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Why do so few Scholars Study the Intersection of Climate and Security?

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by Matthew Ader

Climate change or security, a question of the one or the other? (Image credit: Lisa Benson)

I have had two and a half hours of teaching on climate change and security in two years, and I am unlikely to get any more. BA and MA courses at the King’s Department of War Studies do not offer any modules about climate change. Neither do security studies courses at Exeter, St Andrews, Oxford, or Cambridge. The US has equally slim pickings. Where tuition does exist, it tends to focus on human security and development; not strategy and operations.

And yet climate change is reshaping the world in unpredictable ways. Multiple governments even named it as a major security threat. Academics correlate climate change, if a little tentatively, with increased rates of conflict. However, scholars of strategy and war do not seem to focus on it. I surveyed thirty-four International Relations and Security Studies journals – all those with an H-Index above 30. Since 1995, these journals have, between them, published 45 articles about the intersection of climate change and conflict. As a matter of contrast, just one of those journals, International Organization, published 4356 total articles in the same period.

This initial survey reveals a worrying gap in the literature. Security courses that rely on this research are the incubator for future policymakers and analysts, while academics are often called upon to advise governments. A failure to address climate change risks depriving the next generation of security leaders and thinkers of a solid grounding in an important subject. At best, this may leave governments scrambling to cope with unforeseen challenges. At worst, it could lead to the creation of bad policy – or even open the door for malign actors who take advantage of climate change to push other agendas.

Why has security academia not fully engaged in this subject? Partially, it is because academics are very busy and have many existing commitments. Undertaking novel research or designing new courses, especially when the literature is so sparse, is time-consuming. It is also risky; work on climate change may not be valued in the same way as more conventional topics when hunting for jobs. Worse still, there is little research funding in climate change and security. Ministries and Departments of Defence have declared climate change to be a threat but have yet to put their money where their mouth is. These challenges, combined with the broader structural precarity of academic careers, militate against researchers investigating climate change and security.

These generally applicable concerns are worsened by personnel policy. Security studies departments are not hiring climate change experts. For example, of the eighty academics in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, only two mention climate as a research interest. This makes cross-sectoral research more difficult. Even more concerning still is that such a deficit reduces opportunities for students interested in climate and security to study the issue. This, in turn, perpetuates the existing scarcity, creating a negative feedback loop. Of course, it would be unfair and inaccurate to blame this purely on hiring practices. A department cannot hire scholars who do not exist. However, it is at least partially a chicken-and-egg problem. The lack of cross-sectoral research and limited tuition opportunities addressing climate and security make it harder to attract additional academic talent to the field.

A related challenge is that climate change does not fit within traditional models of security analysis. It is not a human actor, it does not deploy discrete methods, and it is difficult to analyse through the conventional lenses of IR theory or grand strategy. Grappling with the climate requires scientific and geographical knowledge which falls outside the specialisms of most security scholars. For example, the fierce debate among geographers over the linkage between climate and conflict depends on comparing rainfall data against incidences of violence. Unless an academic is trained to a high level in meteorological modelling, they are unlikely to be able to engage with the discussion in depth. The one partial exception to this is the Human Security field. Human security, with its focus on different issues impacting ordinary people, has covered climate change in more detail. However, its perspective has more to do with development and local interventions than big-picture decision-making. While there are absolutely insights to be gained from that discipline for national policymakers, it does not answer the broader questions required to inform strategic decision-making.

Lastly, while we are seeing the impacts of climate change now, its most dramatic impacts lie in the future. Mass climate migration, unprecedented littoral urbanization, and irreversible water scarcity are not science fiction but their true implications are only just emerging. Scholars are understandably reticent to engage in speculation – it is risky and can lead to poor quality research. This is especially true for security studies and international politics, which are wildly unpredictable. As General McMaster noted, “we have a perfect record of predicting future wars…and that record is 0%.”

This is compounded by the creeping nature of climate change. On 12 September 2001, nearly every security scholar turned their attention to terrorism and the Middle East. I’m sure that a similar statistical analysis of journals from 1985 to 2000 would show relatively few articles about Salafi jihadism, but academics were able to apply their existing knowledge to the new problem. It is not clear that this will happen with climate change, because there will probably not be a single dramatic event which changes conversations and research priorities. Rather, it will incrementally alter global conditions over the span of decades, shaping a new normal.

Such a slow-moving emergency is unlikely to attract enough research to effectively inform policy – especially given that great power competition, terrorism, and biosecurity will, among other issues, remain pressing concerns throughout the period. This is worsened, as noted, by the requirement for expert scientific knowledge to properly study climate change. In short, there is unlikely to be a catalyst for the study of climate change, and if there is, security scholars may struggle to obtain the necessary scientific knowledge to properly engage with the issue in a timely fashion.

There is no single policy prescription that can magically fix this deficit. However, it is a problem – and it must be rectified. Climate change is actively reshaping the world. If security academics do not provide perspectives on it, the security implications may be ignored. Worse, they might be dishonestly weaponised to achieve a larger agenda. We have seen this already with alt-right groups using fear of climate migration as a recruiting tactic. The past four years have clearly shown that radical ideologies can find purchase at the highest levels of government. In the absence of informed views from authoritative sources, decisionmakers may turn to confident ideologues for answers.

At the end of that lecture on climate change, I asked the lecturer what the strategic plan was for dealing with the mass migrations, droughts, and water wars he predicted. He said that there was not a single one. The gap in the research is no one’s fault. But catastrophe does not care about intention. Policymakers will require effective advice to navigate the new challenges of this century. The academic community should mobilise to provide it – and security academics should lead the charge.

[1] This was achieved by searching their archives for all articles from 1995-2020 with “climate change” in the title and manually sorting through. This method is necessarily vulnerable to personal judgement and can exclude work on topics adjacent to climate change & security i.e. food scarcity.

Matthew Ader is a second-year student doing War Studies. He has worked as an intern in a number of security consultancy firms. His academic interests gravitate loosely towards understanding challenges and opportunities for Anglo-American strategy in the 21st century (and also being snide about Captain America’s command ability). He is also an editor for Roar News, and has written for a number of security publications – most especially Wavell Room. You can follow him on Twitter: @AderMatthew.

Cash Crops, Conflict, and Climate Change

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by Eve Gleeson

Mexico’s Avocado police on patrol (Image credit: Katy Watson/BBC)

The cultivation of crops is a steady and promising source of economic gain for developing states, both through internal markets and international trade. However, these powerhouses of economic success may well serve as a double-edged sword. Lacking robust and well-enforced laws and regulations, the economies and populations of many states have become dependent on, or in some cases addicted to, the success of these crops for their livelihoods and security. This success has precipitated destructive practices in subservience to the crop’s lucrative economic benefits, such as informal governance by militias and the decimation of environmental resources such as land and water.

Circumstances in Yemen and Mexico, in particular, point to these hostile relationships surrounding cash crops. In Mexico, militias are operating through kidnappings and killings, forests and ecosystems are being destroyed for land clearings, and local populations are facing health hazards from excessive pesticide use. In Yemen, the market monopolisation of a non-food crop is exacerbating a famine originally created by war and natural resource scarcity. In both of these cases, environmental pressures have preceded or followed from the urgency exerted by a stressed food system, depicting the inseparable relationship between unsustainable agriculture and compromised social, economic, and political stability.

Yemen’s cash crop drug: conflict, famine, and natural resource depletion

The War in Yemen, a conflict between the Houthi rebel movement, government forces, and a coalition of Arabian states, has resulted in a famine that harbours a much darker backstory than blockades stopping the import of food and water to the country. In addition, the famine has been worsened by the growth of khat (or qat), a stimulant drug that features as Yemen’s superstar crop. It has brought such financial gain to its growers that it has taken priority in farming country over other crops, such as wheat or fruits, that could provide sustenance to its people. Khat is so ubiquitous in the country’s political economy that it has become entwined with the interests of warring factions, further spurring conflict, water depletion, and famine on the peninsula.

The crop is the source of a violent dispute between farmers, a currency for bribe-seeking soldiers, and a dominant figure in the country’s markets, detrimentally crowding out crops that could help soften the blow of Yemen’s famine. It provides a source of funding for both the Houthi rebels and the pro-government forces in the war, as ‘qat traders pay a tax on their qat to whichever side controls their region‘. The crop also consumes close to forty per cent of Yemen’s clean water reserves, thereby further overtaxing water resources already weaponised by warring factions that destroy infrastructure, obstruct roadways, and blockade imports.

To make matters worse, the stimulant drug is also challenging Yemen’s dependence on groundwater reserves that are dwindling under drought, heat, and other climatic irregularities. The government lacks the capacity to enforce modern water rights, which have been rejected by wealthy farmers who regularly exploit their poor counterparts by drilling on their land. Now, farmers freely drill wells without government regulation. As a result, they continue to use highly unsustainable groundwater reserves to feed khat production, with no plan for developing renewable water sources for human or agricultural use as droughts persist and temperatures rise.

‘Blood Avocados’ in Mexico’s Michoacán state

Avocados, known to many in the growing industry as ‘green gold’, account for conflict between rival farmers and traders in Mexico. Cartels, violence, and extortion are just some of the troubling factors behind this cash crop; one that has drained resources– land, water, and capital– from the regions in which they are grown. Major importers such as the United States, the EU, and Japan have driven a $2 billion industry rooted thousands of miles away with little conception of the havoc the efforts have inflicted on the region of Michoacán, where production is concentrated.

In the Michoacán state, four principal narcotics cartels extorting avocado farmers have transformed the region into what Mexican online magazine Clarín Mundo has called Mexico’s ‘Capital of Violence’. Failure to pay ‘monthly protection’ fees to the cartels has resulted in kidnappings, killings, and seizures of farmland. In response, state-funded self-defence militias have sprouted from the local community to combat these gangs, whose narcoterrorism is partially financed by the extortion of farmers. Consequently, the region’s capital of Tacitaro has become militarised: ‘The new force is equipped with armored patrol trucks, and each officer wears full combat gear, including bulletproof vests, helmets, and high-power rifles — all provided for by the state police’.

This industry is also guilty of precipitating deforestation and water depletion (avocados require nearly 320 litres of water per unit) as well as stimulating competition for land that has provoked the intentional burning of wildlife ecosystems. This deforestation, performed illegally, points to gaps in environmental governance. Climatic irregularities, such as droughts and floods, have further troubled soil and land health, compromising the fertility of existing farmland. Given that growing a crop at an industrial scale often requires the heavy use of pesticides, these chemicals have contaminated the water supply in avocado-growing regions and sickened local populations.

The bigger picture: the disparate effects of climate change on developing states

This unmistakable relationship between food and conflict is an increasingly global issue that threatens and is likewise threatened by, the pressures of resource and environmental degradation. Though vastly different in nature, the cases of Yemen and Mexico illustrate how unsustainable agricultural practices, themselves propagated by gaps in governance and commodity demands from rich, developed states, can manifest in a conflict where effective protection of farmers and land is absent, particularly in an era when climatic changes are an increasing threat to security. Similar situations are unfolding in places like Iraq, where desertification and salination of water tables resulting from climatic irregularities are intensifying grievances in an already fragile state.

For this reason, the looming threat of climate change is not a ‘first world problem’. Although developed countries have the technological and financial resources (even if they lack the willpower) to transition to renewable energy, sustainable agricultural practices, and lower carbon emissions, the threat is a less immediate one for many. Wealthier developed countries have the resources for more expensive projects, like desalination of saltwater, if groundwater reserves become exhausted or contaminated. For communities that strive day-to-day for economic, political, and social stability and predictability, climate change can mean compromises to essential crop yields, irreplaceable loss of natural resources, increased conflict, and even displacement.

How can the global community ensure that more vulnerable populations stop suffering from food and nutrition insecurity, domestic tensions and war, contaminated and insufficient water resources, or displacement at the hand of climate change? Addressing climate change is at the forefront of this matter: lowering greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the carbon sequestration capacity of land by repairing broken systems. In the short term, we must consider how the demands and interventions of more developed and often opportunistic states impact the ability for less stable states to ensure food, water, and other basic livelihoods. Grassroots organisations like Soil, Food and Healthy Communities in Malawi and Sustainable Harvest International in Central America are making major headway in creating more sustainable and regenerative practices in communities that struggle with food insecurity. But movements in the West must acknowledge the disparate effects of climate change on vulnerable communities and their impact on international security.

Eve Gleeson holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. After briefly working in threat intelligence, she is shifting her focus toward sustainable agriculture and food policy. She can be found on LinkedIn or on Twitter at @evegleeson_. 

Will there be an Original Sin of the Decarbonised Era?

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by Michael C. Davies

Does decarbonisation by 2030 or at least 2050 present us with the inevitability of tragedy in one way or the other? (Image credit: Shutterstock)

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is unambiguous in saying that by 2030, without momentous efforts to decarbonise, the catastrophic effects of climate change cannot be avoided. Put simply, we have ten years to save human civilisation. Beyond the usual wranglings about climate change denial, debates over costs versus benefits, and government versus private sector innovation and largesse, the carbon cost of global military operations has only started to be understood as a key driver of carbon emissions. As a recent report from Brown University’s Costs of War project noted, “The [U.S. Department of Defense] is the single largest consumer of energy in the US, and in fact, the world’s single largest institutional consumer of petroleum.” Other similarly-sized armed forces, while not as polluting, still produce mammoth amounts of carbon daily. The problem at hand, therefore, suggests that among the best ways to initiate a global reduction in carbon is a general disarmament, even if temporary. However, in the event disarmament does occur, without appropriate forethought, there exists the possibility for states to bargain away the freedom and existence of other states and peoples as the price for disarmament—creating an original sin for the decarbonised era.

Original sin comes to us from Judeo-Christian theology by way of Adam and Eve eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden, and in doing so transmitting their sins and guilt to their descendants. Its more common, secular usage, however, refers to the foundational wrong that helped to enact a new political order. The birth of many countries, as well as the present international system, holds multiple examples of original sins. For the Americas, slavery and the genocide of indigenous people stand among the most obvious. Depending on one’s viewpoint, the Holocaust or Israel’s very existence and the subsequent Nakbah are described as such. The Soviet’s brutal domination over Poland and other Eastern European states after the Second World War were described similarly, particularly as they were intended, and agreed upon, to be re-birthed as independent states. The mutual genocide between India and Pakistan at Partition, the genocide of the Armenians and others in the creation of modern Turkey, the Congolese genocide by Belgium, and the genocide and reprisals in Rwanda in the mid-90s, just to name a few, all count as original sins of new orders. Each of these stains the honor, dignity, and history of each country involved, and in turn affect the culture, political distribution of power, and national narratives. It is also why denial and forgetting are encouraged by those who made it happen. Such is the power of the original sin.

The current international system, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and made real via the UN organization and numerous international agreements, is an outgrowth of, and legitimising feature of, overwhelming US power—political, military, economic, and cultural. If disarmament is a key to decarbonisation, two basic options emerge. First, a global agreement is signed to set new and/or maintain existing state boundaries, to forbid the engagement in any form of dehumanising actions within said boundaries, and mutual aid is provided to mitigate the effects of climate change for a set period of time. Such an agreed understanding will lock in the existing international order for the time being and keep everyone tethered to the technological breakthroughs within, and economic power of, the Great Powers as the price of disarmament. Second, that Great and Medium Powers alike will utilise the need to decarbonise by disarmament as leverage to achieve their long-held aims—the very thing the military capabilities exist to achieve in the first place—in order to declare themselves secure enough to disarm. This will, if accepted as such, lock in an altered international system, and in all likelihood, present us with the choice of having to allow the destruction and/or domination of entire groupings to save the planet—an original sin of a new era.

What do I mean by this? Obviously, just by sheer carbon numbers, the Great Powers—the US, China, India, the EU, Japan, and Russia must decarbonise the most. As they are the biggest polluters, with the biggest militaries, decarbonisation must start there. But what would happen if, for example, China demands Taiwan be returned to it in order for it to disarm? Or Vietnam be turned into a vassal state? Even as we now know the depth of China’s actions against the Uighurs, should someone be sacrificed to get China on board? What if Russia demands the Baltics and all of Ukraine be placed under its ‘stewardship’ or absorbed into Russian territorial control? Would North Korea disarm and/or denuclearise for the greater good, or would they demand South Korea be absorbed into the North, inflicting another famine and state-terror on its new citizens? Would India require the removal of 200 million Muslims from its territory—as it seems to desire—as the price of disarming? Should we accept, as we have with Syria, the imposition of a dictator willing to burn the country down to keep control in a variety of places?

Disarmament, by itself, rarely equals peace. In fact, it usually leads to annihilation. It is inherent in the character of a new order to shift people, power, and resources so as to strengthen victorious allies and weaken defeated enemies. Any agreement to fight climate change must come with an agreement to disarm. But with that goes the military power that provides the security function that enforces the existing international system, both the good and the bad of it. Security is in the eye of the beholder and as we see so clearly right now, not even a global pandemic can tamper down global conflicts. It is therefore not a hard image to conjure up of world leaders allowing the destruction, absorption, and/or terror of an entire populous to save the planet, or at least, their own skins. And at that moment, we will have found our new original sin.

Michael C. Davies is a Ph.D. candidate in Defence Studies at King’s College London, focusing on the theory and practice of victory. He previously conducted lessons learned research at the U.S. National Defense University where he co-authored three books on the Wars of 9/11 and is one of the progenitors of the Human Domain doctrinal concept. He is also the Coordinating Editor with Strife.

Transboundary rivers and climate change: Testing times for hydro-diplomacy to attain and maintain cooperation

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EDITORS NOTE: This is the third article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first and second articles in the series can be found here, and here, respectively.

By: Professor Ashok Swain

The_Aral_sea_is_drying_up._Bay_of_Zhalanash,_Ship_Cemetery,_Aralsk,_Kazakhstan
Source: Wikimedia

Water is a basic condition for life and it also plays a fundamental role in human development. The global water crisis is of such magnitude that it is growing into an issue of global common concern. This perspective puts the focus on transboundary rivers: approximately half of global fresh water is available through 276 international basins around the world. Overall, 145 countries have territories that include at least one shared river basin. However, national politics complicates the policies towards the enhanced “river basin management” of such shared rivers. Thus, while dealing with the management of the transboundary rivers, political issues are often overshadowed by integrated water resources management (IWRM) terminology that has contributed to a failure of achieving global water governance .[1]

The management of transboundary rivers in different parts of the world cannot follow a particular golden principle of the value of water — its demand and supply varies from one basin to another.[2] Thus, it can be safely argued that “one-shot approach of management within the context of IWRM is far too simplistic to be useful, or applicable” for sustainable management of international rivers.[3] In spite of its huge significance for global peace and development, the available knowledge on how to manage transboundary waters is quite weak.[4] Moreover, the existing knowledge and institutions on governance of international rivers are becoming increasingly volatile because of greater demand and a decreased supply of fresh water. Adding further to the problem, the threat of global climate change has started undermining the on-going regimes and institutions of water sharing and management of transboundary rivers.[5]

The Climate Change and Transboundary Water

The controversy over the science of global warming and the procedures adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in collecting data fails to undermine the decades of climate research confirming the overall global climate change. Doubts and denial have given way to debates about the scale and impact of climate change, particularly in the developing countries. Agricultural production in the Southern hemisphere may become highly vulnerable to climate change, given the other multiple stresses that affect food systems in these regions. Moreover, some countries and societies are better in formulating adaptation strategies for land- and water-use practices that buffers them against the negative consequences of climate change. To address the adverse effects of climate change, the effectiveness and coping abilities of existing institutions also matter.  Within this context, there is a general recognition that the developing countries will be the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change, as they tend to depend more on the natural environment for their livelihoods and have limited coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity.

While the exact impact of climate change is not yet known, it will have a clear bearing upon access to shared water resources as it affects hydrological cycles at all geographical scales, from global to local. Some regions will become much drier, some wetter. Variations in precipitation are already leading to more and severe droughts and floods, changes in the groundwater recharge, high evaporation from fresh water systems, and alteration in river runoff. Increasing number of high and untimely floods will threaten the safety of dams and other water infrastructure projects; severe droughts will drastically reduce water supply, irrigation and hydropower generation. Climate change is thus set to make water management challenges more complicated in terms of providing safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, improved food production, and in generating hydropower and ecosystem protection. Moreover, climate change may have a serious impact on overall availability of river water flow in international basins. Some parts of the basin will experience higher flows and others lower flows placing significant strain on existing agreements and structures for the management of shared water resources — whether at local, national or international level – and thereby increasing the need for serious conflict management institutions and practices. As can be seen, the ongoing climatic changes will make it impossible for a ‘business as usual’ approach, which emphasizes building large projects to increase water supply in managing shared river systems. Increased freshwater variability will introduce a greater uncertainty, which can pose serious new challenges to the on-going practices of water sharing and management in transboundary river basins.

New challenges for hydro-diplomacy

The influence of hydro diplomacy has helped several disputing countries to not only agree on their portions of shared river water, but also to look other areas of cooperation.[6] In 1994, water played a critical role in the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. India and Pakistan, in spite of more than six decades of bitter rivalry, have only had lasting cooperation over the sharing of Indus River water resources.  Thus, international rivers are not only expected to induce riparian conflict, its water resource can also bring engagement and cooperation in the basin.  Many competing riparian countries in the South, most notably the basin countries of the Mekong, Amur, Jordan, Syr Darya, Ganges, Mahakali, Nile, Komati, Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, and Zambezi rivers have signed sharing arrangements in the 1990s. The signing of these river agreements had brought a fundamental shift over the possible impact of shared water on riparian relations, a likely phase of cooperation rather than conflict. Hydro-diplomacy is still being endorsed to take precedence over state-centric politics and decision-making over international water resources.[7]

Most of these recently concluded river agreements have been possible as the riparian countries saw advantages in cooperating to pursue further development of shared water resource to meet their growing demand. In some cases like the Nile, Mekong, Jordan and Zambezi rivers, diplomatic pressures and financial aid and grants from the international community had also facilitated the success of hydro-diplomacy. However, these river water agreements are in grave danger if they fail to receive institutional support for proper water management at the basin level.

Global climate change has added increased uncertainties to the smooth functioning and survival of these recent transboundary water agreements. As Arnell argues, climate change may affect both the demand and supply sides of the balance.[8]  With increasing temperatures, sizeable reductions in precipitation, and the melting of glacial sources of major river systems, less water supplies will be available to the agricultural sector. Climate change will not only decrease the supply of river water, it may also enhance its demand in domestic, irrigation, industrial and ecological use. Thus, climate change induced scarcity and uncertainly of shared water resource in the arid and semi-arid regions can possibly limit the potential of hydro-diplomacy. It is true that the projected impacts of global climate change over fresh water supply might be huge and dramatic, but in a transboundary basin, the effects on the runoff might vary depending on the location. This further enhances the uncertainties and anxieties over the water availability in the shared river systems. Most of the existing river agreements do have provisions to meet near-term shortfalls in the river flow. However, climate change can potentially bring long-term changes to water availability, which requires water regimes and institutions to be flexible and robust enough to cope with the emerging situation.

Climate induced changes in water supply might demand comprehensive adjustments in the on-going water sharing arrangement of shared rivers. The institutions overseeing water sharing must be adaptable enough in re-allocating fluctuating water flow for various sectors. Thus, the task of hydro-diplomacy amid climate change entails both getting the disputing riparian countries to sign river sharing agreements but also to ensure these countries support establishing regimes and institutions which will have the provisions for information sharing, conflict management mechanisms, and flexibility to adjust to the runoff variations in the long term. Moreover, mitigating or adaptive actions at bilateral or even sub-basin levels to address the impacts of climate change in a transboundary river basin are unlikely to achieve the objective of sustainable peace and cooperation over shared water resources. The emerging and unprecedented situation demands basin countries to cooperate and act collectively and jointly. In the face of global climate change, a successful basin-based initiative is required to facilitate better integration of demand and supply and to promote meaningful participatory processes. Business as usual for hydro-diplomacy and a singular focus upon bilateral negotiation and arrangements is no longer an option in the transboundary river basins.

Responding to new challenges

The unfolding effects of climate change will further increase water scarcity, in the form of long-lasting drought and seasonal variation. People need a responsive state to attend to their basic need for water. When climate change makes it difficult for the state to meet demand for water, conflicts over a narrowing resource base are less readily resolved; instability and violent conflict within states may feed instability and conflict between states within the basin. Efficient and good water management in the face of climate change is also part of peace-building effort – both in preventing countries from returning to armed conflict, and in helping avoid relapse after a period of violence. Despite the risk that climate change induced water scarcity poses to social wellbeing and economic growth, in most countries there has been alarmingly little progress towards managing freshwater sustainably. Significant economic and political resources are needed to develop technologies and infrastructure that provide better water management at the basin, national, and transboundary level.

To reach agreement on meeting the competing and fluctuating demands for water in a transboundary basin is, in fact, not an easy task. Hydro-diplomacy thus needs to adopt a total resource view where river water is seen as a key input for development and growth in the basin. The challenges are not only limited to the technical and economic sectors, but also include crucial water sector reform, which is political in nature. Moreover, the task of hydro-diplomacy will not be anymore limited to basin-based regimes and institutions, but also entails achieving effective water governance in the face of climate change and influencing the supporting pathways from local, national and international policies and practices.

In the past, river-sharing issues could be effectively covered by a few negotiators trained specifically to deal with water issues. But today, hydro-diplomacy needs to involve itself not only in an increasing range of fields (such as energy generation, food production, human rights, and health issues) but also hydro-diplomacy should also reflect sufficient knowledge about possible impacts of climate change (such as precipitation pattern, glacier melting, temperature increase, rising sea water encroaching fresh water system). Many developing riparian countries, not only have to survive with the existing power asymmetry vis-à-vis regional powers in the basins, they also suffer from a lack of competent ‘hydro-diplomats’ who can address climate change issues while carrying out negotiation over shared water resources.

Hydro-diplomacy is needed to acquaint itself well with increasingly diversified climate change policy processes. River water negotiators are required to have sufficient knowledge of the climate change phenomenon and the possible impact of climate change on human, society, country and region. They also need to have an overview of the existing and emerging schools of thought regarding climate change and its impact on water availability and demand. It is also crucial to identify and classify important actors and groupings and their positions on climate change and water management issues. Moreover, hydro-diplomacy must have overview of increasing legal and policy documents, which are coming out by international and regional organizations on the impact of climate change on water resources and possible mitigation and adaption measures.

 

 

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research, and the director of the Research School of the International Center for Water Cooperation at Uppsala University in Sweden

 

 

 

[1] Conca, Ken 2006. Governing Water. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

[2] Swain, Ashok 2004. Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. London: Routledge

[3] Varis, O., C. Tortajada, and A.K. Biswa. 2008. Management of Tranboundary Rivers and Lakes. Berlin: Springer.

[4] Earle, A., A. Jägerskog, and J. Öjendal, eds. 2010. Transboundary Water Management: Principles and Practice: London: Earthscan.

[5] Earle, A, A. E. Cascao, S. Hansson, A. Jägerskog, A. Swain, and J. Öjendal, 2015. Transboundary Water Management and the Climate Change Debate: London: Routledge.

[6] Conca, Ken, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds. 2002. Environmental Peacemaking. Washington, Baltimore and London: Woodrow wilson Centre Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[7] Pohl, B, A. Carius, K. Conca, G. D. Dabelko, A. Kramer, D. Michel, S. Schmeier, A. Swain and A. Wolf, 2014. The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy. Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters: Berlin: Adelphi.

[8] Arnell, Nigel W. 1999. Climate Change and Global Water Resources. Global Environmental Change 9:31-49.

 

 

 

When global warming goes to war

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By Adriano Mancinelli

We used to think about climate change as a global issue in itself, separated from more traditional security threats such as military and strategic issues. However, this assumption has to be challenged. As a matter of fact, climate change is already a driver of violence.

On October 24th I attended a public lecture at LSE; the host, Professor Christian Parenti, presenting his book ‘Tropic of Chaos‘, edited in 2011. The core thesis of his work is that climate change and its effects have a growing importance in explaining the causes of violence in the developing world: global warming is not a direct cause of conflict, but it exacerbates the pre-existing root causes for violence and war. In particular, climate change aggravates the problems arising from the legacies of both the cold war  and the neo-liberal economic discourse.

Professor Parenti gave many examples of his claims. Perhaps, the most straightforward case he has studied is Northwest Kenya. The region is affected by periods of chronic drought followed by heavy rains and floods, which have left people without means of survival. They cannot find any relief from government – said Parenti – because of the reduction of the role of the state imposed by World Bank and IMF’s neo-liberal demands and recipes. Furthermore, they are able to procure and purchase cheap guns: after the 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war, a typical proxy war influenced by the confrontation between the US and USSR, the whole region has been inundated by light weapons. The result is what Parenti calls a “catastrophic convergence”: the only solution in order to survive is to conquest more land, attacking the neighbouring villages and triggering a spiral of violence and insecurity that grips the whole region.

Professor Parenti showed how environmental factors, and climate change, are influencing even the war on terror in Afghanistan. When he was there, he asked many farmers the reason why they keep growing poppy flowers. The most recurrent answer was – he reported – that poppy is drought-resistant. In fact, recent decades have seen Afghanistan affected by severe droughts. In such dry an environment, the poppy is one of the most feasible crops, as it uses only 1/6 of the amount of water needed by wheat. Considering that one of the crucial issues that ISAF have been facing in Afghanistan is the eradication of poppy crops, it is quite clear that global warming does matter as a cause of violence, or at least of prolonged violence.

As a solution to all this, Professor Parenti suggested that governments, particularly the US, “take climate science seriously” and start spending money to fund research on global warming and green energy. In his opinion there is still room for action. The problem is, however, that the political discourse in the United States does not seem to be changing, and the global warming subject is still frequently ignored.

I share Professor Parenti’s view on climate change as a driver of violence. I do not share his optimistic conclusions, though. Even if we hope that Obama, if re-elected, would tackle the issue of global warming and green energy in the US, the future appears gloomy. Firstly, it is unclear where to find the money for research and implementation – Parenti appears unjustifiably optimistic as to the location of funds. Secondly, the United States is a polluter, but it is not the only one, and it is uncertain whether China, India, and other developing countries would follow the same path. Finally and perhaps most importantly, even in the happy event of a mitigation of global warming, it would be a long-term victory, whilst the problems caused by the climate change are urgent. This creates a time gap; to address global warming is not to address conflicts caused by the global warming: nobody is going to provide Afghan farmers with drought-resistant wheat in the next few weeks.

Professor Parenti’s lecture has made it clear that global warming represents a serious and pressing challenge, not only because of the threats to the well-being of future generations, but also because it is creating new – and exacerbating old – reasons for violence and instability throughout the developing world. The answer to this challenge is one of the utmost importance and one that the whole international community should commit to. The methods and possibilities are uncertain, and academic research on the subject is still poorly taken into account.