counterterrorism

By: Samir Puri

Balance. It takes just one word to convey the strategic essence of a national effort against terrorism. Trade-offs are inherent in its implementation. Policy responses to terrorism rest on tough judgement calls. One such dilemma is that of potential intrusion into privacy in order to boost the reach of security agencies. This debate has been indelibly shaped by the coincidence of 9/11 occurring at the dawn of the information revolution. The age of mass casualty suicide terrorism and the age of massive data arrived in quick succession. Their juxtaposing has indelibly shaped 21st-century counterterrorism debates.

Contrastingly, the dilemma of human rights infractions occurring in the pursuit of security has perhaps more continuity with the past. Amartya Sen pointed out the contrast between ‘national security’ and ‘human security’. The security interests of people are not necessarily always synonymous with that of the state. The UN declaration of human rights, adopted in 1948, in which “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”, remains a vital coda to the horrors of the wars that it followed. Its relevance to the age of mass casualty terrorist attacks is ground that is being explored with every passing day.

The tension is relatively straightforward to explain. The ‘softer’ responses to terrorism that, for example, reassure alienated populations to reduce their vulnerability to recruitment by terrorists, unfold concurrently with ‘harder’ security responses against the terrorists themselves. This juxtaposition is inescapable. As is the friction, incoherence and provocation that follows its wake.

Phillip Bobbitt, in Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, contends that the relationship between law and strategy had to adapt to the unique exigencies of the modern terror threat. Bobbitt takes it seriously that: “the objective of these wars is not the conquest of territory or the silencing of any particular ideology but rather to secure the environment necessary for states of consent and to make it impossible for our enemies to impose or induce states of terror”.

Counterterrorism (CT) is the basis of the response. In an age in which terrorism is so often aimed at soft civilian targets, whether in the Paris attacks of November 2015, or the New Year’s Day massacre in Istanbul, stopping an attack that is already underway often means that it is already too late. Intelligence-led investigative efforts by the security forces must try to pre-empt the plotters and conspirators before their attack plans reach fruition. This is an incredibly difficult art to achieve with consistency.

But it is vital to get right, both for human security and for privacy. Imagine the horrors facing a country that experiences a brace of mass casualty terror attacks: suicide bombers and marauding gun attacks, one after the other, striking several cities over the course of days. The urgency of the security imperative to respond to murder on such a scale could tip the balance towards becoming a police state.

Indeed, Orwell’s ‘1984’ retains its relevance in the modern age of terrorism precisely for painting its vivid picture of a dystopian police state. Absolute security requires reaching into the minds of citizens. Nobody would want the thought crimes, the torture and the mass imprisonment that might accompany such an expansive programme to root out of enemies of the state.

The balance to be struck is, therefore, the critical matter. It is also highly subjective, given that it is dependent on the nature and severity of the threat that a country faces, as well as its legal and humanitarian norms. Turkey is a case in point. Over the course of 2016, Turkey’s government has – unwisely perhaps – waged war against the Islamic State (IS) while renewing its war with the Kurdish Workers Party (PPK). In attack after attack, IS has tended to strike civilian targets, while attacks claimed by the PKK affiliate TAK have often struck the security forces. And, after a failed coup by disgruntled members of the state apparatus, the government has clamped down on the multitude of threats it faces with an uncompromising response involving mass arrest, detention and allegedly torture.

The tendency towards overreaction is inherently tied to the human instinct for revenge, as well as a succumbing to fear. These tendencies are part of the human condition and, as result, contribute to political realities. What unfolds in one country can be unfathomable to even its closest allies. Guantanamo Bay, in which terrorist suspects are interred within the confines of America’s Cuban naval base, is a testament to the loss of legitimacy that flows from detaching the immediacy of security objectives from law.  Set up in the haze of outrage that followed 9/11, now former US President Obama has failed to close the facility. In a worrying portent, Turkey incarcerated PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on a prison island in the Mamara Sea in 1999 – and there he still remains today. The UN declaration on human rights implores that: “all are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. What to do with captured terrorists, actual or suspected, remains a burning issue.

Respect of human rights is intrinsic to the response to terrorism. CT should always be the preserve of the government. On the spectrum of responses to terrorism, CT denotes the most securitized and invasive. Pursuit, arrest or – in extremis – forceful action to restrain or injure, ought to be directed only at those who are mounting terrorist attacks. Ought is the relevant word here. Mistakes and miscalibration can occur as the security forces contend with plotters and attackers who prepare their attacks in secret. Every mistake can add fuel to the terrorist cause by eroding human dignity.

Countering violent extremism (CVE), called preventing violent extremism by the UN, starts from the other end of the response spectrum. It is aimed at dissuading those who might be vulnerable to the attraction of extremist rhetoric from setting down a path that could lead to terrorist violence. Perhaps a division of labour will arise, in which the really credible agents of CVE will be within society itself. Not to police itself, nor for people to spy on each other, but for the people of the polity to exercise the very courageous restraint expected from the security forces, and to reject the attitudinal pulls of extremist ideologies. Civil society organisations may well be the more credible transmitters of the societal response to terrorism than governments. Such is one possible division of labour.

To think seriously about responding to terrorism is to reject absolute positions. To argue that democratic ideals are sacrosanct in all instances is to ignore the complexity of the security effort required to disrupt terrorist plots. Conversely, to argue for an unfettered security response is to ignore how delicate the ideals of democratic state and society are. And there the debate sits; along a scale that awkwardly tips first in one direction and then in the other, reflecting a perpetual and irresolvable tension.

Dr Samir Puri is a lecturer in International Relations at King’s College London. He has researched and written extensively on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, international security, as well as diplomacy and peace processes. His most recent book is called Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: the Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes.

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By: Felix Manig

The UK Foreign Office currently rates 47 countries around the world as highly likely targets for Islamist terrorist attacks. While this threat spans over much of the Middle East and North Africa, it also extends to Western countries such as the United Kingdom and France. While the threat of terrorism in the Middle East is both quantitatively and qualitatively different than in the West, Western European states today are generally confronted with similar risks and face equal likelihoods of violent terrorist incidents. Yet, despite similar threat levels and a comparable threat perception emanating from the public, states such as the United Kingdom and France have developed starkly contrasting domestic counterterrorism legislation and practices. The divergent approaches between these countries are best explained by highlighting the different institutional characteristics of their respective security agencies and the normative context in which they operate.

In reaction to the 9/11 attacks, Western governments such as in the UK and France made extraordinary changes in their counterterrorism legislation to enable the gathering of court-admissible evidence at the early stages of investigations. By doing so, they embraced a preventive logic of counterterrorism and moved away from solely responding to similar attacks. Even before 2001, counterterrorism efforts in France were characterized by a consistent willingness by security agencies to make forceful and extensive operations in response to a threat. Between 2001 and 2010, France deported 129 alleged terrorists who were considered a threat to its national security.[1] Five weeks ago, French lawmakers approved the fifth extension of the country’s state of emergency – which grants special security powers of search and arrest to police and intelligence agencies. In the United Kingdom, only nine individuals were removed during the same period and the approaches used by British authorities have been marked by relative constraint when arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects.

In his research on counterterrorism and operational routines in Britain and France, Professor Frank Foley found that distinct institutional developments and societal norms in both countries contributed to lasting differences in how each state performs its counterterrorism strategies.[2] Broadly speaking, French security agencies developed early forceful operational routines resulting from a spillover threat from the Islamist insurgency in Algeria in the 1990s. This led its agencies to develop capabilities for large-scale arrests both inside of France and in Algeria or Morocco. A continuous high threat perception and relatively little backlash from civil actors and the media contributed to increased competencies of security agencies over time and strengthened their ability to conduct large-scale raids and arrests on suspects.

Furthermore, France accords special legislations to deal with counterterrorism. For instance, it allows for early cooperation between the judiciary and security agencies through so-called ‘investigating magistrates’. It has established special non-jury courts that encourage a broad interpretation of what counts as terrorist offences through an association law, thus making prosecutions and deportations easier to sentence. Despite such measures, France was affected by several terrorist attacks in the past few years. However, the absence of large-scale criticism against  Hollande’s prolonged state of emergency laws, which according to Human Rights Watch pose ‘excessive and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental freedoms’ complements the notion that security norms have trumped concerns for liberal and human rights values in France.

Unlike France, where the normative consensus focused on securitisation and allowed for extensive counterterrorism strategies, counterterrorism policies and judicial regulations in the UK demonstrate a different picture. Historically, the United Kingdom did not face Islamist terrorist threats prior to the Global War on Terror post 9/11. An example of the different environment in which British counterterrorism operated was the inability of the government under Prime Minister Tony Blair to assure British courts and the public that deportations of alleged terrorists to countries in the Middle East and North Africa – where their life integrity rights could be under threat – would be a legal and acceptable practice.

Moreover, attempts in 2005 to increase the pre-charge detention time for alleged terrorist suspects from 14 to 90 days was met with strong criticism from civil rights NGOs and large sections of the media because it encroached on the suspect’s right to a trial within reasonable time. Subsequently, this bill was voted down. In his research, Foley also contends that British security agencies found themselves in a normative and societal consensus placing a strong emphasis on respect for minority communities, thus making mass arrests of ‘likely suspects’ as in France less acceptable. Furthermore, embedded values such as the principle of political asylum and the right to freedom of speech in British society are likely to have constrained security agencies in their operational approaches. In the UK, prosecutions of suspects are conducted through the ordinary English court system with its standard jury-trial and without major modification of the evidence-testing processes such as in France.

However, it would be far from the truth to depict the UK’s counterterrorism efforts as flawless and perfectly acceptable in the light of their potential effects on rights and liberties. Increased threat perceptions and actual indiscriminate attacks throughout Western Europe linked to the Islamic State or self-radicalised individuals have prompted a strong response by security agencies. The British government continues to expand funding and capabilities for its official counterterrorism strategy, including increased surveillance through the mass acquisition of communications data, and an increase in operations both domestically and abroad certifies this change. While a well-funded and effective counterterrorism strategy is welcome in wake of growing threats to public safety, governments should be careful in maintaining the balance between securitisation and liberty, and between force and the proportionality of its application.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International.  

Notes:

[1] Foley, Frank. “Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France.” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2009): 435–78. doi:10.1080/09636410903132920.

[2] Foley, Frank. “Countering Terrorism in Britain and France.” Cambridge University Press. Accessed December 25, 2016. http://www.cambridge.org/vn/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/countering-terrorism-britain-and-france-institutions-norms-and-shadow-past?format=HB&isbn=9781107029699.

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By: Felix Manig

Countering and responding to the kind of terrorism which today plagues much of the Middle East, parts of Asia, and to a lesser extent Western states have become a massive undertaking and prime concern for policy-makers. The security of the individual is a basic human right which governments are entitled to protect; governments are obliged to develop legitimate measures to ensure their citizens’ safety and mitigate the threat emanating from terrorist groups by bringing such perpetrators to justice. While the actions of terrorist violence negate the fundamentals of human rights, it is especially challenging for the states, related institutions and private actors countering and seeking to prevent terrorism, to operate under the rule of law.

However, since the launch of the so-called Global War on Terror post 9/11,  the responses of security and intelligence communities to combat terrorism have raised serious concerns about the abuse of human rights and the rule of law. Some of the most drastic examples of disregarding legal and practical safeguards manifested themselves in the abuse of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib detention centre. This had a considerable shock value globally and culminated in finding that prisoners in other facilities in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay suffered from similar abuse as well.[1] Other states deport suspects to countries where they face risks of torture or extra-judicial killing, thereby violating the legal obligation of non-refoulment.[2] The use of exceptional and military courts to trial suspects has undermined the independence of the established judiciary, and those individuals highlighting these practices, such as human rights defenders, journalists, or ordinary citizens, have been threatened with repressive measures. In sum, these developments have had and continue to have a negative impact on human rights, the rule of law, good governance, and the effectiveness of countering terrorism around the world.

The Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights seeks to highlight the delicate balance actors must maintain when developing and implementing counterterrorism strategies. Counterterrorism policies are likely to remain priority concerns for lawmakers and relevant agencies alike in 2017, following yet another year of deadly terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East, Europe, and South-East Asia. In the U.S., President-elect Donald Trump’s statements to resume ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as waterboarding, a method considered to be torture by a wide range of legal experts and human rights organisations, should spell concern. French lawmakers recently voted in favour of extending its state of emergency laws for the fifth time, granting police special powers of search, seizure, and detention. In Bangladesh, counterterrorism operations of the government are increasingly used to crack down on political dissent. The authors in this series offer important insights into some of the philosophical, practical, and case-specific contexts of counterterrorism and its relationship to human rights.

First, Lenoy Barkai poses the fundamental question of why liberal democracies fall into the trap of illegitimate practices when countering terrorism. She argues that the preventive logic states have developed to counter-terrorism does not necessitate human rights violations. Rather, violations should be understood as the ongoing norm-contestation inherent to the identity formation of liberal democracies.

In the second article, Felix Manig examines the reason why states with a similar threat perception of Islamist terrorism have developed starkly contrasting counterterrorism legislation and strategies. He evaluates research which finds that France and the United Kingdom – both Western liberal democracies – have approached counterterrorism differently due to the institutional characteristics of their respective security agencies and the normative context in which they operate.

The third piece of the series, also authored by Felix Manig, highlights some of the less visible but equally worrisome counterterrorism measures imposed by governments through mass surveillance, data collection, and their effect on the right to privacy. Felix examines the problems around proportionate responses, i.e. the intrusive steps governments have taken around the world and reviews the implications this has for everyone using digital communications technology.

In the fourth article, Silvia Sclafani evaluates the implications of the state of emergency laws in France, which has recently been extended until mid-2017. She highlights how security agencies have utilised their extended powers to conduct large-scale arrests and searches and how these practices have a disproportionate effect on citizens with migrant backgrounds. At the same time, she argues that the effect of the laws on security remain questionable.

Finally, Athul Menath illustrates in the fifth piece how counterterrorism policies can be misused by governments wishing to silence political opposition or dissent. More specifically, he highlights how historical political volatility and an escalation in jihadi violence in Bangladesh have correlated with an increasing crackdown on opposition parties and fundamental freedoms.

Happy reading!

Felix is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International. Twitter: @felix_manig

Notes:

[1] Brown, Michelle. “‘Setting the Conditions’ for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad.” American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 973–97.

[2] Foley, Frank. “Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France.” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2009): 435–78.

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