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Will there be a coup in Venezuela?

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By Will Bisset

President Nicolás Maduro and Vladimir Padrino López, current Minister of Defence. (Credit: Carlos Garcia Rawlins, Reuters)

 

It has come as a surprise to many that Venezuela’s military, with its history of attempted coups d’etat, has sat idly by while its country descends into chaos.

Ostensibly, all the ingredients for the perfect coup are there: unprecedented shortages of basic goods such as food and medicine coupled with disastrous economic performance led to violent street protests over the summer, in which over 100 protestors were killed. The suffering population, 80% of whom have lost weight due to the ‘Maduro diet’, has been left further incensed by the growing waist-lines and wallets of the President and his cronies. All of this has contributed to the regime haemorrhaging legitimacy both domestically and internationally. If we consider that coups occur when a government faces a legitimacy crisis, it begs the question, why have the armed forces not stepped in for Latin America’s latest golpe del estado?

The depressing answer is that they are making too much money. Maduro, incompetent in so many ways, has launched a stunningly effective ‘coup proofing’ strategy. Lacking both the military pedigree and popular legitimacy of Chavez, it has been especially important to curry favour with the armed forces. Since coming to power, Maduro has identified them as a possible threat and extended patronage to buy their loyalty. Recently, this has come via access to profitable business opportunities and sanctioning involvement in illicit economies.

Business opportunities to buy loyalty

In July 2016 he handed power over food production and distribution, as well as jurisdiction of the ports, to the military. This gives soldiers a lucrative source of extra income, as well as ensuring their families are well fed. There is an unprecedented shortage of food in the country, and providing soldiers with a reliable source of food for their families should not be underestimated as a mechanism to buy loyalty.

Due to mis-management under Chavez, Venezuela imports almost all its food. During the importation and transportation processes, the armed forces are able to extract bribes. A recent Associated Press investigation quoted retired General Cliver Alcala explaining that the military was doing all that was necessary to ensure they got their ‘cut’ from such a profitable business. One South American businessman claims to have paid $8 million in bribes to those working for Food Minister General Rodolfo Marco Torres. Fortunately, for importers, the government overpays for food contracts, enabling them to pay officials these bribes. This particular businessman had a $52 million contract for yellow corn, charging more than double the market rate, with a profit of over $20 million. In this way the regime is using state resources to create this gravy train. Money that should be spent on public services is diverted instead for the armed forces’ profit. This removes any incentive to remove Maduro from power.

Further profits are generated selling food in military-run black markets. For example, Jose Campos, a grocer, has resorted to an illegal market to buy pallets of corn flour, priced at 100 times the government rate. This shows how members of the armed forces, of all ranks, directly profit from Maduro’s decision to allow them to control food distribution.

The figure appointed in September 2016 to ensure transparency and limit this endemic corruption in the military was General Carlos Osorio. Whilst Food Minister, he provided contracts to two shell companies with no history of importing food. The companies paid over $5.5 million into a Swiss account registered to Osorio’s two brothers-in-law. His appointment clearly indicates the regime’s complete disregard for fighting this corruption in food importation and distribution. In this way, Maduro is allowing corruption in exchange for political loyalty.

Sanctioned illegality in exchange for loyalty

General Alcala summarised the value of the food business: “Lately, food is a better business than drugs.”

Fortunately for the Venezuelan military, they do not have to make the difficult choice between the two.  The mysterious ‘Cartel de los Soles’ or ‘Cartel of the Suns’ consists of numerous cells, permeating all ranks and branches of the Venezuelan armed forces. The name is a reference to the sun insignia worn on the uniforms of Venezuelan generals. Moreover, in September 2017, the Cartel de los Soles was publically accused of drug trafficking by the vice-president of Colombia. The United States has brought formal drug charges against numerous high-ranking members of the armed forces. In August 2016, US prosecutors unsealed a federal indictment against Nestor Reverol, the former head of the country’s anti-narcotics agency. Reverol was accused of ‘using his position of power [at the National Anti-Drug Organization] to enable drug trafficking organizations, all the while hindering law enforcement’s efforts to thwart them.’ In further stunning irony, he was promoted to Interior Minister the next day. This blatant protection and support is particularly instructive, in that Reverol is head of the National Guard. Which, less than 12 months later, was carrying out a brutal crackdown on protests against Maduro.

To be clear, the militarisation of the Venezuelan cocaine trade was not the brainchild of Maduro, and has likely been a gradual process over the last decade. However, it is evident why no senior military figures have been punished by the regime. Access to the drug trade is immensely profitable and enough to buy loyalty from generals that would otherwise be a threat to Maduro. The implication of Reverol’s promotion is clear: criminal activity is sanctioned by the state in exchange for political loyalty. Occasional arrests of low ranking soldiers are pure theatre; no important figures are ever threatened.

Conclusion

Maduro has constructed a situation in which it would be irrational for the armed forces to launch a coup. He has sanctioned kleptocratic conduct, endemic corruption, and illegality to cling on to power— and it has worked. As for the military, they are content to enrich themselves at the expense of the starving population by any means necessary. For as long as the President can extend benefits to the armed forces, there will be no coup d’état.

 

Will is a postgraduate student reading International Peace and Security at King’s. He has a degree in History and Politics from Newcastle University and is working as a political consultant. He has a broad interest in international security issues, with a specific interest in trans-national organised crime. You can follow him on @Bil93Bis

 

Image Source: 

https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/styles/16×9-large/s3/venezuela-3aug16.png?itok=mN2WGjJ

Turkey’s President Erdoğan counter-coup cleanup

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By: Kyle R. Brady

SAMSUNG CAMERA PICTURES
A night view of Istanbul, Turkey.

Is President Erdoğan ignoring the lessons of the Iraq War at his peril?

Following the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey[1] — wherein factions within the Turkish military and government allegedly conspired to depose President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[2] — the government of Erdoğan now faces a serious and growing threat:  a potential insurgency found within the thousands of Turkish citizens formerly employed by the government, military, or public sector.

In the post-coup period, Erdoğan has not only retained his position but has also undergone[3] a multi-step[4] process of substantially[5] consolidating his power[6] within the country[7]. After formally blaming Fethullah Gülen[8] — a Turkish man and moderate Muslim reformer in self-imposed exile in the United States[9] — for orchestrating the coup, Erdoğan has proceeded to purge the government and military of anyone accused of supporting or sympathizing with Gülen. This effort has resulted in the removal of thousands of bureaucrats, government officials, judges, teachers, and members of the military from their positions, simply as a result of the allegations of the government — a government that increasingly answers solely to Erdoğan.

In the process of undertaking this purge, Erdoğan has ensured a number of outcomes for the immediate future. The first, and most evident, outcome has been the transformation of Turkish democracy into a democracy in name only, as it is incrementally replaced with a loyalist and increasingly autocratic structure that answers more to its leader than the state’s underlying principles or the well-defined rule of law. Second, the civilian-controlled[10] and structurally weakened[11] Turkish military is no longer seen as the defender of the people and the democracy, despite their decades-long status as such[12]. Third, Turkey’s member status within NATO is likely to come into question[13], particularly as Erdoğan’s state increases formal ties with President Putin’s Russia[14].  Lastly, as a result of Erdoğan’s response to the coup, the Turkish government now has greater control over their own anti-terrorist efforts and, by nature of the newly loyalist government, freedom[15] to swiftly[16] pursue any individuals or groups they deem to be terrorists[17], including members of minority or separatist groups that have long troubled Erdoğan[18].

In addition to the clear outcomes of Erdoğan’s post-coup maneuvers — the subject of much discussion by journalists, academics, foreign policy professionals, and others within the field —  there exists another distinct problem that has received scant, if any, attention: the group of well-trained, disaffected, and now-subjugated Turkish citizens who have had their lives upended.

One of the most widely acknowledged mistakes of the Iraq War was the swift disbanding of the state’s military and police forces[19]. With this simple act, the United States and its allies created an entire group of individuals who no longer had a source of income or personal pride, but were well-trained in their field, motivated to serve their fellow Iraqis, and fight for what they believed in. This substantially contributed to the extraordinarily difficult problem of insurgency within Iraq — and, eventually, helped to birth ISIS — as many of those who were trained in various aspects of fighting, training, and organizing applied their talents to a familiar purpose and in opposition to those who had deposed them.

This is, precisely, a problem that Erdoğan may soon face: thousands of Turkish citizens who are well-trained in the arts of war, education, and government but have been removed from their posts, stand accused of treason, and are disaffected at the hands of the state they formerly served. It seems unlikely that Erdoğan has yet to realize his potentially grave mistake, nor is he likely to ever do so, given the increasingly loyalist nature of his government. Instead, as he continues to remove citizens of all kinds from their positions, he may be creating the foundation for a widespread insurgency that is entirely unrelated to Turkey’s longstanding problems — both real and perceived — with terrorists, separatists, minorities, and nationalists. Moreover, should he continue down this path, Erdoğan may alienate himself from the general population and create the conditions for his own removal through a populist uprising, rather than a military coup.

It would, therefore, be advisable for Erdoğan to understand and apply the lessons of the Iraq War to his country, his interest in power, and his reforming of government: those who are relied upon to maintain order and function should not be disavowed or disbanded en masse, lest they band together to focus their talent and training on a newer, emerging threat found much closer to home.

Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent — unless stated — his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

 

 

 

Kyle R. Brady is an imminent postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. You can follow Kyle on Twitter: @KyleBradyOnline and his personal blog at http://blog.kyle-brady.com. He can be reached through email via: brady.k@gmail.com.

Notes:

[1] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/turkey-military-coup-what-we-know/ 

[2] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/what-caused-the-turkish-coup-attempt-214057

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN0ZX07S

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/europe/turkey-prisoners-erdogan.html

[5] http://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-convenes-emergency-security-summit-over-coup-attempt-1469015066

[6] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/turkey-erdogan-coup-future/491696/

[7] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/08/06/turkey-chooses-erdogan/ 

[8] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/11/politics/turkey-us-fethullah-gulen-ultimatum/

[9] ibid.

[10] https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/07/31/decree-tightens-civilian-control-over-turkish-military/qSdjjrhmpHRuCUKpwQLTwM/story.html

[11] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/middleeast/turkey-military-failed-coup/

[12] http://www.vox.com/2016/7/19/12225564/conspiracy-turkey-military-coup

[13] http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/turkey-military-coup/analysis-erdogan-s-purge-coup-proof-turkey-s-military-may-n630791

[14]  http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/world/turkey-russia-erdogan-putin-meeting/

[15] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/02/the-west-is-supporting-terrorism-against-turkey-claims-erdogan

[16]  http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/

[17] https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/in-erdogans-turkey-everyone-is-a-terrorist-kurds-pkk-terrorism/

[18] http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-struggles-to-fight-war-on-two-fronts-1458174473

[19] http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/

Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/city-bridge-cityscape-istanbul-45189/

Emerging expressions of people’s will beyond elections: The case of West Africa

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By Myriam Wedraogo:

BURKINA-POLITICS-PROTEST-PARLIAMENT

On the 30th of October 2014, large numbers of protesters prevented the Burkina Faso National Assembly from voting on a constitutional review bill that would allow President Blaise Compaore, in power since October 1987, to be eligible to contest the November 2015 Presidential election in a third term bid. This uprising reached a climax within one day, with the resignation of the President and the announcement of an interim leader in the person of Honore Traore, Chief-of-Staff of Burkina Faso’s armed forces. The unexpectedly quick succession of events was triggered by a massive rejection of the idea of modifying Article 37 of the Burkina Faso Constitution. Indeed on 28 October, ordinary citizens, together with opposition parties expressed their discontent in an unprecedented manner as several media reports on the protest show. People’s will, like a powerful tide, engulfed President Compaore.

These events in Burkina Faso should be analyzed as a social change movement and not merely a political one. While opposition leaders are undoubtedly benefiting from the expressed will of the people against ‘ruling for life’, the mounting thirst for change shows a new dimension of leadership being experienced in the West African region. People are claiming entitlement to not just elect, or be given universal instruments for voting leaders out of office, but to also enforce such a will whenever they feel the so-called legal and universal channels are being manipulated at their expense. Now people want real power, not the type they entrust a leader with, but the kind of power they can use to ensure legally enforced electoral processes.

Between Peaceful and Militarised Enforcement

Other cases of disputed electoral reform in the region offer some reflections for consideration, even if their historical paths and contexts are different from what is happening in Burkina Faso. The main focus should be on how such pre- or post-electoral disputes got the military involved or not.

In 2009, President Tanja of Niger sought and obtained a constitutional review through a referendum that, according to the outcome, meant the people wanted him to stay in power. This move was short-lived as a military coup took place in February 2010 and was followed by elections under the guidance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

In a different style, the Senegalese peaceful protest movement ‘Y en a marre‘ (‘Enough is enough’) led the population to a historic presidential poll in 2012 whose outcome was more an expression of voting the incumbent President Wade out of office, than one of placing President Macky Sall in power.

Then comes Burkina Faso currently undergoing a “revolution” ahead of the general elections scheduled for November 2015. The Government had prepared two plans in view of the review of the constitution pertaining to the number of presidential terms. Plan A was to have the National Assembly decide on 30 October, in which case, three-quarter of votes in favour of the bill would have sufficed for the bill to be adopted. Plan B was in case of no parliamentary consensus to consult the “sovereign people” through a referendum None of the two plans materialized. Rather, Burkina Faso has from 31 October an interim military ruler, following the resignation of the embattled President Compaore.

This turn of events implies that a presidential election will have to be held within 90 days, assuming all logistical aspects and right transitional processes are put in place; most importantly, assuming the military leader does not begin to experience the syndrome of “appetite comes with the eating”, thus delaying the return to civilian leadership.In any case, civil-military alliances in enforcing people’s will are, rightly or wrongly utilised, and remind us of the need to deeply interrogate our history, our democratic systems and above all, initiate sincere dialogue on where we are aiming at, but also how we want to contribute to enriching democracy manifestations in a globalised setting. Indeed, no amount of defense and security sector reforms combined with the regular holding of elections would sort out our troubled and conflict-prone interpretation of leadership, democracy and governance.

 

___________________

Myriam Wédraogo is an alumna of the African Leadership Center (ALC) who has been working with the German development cooperation since 2010 as an Advisor in peace and security to the Commission of the Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS).

23F or ‘The Coup that Never Was’

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by Laura Hamilton

23-f

Last month marks the 32nd anniversary of 23F, the failed military coup in Spain, which threatened to challenge the state’s transition to democracy.

On the 23rd February 1981, the military governors in the various regions around Spain planned a coup d’etat. Although Franco had nominated the King as his successor, military leaders, led by General Milans del Bosch, were not happy with the changes that were taking place as Spain transitioned from a repressive dictatorship to a fully-fledged democracy.

The coup began when Antonio Tejero stormed congress with the Guardia Civil (Spanish military police) and held the Parliament hostage. This was meant to be the signal to mobilise the rest of the country. However, they were hesitant and it was only in Valencia that tanks rolled in the streets.

My parents were living in Spain at the time, having moved to Madrid only a month earlier.  Having come from England, where a military coup is an unfamiliar concept, they weren’t really sure what was going on. My father was in a meeting, which was overrunning. One of his Spanish colleagues left to call his wife and tell her he would be late. Hurrying back in a few minutes later, he agitatedly informed the room “¡Hay un golpe!” (There’s a coup!) before all the Spaniards rushed home to check on their families.

Spain’s history is marred with coups – it was this lack of stability, which provoked the army to rise up under Franco.  We recently discussed, in one of my classes, the way that your culture influences the way you view a situation. The Spaniards had grown up in a country that had been under 40 years of military dictatorship. Although the majority of the population supported the transition to democracy, the constant threat of a military takeover existed since a sizeable minority still believed that life under Franco was better: there were low crime rates; goods were cheap; ‘immoral’ behaviour wasn’t rife.

No one explained the seriousness to my father and his colleague, who were the only expats in the room, so they didn’t fully grasp the concept of what was going on. Instead, they decided to continue working, travelling across Madrid to another meeting. My father recalls how this meeting was located in the same building as the Spanish press and TV headquarters. On their arrival, they found that the whole area was closed off and the seriousness of the situation began to set in.

At the same time, my mother, in a foreign country where she didn’t speak the language, had no idea what was going on.  She had no television or radio, since they were still in the process of being shipped across, and it was prior to the widespread use of the Internet or mobile phones. She first found out what was happening when my father’s colleague called, excitedly informing her “have you heard the news? There’s been a coup!”  Having no way of contacting my father, she was worried, mainly because of the fear of the unknown. As aforementioned, if you do not have any experience of a situation, you have no idea what to expect or how to prepare.

The whole country was on tenterhooks and there was only one person who was able to change the situation – the King. Having been ‘trained’ and chosen by Franco, he was seen by the majority of Spaniards as Franco’s puppet. However, his actions on the night of 23rd February turned him into the nation’s saviour, affirming his leadership of the country. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the military governors had sworn allegiance and loyalty to the King. It was this promise that he used to assert his authority and bring Spain back on the path to democracy. He appeared on the national television channel, TVE, throughout the night. Dressed in his military uniform, he broadcast the message that he did not support the coup and reaffirmed the need for democracy in Spain. It was this message that managed to convince the military governors to step down and not continue with their planned coup.

Spain’s future hung in the balance on that date. Yet, through the strong leadership of the head of state, he was able to save it and proceed with the transition that was taking place. There is a strong belief that, had the King supported it, the coup would have been successful and Spain would be a very different place today. Although Spain has recently been marred by many problems, there is no doubt that things would have been worse had the King not fully supported the path to democracy and used his leadership to save the country from returning to a military dictatorship.