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Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part III – Security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws

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By: Felix Manig

The United Kingdom has remained largely unaffected by the refugee crisis which has rocked the Middle East and much of Europe over the last few years. As the UK has one of Western Europe’s most stringent refugee policies in place already, the Guardian recently placed Prime Minister Theresa May ahead of Donald Trump in her attempts to undermine the global refugee system.  Now, post-Brexit negotiations and political messaging of an anti-refugee nature have the potential to further shift European refugee policy to the right and result in tangible security risks for Britain’s military and counterterrorism strategies.

‘Refugee’ System in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has always retained opt-out clauses for most EU asylum policies, including the 2016 relocation quota of 160,000 asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and North Africa. Post-Brexit statements by Theresa May on asylum policies now point to a clear refusal to accept more refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, pledging a meagre number of 20,000 resettlements into Britain over the next four years. Instead, the PM believes that strengthening capacities and resources directly in the affected regions would help refugees more than bringing them to Europe. This February, the Government ended its commitment to the so-called ‘Dubs’ scheme, an agreement under which Britain pledged to take in vulnerable lone child refugees from camps in France, Italy and Greece. May also announced a campaign to leave the European Court of Human Rights, a separate entity from the EU, but representing a move which would discharge Britain from the special appeal rights and legal protections the Court extends to refugees.

Shifting European Refugee Policy

Perhaps the more far-reaching implications for refugees will manifest themselves in how Britain’s departure from the EU has the potential to further shift asylum and immigration legislation to the right of the political spectrum in remaining member states. A particular danger lies in the scapegoating and conflating asylum seekers and refugees, who are protected by international law under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention vis-a-vis more structural European problems such as economic marginalisation of rural areas and questions of national identity. Politicians in Europe already cater heavily to nationalistic and identity-driven sentiments to gain votes. This year, it is likely that far-right populists will gain votes in important elections such as in Germany, the Netherlands, and particularly in France. Most EU states have already passed sweeping legislation to strictly limit refugee inflows for the next few years. Anti-immigrant sentiments and hate crimes against refugees have reached all-time highs throughout the EU. A recent European-wide Chatham House study found that 55 per cent of respondents would like to see all future migration from Muslim-majority countries stopped. The prime victim of such developments is inevitably the asylum seekers who flee armed conflict and persecution.

UK Security risks for military and counterterrorism strategies

From a strict national security perspective, barring refugees from entry and catering to islamophobic sentiments in the population may create both immediate and more long-term security risks for Britain in its military operations overseas and counterterrorism efforts.  In August 2016, the BBC obtained pictures showing British special forces operating in Syria. While the UK Ministry of Defence declined to comment on the presence of personnel in the region, it should not come as a surprise to see limited ground operations taking place to complement the air campaign against Islamic State in Levant (ISIL) and other jihadist groups. However, the success of such missions often hinges on effective intelligence sharing and cooperation with local partners from host governments and their respective intelligence agencies. Extreme anti-immigration laws and the appeasement of nationalistic constituencies will lead partners to question the sincerity of their cooperation and the sustainability of their relationships with the United Kingdom.

On a more basic level, soldiers may also depend on translators and guides, who put themselves and their families in danger for assisting foreign troops. In 2015, a number of MPs warned that Britain will struggle to recruit interpreters in future conflict zones if it declines them shelter and asylum after completing their missions. Should tighter immigration and asylum legislation result in a culture of suspicion and alienation, the repercussions for the British military and the success of their operations would be considerable.

Constricting refugee flows and engaging in political messaging of an anti-refugee rhetoric nature also directly plays into the hands of groups like ISIL in two distinct ways. For one, refugees fleeing the region represent the inherent failure of the Islamic State and its envisioned society. By closing avenues and opportunities to escape violence and persecution, keeping civilians confined to the territory of ISIL will allow the group to continue to target non-combatants and extort money for arms and recruitment through taxes.

According to the UK’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, individuals within the United Kingdom who are at risk of radicalisation currently pose the biggest threat to national security. ISIL and other jihadist terrorist organisations directly benefit from Western anti-refugee rhetoric and legislation because it appears to reinforce their narrative of ‘Islam versus the West’. Adding fire to the propaganda messages of ISIL by contributing to the marginalisation and implicit criminalisation of mainly Muslim communities may pose a serious danger and contribute to radicalisation at home.

Accepting well-vetted refugees can have national security benefits when dealing with global terrorism as it pushes back against the idea of a cultural and religious war between the West and Islam. Incoming individuals may become part of a counter-narrative which is needed to push against transnational terrorist networks and their developing recruitment strategies.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. He is Series Editor at StrifeBlog and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2016/09/14/19/49/barbed-wire-1670222_960_720.jpg

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part II – Stormy Seas: The UK-US Relationship under Trump

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By: Christina Dutton

 

People demonstrate during a protest at Downing Street in central London against US President Donald Trump’s immigration ban.

 

The UK has spent the past half-century balancing two primary foreign policy commitments: its membership in the European Union (EU) and its ‘special relationship’ with the United States (USA). Primed and ready to pull the trigger on Article 50, However, Britain seems to be leaning hardest on its American ally at the worst possible time – after the election of President Donald Trump.

Brexit supporters feel validated by President Trump’s support for the country’s exit from the EU, while others worry about his strong “America First” policy.

What does this mean for the future of this historic Anglo-American relationship? Political commentators stand at the ready, critiquing every speech, meeting and tweet coming out of Washington, while UK leaders are forced to play a torturous waiting game. This is a special relationship, indeed. While some may have once cast Britain as the Greeks to  America’s Romans, such a parallel would require some form of veneration for the ailing UK – and Trump has little interest-holding vigil for anyone. His policies and decision-making patterns are proving hard to predict. Nevertheless, both sides seem to have renewed their support of the special relationship. No one is more dedicated to this cause than Prime Minister Theresa May, who seemed to have hurled herself towards her American ally by extending an invitation to the UK in January to welcome President Trump into office and to reaffirm the relationship. Many, including Trump, have been quick to draw a parallel between the close relationship between President Ronald Reagan and PM Margaret Thatcher and future relations between President Donald Trump and PM Theresa May, suggesting that leaders of the two countries will work together quite closely. While Trump may enjoy the historic romanticism of calling May ‘my Maggie’ for now, he is also keenly aware of the position in which he sits, and that May has very few cards to play. Those she does have may just turn out to be irrelevant to his future plans.

Traditionally the US-UK relationship has been maintained between presidents and prime ministers. Trump may choose to change the rules of this game, as we have already seen him engaging and collaborating with other UK political figures ahead of the PM, such as conservative MP Michael Gove and former UK Independence Party leader (UKIP) Nigel Farage. Farage, in particular, has developed a bond with Trump and other American conservatives. He was even invited to speak at this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference where he was greeted with a standing ovation. During his campaign, Trump supported Farage and UKIP’s campaign for Brexit.

President Trump has been quick to set the tone of his administration – ‘America First’. His definition of what ‘America’ includes seems to be highly selective. His controversial executive orders have made quick work of overturning the more liberal initiatives championed by President Obama. Both Brexit and Trump’s election seem to have given a voice to right-wing movements across the world. Some have highlighted that pledging close alliance with the US sends a dangerous message. Rallies, marches, petitions and debates are being held worldwide rebelling these shifts occurring in these ‘liberal’ democracies.

Potentially his most controversial order on immigration, now dubbed the “Muslim Ban,” regardless of its legality, puts Britain in a difficult position. Trump’s views on immigration stand in direct opposition to those of German chancellor Angela Merkel. Aligning too closely with Trump may sever any remaining ties or chances at negotiating new agreements with EU leaders. At present, Britain runs the risk of standing too close and getting scorched by Trump’s options or standing too far and being cast out into the cold.

Trump presented a renewed sense of hope for strengthening trade relations with the UK in contrast to Obama’s position that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ following Brexit. Theresa May seems determined to make things work, while also attempting to keep Trump somewhat in check. The US and the UK worked very closely to impose sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea, and maintain a ceasefire between the Ukraine army and pro-Russian rebels as part of the Minsk Agreement. However, Trump has stated that he could consider doing a deal with Russia, which would result in the lifting of sanctions. May was quick to denounce the idea during their joint press conference at the White House in January, supporting the continuation of sanctions until full implementation of the Minsk Agreement is achieved.

Additionally, during the press conference, May suggested that Trump has reaffirmed his dedication to NATO, which he had previously referred to as ‘obsolete’. Trump’s views on the NATO partnership worry many in the alliance, particularly when it comes to honouring the agreement in reference to Russia. Trump’s recent proposal to increase the US defence budget spending by almost ten per cent will also result in some benefits for NATO. With incremental spending cuts on the UK’s own armed services, the UK would be wise to maintain its longstanding relationship with US armed forces and keep them as their closest military ally.

The future of this special relationship will probably remain vague until the triggering of Article 50 and the UK is formally in a position to negotiate bilateral trade agreements. But until then, it is hard to map out the future of this relationship. By then, Trump may have found a new best friend – be it Russia or another power. At the same time, the legitimacy of Trump’s administration seems to be challenged on a daily basis, with reports of pre-election backroom chats and corrupt advisors shaking the legitimacy of his administration.

As Trump proves to be a volatile force, Theresa May must remain vigilant for now. It is her hand that must steady the rudder of this special relationship.

Christina Dutton(@cbdutton111) is pursuing an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College. She received her undergraduate degree at the University of St Andrews in International Relations, and works at a consultancy in the City of London providing research and risk assessment. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/763514/Donald-Trump-travel-ban-US-court-rejects-appeal-reinstate-Muslim

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part I – Brexit, Empire and British Security

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By: Dr Samir Puri

The end of its Empire was Britain’s last seismic rearrangement of its alignments and alliances. Today, Britain is slowly and painfully disentangling itself from the European Union. Of course, the two processes are incomparable in all but the most analogical, journalistic terms. Or are they?

“As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies”, said Winston Churchill in 1948. “The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire… Then there is also the United States… And finally, there is United Europe.”

Britain’s defence and security has been underpinned by positioning itself at the centre of these three overlapping circles. Doing so has conferred to this Sceptred Isle a uniquely advantageous geopolitical position throughout the tumult of the Cold War and beyond.

While Britain has continued to provide a lynchpin between the USA, Europe and many parts of the wider world, what this means has changed a lot in the last 70 years. Britain’s relationship with the United States has experienced its peaks and troughs but has remained constant. Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 led to economic interdependence but stalled any notion of a common currency or political union. But it is the last of the three circles that merit attention here.

In anticipating Brexit’s unfolding, it is the end of Empire that is instructive. There is, as The Economist wrote, an art to leaving in evidence after decolonization, of “breaking up and staying friends”. The Empire was dismantled “as haphazardly as it began, with different territories gaining independence in different ways,” wrote Piers Brendon in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997. The piecemeal manner of its dismantling is striking. Britain’s hold in the New World was diminished by the independence of the United States in 1776. A later iteration of Empire, with its focus on Asia, was eroded by World War Two. The wartime loss of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 presaged India’s independence five years later. The Suez Crisis of 1956 dealt a blow to British influence in the Middle East. There was, for a time, an aspiration to relocate the Empire’s centre of gravity to Africa, but these colonies became independent throughout the 1960s.

Today, it feels almost otherworldly to conjure up any sense of what the Empire meant. It can also seem immoral, given how out of step much of imperial ideology was in relation to contemporary norms. But to reflect on the defence and security implications of the breakup of the Empire is fruitful. The dismantling of a globe-spanning Empire that had existed in one form or another for centuries was transformative. There was a horrific amount of violence in some theatres of decolonization. But in others, relatively amicable arrangements were made, with security networks underpinning relations between Britain and these former colonies.

The transition from Empire to Commonwealth reminds us that a realignment does not necessarily mean severance. Brexit does not mean the end of Britain’s role in Europe. Rather, it reimagines a relationship that will not suddenly vanish, no matter the dramas of the rupture yet to come.

In a RAND Europe report on ‘Defence and security after Brexit’, the authors observe that “the decision to leave the EU arguably looks likely to have minimal impact on Britain’s conventional defence apparatus in the near term”. In other words, the upheaval for Britain’s military will be moderated by the fact that the EU has never offered a major platform for cooperative military action, and because NATO will remain Britain’s preeminent multilateral military ‘club’. But, RAND opines, “Brexit may pose more immediate practical challenges for security than defence.”

Security, rather than defence, is indeed where Brexit’s impacts will be intricate. The transnational nature of criminality and terrorism and the security implications arising from huge migration flows are for Britain inherently European-facing issues. The Brexit in-tray of UK-EU cooperative policing arrangements is considerable. Policing, serious crime investigations and intelligence work simply cannot be done in the vacuum of a nation-state, given the informational revolution and the relative ease and speed of international travel. The myriad of treaties to be renegotiated will make Brexit akin to uprooting a tree that has had several decades to lay its roots.

The biggest imperial connotation of all, however, is the mindset that led to Brexit in the first place. The essence of British exceptionalism has its roots in the fact that Britain was for so long a globe-straddling superpower. It is perilously hard to argue about the often subconscious impact of the Empire on current British foreign and security policy thinking. Generationally, the impact of the Empire is now much less direct than before. However, a grandiose sense of destiny and purpose – which need not be negative qualities if harnessed in the name of order – still pervade Britain’s sense of global identity.

All national histories are exercises in selective amnesia. The myths that parts of Britain hold of itself – as a plucky nation able to survive on its own wits – are part of the Brexit story. And they spring from the defensive conundrums of bygone ages.  Even in its darkest days, such as after the fall of France in 1940, Britain was able to stand alone and survive a horrific onslaught, while Churchill began ensuring Britain’s survival and longevity as a global player through a realignment with the USA. David Reynolds has called 1940 “the Fulcrum of the twentieth century”. It is not difficult to see why the fall of France began a turn towards the Atlantic – and why this still matters today. The release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk has almost too much significance to bear.

The Empire and the wars that were fought in its name are essential components of Britain’s sense of global identity. History tells the story that explains Britain’s geopolitical positioning today. Looking historically, and thinking self-reflectively, will be the only way to navigate the humbling that Brexit is sure to spell in relation to British influence in Europe. To imperil British security during the coming realignment is a fate that must be avoided.


Dr Samir Puri is a Lecturer in War Studies where he teaches the MA module on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also serving as a strategy adviser to the Commonwealth Secretariat in the establishment of its Countering Violent Extremism unit. Before joining King’s, Dr Puri worked for the Foreign Office (2009-2015) and for RAND (2006-2009). In 2016 his book, ‘Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups’, was released by the IISS; and he has extended this analysis to the war in Syria for the Telegraph and Observer newspapers. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Post-Truthism: the Scourge of 2016

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By: Anastasia Beck

Nigel Farage and Donald Trump. Photo by Getty Images

The year 2016 was most certainly memorable, from the first British astronaut – Major Tim Peake – and his ascent into space to the colourful Rio Olympics.  But the two events that overshadowed the many highlights of 2016 were the unexpected vote to leave the European Union by the British people and the unprecedented election of Donald J. Trump. For many observers, Brexit and the rise of Trump signalled a transition in Western politics to that of ‘post-truthism’. In fact, the word ‘post-truth’ became the Oxford Dictionaries ‘Word of the Year’ in 2016 and was defined as ‘an adjective defined as relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.’ The real question remains as to why post-truthism has emerged so powerfully into both mainstream political and media narratives and how the likes of  Trump and former-UKIP leader Nigel Farage have utilised it to their advantage.

Post-truthism in 2016 arrived in the form of the rhetoric espoused by Trump in the USA and the Leave campaign in Britain. In the UK, assertions were made that £350 million in government funds were being sent by Britain to the European Union every week. Once Britain departed from the EU through Leave, these funds would be available for agencies like the NHS. Alongside this, it was claimed that Britain would have no veto on Turkey’s accession to the EU. Across the Atlantic, similar populist claims were being made by Trump regarding the possible fakery of Obama’s birth certificate, the assertion that Muslims in New Jersey cheered the tragedy of 9/11, and that the Mexican government purposefully sent their worst immigrants to America. All of these statements have one thing in common and that is that they are all fabrications – meant to incite fear, hatred and emotions that would captivate the population. Many experts and so-called ‘fact-checkers’ deemed these claims untrue. According to one fact-checking agency, 78% of all Trump’s campaign statements were false. So how did the Trump and Farage get away with it and unpredictably go on to claim victory?

Post-truthism emanates from a deep mistrust of politicians and political elites.  Throughout the Western world, there appears to be disillusionment towards these institutions and experts who, for example, had once stated that the euro would improve our lives and that Saddam Hussein certainly possessed weapons of mass destruction. The average person views this powerful elite minority as pushing their own interests above those of the masses and manipulating popular demands for their own benefit.[1]  The discontent and dissatisfaction towards Hillary Clinton displayed in the US election is a clear example.  To many, she epitomised the establishment, something that not only Trump supporters despised, but also swathes of the American populace as well. Furthermore, we see economic marginalisation as another trigger of ‘post-truthism’.

We also see economic marginalisation as another trigger of post-truthism. Throughout the 80s, both the USA and the UK witnessed a weakening of the labor unions and the gradual dissolution of the industrial workplace. In the 21st century, many of these old industrial areas where economic hardship persists feel let down by the progressive forces of globalisation. Trump tapped into such overarching economic concerns, as a result of which any extravagant comments he made were not considered in a measured manner. It is difficult for people to listen to Washington talk about the benefits of globalisation when they have not felt those benefits.

Interestingly, the feeling of being left behind by the forces of globalisation often brings about nostalgia. We see this with slogans such as ‘Make American Great Again’ and the many social media posts of Brexiters longing for a lost England. There is a level of perceived patriotism here, and one of the reasons why Trump and Farage are able to get away with being dishonest is when someone tries to refute them, they are labelled as unpatriotic and putting the country down. Trump and the Leave campaign often resorts to patriotism and calls to ‘rally around the flag’ as a means to garner support.

Further, a big propeller of post-truthism’ last year was social media. Few politicians can boast of reaching out to a mass audience in a short space of time, but throughout history, certain demagogue-like leaders who have achieved this: Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin come to mind. Trump’s use of social media like Twitter has most certainly helped him reach a wider audience. Worryingly, this has meant that his aforementioned conspiracy theories and scaremongering have also reached many people. If information is predominately acquired from social media and the web, it is unlikely that official sources such as academics and newspapers will be listened to or trusted.

In a nutshell, post-truthism ultimately implies that emotions trump facts.  If people distrust the establishment and suffer economic hardships – which they believe has not been alleviated by politicians – they will seek a change. In 2016, that change arrived in the form of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, regardless of questionable claims made by both parties.  Any outlandish immigration policies or sexist jibes would always be outweighed by the possibility of economic upward mobility and the opportunity to wave goodbye to the political elites and the establishment.  The interesting question now is: how has ‘post-truthism’ affected Western political discourse and in what direction is it ultimately heading for?

Anastasia Beck (anastasia.beck@kcl.ac.uk) is a postgraduate student studying Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL).  Anastasia’s research interests include counter-radicalization, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and the impacts of migration, both at the macro- and micro-levels. 

Notes:

[1] Crouch. C, Post Democracy, (Polity Press: 2004)

Image source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37934790

NATO in the Crucible

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By. Dr. Zachary Wolfraim

nato_parliamentary_assembly_london_2014
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held in London 2014. (Source: NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pre-Summit Conference)

Yet again, NATO is having a challenging year. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has demonstrated its repeated ability to pivot and adapt in order to retain some level of relevance in the face of continued international instability. That being said, the newest challenges are coming from within the Alliance and from three of its key member states: the US, the UK and Turkey. NATO is now fully immersed in one of its most difficult and uncertain periods yet, as all these countries potentially redefine their roles internationally and their relationship with the organisation.

The most immediate challenge for NATO is Turkey’s drift towards authoritarianism under President Recep Erdogan. The has given Erdogan the freedom to purge his enemies, both real and imagined, from government while also allowing him to consolidate power. This is troubling for many reasons; however, for NATO, it certainly compromises its ability to act as an alliance built on shared values. NATO has previously had questionable governments in its ranks such as Portugal under Antonio Salazar, the Greek military junta in the 1970s, and Turkey during its previous periods of military rule. That said, the current trend in Turkey seems to be an increasingly colder relationship with Europe and the NATO allies. This has been coupled with renewed overtures towards Moscow, thus presenting a serious difficulty for any future NATO role.  An Erdogan-led government of an increasingly authoritarian nature presents a serious threat to NATO’s  .

To respond, NATO must continue to gently remind Turkey of the benefits of the Alliance. NATO must also prod other nations, particularly European ones, to remember Turkey’s role in NATO as well the regional pressures that Turkey is facing and which many member states have done little to alleviate. While Turkey is unlikely to leave NATO, a closer relationship with Russia would complicate NATO’s consensus-based decision-making process. Backing Erdogan into a corner will only serve to deepen the Turkish dissatisfaction with NATO and promote closer ties between Ankara and Moscow.

The second clear threat came in the form of the message sent by the British public about their continued relationship with the European Union. With the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron, the desertion of leadership posts by the main pro-Leave campaign leaders and deep turmoil within the Labour party opposition, the British political system was shaken to its foundations. Brexit has fundamentally damaged the credibility of the UK’s ability to serve as the leading international actor in Europe. Though the UK remains a critical military actor in NATO for the time being, it has nonetheless called into question its ability to maintain this position in light of Brexit-related budget shortfalls. Additionally, the deep differences in attitudes towards Europe between Scotland and Northern Ireland and the rest of Britain point to potentially further instability within the UK. While it would be wrong to doubt the UK’s resolve to act in a crisis, the Brexit vote calls into question the scale and capabilities that it can bring to bear in the future.

For now, there has been little immediate effect from the referendum save for the self-inflicted economic damage. Prime Minister Theresa May has announced her intention to invoke Article 50 in early 2017 and formally begin the process of leaving the EU, meaning most, if not all, the instruments of British policymaking will be focused on disentangling and redefining the UK’s relationship with the EU . Beyond this, the future economic impact of Brexit will likely mean diminished revenues and, by extension, NATO can insulate itself somewhat from this by strengthening its relationship with the EU and European member states and offering a more cohesive and coherent partnership between the two organisations. Depending on the shape that Brexit takes, however, it may see one of its most stalwart members reduced significantly in stature.

The final and thankfully still hypothetical prospect, for policymakers in Brussels and for many of America’s allies more generally, is the election of Donald Trump. He recently declared his intention to what could be diplomatically called a more “ blatant disregard for the rules and norms that govern participation in NATO drew a strong response from the Secretary General; however, the reality is that the lack of American participation in the Alliance would effectively demolish its effectiveness. Even questioning the commitment to NATO’s collective security guarantee, Article V, would mean that European member states would find themselves under threat. While there has always been some unease in Washington D.C. about NATO allies pulling their weight, it is the first time that a Presidential contender has threatened to leave American allies undefended.

Thus far Mr. Trump’s foreign policy pronouncements have lacked coherence; however, he has made it clear that European states would not be able to count on the US to uphold the key tenets that underpin NATO’s security guarantee. Similarly, he has expressed his affinity for President Vladimir Putin and recognised Russian claims to Crimea while also (apparently sarcastically) encouraging Russian hackers to leak information about Hilary Clinton. There is little NATO can do should Mr. Trump win the election as his approach to foreign policy is erratic at best. It nonetheless falls on the Secretary General and senior officials to continue to articulate the importance of NATO to American interests overseas.

Any one of these issues would present a serious challenge for NATO yet the Alliance is now faced with all three. This reinforces the commentary from the Wales Summit about NATO’s ability to “walk and chew gum” as crises continue to crop up in parallel rather than sequentially. NATO has continually shown its capacity to repurpose itself, often despite its own worst impulses. It must demonstrate this ability yet again.

 

 

Dr. Zachary Wolfraim recently graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as the political risk sector in London.