China

Cyber Security in China

November 7, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Christy Quinn:

Greg Austin, Cyber Policy in China. China Today. Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 2014. Pp. 232. £ 15.99, paperback; £50.00, hardback; £10.99, e-book. ISBN: 978-0-7456-6979-3.

From the emergence of the printing press in Early Modern Europe, to the expansion of global satellite television and the internet,the state has always been on the back foot in trying to control the spread and content of information and maintain its monopoly over the control of information within its sovereign borders. There is nothing new about balancing the societal benefits of information-sharing with maintaining state power.

What has changed in the last decade is proof of the unique qualities and vulnerabilities of electronically-stored information: both the strengthening of the state’s ability to harvest information through the bulk collection of electronic data, and the weakening of the state’s ability to keep information secret and control its flow across borders. Cyberspace offers unique challenges to state power. Greg Austin’s Cyber Policy in China provides an informed perspective on the experience of arguably the world’s most empowered state in both harnessing the potential of, but also controlling, the hugely disruptive changes that cyberspace brings, providing an explanation through recent Chinese history and its current policy direction.

Austin focuses on an overlooked and misunderstood aspect of a fundamental change in mindset in Chinese leadership following the death of Mao in 1976: the shift from waging war against an information-based society through purges and ideological education, to putting the full strength of the state economy into creating an information-based society, thus placing information technology at the centre of the future economy.

The Cultural Revolution and the systematic destruction of the intellectual classes in China had demonstrated to Deng Xiaoping the potential for the state monopoly over information to decimate the knowledge base on which the economy depended. The alternative vision offered by the Californian futurist Alvin Toffler in his book ‘The Third Wave’ was striking in its contradiction to Maoism. Toffler argued that the development of an ‘informatized’ society through mastering telecommunication technologies offered a way to fundamentally rebalance the relationship between the people and state, and propel China to global leadership. The book was a bestseller in China in 1983 and was reputedly studied by both Deng and the reformist Premier Zhao Ziyang.

At the same time, however, the Party invested a huge quantity of resources into creating an unprecedented cyber apparatus for information control, known popularly as the ‘Great Firewall of China’, in order to mitigate any threat to its political monopoly. Austin’s analysis aptly demonstrates the contradictions of seeking to reap the socio-economic benefits of an information-based society and economy, and the ‘i-Dictatorship’ that is undermining the values of trusted information and innovation upon which the whole edifice sits.

One of the most striking insights within in the book is how the ‘Dictatorship’ has undermined trust in information on a societal level by devaluing and denying space for any information intruding on the political sphere. Austin argues that the dearth of public information outside of the oft-discounted official media and the state obsession with curtailing the spread of viral posts on social media has led to a ‘country awash in supposition, half-credible news stories and libel’.[i]

An example is the attempt by state officials to censor death tolls of schoolchildren killed by the Sichuan Earthquake in 2008. This demonstrates how the self-preservation instinct of the party cadres have routinely deprived the public of trustworthy information. The Party’s obsession with curtailing rumours and falsehoods online only points to how starved the Chinese media market is of illuminating information on current affairs, and is further evidence of the barriers China faces in reaching the full innovative potential of an informatized society whilst constrained by the strait-jacket of political control.

Another key contradiction in China’s informatization strategy illuminated by Austin’s research is how the actions of state security services have systematically undermined information security across the information ecosystem. Despite the Ministry of Public Security’s legislative focus on tackling the threat of cyber-crime to the Chinese economy, it has curtailed the development of information security such as encryption standards, education and technology adoption by using public security and state secrecy arguments. This has contributed to a strong state but a weak information ecosystem that is plagued by phishing bank scams and has resulted in 14 million IP addresses being infected by Trojans or Botnets.[ii]

Moreover, Austin points out that this weakness in protecting personal information has begun to extend to Chinese elites, as demonstrated by the Bloomberg News exposé of the hidden wealth of the Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao’s extended families. It is arguable then that the inherent contradictions of the ‘i-Dictatorship’ in protecting the Party’s privileged position but neglecting personal privacy has created a toxic information ecosystem with the potential to destabilise China’s political economy in the long run.

Austin also examines how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has struggled to adapt to informatisation across their organisation while at the same time investing heavily in cyber espionage. His assessment of the PLA’s strategic anxieties of falling behind in a destabilisingcyber-arms race with the US is a welcome reminder of the value of directly engaging with institutions to ask them what they think, rather than operating in a research vacuum.

He takes a critical view of the conventional media narrative of the PLA overseeing the ‘largest illicit transfer of wealth in human history’[iii] through espionage targeting private companies in the West and transferring commercially-sensitive information to Chinese state industries. Instead he argues that the PLA is mainly focused on military intelligence collection and science and technology research useful to developing China’s military capabilities. This view is refreshing but requires a more detailed analysis to be convincing, especially as it contradicts other well-regarded reports on the activities of the now infamous PLA Unit 61398 in aggressive cyber attacks.[iv]

One of the text’s strengths is the time dedicated to analysing the hundreds of official policy documents and declarations issued by the dozens of party committees overseeing China’s industry, security and education sectors. These give readers a level of depth and context into the Party’s official stances and aspirations which can be compared against the state’s performance. The downside to this approach is the uncertainty of how much weight we should assign to official pronouncements, which aspire to all of the ideal values that Austin prescribes for an information society, while the Party has run roughshod over them in practice. In other words, does the Party really believe in what it says?

This book offers much through its dissection of the Chinese information state, yet raises more questions as to its direction. Whether China under Xi Jinping will try to realise Toffler’s dream of a fundamental rebalance in the relationship between the people and state through information technology, or instead drive the information society towards further security control and secrecy, will reveal much about the direction of the Chinese state.

For further information on the book, listen to a discussion the War Studies Department at King’s College held a with the author.

___________________

Christy studied International History at the London School of Economics & Political Science and is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence & International Security at Kings College London. His research interests are cyber security, national security strategy and the Asia-Pacific region. He is a Guest Editor at Strife.

NOTES

[i]Greg Austin, Cyber Policy in China (London: Wiley, 2014), p.80
[ii]Ibid, p.78
[iii]Ibid, p.139
[iv]MANDIANT (2013). APT1: ‘Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units’. Accessed at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf

A creative mind? An early assessment of Modi’s foreign policy

July 12, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

As Narendra Modi prepares to depart for the 6^th summit of BRICS during what will be the Indian Prime Minister’s first international appearance since being voted into office in May this year, many will observe closely to dissect his meetings with his Brazilian, Russian, Chinese and South African counterparts. Modi’s foreign policy, a matter that has been the subject of much speculation, was also the subject of the Chairman of the Indian National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s talk at King’s College London, ‘Indian Foreign Policy under Prime Minister Modi: An early assessment’, on Friday, July 11. On the domestic front, Mr. Modi has been blatantly vocal and articulate about his goals for India, but his intentions towards the Asian neighbourhood have been less transparent. Mr. Saran, who holds a commendable record as a respected Indian diplomat for four decades now, attempted to break these down.

After acknowledging the positive developments between India’s relations with Bhutan and Bangladesh, Mr. Saran turned his focus to her dynamics with Washington. The negative legacy of this relationship, and a certain amount of bitterness that lingers on between the two countries, was worsened by the decade-long visa restriction irritant (which was quickly reversed following Modi’s victory). Despite this, Mr. Saran observed, the United States is bound to remain a preferred partner for India, although Modi’s visit to the US later this year will reveal more on this account.

This brings us to another key question: how will India deal with China? In Modi’s views, previous Indian governments have taken a weak posture towards China, which needs to be changed. Under Modi, India is likely to have a more robust stance that will safeguard Indian interests first but, according to Saran, will be balanced with a stronger economic relationship as the Prime Minister has long been fascinated by the Chinese economic model, which could be an area he would likely want to expand upon

Mr. Saran argued that to strengthen the defence policy vis-à-vis China, India is likely to build closer relations with the US and Japan. There is thus a possibility of stronger security ties with Tokyo, coupled with a furtherance of shared defence interests, while maintaining the slowly developing industrial relations ahead.

The possibility of regional cooperation with China is also going to be influenced by the Pakistan factor. By Mr. Saran’s analysis, although the Chinese have been previously unwilling to speak about Pakistan with India, this attitude is gradually changing. While Mr. Saran did not specify to what extent this is going to be discussed between the two neighbours, it can be assumed that Chinese grievances with Pakistan for not taking stronger action against the Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on the territory bordering China, is likely to be a common ground for discussions between New Delhi and Beijing.

Despite Mr. Saran’s optimism, Modi should not be quick in expecting a frank cooperation from China as the latter’s relationship with Islamabad – fair-weathered as it may be on security matters – is unlikely to be strained on economic and energy fronts.

While Modi’s policies vis-à-vis East Asia will be moulded long-term, Afghanistan is likely to be a critical and immediate issue in the foreseeable future, which will naturally influence the Indo-Pak relationship ahead.

On the non-military foundations of this relationship, Islamabad has requested for the supply of power and petroleum from India. This request, as per Saran, made by the civilian government may not be something the Pakistani army is particularly happy about. Regardless, ties between the two governments are going to remain a subject of apprehension ahead of the uncertainty surrounding what might happen in Afghanistan.

Concerning military assistance to Kabul, Mr. Saran maintained that while India is going to continue providing aid and training to the Afghan military and police forces, boots on ground is not an option New Delhi is likely to pursue.

Coming to the pressing question of the terrorist threat from Pakistan, Mr. Saran referred to previous statements from Delhi that have recognised that Pakistan’s internal threat of terrorism is far greater than otherwise understood abroad. But while there are efforts on the part of the Pakistani army to fight non-state actors in North Waziristan, India – like many within Pakistan – is concerned about the lack of efforts being made to target groups that have particular agendas against her.

Coincidentally, Saran’s concerns on this regard were voiced at King’s soon after a seminar was held at the Lahore High Court by Hafiz Saeed in which the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief, while praising Operation Zarb-e-Azb (the on-going Pakistani military’s operation against terrorists in North Waziristan, FATA), said that the United States and NATO are ‘bound to be defeated in this region’. This was Saeed’s second address to the Lahore High Court this year. In May, he was invited as a chief guest at the Lahore High Court Bar Association. One month later, the US blacklisted JuD as a foreign terrorist organisation and a charity front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Mr. Saran warned that despite a willingness in India to push ahead with the peace dialogue with Pakistan, should there be another Mumbai-style attack on its soil, orchestrated by any group in Pakistan, the ability to take the Indo-Pak friendship forward would be stalled once again and the forbearance shown by the Indian Congress – the previous administration – may not be likely anymore. The Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) government has already made clear its intentions towards taking a robust response to any terrorist attack. Whether this is pure political rhetoric or a strategy that will be practised, are theories that can only be tested should New Delhi be confronted with the repeat of such an event. Only then will Modi’s threshold be truly gauged.

Moving on to the Gulf, Mr. Saran analysed that the region is important to India for two reasons. First, the obvious remittance factor, and second, most importantly, the threat of sectarian conflicts spilling over to India. The risk of the latter is being realised by a couple of recent developments in Iraq: the abduction of 46 Indian nurses by ISIS in Tikrit (released last week) and the kidnapping of 39 Indian construction workers near Mosul in June.

The growing sectarian divide in the Gulf region (coupled with that in Pakistan), according to Mr. Saran, poses risks for an otherwise peacefully co-existing Sunni-Shia population of India (its peaceful coexistence has by no means been an absolute condition and should be read here in relation to and in comparison with that in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East). While there have been no major recent sectarian struggles in India, there have been a few sporadic clashes erupting. This is likely to be further aggravated by the fact that recent news now reveals that at least 18 Indian citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight as ‘jihadis’.

Asked if Modi’s lack of experience on the international stage could hamper India’s foreign relations, Mr. Saran assured that even during his tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had made several visits to China, Japan and other countries. Besides Nehru, not many Indian prime ministers have had foreign exposure prior to being voted into office, but they have been assisted by selected advisors. Moreover, as was demonstrated by his invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Saran insisted that Narendra Modi has ‘a creative mind’, implying that Modi’s lack of past presence in Delhi and abroad should not be taken for granted.

________________

Mr. Shyam Saran was hosted at King’s College London by the Department of War Studies and King’s India Institute.

Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and Associate Editor at Strife. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

The strategic aims of Chinese cyber industrial espionage

June 3, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Christy Quinn:

The recent indictment of several People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers linked to the 61398 Unit, accused of industrial espionage against several US private companies and trade union bodies on the behalf of Chinese state industries, has pushed the issue of ‘cyber warfare’ to the front pages of global media. What for decades was the mutterings of government officials in anonymous briefings with journalists and high-level diplomatic meetings, has been pushed firmly into the level of public diplomacy, with the spokespeople of rival foreign ministries engaging in slander matches and finger pointing. There are key perceived differences, however, in the motives and strategic goals of the “Five Eyes”, the formal alliance between the signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies of USA, UK, Canada, Australia & New Zealand that are responsible for intercepting communications, and the Chinese PLA’s cyber units. This is summed up by investigations firm Kroll’s managing director Timothy Ryan’s statement in an interview for Bloomberg TV, in which he asserted that, ”The US government is concerned primarily with geopolitical conditions in the world [and that]… The Chinese are doing (cyber espionage) primarily to make money, to give their state owned corporations an unfair advantage.”

This is a potentially misleading representation of Chinese motives for two main reasons. Firstly, for strategists in the Chinese Communist Party, it is impossible to overlook that Western industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries was buttressed by state power and often military force. The need to secure cheap raw materials such as cotton to support the burgeoning private industries in northern England was a key motivator for British imperialist adventurism in India and Africa. Forced entry into Chinese markets through the humiliating concessions made by the Qing dynasty during the Opium Wars provided Western imperial powers with access to Chinese trade and a huge export market for manufactured goods. ‘The Century of Humiliation’, the period between 1839 and 1949 under which China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty was ripped asunder by unequal treaties, port concessions and violent interventions by Western imperial forces, still has huge resonance amongst party cadres. This reinforces the view that they are simply righting historical wrongs that have given Western corporations a huge starting advantage at the expense of Chinese national sovereignty and dignity. It is only natural that the Chinese military work in tandem with the needs of Chinese national industry, without regard for the protestations of Western business, privileged by centuries of state protectionism and economic imperialism. This nationalist narrative of re-asserting national honour is gaining credence within the PLA and tapping into it offers a key means for the Party to keep control over its military as it becomes an increasingly professional force.

Secondly, this view does not provide a complete picture of the motives of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) that are still central to the Chinese ‘socialist market economy’ model. Whilst on the surface these businesses operate on a profit-driven corporation, rather than the provision of mass-employment during the Maoist era, they are still dominated by the strategic needs of the Party State. The huge role that SOEs still play in the Chinese economy, representing over a third of all business activity in the country by one measure, are a means of keeping the market economy under party discipline, avoiding commercial actors seizing political power to serve their own interests, for example the Russian oligarchs created in the privatisations of the Soviet economy in the 1990s. Their CEOs are party-appointed cadres that are recipient to party discipline and must be seen to be contributing to the State’s strategic objectives in order to progress up the political ladder within the Party. Whilst increasing profitability within the SOE sector is a key area of reform being considered by President Xi Jinping, it is by no means the only or even first priority for SOEs.

The unnamed SOEs referred to in the US Department of Justice (DoJ) indictment as the recipients of stolen intellectual property and confidential data, from Unit 61398, all operate in strategic sectors of the Chinese economy such as energy and steel. ‘SOE-1’, which builds and operates nuclear power plants in China, is alleged to have benefited from stolen design specifications for pipe designs and strategy documents from a US firm they were partnering with to build four nuclear power plants in the mainland. By sub-contracting industrial espionage to the PLA unit, they are supporting the Party’s strategic aims of reducing their dependence on foreign sources of technological expertise and speeding up China’s drive towards energy independence in the long term. This is quite different from the more mercenary terminology of simply ‘making money’ and seeking commercial advantage in the global marketplace. There is much less evidence to suggest the PLA unit is simply selling their expertise to private commercial businesses in China who simply want to win market share.

The role of the PLA in this is also worth discussing. The Peoples’ Liberation Army is the military arm of the Communist Party, and its responsibilities to the Party come before its responsibilities to the state. In this way, it is similiar to SOEs in that its political responsibilities take precedent to its own institutional strategic objectives. SOEs commissioning a PLA unit to carry out cyber espionage against commercial partners and rivals is much more of an internal secondment of duties within the Party bureaucracy, rather than the PLA being a ‘gun-for-hire’ for Chinese businesses. The activities of Unit 61398 have been well known within government and IT security circles for some years as perhaps the most prolific hacking unit in the world. From the Council of Europe, commercial giants like Morgan Stanley, Google and Exxon Mobil and defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin, the Unit has been tied to massive intrusions to company databases and the ‘hoovering up’ of proprietary data on a global scale. Whilst in comparison, Edward Snowden revealed NSA penetration of SOEs globally, such as Brazil’s state oil company Petrobras, the PLA is alleged to have a ‘no-holds barred’ approach to commercial espionage. Immediate strategic aims are to enhance the Party’s leverage over transnational corporations who want access to Chinese markets, such as Coca Cola’s attempted acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group in 2011, and increase the rate of ‘catch-up’ between China’s SOEs and western corporations. This supplements more conventional espionage efforts such as the theft of aerodynamic models of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from US military defense networks and aerospace companies, to aid in the development of China’s military capabilities.

The real risk for China is that they normalise the process of industrial-scale state-sponsored commercial espionage, to the extent that decades down the line they themselves could become the victim of another emerging economic power. It is entirely foreseeable that in the next few decades India could harness its knowledge base in IT and direct thousands of newly hired state employees to erode China’s competitive advantages through hacking of proprietary data. The heightened risk of loss of intellectual property also lowers incentives for businesses to develop labour-saving technologies, which could have a knock-on effect on economic productivity in the long run by creating a ‘wild west’ where industrial espionage is the norm and there are few ‘secret recipes’ left in business. The US Department of Justice’s indictment is essentially trying to re-assert what it deems acceptable limits on cyber espionage and modify the Chinese leadership’s cost-benefit analysis of its sponsorship of cyber-hacking. However, it is unlikely to make a dent in the juggernaut of cyber malfeasance that the Communist Party has created in Unit 61398.

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Christy Quinn is an incoming student for the MA in Intelligence & International Security at the War Studies Department of Kings College London and is a graduate of International History at the London School of Economics. His primary research interests include cyber security, diplomacy & strategy, economic history and the SE Asia and MENA regions. You can follow Christy on Twitter @christyquinn

Sources consulted

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Bingham, Kit and Virginia Bottomley, Clare Glackin, Caroline Sands. ‘Cyber Security: What Boards Need to Know.’ Odgers Berndston 1 October 2013http://www.odgersberndtson.co.uk/fileadmin/uploads/united-kingdom/Documents/Cyber_Security_-_What_Boards_Need_to_Know_01.pdf
Bloomberg TV. Why the US is cracking down on Chinese Hackers. 20 May 2014 http://www.bloomberg.com/video/why-the-u-s-is-cracking-down-on-chinese-hackers-VuwjYMuvSPS3Bs9qYNRzWA.html
Bradsher, Keith. ‘China’s Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders.’ The New York Times. 9 November 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-for-chinas-new-leaders.html?_r=0
Brenner, Joel. Why Isn’t Cyberspace More Secure? Communications of the ACM 53:11. November 2010 http://joelbrenner.com/why-isnt-cyberspace-more-secure/
Cain, P.J. and Antony G. Hopkins. British Imperialism, 1688-2000. Longman: London, 2002.
Higgins, Kelly Jackson. ”The New Normal’: US Charges Chinese Military Officers With Cyber Espionage.’ Informationweek Dark Reading.19 May 2014 http://www.darkreading.com/government/the-new-normal-us-charges-chinese-military-officers-with-cyber-espionage/d/d-id/1252911
Lee, David. “The hackers hunting for clues about you.” BBC News. 11 February 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21371608
McGregor, Richard. The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers. Penguin Books: London, 2012.
McKinsey & Company. The rising strategic risks of cyberattacks. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/The_rising_strategic_risks_of_cyberattacks
Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013.
Riley, Michael and Lawrence Dune. ‘China’s Comment Group Hacks Europe—and the World.’ Bloomberg Businessweek. 2 August 2012 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-02/chinas-comment-group-hacks-europe-and-the-world
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Democracy on the brink: turmoil in Taiwan

May 19, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Carla Hung:

POST Taiwan Article - Carla Hung 2nd edit - sm. — Protesters occupying parliament (photo by J. Michael Cole)

An unprecedented protest, now dubbed the ‘Sunflower Student Movement’ or ‘Occupy Taiwan Legislature’, broke out in Taiwan on March 18, followed by a violent suppression in the midnight hours of March 23, during which the riot police forcibly evicted the protesting students who had broken in and stayed around the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the highest administrative body of the Republic of China. The brutal assault by the riot police targeting unarmed citizens shocked Taiwanese society, which has long enjoyed peace and prosperity, exposing the internal division and deepening conflict within the island against a controversial trade agreement with China.

Waking up to the Crisis

The crisis was initiated by the improper review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in June, 2010. Angered by the unilateral move of the Ma Ying-jeou administration and his party regarding negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), tens of thousands of students in the capital carried out 23 days of sit-in protests and occupied the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), in which the March 23 clash erupted. The conflict and criticism heightened when the president and premier failed to respond to the appeals of the demonstrators, spurring more than 500,000 people to take to the streets on March 30. The Movement not only shook up the political structure, but also brought about more civil unrest that followed.

Selling Taiwan or helping Taiwan?

The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) itself may appear to be legitimate given the increasing business interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China, but the underlying political ambition is worrying. Conflicts and crises between the Republic of China (ROC) and PRC have existed for more than six decades. As a political entity claimed by China to be an indispensable part of its territory, Taiwan has an ambiguous status in the international community. When Ma took office in 2009, Taipei’s tense relations with Beijing largely relaxed with his declaration of a ‘diplomatic truce’ and ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force’.[1] In other words, his policies focus on maintaining peaceful cross-strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus: ‘one China, respective interpretations’.[2] As a result of the friendly and cooperative political relations, peoples on both sides now have even closer exchange in business, education, culture and various areas. However, there is always a concern among people in Taiwan about the opening of the market to the Chinese Mainland, and more deeply, a fear of losing freedom, democracy and sovereignty when they become too dependent on their strong neighbour.

Trust crisis facing the pro-China ruling party

The Sunflower Student Movement has opened Pandora’s box. Citizen journalism thrives and grassroots media outlets stand up against biased media conglomerates that ‘have substantial business relations with China or seek to develop them’[3]. These citizen journalists take an active role in informing the public of the pressing issues juggled by the government and in helping shape public opinion to urge the government to listen to the voice of the people. As a result, frequent protests erupt regarding issues such as the trade agreements, construction of nuclear power plants, labour rights, social injustice and environmental protection, all demonstrating the increasing awareness among the general public and their dwindling trust in political leaders.

Nevertheless, under such tremendous social and political pressure, when the Sunflower Student Movement was drawing to an end, the leader of the ruling party, Ma Ying-jeou, who is also the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), made a remark during a CSIS video conference on April 9 that his administration ‘do not exclude political topics if the people of Taiwan support it.[4]’ This statement directly contradicted the appeal of the protesters who demanded a slowdown in the negotiations with Beijing. It also demonstrated the intention of Ma to defend his power and stance by taking a stronger position in cross-strait relations, sending a clear message to Beijing that the situation is still in his control and he is willing to take cross-strait cooperation to the next level.[5] Being well-known for his pro-China policies, the two-term president, whose approval rating has hit a historic low of 9.2%, continues to turn a blind eye to people’s demands [6]. Since he will not be able to run for a third term and it is likely that the opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party, will win the 2016 election, Ma is seeking a closer relationship and an eventual peace agreement with the Chinese administration before his term ends.

The recent turmoil certainly gives the PRC leadership a new perspective and pushes them to rethink their strategy towards Taiwan. The Sunflower Student Movement marked the rise of a more independence-inclined third power, the citizens and the younger generation who have been enraged by the obstinate, autocratic KMT and the incompetent, marginalised DPP. With growing support for independence and resentment towards the KMT as well as China, it will be more difficult and complicated than ever for the PRC to dissolve Taiwan’s independence threat through political influence, business means and media manipulation.

Conclusion

Being de facto independent, Taiwan has always been a beacon of freedom and democracy for many in the Chinese mainland, including those in Hong Kong, Tibet and regions of ethnic minorities. The Sunflower Student Movement is yet another great example. This is also a significant reason why Communist China has to contain pro-independence force in Taiwan, especially when there are more and more riots happening within the mainland. However, in a world where almost every nation finds it difficult, if not impossible, to ignore a powerful China and its influence, it is ever more challenging for Taiwan to strike a balance between political and economic goals as it struggles to safeguard its sovereignty. Faced with a seemingly friendly business partner who can take over Taiwan at any moment, the next step of the Taiwanese people will be crucial to the existence of the Republic of China and the political map of the People’s Republic of China.

___________________

Carla Hung holds an MA in International Relations from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and is currently a translator and interpreter in Taiwan.

NOTES

[1] ‘President Ma’s Inaugural Address’, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16304&rmid=2355&word1=President+Ma%27s+Inaugural+Address, 20 May 2008.
[2] ‘President Ma meets delegation from US Center for Strategic and International Studies’, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=97299&ctNode=5909&mp=3, 24 August 2011.
[3] ‘Blanking Out’, https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/31/taiwan_media_mainland_influence, 31 March 2014.
[4] ‘President Ma’s Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/80d8d4f6-5e63-405d-83f6-d8093dde8e48?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781&opno=84ba3639-be42-4966-b873-78a267de8cf1, 9 April 2014.
[5] ‘A political war will decide Taiwan’s future’, http://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/articles/view/2030, 8 May 2014.
[6] ‘Ma’s approval rating is only 9.2%’, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2301606, 15 September 2013.

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