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Being English/ British/ European and the politics of difference

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By: Henry Redwood

Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/
Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/

To say that it has been a bad couple of weeks to be English (or is it British, or European? I’m not sure anymore…) is an understatement. Violent and racist football supporters in France; racist abuse at home; intolerant and divisive politics in all political parties; “Brexit”; and lastly, losing a football match to a team with more volcanoes than professional footballers. Each of these events has left in its wake a series of finger-pointing and questions over who’s to blame: Roy Hodgson? The working class? The Tories? The press? A complacent left? (Im)migrants and/or refugees? This need for someone, or a collective, to be blamed within society seems to run deep. It was certainly key in the angry protest vote that saw Britain leave the EU. The primary concern within each of these allegations seems to be to find the ‘Other’, upon whom we can unburden our own responsibilities and troubles – the immigrant; the elite; the European bureaucrat; the English -and draw, perhaps, clear lines that strongly delineate what “we are” – and more often what we are not.

However, the ‘blame game’ rests on an unsustainable model, which assumes that clear lines can be drawn which delineate what “we” are – and more often what we are not. The most obvious example here is the notion of “Great Britain”, which has been variously deployed in, often contradicting, ways by different parts of the argument. Underneath each, though, is a conception of a nation – a collective – that remains unchanging; of a set of morals, values, culture etcetera, that is transcendental, frequently constructed by relational difference (we are not European; we are not fascist).

The arbitrariness of this (of course, being arbitrary makes it no less violent) is seen with the difficulty we have in deciding at which point a particular “Great Britain” began. The pretence of unity and solidity of these categories, which was pumped out throughout the referendum ‘debate’, and the confidence that we could ever know what it means to be English, British or European (or all three at once), meant that the debate was conducted from a perspective where we could decide what it meant to be ‘British’ (or even democratic). This decision was made through exclusionary identity politics, rather than considerations on how we might reconfigure these understandings of difference to try to remove the harm caused by arbitrarily signifying Self against the ‘Other’.[1] This is not only directed at those who voted in favour of Brexit; this issue has come up repeatedly in the anti-Brexist arguments since, where Brexiters are labelled as racists, ignorant, idiots, and are consequently de-politicised in the process as their voices are considered irrelevant. This ignores both our (here meaning Remain voters) responsibility, and in these cases our dependency on this ‘Other’ to define us (I am not a Brexiter, I am not racist or fascist), which was perhaps most clearly seen in the celebratory pro-European protest in London on Saturday.[2] This protest summed up this forms of identity politics, and worryingly seemed to recreate the boundaries that de-politicised the voices of Brexiters, reproducing the same political relationships that led to the ostracisation of large sections of the population in the first place; hardly a basis upon which to rebuild the shattered community.

The accusatory, and often angry, politics of the blame game seems to have occupied us elsewhere over the past decades, and perhaps it marks a trend in the new-millennium’s political landscape. At University, and elsewhere, the response to the impact of austerity has frequently been about blame and the fragmenting of larger political ideologies and structures and issues into “bite size” issues. Students are angry at the staff for not providing more contact times; the academic staff resent students for wanting a corporate-inspired ‘transferable skills’ format of education that the University was not designed to deliver, and that they are not trained to deliver.[3] It feels as though something similar has happened in the political realm, where there seems to have been a turn to (possibly thanks to, or as a result of, the digital age) a politics based on fragmented and seemingly isolated issues. A trend most evident in the rise of pressure group politics and organisations like 38 degrees.

Underlying both of these points is a sense that we can distil responsibility – and perhaps importantly with this, a sense of belonging and being – to different individuals and collectives, without considering our shared responsibility and co-dependence. As such, we are failing to explore the culpability of much larger systems that produce these harms and us as recognisable subjects we are not looking at the shared responsibility that we consequently have for the reproduction of that system and the violence that relates to it. Without this understanding, the “immigrant” remains an external entity that we have no obligation to; a burden, rather than an always-already member of our community that we are responsible for.[4] Without this understanding, the Brexit voter remains an ignorant racist, rather than someone who has been subjectivised through the same system that produces others’ (my) privilege; someone silenced for decades whilst a politics was practised that was blind to its violence, and complicit in aggravating inequality.  In both, it is the gap and relation between the Self and the ‘Other’ that needs to be addressed. Not by blaming the ‘Other’, but by reconfiguring the system as a whole. The same system that currently produces the Self and ‘Other’ as different, and as opposing polarities. In a time of rising extremism – islamophobic; homophobic; transphobic; take your pick – such reframing is more important than ever.

 

 

Henry Redwood is a third year PhD student in the War Studies department and senior editor at strife. His work engages with critical theory to explore how international courts construct truths and the normative underpinnings these project. Alongside his research Henry has previously worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a number of (I)NGOs working in Rwanda. Twitter: @hred44

 

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See Martha Minow, Making all the difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American law (Cornell University Press, 1991)

[2] For an excellent insight into Brexiters see here

[3] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/transferable-people/

[4] For an wonderful article on migrant identities and borders see, Francis Saunders, ‘Where on Earth Are You?’, 38:5 (2016), pages 7-12

 

What Brexit means for UK-China ties

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By: Lauren Dickey

UK China

The people of the United Kingdom have voted to leave the European Union, and it is a bitter pill for many of its friends, partners, and allies to swallow. This is particularly true for China, one of the rising global powers that has invested no shortage of time and energy in nurturing its bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom and China, the ‘golden relationship’ and ‘golden decade’, as Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne trumpeted last year, are equally under threat.[1] Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aspirations for a ‘united EU’ and constructive British role in ‘promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties’ now look to be fading memories.[2] A Britain outside of the EU stands a chance at saving its valuable linkages to Beijing, but the work ahead will not be easy.

Historically, the UK-China relationship faced a fair share of challenges. China fought and lost two Opium Wars with Britain in the 19th century, resulting in the UK forcing the Chinese to open their borders to trade, including in the narcotic derived from the Asian variety of the poppy flower. The Qing dynasty staunchly opposed the opium trade networks, going so far as to confiscate and destroy much of the drug. One of Britain’s first acts of war in response was to occupy Hong Kong; and, just a few years later in 1841, Hong Kong was formally ceded to the British and the first Opium War was formally ended through the Treaty of Nanking. It was only in 1997 that Hong Kong returned to Chinese control, a transition with continued ripple effects nearly twenty years later.

More recently, the UK-China relationship suggested that such historical troubles had been shelved in order to pursue mutually beneficial ties. China has invested more than US$40 billion in the UK, creating more than 6,000 jobs; a further $60 billion in trade deals were signed during Xi’s state visit last fall.[3] When China kicked off its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in early 2015, the United Kingdom broke ranks with the United States in stepping up as a founding member of the institution.[4] At a societal level, people-to-people exchanges also continue to flourish, with academic and cultural exchanges as well as tourism on the rise.

But the referendum is a game changer. Brexit threatens what lies at the core of the UK-China relationship: Britain’s promise to serve as an ‘essential partner for an opening China, for the benefit of [both] peoples.’[5] The question ahead for British policymakers — and, importantly the captain that steers the ‘leave’ ship after Prime Minister David Cameron — is whether the United Kingdom can still be the western country ‘most open’ to China’s rise.[6] It is a question that has serious reverberations for China’s economic standing at a time when its economy is slowing and it continues to search for global partners.

Assuming the two-year process to leave the EU proceeds without hiccup or member state opposition, once the UK is fully divorced from the EU, China will lose its access to the European market via Britain.[7] The United Kingdom is no longer an attractive extension of the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative to link markets from Europe to China by land and sea.[8] For existing plans to develop the ‘northern powerhouse,’ boosting economies in Manchester, Leeds, and Liverpool, Britain cannot expect the deep pockets of Chinese investors to save the day.[9] Additionally, with London as host to more than 40 percent of the global market for currency trading — and the second largest offshore centre of renminbi — it will be difficult for the City to retain its lustre and gateway banking position in Europe.[10] While offshore yuan trading centres are largely dictums of Chinese policy, the Brexit will, at a minimum, yield a significant re-think of Beijing’s fiscal posture in the UK.

After the referendum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted that China respects the decision of the British people, and that China will continue to examine and develop UK-China and China-EU ties with a strategic, long-term outlook in mind. She further commented that China wishes to continue cooperation and progress in the relationship between the two countries.[11] Elsewhere, however, signs of Chinese concern started to appear. An op-ed in the Chinese-language Global Times claimed the United Kingdom is back to where it started 300 years ago and that Europe is in decline. Most strikingly, the author opined ‘all that will be left is the little piece that is England.’[12]

The European Union has, somewhat ironically, already begun to assemble new pieces of its strategy toward China for the decade ahead.[13] But for Britain, no such contingency plan appears to exist. The task ahead, for British policymakers navigating the tumultuous waters of leaving the EU must thus also entail prioritising and defining what and how the UK-China relationship will evolve in the post-Brexit era. A new UK-China trade agreement, according to a China Daily estimate, will take 500 British officials ten years to negotiate. Instead, both sides will need to turn to interim steps to preserve politico-economic ties and domestic interests.[14] Furthermore, for Beijing, its largest advocate vis-à-vis the European Union trading bloc will soon recede to a cheerleader on the sidelines. Now, Beijing will likely face tougher restrictions from the EU without sufficient economic liberalisation.

None of the aforementioned challenges that lie ahead for the UK and China as the Brexit moves forward are insurmountable, but much is still unknown. To mitigate the negative consequences for the UK-China economic relationship, policymakers in both London and Beijing must begin immediately to navigate the new terms and conditions of their relationship. The Brexit may indeed be a bitter pill to swallow, but the sooner China is able to stomach this seismic geopolitical moment, the more readily it can look to adapt its ties with both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Lauren is a first year PhD researcher in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore. Her research explores Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strategy toward Taiwan. She is a fluent Mandarin speaker and a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to King’s, she was a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. You can follow her on Twitter @lfdickey.

 

[1] Simon Denyer, ‘Britain is bending over backward to prove its friendship to China,’ Washington Post (14 October 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/14/britain-is-bending-over-backward-to-prove-its-friendship-to-china/.

[2] Andrew Bounds, ‘China’s Xi Jinping urges UK to stay in EU,’ FT (23 October 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df78cae4-797e-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89.html#axzz4CWfAzGhZ.

[3] ‘The Brexit result will have China worried,’ Time (24 June 2016), http://time.com/4381309/china-brexit-eu-trade-uk-economy/; ‘China and Britain head into golden era of relations,’ The Telegraph (20 October 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/politics/11936897/china-britain-relations-new-era.html.

[4] ‘UK announces plans to join Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,’ HM Treasury (12 March 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.

[5] David Cameron, ‘My visit can begin a relationship to benefit China, Britain and the world,’ The Guardian (1 December 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/02/david-cameron-my-visit-to-china.

[6] Ibid.

[7] The European Union is currently China’s largest trade partner, sending US$389 billion worth of imports into the trading bloc in 2015.

[8] Andrew Browne, ‘A wrench in the U.K.-China relationship,’ Wall Street Journal (24 June 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-wrench-in-the-u-k-china-relationship-1466768571.

[9] Sarah Gordon, ‘Northern Powerhouse takes the lion’s share of FDI,’ FT (24 May 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63d695da-20e8-11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c.html#axzz4CWfAzGhZ.

[10] Enoch Yiu, ‘Brexit could dull London’s sheen as offshore yuan centre,’ South China Morning Post (19 June 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/1976870/brexit-could-dull-londons-sheen-offshore-yuan-centre; Mark Gilbert, ‘London Could Lose Its Euro Trading If U.K. Leaves EU,’ Bloomberg View (16 March 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-16/london-could-lose-its-euro-trading-if-u-k-leaves-eu.

[11] ‘2016年6月24日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 24, 2016],’ PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1375085.shtml.

[12] ‘英国回300年前原点，欧洲加速衰落 [England back to starting poitn of 300 years ago, Europe increasingly in decline]’, 环球网 [Global Times] (24 June 2016), http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-06/9080633.html.

[13] ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a new EU strategy on China,’ European Commission High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 22 June 2016.

[14] ‘UK vote to leave the EU blows the whole European plan wide open,’ China Daily (24 June 2016), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-06/24/content_25841499.htm.

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

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Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

The future of European defence: An interview with Daniel Keohane

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Daniel Keohane interviewed by Annabelle Vuille

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Leaders gather for a photo at the February 2016 meeting of the European Council. Source: Wikimedia

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say are the most pressing security challenges faced by Europe today?

Daniel Keohane: Let me answer this question slightly differently, as there are numerous security challenges to be listed – from Russia to ISIS, failing states in the Middle East, the refugee challenge, and terrorism etc. What is more interesting, is to think about which challenge is a priority for whom. I have been struck on recent travels by the level of diversity; in Berlin at the moment, the priority is the refugee crisis; in Paris, the priority is terrorism; in Warsaw, the priority is Russia; and in the UK, the government is consumed with the Brexit referendum debate. Added to this is the fact that everybody is still recovering and, indeed, still suffering from the economic crisis, which is also a security challenge in a way as a healthy, growing economy is requisite to deal with other pressing security challenges. No doubt, there is an incredibly complex confluence of crises at the moment. So, rather than prioritizing, I prefer to understand which challenge is a priority and for whom.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report published by CSS, you argued that European defense cooperation is no longer primarily driven by the EU and NATO, but rather by the interests of national governments. To what extent does this dilute the strength of Europe’s collective security environment?

Well, this is a good question and I should start by explaining the reasoning behind my argument. Of course, there are some people that would say that my argument is not very new and that defense policy in Europe has always been driven by national governments. The point I am trying to make is that during the 2000s, even if you just look at operations, governments cooperated and acted mainly through the EU and NATO. The difference today is that they are doing it in a whole host of ways, be it bilaterally, regionally or ad hoc like the coalition against ISIS. Of course, governments still act through the EU and NATO, but these two institutions are no longer the central option and this is a major change from five to ten years ago. Let’s take France as an example: in Congo 2003 and Chad 2008 France acted through the EU, but since the 2011 Libya intervention, the government has mainly acted alone or as part of an international coalition, i.e. anti-ISIS. This is a change that I find quite interesting because it is not the renationalisation of policies, it is a renationalisation of cooperation; making it more complex, more messy, more widely driven by the national governments and hence, all the more interesting.

With the ‘Big 3’ (France, UK and Germany) making up the bulk of European defense expenditure, how can we expect their national interests to shape the operational priorities of NATO?

First off, it is important to note the difference between the three states. Traditionally, France and Britain have an interventionist culture with a global outlook. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and as nuclear-armed powers, both have a certain sense of responsibility for global security and, as such, are more willing to carry out external military interventions unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This is quite different from Germany. Whilst comfortable pursuing ad hoc, bilateral or mini-lateral cooperation on capability projects, as with the Dutch, Germany is much more hesitant when it comes to operations and the use of robust military force. In such instances, Germany prefers to act in conjunction with the United States, NATO, or the EU, even as it has come to take on a more active, and central role in European politics and foreign policy. Not only has Angela Merkel led the European response to the Ukraine Crisis but also, in a surprising response to the Paris attacks, Germany sent a relatively robust support team, including frigates and reconnaissance aircraft to the anti-ISIS coalition. Whilst no full-blown combat role, I think that Germany has come a long way since its abstention on the Libya intervention in 2011 and that, in contrast to the assessment by some German experts, it may slowly assume a more advanced leadership role. Additionally, Britain and France cannot do it alone; with their resources reduced, they need Germany’s help diplomatically and militarily even if only in a beefed-up role. Consequently, these three states have come to cooperate closely and this has provided some potential for convergence: All three are supporting NATO to deter Russia in Eastern Europe. All three have deployed forces to fight ISIS and other Islamists, whether in Syria, Iraq or Mali. And all three are keeping a close eye on what is going on in Libya. However, the potential for divergence still exists, particularly concerning the EU referendum in the UK. At the end of the day it is about politics and if the UK votes to leave the EU it could cause a major rift that could negatively impact defense cooperation. Another possible divergence exists over operations in the Middle East and North Africa. If in the future Britain and France are required to step up their anti-ISIS campaigns and Germany is unwilling to contribute, there could be a rift on burden sharing over who is doing what against Islamists in southern neighborhoods. Elements of both convergence and divergence are in play.

What role will Poland play in shaping NATO’s future priorities?

Poland’s main concern is Russia and territorial defense. It has long wanted a beefed-up NATO, and particularly American presence on Polish soil and things are moving in that direction. I think where Poland could come to play an interesting role is in NATO’s southern strategy, which will be discussed at the NATO summit in Warsaw in June this year. Whilst it is relatively clear on what measures need to be taken to deter Russia, it is much less clear what role NATO has in fighting ISIS, stabilizing Libya etc. If Poland demonstrates its willingness to contribute to these efforts, it would suggest a mood of, and desire for coherence among the NATO allies. If, on the other hand, Poland proves unwilling then I fear that there will be some divergence; some southern countries, such as Italy, will expect more engagement from Poland in return for supporting the deterrence efforts against Russia.

 A 2016 RAND wargaming study showed that Russia could reach the capitals of Estonia or Latvia on NATO’s eastern flank within 60 hours. How well equipped is the Alliance in responding to possible Russian aggression?

That’s a good question because in strictly military terms, so far, the NATO efforts would not be enough in terms of conventional deterrence. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is relatively small, compared to the Russian forces on the other side. Additionally, whilst the United States is quadrupling its Reassurance budget and investing more resources into deterring Russia and beefing-up NATO’s defense, it’s still a relatively small amount; less than 1% of the Pentagon’s entire budget, which is nothing compared to the money that Russia has been investing into its military structure over the past few years. However, whilst there is more that NATO could, and even should do, that would be to miss the political and strategic point. The reason why NATO is not doing more is mainly because the United States does not want to push too hard. It is highly unlikely that Putin would attack a NATO member state and it would be unwise on his part to try and test NATO’s and U.S. resolve. Thus, I think the feeling in Washington is to strengthen deterrence and signal an alertness of a possible military threat from Russia, but at the same time, to avoid provocation or any move that would provide Russia with an excuse to attack; essentially, it is about striking a delicate balance between deterrence and détente. So, in strictly military terms NATO’s efforts are not so impressive, but in strategic terms it might be the wiser course.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report you also discussed the UK security and defense review of November 2015, and mentioned that its ‘main political message’ was that ‘Britain is back as a serious military power’. Additionally, Britain is NATO’s strongest European military power. Therefore, if the referendum on EU membership did result in a ‘Brexit’, what impact would this have on European defense and, more specifically, on the internal cohesion among NATO member states?

My own view is that, in theory, from a military standpoint a Brexit should not change that much for European defense cooperation as Britain will remain a member of both NATO and the UN Security Council, and it will remain a major military and nuclear-armed power. In practice, however, it might all be a little bit different. Certainly, it will make political alignments with France and Germany more difficult, which will directly impact defense policy. It has been a longstanding dream of many in Paris and Berlin to have separate EU military structures – by that I mean operational headquarters – and until this point, the UK has always been able to block such efforts. However, if Brexit were to take place, there would be nothing to stop France and Germany from doing so and would, at the very least, throw the gauntlet to them. There is another aspect to the Brexit business that has not been widely covered: the damage that it could have on the UK’s military ambitions. I think that Brexit could have the same impact on the UK defence budget as the economic crisis of 2008; diminishing government revenue and hence, taking a toll on defense expenditure. If you look at the forecasts, such as the one provided in last week’s issue of The Economist, none of them are particularly positive on the outlook for the UK’s economy if there was a Brexit. Consequently, if the UK economy suffers badly then the government’s budget will suffer badly, and this will have a negative effect on defense spending. Even if Britain sticks to 2% nominally, in real terms, it could really hurt their military ambitions as the cost of advanced equipment rises by 5% a year. The other impact of Brexit is that Britain would be diminished as a diplomatic player because it would lose its voice in guiding EU foreign and defense policy. Britain would simply matter less, particularly to the United States. Essentially, Brexit could potentially damage relations with the United States, make Britain less valuable at the UN and NATO, and it could hurt the UK’s own defense ambitions. I think the consequences are quite serious.

Could it make Europe more vulnerable?

It would – at least psychologically. Primarily because there is already a perception that Europe is frail and struggling to cope with the various crises ranging from terrorism, Russia, and ISIS to the refugee crisis. If Britain did indeed vote to leave the EU, it would create a whole host of questions: Will other countries, particularly non-Eurozone countries hold their own referendums? Will they subsequently want their own special relationship with the EU? Will the original founding members – or some of them at least – come to pursue a strategy of selective integration? In other words, you could end up having a very introverted debate about the future of European governance at the very moment when everything is falling apart around us; potentially akin to shifting the deckchairs while the Titanic is sinking. So from a psychological standpoint I think it would have a dreadful impact. Yet, it is difficult to make any definitive assessment. Some people believe that Brexit could drive France and Germany toward more integration. It might, but it might not because it could legitimise the arguments of populists and nationalists including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Ultimately, although there is much uncertainty as to what will happen, I am pretty sure that the effects will not be positive.

Is there any other aspect of European defence and security you would like to touch upon?

This isn’t directly a question for European security, but rather for global security. I think that the military aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will constitute the big question for the 21st century and for the international system as a whole. Europe, I believe, is only just starting to wake up to this reality because, understandably, we have been focused on the immediate crises at our doorstep. The other issue will concern what happens next in Libya and Syria. The Syrian war, we hope, will not go on forever and we will have to ask ourselves how we will remedy the situation and rebuild the Syrian state. Additionally, what will we do about Libya? Are we prepared to invest the military resources necessary to stabilise the state? These are questions that will confront Europe relatively quickly. From a long-term perspective, say 20 years, it is clear that Europe will be occupied in the broad neighbourhood; not only are there so many weak states that could potentially become beacons of instability, such as Egypt, but who knows how the situation in the Caucasus and the Sahel will develop. My experience, to paraphrase Macmillan, is that there is no certainty in predicting future events and their impact on international politics. As a consequence, political leaders across the globe will have to remain relatively flexible whilst being able to distinguish between the urgent and the important. What is urgent will not always be the most important issue at hand.

 

 

Annabelle is currently based in Switzerland and in her final year of the MA programme in International Relations and Contemporary War at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Having studied International Business in Rome, she is specifically interested in applying her economic background to the sphere of conflict and security. Her main research interest is the interplay between geopolitics and energy security, particularly in the maritime domain.

Daniel Keohane is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich. He previously held positions at the Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE) in Brussels and Madrid, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Centre for European Reform in London. His work has been published in journals such as Survival and the Journal of Common Market Studies, and he has conducted studies (both alone and as part of consortia) commissioned by the European Union and NATO.