria Ohisalo, outlined the importance of sensitive communication and cooperation within the government to successfully master the crisis.

Now, the successes at the beginning of the pandemic have been forgotten: Voices are raised criticising the inadequate measures after the first lockdown. Even though now, most heads of state can be accused of underestimating the tenacity of the virus, the initial reactions to the outbreak of Covid-19 is of enormous importance in assessing leadership: Dealing with and assessing a new acute emergency is the starting point of crisis management. With regards to this, the female-led countries performed better.

A recent study found that female-led nations suffered fewer Coronavirus deaths than their male-led neighbours: In the face of potential fatalities, female leaders made risk-averse decisions and were willing to take more economic risks at the same time. Other male-led countries claimed to have everything under control or actually denied the existence of the virus. Among them the United States, the UK, Russia, and India. Making false statements to promote their own governance turned out to be fatal. They downplayed the threat and waited for a clearer picture to make decisions. The fear of economic damage and its political consequences appeared to be bigger than the fear of the virus. In times of a pandemic, slow actions mean deaths. They undeniably reveal any faked control. Now, the named countries lament an above-average number of fatalities and additionally experienced a significant economic decline.

One could argue that the subject of a crisis shouldn’t be gender or sex but rather about finding an efficient solution to the problem, especially when the theatre of horrors has not yet reached its final act. At least for once, one could sarcastically add, no one is doubting the person in charge for their suitability for the position because of her sex. 

Some argue, that connecting good leadership to women is in itself sexist, and that female leadership is a symptom of a successful political system. An important argument, but it falls short in view of the fact that there are only 16 women globally leading a country. Now, humanity is (once again) asking itself the fundamental question of how it weighs central things like the economic system, the environment, or social division. So why not put female leadership in politics up for debate as a fundamental necessity for society?

Research perceives politics as a ‘gendered legacy’ (Lockhart & Mollick, 2013), which has been male dominated. It seems like the pandemic breaks traditional leadership approaches open. It lies within the nature of a crisis that society and politics face a new disastrous event of which the outcome can’t yet be grasped to its full extent. Long-term considerations must be made. The Coronavirus crisis has shown: basic human concerns must be taken just as seriously as the fact that a crisis needs clear decisions to be taken by the leadership. The German Chancellor’s unusual emotional plea for an understanding of the situation was exemplary. She connected the necessary enforcement and empathy. It is therefore not surprising that scholars attribute a more transformational leadership style to women. This includes concern, respect, demonstrating compassion, care and equality. Men tend to have a transactional style, which is more direct and achievement-oriented. A report from 2009 shows that women tend to demonstrate more often than men essential leadership behaviour that improves organizational performance. Regarding the financial crisis in 2008, the research found that women more frequently adopt certain leadership behaviour seen as most important in and after the crisis, e.g. motivate action and inventiveness. These skills will be needed during the recovery of the pandemic, too.

The Coronavirus crisis could be a door opener to follow up on the discussion regarding too few women in politics with action. Societies must ask themselves if there has been a fundamental misinterpretation of which characteristics determine good leadership and to whom they are attributed. Since the beginning of statehood, men are associated with leadership. Women often have been overlooked, even though they have the same necessary skills to lead. Thus, new challenges require us to question our traditional associations once again – especially because in states of emergency societies tend to stick to familiar, often traditional patterns. 

However, the re-election of some stateswomen, e.g. Tsai Ing-wen, Angela Merkel or Jacinda Ardern, speaks for itself indeed, and yet society and academia, especially after this crisis, need to contribute to this specific discourse in order to effectively promote this modern political and female leadership in the minds and in practice.

 

Rixa Riess holds a Bachelor in Culture and Economy from the University of Mannheim and is currently studying towards a Master degree in International Relations at KCL. Find her on Twitter @Rixariess.

Peace in the time of Pandemic

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Coronavirus, Source: istockphoto

While the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected professional and personal travel plans across the world, what happens when these plans can have a direct impact on cessation of hostilities in a conflict zone? What happens when a state or group may have an interest in allowing – or denying – individual travel in order to further their political aims?

Taking into consideration the current Afghan Peace Talks[1], as well as the ongoing political negotiations in Yemen, this article outlines how the pandemic has a potentially far-reaching impact on humanitarian assistance operations in conflict zones, and more broadly on peace.

Operational Environment

The pandemic has severely impacted the ability of aid actors to deliver assistance, including in countries facing enormous need. Beyond peace negotiations, humanitarian and development operations are also critical to providing security and opportunity to citizens in conflict zones. In Yemen, COVID-19 is yet another health challenge to a population already battling hunger, medicine and vaccine shortages, and diseases that have been long eliminated in other countries[2], all within a struggling medical system.

Afghanistan faces similar issues, where health clinics are already inaccessible for many citizens, especially women, and where scepticism concerning the virus further complicates limited medical capacity to treat it. At the same time, COVID-19 has not forced a break in fighting in the lead-up to the peace negotiations discussed below, with clear Taliban resistance to ceasefire attempts or a UN call for a humanitarian pause.

How does this affect peace and stability? While aid agencies struggle with their own operational limitations, they also operate in countries where they may not be popular with both governments and armed groups due to perceived ties with Western powers, and where securing access may already be a challenge. The pandemic is being wielded as an excuse to further deny access, travel, and movement to aid workers in areas where assistance is greatly needed. As such, this pandemic could deepen humanitarian crises, and threaten greater instability. This has been seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, but also in parts of Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere. In Yemen in particular, Houthis have used the pandemic to not only restrict access to the country, but also to exert greater control on needs assessments, aid distributions, and any potential involvement of international actors in political process[3], all by holding a firm grip on permitted operations. These limitations can threaten the fair distribution of aid to the most vulnerable.

Beyond access under COVID-19, aid agencies also face a great challenge to their duty of care and best use of their resources. They must determine how much risk they are willing to take in sending their staff to field sites potentially exposed to conflict as well as severe health issues, possibly requiring medical evacuation. While organisations improve their understanding of the degree of risk posed by the pandemic to staff health and movements, many UN agencies and other NGOs[4] have responded with variations on a reduced footprint. Some are keeping staff in compounds (creating its own risk for staff due to the impossibility of social distancing) rather than sending them to more remote field sites. As familiarity with pandemic realities have increased and additional medical resources have been mobilized to treat sick staff, operational capacity has also increased – but humanitarians can still be denied access to their areas of intervention, with the perfect justification: it is for their own safety.

Pandemic Peace talks – Strategy and Logistics

This unique opportunity for affecting operational contexts neatly extends to peace talks, as the challenging logistics of bringing together warring sides to negotiate settlements in a third host country are intensified under pandemic conditions. In September 2020, discussions between Houthis and the Yemeni government over the release of Houthi prisoners moved forward in Switzerland. The Houthi and Yemeni delegations utilized UN Special Envoy planes departing from Saudi-controlled airspace to reach Switzerland and secured exceptions for diplomatic travel when no other movement was permitted, even as the Houthis themselves closed airports in Yemen and restricted movement for aid actors – including UN agencies. The Swiss government worked around national pandemic restrictions to allow representatives to speak directly to one another and to maintain their negotiations schedule.

The ongoing Afghan Peace Talks in Doha have been similarly impacted by logistical issues, with strategic implications. Under normal conditions, countries compete to host peace negotiations to protect their interests, ensure they are part of the conversation, and bolster their reputations as key geopolitical players. This confluence of actors and interests can pressure a negotiation and complicate participants’ calculations. However, during the pandemic, countries that might typically host peace negotiations become more focused on their urgent domestic needs and give less attention and resources to peace delegates. Where many great powers and actors may have competed to hold the Afghan talks prior to the pandemic, fewer countries are currently willing to assume the risk of hosting such an event.  As such, the pandemic favours wealthy, autocratic systems such as Qatar’s that do not have to justify their decisions and risk-taking to their public. Also, a second round of talks is unlikely due to these logistical concerns[5], so Qatar’s willingness to host prolonged talks amid few alternative options creates pressure to conclude discussions during this round.

Qatar’s hosting has additional advantages: a strong Qatari national health authority able to handle testing and tracing, combined with the ability to indefinitely block off a 5-star hotel for talks, to mobilize private jets for transport, and to offer luxury accommodations for Taliban representatives and their families, all as representatives arrive from high-risk countries and are granted entrance health waivers for indefinite stays. This pandemic then serves Doha’s goals: they are at the centre of peace talks, ensuring international – including American – support despite being in a hostile neighbourhood. Senior diplomats leverage personal relationships with Qatari officials to get clearance to enter, while others less favoured find that their travel has ‘accidentally’ not been cleared. While externally entrenching their centrality to the negotiations, internally Qatari actors are also using their roles to leveraging power against one another. At the same time, Doha is a relatively less experienced host[6], which has opened the way for interested third parties to establish strong support groups and facilitate consultative, collaborative assistance to the talks to protect their interests.

Actors at the margins also lose; with COVID-19 travel restrictions in place, meetings on the margins – for example, side events on gender, minority rights and protections – are less likely to happen. Participation of civil society in peace talks becomes more tenuous, and inclusive representation at peace negotiations, which are already often seen as elite-driven or elite-bargaining processes, also suffer. When citizens do not have the opportunity to directly challenge leadership, it becomes more difficult to ensure that a range of views are accounted for in a potential settlement. In Doha, conference organizers fought to secure access for 30 Afghan journalists to attend the opening ceremony of the talks, allowing for some interaction between national press and the Taliban. This benefits the overall objective of the talks – with fewer sideline attractions, attention can be focused on the single outcome of reaching agreement – but inclusivity can suffer.

Another key difference in the current climate is that peace negotiations are commonly preceded by (secret) pre-negotiation discussions where key agenda items, red lines, and starting positions can be clarified on both sides. These have the advantage of accelerating formal talks once they begin but can also create tension should personalities or political positions combust from the start. Partly due to the pandemic, parties have arrived at the Afghan talks without pre-existing personal relationships, resulting in increased caution on both sides when interacting with one another, but also creating an opportunity to focus discussions free from personal distractions.

While it is too early to make comprehensive conclusions, the COVID-19 pandemic directly affects peace. It is being used as a justification to exert greater control over humanitarian activities in fractious contexts, further complicating operations in already difficult environments. The direction and execution of peace talks are being similarly constrained, resulting both in more concentrated but also less inclusive events. Whether these factors will increase chances for resolution remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that lessons drawn from this unique time can offer insights to practitioners once the post-pandemic chapter begins.

[1] Formally, the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks.

[2] Such diseases include measles, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio.

[3] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, Yemen, 11 November 2020.

[4] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, 11 November 2020.

Interview with NGO worker, Afghanistan, 15 November 2020.

[5] Six months ago, at least 4 rounds of talks in Qatar, Germany, Norway, and Uzbekistan were envisioned, with all but Doha ultimately being scrapped.

[6] Capacity to properly address protocol and logistics are also a concern, for example with Doha releasing press statements concerning the talks without first clearing them on both sides, or releasing invitations and agendas to participants that are only available in Arabic (Dari and Pashto being the official languages of Afghanistan).

Constance Wilhelm is a Senior Editor for the Strife Journal, and a doctoral researcher with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she focuses on approaches to the return and prosecution of the European women that have joined Daesh. She is also an experienced researcher and Public and Humanitarian Policy consultant, specialising in conflict-affected areas and fragile states. She has worked with think tanks at Princeton University and New York University, with the Afghan Mission to the UN in New York, the OECD in Paris, humanitarian and international development organisations and consulting firms in Lebanon (leading teams in Syria), in Jordan (leading teams in Yemen), in Afghanistan, in Libya, as well as across both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel-Lake Chad region. Constance has an MA in Conflict Management and International Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA from McGill University.

Daniel Ortega: Weapons of COVID-19 Destruction

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by Roisin Murray

A Nicaraguan woman wears a facemask, against the advice of Danial Ortega and his government (Image credit: Reuters/Oswaldo Rivas)

While governments worldwide grapple with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega adopted an alternative approach: exploiting the pandemic to bolster his autocracy. In power since 2007, his presidency is marked by accusations of political repression and forced censorship. Topping this list is a criminally irresponsible government during the pandemic. Social distancing measures remain non-existent; while COVID-19 statistics are rejected as fabrications. In brief, as Salazar Mather notes: Nicaragua’s response to the pandemic is ‘perhaps the most erratic of any country in the world to date.’ Unrestrained by concerns for public health in Nicaragua, Ortega is now actively strengthening his hold on power building on a new COVID-19 culture espoused by the government. Adding further credence to his socialist ideology, while simultaneously curtailing civil rights in the country, Ortega effectively weaponised the pandemic, wielding it against his own people for power gains.

According to Pearson, Prado, and Colburn, Daniel Ortega’s inaction towards the pandemic is a calculated political decision to safeguard the economy in order to retain electoral support. Even more, as the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change asserts: populist leaders like Danial Ortega actively ‘downplay’ the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic for political gain. While the majority of nations are retaining decisive countermeasures against the virus in, Ortega and his government actively flout any kind of guidance given by world health authorities. Schools and businesses remain open, while large scale public events such as sporting fixtures proceeded with government support. In the most damning indictment, a mass walk (‘Love In the Time of Covid-19’) intended to show the strength of solidarity against the virus.

Commentators attribute Ortega’s pandemic response to his priority of taking the health of the country’s economy over that of its populace. Indeed, in a televised address in April, Ortega reasoned that ‘if a country stops working, it dies.’ Due to the lack of state planning undertaken by the government, Nicaraguan citizens are forced to become personally accountable for the response to the pandemic. Business owners close shops on their own initiative, and a majority of individuals choose to wear masks even though it is not mandated by the government. By contrast, reports mention that healthcare workers are dissuaded from wearing masks in healthcare settings. Ortega is also actively obstructing relief provided by independent bodies. For example, the government did not allow the Diocese of Matagalpa to establish a call centre to dispense COVID-19 related advice to Nicaraguan citizens. It all serves as a reminder to the Nicaraguan people that Ortega and his political decisions have supreme authority, even – and most especially – in matters of life or death.

Protestors during a state-sanctioned march called “Love in the time of COVID-19” (Image credit: Reuters/Oswaldo Rivas)

The pandemic response in Nicaragua also serves a clear ideological agenda, with the intent to demonstrate the superiority of socialist countries over their ‘imperial’ adversaries. Consequently, Ortega is waging a campaign of deliberate misinformation with regards to COVID-19 statistics. As of May 2020, the COVID-19 Citizen Observatory, an independent group of Nicaraguan healthcare professionals, recorded the pandemic’s death toll as almost ten times larger than the official government figures. The disparity in results can be attributed to the Ministry of Health’s manipulation. Healthcare professionals also reported that deaths related to the pandemic are intentionally covered up, describing the cause of death as diabetes, hypertension, or other, unrelated respiratory diseases.

Ortega employs these artificially low COVID-19 statistics to legitimise his position in Nicaragua’s ideological battle with the United States, which imposes economic sanctions against the country since 2018. In a televised announcement in April 2020, Ortega argued that the pandemic was a ‘sign from God’ and highlighted the US’ inability to provide sufficient healthcare and support for its citizens. Instead, Ortega’s assertion that there is no community transmission of the virus within Nicaragua other than ‘imported’ cases paints a stark contrast. Again, ideological legitimacy comes at a cost for the Nicaraguan citizens.

Against this backdrop of state denial and dismissal, the Ortega government are quelling internal dissent against the regime. Since the pro-democracy protests of April 2018, in which over three-hundred persons were killed by the state forces, political opposition in Nicaragua remains under attack. The Nicaraguan government has taken drastic steps to restrict opposition through statutory means. At the end of September, Ortega’s party proposed a draconian new law to the National Assembly which would criminalise the dissemination of ‘fake news’ on social media, carrying a sentence of up to four years imprisonment. The law covers ‘the publication or dissemination of false (or) distorted information, likely to spread anxiety, anguish or fear.’

By the same token, Ortega’s denial of COVID-19 in Nicaragua and his lack of transparency concerning the pandemic set a distorted standard for what constitutes ‘fake news’. For example, legitimate public and medical concerns over the pandemic are repeatedly portrayed by the government as unduly hyperbolic and inaccurate. In April 2019, for example, Ortega opposed public campaigns urging Nicaraguans to stay at home, referring to those who endorsed such campaigns as ‘radicals’ and ‘extremists’. Reports of widespread ‘express burials’, utilised to conceal the extent of the pandemic, are similarly rejected by the government as fake. Consequently, the aforementioned censorship law, already passed by the Nicaraguan Congress, could be used to attack individuals circulating non-government sanctioned truth and guidance pertaining to the virus. The result of this repression is a death sentence in the making for many Nicaraguans.

In Nicaragua, the pandemic is a vehicle to further restrict the civil rights of Nicaraguans and discourage non-conformity to the regime. While the public intends to take measures into their own hands, the government is working to actively discourage any such actions. COVID-19 is also a tool for the government to reinforce its grip over Nicaragua, with the country’s citizens bearing the brunt of this new pandemic tyranny with their lives. As a weapon, President Ortega is the militant brandishing COVID-19.

Roisin Murray is currently working as a researcher at a private security consultancy. She holds an MA in International Relations from King’s College London. Her research interests include diplomacy, authoritarian regimes and counter-terrorism.

COVID-19 and China-US Relations: An Interview with Jia Qingguo

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by Lin Li

Professor Jia Qingguo, former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’s National Committee (Image credit: SCMP)

The global economy, politics, as well as daily life, ground to a halt after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Worldwide, infection rates rose to staggering heights; leaving a striking amount of casualties in its wake. Despite this situation, the chronic rivalry between the US and China continued, with further pessimism on the rise and little hope of cooperation anytime soon. As is now usual, Lin Li virtually met with Professor Jia Qingguo for an interview on US-China relations during and after the pandemic. Originally conducted in Chinese, the interview, and its subsequent translation are made by the interviewer.

The failure to cooperate against COVID-19

At the outbreak of the pandemic, the world expected China and the United States to work together in stemming its spread. However, the opposite is true. Instead, the mutual suspicion between the two countries escalated further from an initial trade war to become a war on all but the kinetic front; with little hope of such rivalry diminishing in the near future. The reasons for this situation, Jia Qingguo believes, is because the political environment in the United States sustains a highly emotional consensus on the government’s tough stance towards China. Such sentiment led to the ideological and political differences between these nations to become more pronounced. As a result, the population of each country tends to see the one as the polar opposite of the other.

‘After the outbreak of COVID-19, the US government poorly implemented measures against its spread. Out of domestic political considerations, it tried to pass the buck to China, which led to more negative interactions between the two countries. Moreover, in the heat of the U.S. presidential election, both sides of the campaign intend to play tough on all matters related to China. This situation is not beneficial for the bilateral relationship. Of course, that does not mean there is no room for improvement. Domestically, consensus on China is based on very particular perceptions of the country,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘These perceptions may not be entirely in line with reality. If China does a good job in explaining itself and adjusts some policies, I think it is still possible to change the American public’s position on China.’

Jia Qingguo believes that, globally, the response to the pandemic has been lacking in leadership. With the US finding itself bogged down in the fight against the pandemic, the virus further exacerbated previously existing suspicions against China. In such a situation, it is difficult to find any grounds for effective cooperation. ‘The Chinese government has been expressing its willingness to cooperate and has made great efforts, actively helping other countries to fight the virus. As President Xi Jinping said recently at the Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit, China believes that the best way to fight the global pandemic is through international cooperation.’

China and the US: more alike than one would think

‘I do not think that China and the United States are that different in nature,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘Although the two countries have different ideologies and political systems; both do advocate democracy and freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy. In fact, these three elements are all listed as China’s official core values, although there is still a big difference in how these values are put in practice. Both China and the United States are also beneficiaries of the existing international order. Both countries hope for stability, peace, and international prosperity. They also advocate free trade and the need to jointly address global challenges such as climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and international crime. In fact, one could argue that the two countries are more similar than many may believe. If we can emphasise these common values and interests, without focusing on the ideological and institutional differences, the bilateral relationship could well be stabilised again.’

Professor Jia contends that the United States and many Americans remain doubtful about Chinese intentions, indeed in part because of their perceptions about the country. For example, realists assume that when a great power rises, it will expand and challenge the existing power. This so-called Thucydides Trap assumes that, as China rises, the country will challenge the US; thereby provoking a confrontation. Others believe that the United States is able to change China to its liking. This latter group is very disappointed that China has not made the changes they expected it to make.

The effects of COVID-19 on China-US relations

According to Jia Qingguo, the pandemic has both positive and negative effects on China-US relations. Its negative impact is taken by extremists on both sides as an opportunity to vent their discontent and to speculate on the other side’s culpability. Riddled with undertones of a conspiracy, such assessments feature accusations of intentionally creating or spreading the virus, thereby even advocating war.

At the same time, the virus has become the common enemy of the two countries, the fundamental interests of which require cooperation to fight against this enemy together. This mutual fight requires both China and the US to strengthen their information-sharing processes, to enhance bilateral cooperation in the development of medication, to provide anti-epidemic supplies to each other through donation and trade, and finally, to coordinate international cooperation.

Nevertheless, Jia Qingguo believes that the chance for cooperation has been diminishing as a result of negative interactions between the two sides. In the post-pandemic era, both countries should reflect on what the main reasons and factors are for the deterioration of the relations, as a basis upon which to formulate more reasonable policies.

Obstacles for China-US cooperation in fighting the pandemic

‘The two biggest obstacles in China-US Cooperation in fighting the pandemic are psychological and political. Psychologically speaking, both countries are faced with the problem of how to perceive the other properly. In recent years, the mainstream of American foreign policy has taken an increasingly extreme view of China, always interpreting China’s words and deeds from the worst possible angle. China also has some speculations about the intentions of the United States from the perspective of the ideologues and offensive realists. Such mindsets make it difficult for cooperation to be sustained. Politically, and based on the different interests and value orientations, there are people on both sides who deliberately exaggerate the other side’s negative rhetoric and actions; even inciting confrontation as inevitable. In so doing, the level of distrust between the two countries is growing. It is likely that Chinese people have similar views on the United States.’

Under such circumstances, Jia Qingguo continues, people on both sides should objectively and pragmatically assess the China-US relationship and take positive measures to stabilise and promote cooperation. Both countries are stakeholders in the international order and hope for world stability and prosperity. Peaceful coexistence and cooperation are in their best interests and feature as the foundation of this bilateral relationship. China and the US could strengthen their cooperation, for example, by exchanging anti-pandemic experience, collaborate in developing medication, and coordinate economic policies in order to stabilise the global economy. Only through cooperation can the two sides effectively overcome the pandemic and improve the relationship.

The lowest point in the past four decades?

‘Whether it is the lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties forty years ago depends on how you measure it.’ Jia Qingguo argues, ‘I think politically and security-wise it certainly is. But when it comes to the economy and other aspects, I think we still made much progress. Nevertheless, a further deterioration of the relationship is in the books. The Trump administration seems determined to stir up some kind of crisis in the relationship in order to improve the President’s chances for a second term. China also has domestic public opinions, so when the United States closed the Houston Consulate, China felt that it had to close the Chengdu Consulate in response. Indeed, if the United States decides to take certain measures, the Chinese government may find it necessary to respond in kind. As a result, the relationship may end up in a disastrous spiral of escalation. I hope that both sides can calm down and handle bilateral relations in a more pragmatic way. It is complicated, but I think both sides should at least make some efforts.’

‘Recently, many people are talking about the possibility of war between China and the US. I think that is still very unlikely. First, the cost of war between China and the US is too high for both countries to bear. It has become an unwritten law that nuclear powers do not fight wars, since there is no winner in such a conflict. As long as leaders of the two countries are rational, they will try their best to avoid war. It is also very hard to persuade their people to fight such a kind of war. The American political system with its checks and balances means that only when most people say yes, could the government go to war with foreign countries, especially with nuclear states.’

If not nuclear, what kind of war?

‘The war on the scientific and technological fronts has begun and will continue. However, there will also be limits. The blocking of Huawei or other Chinese high-tech companies hurts not only China but also the US, because these Chinese companies are important customers of American companies in the high-tech industry as well. If uncontrolled, the war in science and technology will break the existing ecology of the research and development as well as production chains, with a devastating impact on all countries in the world.’

China and the United States are facing a crisis of trust. America’s distrust of China is particularly prominent in its approach to China’s development of high technology like 5G. Because of the high degree of penetration of technology into people’s life and work, trust is needed more than ever. With this in mind, Huawei has offered to release the source code of some of its software, in an attempt to soften concerns on the safety of personal information and its storage. Jia Qingguo argues: ‘In terms of technology, we should have more communication and take necessary measures to reassure each other. The Americans also have a responsibility to reassure China that Microsoft and Google will not harm China’s national security. Both sides must make a lot of effort to rebuild some trust for the future of our relationship. However, I do not believe the Trump Administration will do so. I hope the next government can.’

‘The possibility of a financial war cannot be ruled out either. But this will bring even more harm to the US. Unless the two countries become extremely confrontational, it will be difficult for the United States to make such a decision.’ Trump’s views on the international economy remain those of the 19th century. For example, the American President thinks that the United States has suffered a great loss in trade with China because it runs a large deficit with the country. In fact, many products exported from China to the United States include parts, services, or patented technologies from other countries, including the US. Trump assumes the goods exported from one country to another are 100 per cent made in this country. It is simply not true.

‘Some people are wondering what happens if the United States refuses to honor the U.S. Treasury bonds purchased by China. I think the chance for that to happen is very low, because such action may trash the credibility of the US. Some people say that the United States will forcibly terminate its financial exchanges with China, which is even less likely, for the same reason that this will cause great harm to the US, and other countries will not agree either.’

Therefore, whether it is to fight a war of science or technology or finance or trade, the costs are likely to be prohibitive. The Trump administration may not rational but in the end, people in the United States may stop it.

In conclusion, Jia Qingguo argues that in the long run, China and the US have to find a way to coexist peacefully and cooperate when needed because their interests and survival demand it. ‘As stakeholders in peace and prosperity, China and the US have many things in common, and that hasn’t changed despite the recent round of conflicts.’

Lin Li is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. Lin completed her BA in Law at the School of International Studies, Peking University in Beijing; her MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at Department of Geography, KCL; and her MA in History of War, War Studies, also KCL. Lin previously worked as Teaching Assistant for the School of International Studies and a Research Assistant for the Institute of International and Strategic Studies of Peking University, as well as Program Manager for Peking University’s Office of International Affairs. Lin is an Observer of the PKU Youth Think Tank since 2018. A Chinese Zheng musician, Lin has published concerto CDs with the Chinese Film Symphony Orchestra and held a series of concerts internationally.