Canada

A reflection on Canadian identity in a moment of crisis

October 23, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook,
Editor-in-Chief, Strife

Today Canadians watched in horror as Ottawa was locked down when at least one gunman opened fire at the national Parliament, forcing politicians to barricade doors, journalists to dive for cover, all while streaming live across national and international media. When the dust settled, one reservist and one gunman lay dead and a nation stood in shock.

Within a week of each other, two separate (and as of yet unlinked) incidents seemingly targeted symbols that Canadians hold dear – our capital city, our democratic institutions, a memorial to our fallen, our armed forces. Even amidst our own acknowledged rising threat levels, a country which had appeared to cautiously contain and manage the plots present in other nations is never prepared to see one unfold before their eyes. It is perhaps premature to reflect at this point, but in the thralls of the narratives, imagery and symbolism which flows forth in (real) times like these, the implications of these will impact upon Canadian consciousness for some time to come.

As a country in the midst of present and shifting global tensions and concerns, we have struggled with our evolving identity. Are we still the Canada of peacekeepers? Has our role in Afghanistan redefined us? How and why are extremists emerging from our own backyard? How do we envision our role in this world amid seemingly increasing violence?

These tragic events may have just reaffirmed how we view ourselves as Canadians, while also offering a starting point to rethink the broader questions above. We are a country which, when faced with the unthinkable, still reverts to unification, quiet and humble heroism, and the ‘level-headedness’ we have always held dear.

We sent tweets, messages and emails to those affected in Ottawa stating our support with them. We stood together as Canadians. We proved this with statistics.

We praised those who kept cool heads in the thralls of confusion, who didn’t ‘kill’ the terrorist, but instead ‘took down’ and stopped the attacker.

The actions of our everyday citizens spoke louder than words…

… while Canadians of all political affiliations and faiths spoke with the same message.

Perhaps most telling is the show of support and response to the soldier killed today while on duty. We will not see the same for the shooter.

Few in the national media directed the blame, or cited a motivation from the onset. We questioned, we scrutinized, but we did not point fingers carelessly. We were cautious with our language, phrasing and insinuation. We understand the weight that words can carry.

As the story unfolds in the coming days, we will find out more about the shooter. We will analyse the perpetrator’s plot and motivations, social profiles, background, and networks, as we should. We will need to understand what could instigate such violence, how and why it could be carried out, and how we can prevent such events in the future. We cannot afford to be naïve; there are many emerging risks we face and many challenges still to come.

As Canadians, we will continue to question the policies we form to address these, as well as their impacts. We will challenge the roles we take, and the ways and means by which we deal with new and uncertain problems that come our way. This is our right and our duty.

However, I believe we will do so knowing that in the face of those things which may challenge and frighten us, Canadians can act as an example of how to navigate such waters together with poise, thoughtfulness, and a remembrance of the values we hold dear as our guide. We will do so knowing that even if such hate can permeate certain individuals, these are not reflective of the overwhelming majority of our citizens.

If it is in tragic and painful moments like this that our identity as Canadians is shaped and reinforced, then I am confident we will, together, weather the storm and only emerge stronger as a nation.

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Joana Cook is the Editor-in-Chief of Strife and a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London where she focuses on the role and agency of women in counterterrorism. She is also a Research Affiliate with Public Safety Canada and member of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook. All views are her own.

Canada’s NATO response: A missed opportunity

September 9, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

Meetings of the Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels - Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) — Meetings of the Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels – Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) (Source: Reuters)

Earlier this May I analysed Canada’s tentative re-engagement with NATO given its full-throated defence of Ukrainian sovereignty and its commitment of military assets to NATO’s reassurance mission in Eastern Europe. The deployment of F-18s, the participation of a Canadian frigate in NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group, as well as additional headquarters staff, raised the profile of Canada in the NATO alliance and is a welcome step given that Canada was seen to be somewhat disengaged after the end of the Libya campaign and its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was one of the longest-serving leaders of one of the founding NATO member states at the Wales Summit, however there was no distinct Canadian ‘stamp’ on any initiatives adopted. Now, in the wake of the NATO Summit in Wales this past week, can this still be characterised as a significant re-engagement with the Alliance? More broadly, does this signal any kind of change in direction for Canadian foreign policy?

Over the weekend Prime Minister Harper made a number of foreign policy announcements related to Canada’s commitment to international security. He grudgingly committed Canada to spending more on defence, however, he had previously noted that increasing spending to the NATO target of 2% of GDP would be unpalatable to Canadian taxpayers. By the Harper government’s reckoning, the Canadian public is not overly keen on spending on foreign policy or defence and moreover, spending on defence has not been a guarantee of international influence. Given that Canada’s defence spending currently lies around 1% of GDP it represents a disconnect for the government with regards to its previous public commitment to supporting and investing in the Canadian military. The current government had been withering in its criticism of the previous Liberal governments who slashed defence spending during the 1990s (to a comparable 1%). This disconnect between investment and rhetoric undermines Canadian credibility as ultimately, Canada has little ability to back up its threats with actions and raises questions about the actual priorities of Canadian foreign policy.

NATO and the Afghanistan mission were paramount up until they were no longer politically tenable and Canada unceremoniously withdrew from combat operations in 2011, pushing aside the ‘in-together, out-together’ mantra. The Conservative government had been keen to stress its links with the military and a willingness to utilise ‘hard power’ in response to crises unlike preceding governments which had favoured multilateral, diplomatic solutions. Nonetheless, the current Conservative government has been willing to follow the lead of other nations when it comes to determining a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. This however, remains a fundamentally reactive response and reflects a wider shortcoming in the current government’s approach to diplomacy. Though this government has eschewed the idea of ‘going along to get along’ it appears to be willing to do so provided some conditions and coalitions are right and as long as it allows for strong rhetoric. This has been the case with Canada’s recent deployment of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment to northern Iraq to assist multinational efforts against ISIS. That said, while a positive contribution this once again reflects a reactive response to international affairs and ultimately a solely military response.

Years of disengagement from the UN along with other multilateral partnerships mean that Canada while certainly still respected for its contributions to various initiatives, is left out in the cold when it comes to actually influencing international affairs. While content to offer ‘bullhorn diplomacy’, and making bellicose statements, it has done little of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic work to actually try and remedy these issues. This naturally absolves the government of any failures when it comes to major foreign policy initiatives. However, it also means that Canada’s influence in the world is also diminished. The government needs to acknowledge that influence in the world does not come only through military contributions and trade, but that diplomacy and development also matter.

NATO requires the diplomatic and military capabilities of all its members in the face of growing threats from Russia as well as the Middle East, on top of its current NATO commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans and off the Horn of Africa. While the NATO Summit in Wales reaffirmed and reinvigorated the Alliance, the real work has yet to be done – namely staffing, basing and supplying the Rapid Reaction Force along with continuing to put pressure on Russia for its invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Indeed, the Alliance needs countries like Canada to not only remain staunch supporters, but also to undertake vital public diplomacy and communicate the value of the Alliance in order to maintain its momentum and relevance. Given that the Harper administration has focused largely on headline diplomacy it seems unlikely that there will be a concerted effort to rebuild the NATO relationship to levels it once reached, nor to regenerate Canadian diplomacy more broadly.

Canada’s attitude towards NATO is indicative of a fickle approach to world affairs which has focused more on immediate public diplomacy rather than any kind of overarching strategic aim or narrative. The government has stressed trade but thus far its crowning achievement, a Canada-EU free trade agreement, has languished since it was signed in principle last October and has yet to be fully concluded. While the importance of trade shouldn’t be underestimated, using this as a central platform for diplomacy does not offer many avenues for future crisis management or leveraging Canadian influence in other forums. Ultimately, the current government has not articulated a clear vision of Canada’s place in the world and by failing to seize on the initiative leading up to the Wales Summit, has lost an opportunity to reinvigorate Canadian diplomacy and reinforce Canada’s international influence.

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Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

General John de Chastelain: Reflections on the introduction of women into combat roles in the Canadian military

June 25, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife
Interview conducted on 8 May 2014.

Graduating from military college in 1960 with a commission in the Canadian Army, John de Chastelain rose quickly through the ranks. In 1989, he was promoted to General and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). During his tenure, the Canadian military was involved in the Oka crisis, as well as the first Gulf War and Somalia. He served as Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1993 before being reappointed to the post of CDS from which he retired in 1995. Since then, General de Chastelain has served as Chair of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in Northern Ireland. He helped forge the Belfast Agreement, the blueprint for peace in Northern Ireland signed on Good Friday, 1998. General de Chastelain was named to the Order of Canada in 1993, and a Companion of Honour in 1999.

* * *

Joana Cook: In your time with the military, were you responsible for any initiatives that focused on increasing the number of women in the Canadian forces? If so, what motivated these changes?

General de Chastelain: When I was Commandant of the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston (1977-1980), the government made the decision to change the policy of not having women attend the College – other than in the postgraduate programs. The policy to exclude women had been in effect since the College was founded in 1876. It was felt by the government to be still valid up until 1980 as the majority of graduates from the College were commissioned into the combat or combat support classifications from which women were then excluded. As moves began to open these classifications to women, it was decided to open the College to women officer cadets. I was involved in the selection of the first class of such cadets who came to the College in 1980. Women have been fully involved at the College since that date.

In 1980 after leaving RMC I was appointed Commander of Canada’s 4^th Mechanized Brigade Group in Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, Germany. At the same time a trial was announced by National Defence Headquarters to see how women could operate in “near-combat” roles, Germany being considered an operational area. That meant that women soldiers were employed in the Logistics Battalion and the Field Ambulance unit of the Brigade Group. They filled roles in these units that were normally filled by men and they went on all the exercises and the major Fall manoeuvres along with our NATO allies. At the end of the trial it was established that women should be employed in field combat support units without restriction. It was also felt that the expression “near combat” was a misnomer, since a vehicle technician repairing a fighting vehicle in a forward area was just as exposed to combat as were soldiers in the combat classifications. I believe it was the result of that trial that gradually opened up the role of women in combat classifications, including flying fighter aircraft, serving on fighting ships and in combat and combat support classifications.

The only limitation that was made was that women candidates had to meet physical fitness requirements for combat and combat support classifications as did men. As I recall, there was some debate about the physical differences between males and females with regard to fitness testing, but appropriate tests were established and women were enrolled in the combat and combat support classifications on a voluntary basis.

As to how this came about and who initiated it: I believe it was a combination of circumstances that were a part of the nationwide gradual entry of women into roles traditionally filled by men alone, eg, firefighters, loggers, police, and some emergency services. There was also an in-house (Defence Department) program to look at the benefits of opening up hitherto excluded classifications to women both as a means of expanding the recruiting base of qualified candidates as well as a sense of fairness. As technology played an increasing part in military capability, the need for engineers and science-oriented recruits expanded also, and women were equally capable in these fields.

A benefit many sought in joining the armed forces, was the ability to learn and practice a skill that would be of value after leaving the Service. For this reason there was seldom a shortage of recruits seeking careers in the technical and support classifications, particularly in the Navy and Air Force. While technical ability was equally important in the infantry, armour, artillery, field engineering and communications classifications, the nature of their work under field conditions made them less desirable to many of the men who applied to join the forces and to many of the women as well.

The one exception to all classifications being opened to women when I left the Forces in 1995 was in the submarine service. I believe that has since changed (and I believe it changed in the Royal Navy only this year).*

As to pressure for change, while there was pressure from the media and some politicians to open up hitherto excluded possibilities in the military for women. It was most vocal, I think, in the case of the Military College, which provides a paid-for university education for officer candidates entering the Regular Forces. Why, it was legitimately asked, should women be excluded from such an opportunity?

I’m not aware of what factors, other than personal desire, motivated women in their choice of the military role they wished to play.

In what roles did you see the majority of women take up in the forces? Do you feel that these changed over time?

I don’t know what the situation is in Canada’s Regular Force today. Certainly up until I left it was largely the technical and supporting classifications in all three Services, that attracted more women candidates, while the Navy and Air Force was more attractive to those seeking combat roles. That has perhaps changed. Certainly women have distinguished themselves in army combat roles, commanding units and subunits in the Afghanistan war. The only Canadian woman soldier killed in Afghanistan was an artillery Forward Observation Officer, killed while directing fire from her armoured vehicle.

It is fairly standard practice for someone to change their classification mid-career (or earlier). Not everybody finds they made the right choice at the outset and if a vacancy in another classification is available they may request the change. Those who have experience in combat units are frequently sought by the non-combat classifications, and those who have served in combat roles and look for a skill to get employment after they retire, may ask for such a transfer. In my experience, that was certainly the case for the men in the Forces and I assume it is the same for the women.

In International Military Training Operations (IMTO), what roles have women played?

The Forces have conducted a number of training missions in various countries (most recently, and ongoing, in Afghanistan). Some of these are conducted by Special Forces soldiers and I don’t know if they include women. I can see the advantage of having women soldiers involved in training missions in locations where male contact with female residents would be unacceptable for religious or societal reasons.

In regards to foreign operations, how did having women in the forces impact relations and interactions with both local populations and foreign forces?

During my time in uniform there was little foreign reaction to the role of Canadian women in operational units, as the numbers were then not large. Many national forces don’t have women in combat roles so there may exist a negative reaction among some to what Canada is doing in this regard (especially in societies where women’s roles are restricted – Afghanistan is an example of this), but I have no personal knowledge of it. In Afghanistan I understand Canadian women soldiers were able to play a unique role in contact with Afghan women.

What were some of the challenges you saw facing female military members? This could include operational, logistical, or social for example.

I suspect (but I have no evidence) that there may still be males who cannot accept that women should be in the fighting classifications and this attitude may still be a problem for women who seek such roles. At the Military College women equal or outperform men academically, militarily or athletically and I suspect the same is true of women in operational units. Recent publications in Canada report that sexual assault is a problem and that the hierarchy has been slow in responding to it. I understand assaults against Canadian women soldiers by foreign soldiers serving in the same overseas operational theatres have occurred. This has nothing to do with a woman soldier’s ability to perform their role and everything to do with the need to deal harshly with the offenders and the mentality that causes it.

What lessons do you think Canada could offer to other countries regarding the integration of women in to the military and onto the front lines?

The lesson that Canada can offer is that it has worked for us and is a conscious demonstration of the belief in the equal status of women in Canada. There may still be examples when equality of opportunity and pay is far from perfect in Canada, but in the Canadian Armed Forces the pay is the same for males and females. The glass ceiling may still be a problem for women in industry and business, but there are female General officers in the Canadian Forces. Canadians as a whole supported the efforts of its soldiers in Afghanistan, including the employment of women in combat roles there.

I think the best contribution Canada can make in this regard is to do what it is doing now, opening up security roles to qualified women; ensuring that those who resent or try to resist the policy are side-lined or dealt with; and demonstrating to the world that this is who we are and what we do.

* In 2001 General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, announced that women will serve in submarines

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Joana Cook is a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London focusing on the role and agency of women in counterterrorism in Yemen. She is also a Research Affiliate with Public Safety Canada and member of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook

Back in the fold? Canada's tentative re-engagement with NATO

May 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

Amid the increasing tensions with Russia, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s meeting on 5 May with the head of NATO’s military operations, General Philip Breedlove along with the recent deployment of 6 F-18s to Romania have garnered some Canadian press attention. This represents some of the highest-level contact between the Canadian government and NATO leadership in some time. The question is, does this signal a Canadian re-engagement with NATO?

Since Canada’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, there has been a marked disengagement with the alliance, the hints of which came while Canada was still engaged in Kandahar. The decision to deploy Canadian forces there, motivated by undoubtedly honest intentions, nonetheless placed a heavy strain on a force not really designed for a long-term overseas combat deployment. The challenge of stabilizing southern Afghanistan was underestimated by allies and the casualties among the deployed nations attest to the grim and thankless challenge. With years of blood and treasure spent in southern Afghanistan and trying to muster greater commitment to the operation from NATO Allies, Canadian policymakers had seemed fed up.

After continually hammering allies over burden sharing and finding no relief for their forces in Kandahar, the Canadians faded into NATO’s background, still present, but not nearly as forward-leaning, constructive or vocal as in years past. Beyond Afghanistan and Libya, there was no more Canadian engagement in any other NATO operations, be it Kosovo, counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia or elsewhere. The commitment to the Libya campaign, while not irrelevant, was done without fanfare which can be attributed to Harper’s tight control over diplomatic messaging. While quiet diplomacy can be positive, the lack of recognition in headquarters of Canada’s contribution adds to the perception of its diminishing NATO presence.

When coupled with Canada’s meagre presence in the International Military Staff, it further highlights how it has lost its informal presence around the Brussels headquarters and across the alliance. Moreover, Canada publicly withdrew from NATO’s aerial surveillance platform (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) which it had previously supported. The withdrawal left the programme in limbo and upset its allies. On top of that, the withdrawal from the allied ground surveillance programme was also noticed as both of these happened as the Secretary General was pushing for more shared capabilities in the Alliance.

Undoubtedly, Harper’s move to support NATO against Russia is the right one, but as of yet it doesn’t represent a wholesale re-engagement with the alliance. NATO needed to send a clear message that the annexation of Crimea would evoke a notable transatlantic response and the deployment of US and Canadian assets to Europe helps underscore the alliance’s solidarity, To not respond to NATO requests for assets would have been damaging for the alliance and certainly upset a number of allies, perhaps most importantly the US and the UK. The current government has often accused previous Liberal administrations of offering hollow rhetoric and relying on its peacekeeping and ‘middle power’ traditions without offering concrete contributions. In this circumstance, the Canadian contribution, important as it is, needs to also support a robust diplomatic effort on the part of Canada focused on keeping the Alliance relevant and purposeful.

The deployment of F-18s to Romania and a frigate to support NATO’s Standing Maritime Naval Group in the Mediterranean is significant, but they need to be coupled with a diplomatic effort in NATO headquarters. Though it is unlikely to happen, the Harper government needs to offer some additional leeway to its diplomatic corps in order to let them not only ‘talk up’ Canada’s contribution, but also offer some significant experience and depth of knowledge.

This is an opportunity for Canada to once again exercise a level of leadership and agency in NATO and help shape its character for the year to come. It may not represent a new ‘overarching’ theme to Canadian foreign policy, but it will show allies that not only is it an active contributor to the defence of Europe, it is also proactive in ensuring the future transatlantic relevance of the alliance. As the past decade of foreign policy has demonstrated, it is not enough to wield the stick; speaking softly is also a requirement. The upcoming NATO summit in Wales and a lack of identifiable deliverables places a burden on the shoulders of the member nations to start articulating a vision for a post-Afghanistan phase. While this was previously conceived of as the transition from ‘NATO operational’ to ‘NATO prepared’ these plans, however nebulous they may be, will have required some alteration. Russia will certainly dominate the agenda, but for NATO to lose the capabilities it has developed in Afghanistan would also be tragic. The alliance has worked relatively successfully with militaries from around the world in Afghanistan and built relationships with many more. To see these partnership opportunities wither or disappear after 2014 would diminish the influence of NATO for years to come.

This should also give policymakers in Ottawa some pause and hopefully encourage a more serious contemplation of Canada’s foreign policy, which has been adrift for some time now. With elections next year there will be an opportunity to redefine Canada’s place in the world and encourage a deeper contemplation as to what that means for Canadian influence. Are they content to continue with ad hoc diplomacy or can they define priorities which not only defend and advance Canadian interests but also buttress an increasingly beleaguered Western international order?

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Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Canada: The retirement of a global peacekeeper?

November 29, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Joana Cook

“We cannot close the door on diplomacy. We cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world’s problems. We cannot commit ourselves to an endless cycle of violence, and tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it’s not the right thing for our security.” At least our American neighbours to the south think so, as Obama said this week while discussing the recent breakthrough nuclear deal with Iran.

Following tense, and earlier secret negotiations, the P5+1 consisting of the US, Russia, UK, China, Germany and France struck a deal with Iran. This deal, in exchange for the lifting of a number of strict sanctions imposed by the UN, EU, and US (valued at $7 billion USD), will see Iran take a number of clear actions to curb its nuclear program. These include Iran ceasing enrichment above 5%, neutralizing its stockpile which currently exceeds this, and granting greater, regular access to inspectors to its two key nuclear sites, Natanz and Fordo, amongst other clauses.

While this deal has received some criticism in the US, and the expected opposition of Israel, even Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rival, offered cautious optimism. So why has Canada opted for a position that can be viewed as cynical at best?

Canada, once viewed as an international peacekeeper, and often still thought as such by its population, has now assumed a stance that can be viewed, in frank terms, as negative and uninspired. Canada justifiably shuttered her embassy in Tehran in 2012 and has ceased any type of relationship with the Iranian government since due to its nuclear ambitions and human rights abuses. While certain P5 members, such as the US and UK, had previously done the same, seeking broader security goals took precedence and high-level contact was carried out between these parties over an extended period of six months to reach this breakthrough deal. This is not the case in Canada, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird, stated he was “deeply sceptical of the deal and Iran’s intentions” and had no intention of engaging in the foreseeable future. While stating that Canada wants to be part of a diplomatic solution, and will continue to work through organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), little was offered in the way of innovative or inspired approaches that Canada could take to support the constructive actions of the past weekend. It also appeared that higher goals of lasting security, or what positive implications improving relations could play in other areas (such as its influence in Syria), were simply sidelined.

What is now appearing to be an aged, though historic, highpoint for Canada in international diplomacy was its 1957 Nobel Peace Prize won by Canadian Liberal politician Lester B. Pearson for negotiating a peaceful end to the Suez Crisis. As introduced in the presentation speech, Pearson was applauded for his qualities, demonstrated during the crisis – “the powerful initiative, strength, and perseverance he has displayed in attempting to prevent or limit war operations and to restore peace in situations where quick, tactful, and wise action has been necessary to prevent unrest from spreading and developing into a worldwide conflagration”. It is a sentiment which could be easily applicable to modern day Iran, but what is lacking is this same will and spirit.

Canada’s current narrow, even, arguably, non-existent, vision for what is achievable through diplomatic channels risks side-lining itself not only from future negotiations with Iran, but also from other potential opportunities that may rise for it to again utilize its past strengths as negotiator, mediator, and peacekeeper. It will take a strong stance from Canada to do this, but there is no reason it can not engage with Iran while continuing to hold her position and stress the importance of human rights, particularly at this pivotal stage in Iran’s new leadership. With peace talks for Syria now planned in Geneva in January 2014, and instability currently threatening the Central African Republic, there is certainly no lack of opportunity to re-establish a positive global role for Canada in the world.

Simply put, Canada must reflect inwards. It must reassess not only how it views its current position, but also, more broadly, what role it wants to perform on the world stage or whether sitting in the audience will be enough.

Canada

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