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Strife Interview – Benedetto Della Vedova, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs: Europe’s uneasy path

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief in discussion with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 28, 2014, serving in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments; he has also been a Member of the Italian Senate since 2013. He is currently competing in the Italian national elections with the +Europa (“More Europe”) political party, headed by former Foreign Affairs minister Emma Bonino and campaigning on a strong pro-European platform. Strife’s Editor-in-Chief, Andrea Varsori, met with him at King’s, where he participated in the KCL Italian Society’s debate “The Road towards the United States of Europe”. On that occasion, they spoke on the future prospects for the EU, its internal divisions, and the Italian take on Brexit.

AV: 2017 was a year of important national elections in four European countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria. Do you think that the European Union emerged stronger from this?

BDV: Absolutely. Especially concerning the French elections. I would like to highlight, however, that although this battle was won, and it was surely a hard one, the war is far from over. And this war consists in a considerable political struggle: that between those who support openness and those who support different varieties of closeness. In this regard, the Austrian elections demonstrated that this fight is not over yet. Van der Bellen’s victory [in the 2016 presidential elections] had seemingly given good reasons to many to hope for a pro-European turn in the country. In last year’s political elections, however, Sebastian Kurz’s ÖVP won and formed a government that has as its junior partner the nationalist FPÖ party. The match, thus, is not over yet.

AV: In this context, then, where can a new impulse to European integration come from? Maybe from the reform of a particular domain of EU governance?

BDV: Actually, I think that elections are the most important factor, with all their natural limits. We need to be aware of how people are voting in Poland, in Austria, in France, where the electoral results were fundamental, and of course in Italy, where there are reasons to be worried. Most importantly, we need to acknowledge the fact that the European Union is a recurring topic in several national campaigns. Different nationalist discourses are engaged in criticising the EU. It is necessary to build an effective counter-narrative, first of all on a political and symbolical level.

AV: Do you currently see any examples of this counter-narrative in Europe?

BDV: The foremost example I can think of is Macron’s electoral campaign. Most importantly, the French president has kept saying the same things after being elected, for example in his Sorbonne speech [on September 26, 2017]. Macron won exactly because he confronted nationalism directly, arguing, against the prevailing common sense, that there is a need for shared sovereignty, the only possible type of sovereignty.

AV: It was surely a controversial choice of terms. A sizeable portion of European citizens probably sees the very expression “shared sovereignty” as a contradiction in terms.

BDV: I think that the main fault of making this idea popular lies primarily on political leaders. They have often decided to use emotional arguments to their advantage, on the assumption that they would have benefited from them for a long time. This often did not happen, but those same ideas that they disseminated among the population stayed and took roots. Brexit is an example of this phenomenon.

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: As far as Brexit is concerned, what do you think of the current state of UK-EU negotiations?

BDV: In my opinion, the EU has been doing very well. Up to now, Brussels managed to act without allowing internal divisions to have too much of an impact. Of course, within the Union there is a variety of positions, depending on what is at stake in each country. Besides this, the Union’s position has remained tightly knit and every member state is respecting it. Actually, the United Kingdom has the most unclear position. London must decide what endpoint it desires to achieve. On a continuum that goes from Canada to Norway, the United Kingdom should decide where to end up.

AV: Does Italy have a preferred endpoint in the current negotiations?

BDV: I can only tell you which my favourite endpoint is. Personally, I would prefer that Brexit negotiations ended by leaving room for a potential British change of mind. This change of mind can take place with a referendum, just like the one that was had in June 2016, and can express the opposite political choice. I am convinced that such a great democracy as Britain can reconsider the decision that it took.

AV: In this context, Italy is often described as sympathetic to the UK on Brexit. This impression is particularly evident in the Italian press. Do you agree with it?

BDV: This impression may be appropriate for the current government. Prime Minister Gentiloni has surely been very ‘friendly’ towards London – and rightly so. Personally, I am convinced that the relation between Italy and the UK should consist in an outspoken friendship. Outspokenness in mutual relations should not prevent cooperation between the two countries – on the contrary, it can be conducive to that. Actually, my dream is to set a way to have the UK not leave the European Union. Having said that, those who say that ‘Brexit is Brexit’ are right: it is a serious and historical move that we simply cannot ignore. Surely, it is impossible to have ‘business as usual’ after this referendum. The fundamental point that must be clarified in Europe now, in the Brexit negotiations and in general, is that the European single market, its flows, and its positive consequences could not survive the end of political integration. It is impossible to imagine a real single market without its governing institutions: economic and political integration support each other. For them, the Latin brocard aut simul stabunt, aut simul cadent [they will either stand together, or fall together] applies. This must be reaffirmed, of course, to fight nationalism, which is an enemy of both political and economic integration, as it often implies the adoption of protectionist policies. It should also be reaffirmed, however, to Central European countries.

AV: In this regard, how should the EU deal with the more sceptical position of some Central European member states, like the Visegrád Four [Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic]?

BDV: With the Central European countries, we need to engage in a political confrontation that should be solved in political terms. Of course, inside the Union each country is free to make a choice regarding the type of policies that they want to implement internally. But it should be clear that belonging to the single market means sharing not only its rights, but also all the duties and responsibilities that follow from them. From this point of view, the refusal of some member states to share the burden of migrant hospitality is inacceptable. Central European countries receive, and rightly so, structural funds that helped and still help them to reach a level of development that is comparable to that of Western Europe. As for structural funds, Italy is a net contributor. Benefitting from the EU budget through structural funds, however, entails the need to take part in the Union’s common efforts, including sharing the burden of immigration policies. The two things are inseparable: accepting the former means accepting the latter too.

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The Italian version is available here.

Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview.

Intervista con Benedetto Della Vedova, Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri del Governo italiano – Il difficile cammino dell’Europa

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief discusses with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova è Sottosegretario di Stato agli Affari Esteri e alla Cooperazione Internazionale dal 28 febbraio 2014, nei governi di Matteo Renzi e Paolo Gentiloni; è Senatore della Repubblica dal 2013. È attualmente candidato per la lista pro-europeista “+Europa”, assieme all’ex-ministro agli Esteri Emma Bonino, per il collegio uninominale di Prato. Andrea Varsori, Editor-in-chief di Strife, gli ha parlato al King’s College, dove della Vedova ha partecipato al dibattito “The Road towards the United States of Europe”, organizzato dalla King’s Italian Society. Nell’intervista, si è discusso delle future prospettive dell’Unione Europea, delle sue divisioni interne, e della posizione italiana riguardo a Brexit.

 

AV: Col 2017, ci siamo lasciati alle spalle quattro grandi elezioni nazionali: Paesi Bassi, Francia, Germania, Austria. Lei pensa che l’UE ne sia uscita più forte?

BDV: Sicuramente sì. È uscita più forte soprattutto dalle elezioni francesi. Vorrei sottolineare, però, che si tratta di vittoria in una battaglia, magari quella principale, ma non nella guerra. E questa guerra consiste in uno scontro politico sostanziale: quello tra i fautori dell’apertura e i fautori di varie modalità di chiusura. A questo proposito, le elezioni austriache ci hanno dimostrato che lo scontro non è finito. Poteva sembrare, all’inizio, che la vittoria di Van der Bellen lasciasse ben sperare per un esito a favore dell’Europa. Alle ultime elezioni politiche, però, l’ÖVP di Sebastian Kurz ha vinto e ha formato un governo che ha come azionista di primaria importanza i nazionalisti dell’FPÖ. La partita, dunque, non è chiusa.

AV: In questo contesto, allora, da cosa può passare un eventuale rilancio dell’integrazione europea? Forse da una decisiva riforma di un settore dell’Unione?

BDV: In realtà credo che a contare di più siano le elezioni. Con tutti i difetti che possono avere. Dobbiamo tenere conto di come si vota in Polonia, in Austria, in Francia, dove l’esito è stato decisivo, e ovviamente in Italia, dove c’è da avere preoccupazione. Soprattutto, dobbiamo accettare il fatto che l’Unione Europea sia oggetto delle campagne elettorali nazionali. Da un lato, è oggetto di critiche da parte delle varie narrative nazionaliste. La necessità è quella di costruire una contro-narrativa efficace, soprattutto sul piano politico e simbolico.

AV: Lei vede degli esempi di questa contro-narrativa in questo momento in Europa?

BDV: Sicuramente la campagna elettorale di Macron è uno di questi. Soprattutto, il presidente francese ha continuato a dire le stesse cose anche dopo essere stato eletto, ad esempio nel discorso che ha fatto alla Sorbona. Macron ha vinto proprio perché ha affrontato direttamente il nazionalismo, sostenendo, contro la vulgata comune, la necessità di costruire una sovranità condivisa, l’unico tipo possibile di sovranità.

AV: Sicuramente una mossa controversa. Una parte consistente dei cittadini europei probabilmente vede l’espressione “sovranità condivisa” come un controsenso.

BDV: In questo, penso che la responsabilità decisiva nella diffusione di questa idea sia delle leadership politiche. Spesso, hanno deciso di cavalcare l’emotività, nella falsa convinzione che una tale mossa potesse pagare ben al di là del voto. Così spesso non è stato, ma le idee propagandate in campagna elettorale sono rimaste e hanno attecchito tra i votanti. Brexit ne è un esempio.

 

Benedetto Della Vedova has been Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: Parlando di Brexit, lei cosa pensa dello stato attuale dei negoziati tra Gran Bretagna e Unione Europea?

BDV: Trovo molto positivo l’atteggiamento tenuto dall’Unione Europea sinora. Per ora, a Bruxelles ci si è mossi senza prestare il fianco a troppe divisioni interne. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione le posizioni sono differenziate tra diversi Paesi. Nonostante questo, la posizione coesa dell’Unione nel negoziato è rispettata da tutti. Il punto della questione, in realtà, è il Regno Unito. È Londra che deve decidere che obiettivo vuole raggiungere. Su un continuum che va dal Canada alla Norvegia, il Regno Unito deve decidere dove posizionarsi.

AV: L’Italia ha un esito preferito dei negoziati in corso sulla Brexit?

BDV: Io le posso dire quale esito preferirei io. Personalmente, io vorrei che i negoziati sulla Brexit finissero in modo da lasciare spazio e modalità per un ripensamento. Questo ripensamento può avvenire con una modalità uguale e una decisione contraria a quella avvenuta nel giugno 2016. Sono convinto che una grande democrazia come quella britannica possa benissimo ritornare sui propri passi.

AV: In questo contesto, la posizione dell’Italia, soprattutto nella stampa domestica, è spesso descritta come simpatetica alle istanze britanniche nel negoziato. Lei è d’accordo con questa visione?

BDV: Questa impressione può essere adeguata per il presente governo. Il Primo Ministro Gentiloni è sicuramente molto friendly nei confronti di Londra – ed è giusto così. Personalmente, sono convinto che il rapporto tra Italia e Regno Unito debba essere una amicizia nella franchezza. La franchezza nei rapporti reciproci non deve impedire, ma anzi può aiutare la collaborazione tra i due Paesi. Il mio sogno, in realtà, è quello di impostare delle modalità per ottenere un esito diverso dall’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione. Detto questo, ha ragione chi dice che Brexit is Brexit: è una cosa seria, di portata storica, che è impossibile ignorare. Sicuramente, dopo il referendum non è possibile avere del business as usual. La questione fondamentale che va riaffermata in questo momento in Europa, nell’ambito dei negoziati su Brexit ma non solo, è che il mercato unico europeo, i suoi flussi e i suoi benefici non sopravvivrebbero alla fine dell’integrazione politica. Non è possibile immaginare un vero single market senza un complesso di istituzioni che lo governi: integrazione economica e politica si sostengono a vicenda. Per esse, vale la formula latina simul stabunt, simul cadent. Questo va ribadito, ovviamente, per combattere il nazionalismo, che è un nemico sia per l’integrazione politica, sia per quella economica, dato che spesso implica il protezionismo. Ma andrebbe ribadito anche ai Paesi dell’Est.

AV: A questo proposito, come affrontare le posizioni più scettiche di certi Paesi dell’Europa Centrale, come quelli del Gruppo di Visegrád (Polonia, Ungheria, Cechia, Slovacchia)?

BDV: Quello con i Paesi dell’Europa Centrale è uno scontro politico da affrontare in termini politici. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione tutti i Paesi sono in condizione di fare una scelta riguardo al tipo di politiche che essi preferiscono condurre internamente. Però il punto che va chiarito è che l’appartenenza al mercato unico implica una condivisione totale dei diritti, ma anche dei doveri e delle responsabilità che ne conseguono. Da questo punto di vista, è inammissibile che certi Paesi si siano rifiutati di partecipare alla condivisione dei migranti. Le nazioni dell’Europa Centrale ricevono, giustamente, fondi strutturali dall’Unione che le hanno aiutate e le stanno aiutando a raggiungere livelli di sviluppo economico comparabili a quelli dell’Europa Occidentale. Per i fondi strutturali, l’Italia è un contributore netto. Beneficiare di voci di bilancio europee quali le politiche di sviluppo strutturale, però, significa anche dover prender parte agli sforzi comuni dell’Unione, inclusa l’accoglienza di migranti. Le due cose si accompagnano: accettare una significa accettare anche l’altra.

 

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The English version is available here

Images Sources 

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview

This is the year of the nationalist reckoning

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By Dr Pablo de Orellana, King’s College London

 

Lega posters for the upcoming 2018 Italian Election (Photo credit leganord.org)

Nationalism is back. In the last two years, nationalists have conquered the core of conventional politics in an electoral resurgence that has brought it back from the fringes. Its support, discourses and arguments draw on old logics but directly address grievances born out of global effects of the economic revolution that begun in the 1980s. While 2017 saw the consolidation of nationalist successes in the West, 2018 will see their ideas put to the test.

Nationalism is now a dominant political paradigm. In 2015 I predicted that identity politics and especially nationalism would burst into the global mainstream. In 2016, nationalist ideas were by far the most successful political offering, able to explain grievances including unemployment, future prospects, poverty and social change while suggesting solutions predicated on identity. The vote for Brexit and Trump’s victory also show that mainstream politics failed to address such grievances, particularly poverty. Furthermore, besides bringing some nationalists to power, in cases like the UK, France and Italy, nationalist ideas have conquered traditionally democratic establishment parties. In non-democratic states like Russia and China, nationalism is reinforcing their rulers’ grip on power, which might otherwise have run short on legitimacy and support.

As the short film accompanying this article explains, the core premise of nationalism is that if “patriots” win power, rights and services should be allocated on the basis of identity. Nationalists vary in their definition of identity, from citizenship to religion, race or ethnicity. Some nationalists define identity on the basis of biological differences, which is why the body can be so important for nationalist ideas of identity. Furthermore, this impacts on ideas of gender, with some nationalists, particularly in populist movements, drawing on biologically-framed arguments to determine the social or political role of genders. In this worldview, identity struggle is the result of “natural” difference, which is how nationalists can conflate patriotism with nationalism while accusing critics of treason. As seen in Poland over recent months, the radicalisation of such ideas can seriously jeopardise democracy. It is also crucial to note that nationalism is an extremely flexible political paradigm, able to live under right-wing as well as left-wing political umbrellas.

Nationalism has changed since its previous mid 19th and 20th century incarnations. A crucial difference in terms of political practice and dynamics is that nationalist electoral forces like Vote Leave in Britain, Republicans in the US, Front National in France and Forza Italia in Italy have come to depend on alignment or direct coalitions with loose extremist coalitions such as Leave.EU, the Alt-Right, Génération Identitaire and La Lega, which add vital votes to extremely narrow electoral margins. The international outlook of this generation of nationalists is not simply reducible to isolationism. Rather, it seeks to reshape international relations to allow “natural” identity conflict – read as Darwinian struggle for survival – to determine winners and losers. The antisemitism that characterised previous waves of nationalism has been replaced by anti-immigration sentiment and especially islamophobia. The consolidation of transnational alliances like the Europe of Nations and Freedom coalition between nationalist parties shows that, like the liberal, feminist and socialist ideals they revile, nationalism is also a remarkably transnational force.

2017 was the year of nationalist consolidation. Internationally, four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now nationalists: Trump continued his conquest of Republicanism while overtly emboldening identitarian extremists and May’s Brexit has to a great extent became an anti-immigration endeavour. In France, however, while Le Pen convinced a staggering 33% of the French electorate, rival Macron decisively defeated her with 60% of the vote. Front National’s results in the subsequent parliamentary elections (8 MPs out of 577) show that French voters have rejected nationalism as a viable option for government. It is, however, likely that FN’s abeyance will to a great extent depend on Macron’s and possibly the EU’s performance in the near future. 2017 also witnessed mainstream politicians jumping on the “dragon of nationalism” for their own goals. The appeal of populist expressions of nationalism and movements has not only been evident in the US and France, but also elsewhere in Europe where it is having significant effects on all sides of the political debate. In Germany, the electoral surge of Alternative für Deutschland in the 2017 Federal Elections has led to attempts by mainstream parties to shift their policies towards the nationalist offering. In Italy, the current electoral campaign is witnessing the farce of Berlusconi proposing himself as a moderate while simultaneously promising to deport 600,000 migrants and disputing the elections in coalition with the extremist Lega and Fratelli d’Italia. A key development showing the broader appeal of nationalist politics in the last two years is the attachment of other agendas to a variety of nationalist ideas. In Britain, the Gove/Johnson wing of the Conservatives and the Corbynite side of Labour both regard Brexit as an opportunity to further their ideological models of the state, economy and society.

Nationalist rebels are no longer confined to fringe parties. In 2018, nationalists in power will need to prove that their solutions work or find ways to explain failure. It will be worth keeping a close watch on the success of Trump’s tax reforms and anti-immigration measures, whether difficulties in Brexit negotiations outweigh Brexiteer national liberation optimism, and the continued role of anti-immigration sentiment in polls such as Italy’s general election in March. Italy, still mired in the overtly racist debate as to the political rights of Italian blood, is also an excellent example of how the simple politics of birth and blood rights triumph in the face of complex economic problems and the failure or incapacity of mainstream politics to address them. In France, while Macron’s 2017 election is regarded as a centrist victory, Le Pen will indubitably benefit should he fail to address urgent grievances or please the complex “neither left nor right” coalition that brought him to power.

Crucially, the success of nationalists will not be assessed as an objective truth. As Trump, Putin, and the Brexiteers showed, one of the greatest successes of the contemporary nationalists is to link truth to identity rather than fact, expertise, reliability or science and treat criticism as sabotage or fake news. That is, as we have seen with Trump’s unwavering supporters, the believability of politicians will be determined by their identitarian credentials. In my assessment, this will aggravate the bubble effect where believability is determined by identity and political tribalism, leading to further radicalisation.

Much depends on the extent to which nationalists can address acute economic and social grievances on the ground as well as the sinking hopelessness for the future felt by the young. They might, as Trump has done over the past year, claim betrayal as an excuse for delay or failure. Ultimately, the future rests on whether the loose and small electoral constituencies forged by nationalists continue to believe in identity birthright as a political paradigm.

 

Nationalism: tales of love, fear, and hatred
A short documentary that explores the re-emergence of nationalism in our time, explaining how it works, why is it so powerful, and why it has returned. Written by Dr Pablo de Orellana of King’s College London and directed by Fernanda Marin of OuiShare Paris, the film introduces identityhunters.org, a student-led initiative to analyse and explore nationalist ideas and politics around the world.

 

 

 

Dr Pablo de Orellana is a Fellow of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and Co-Chair of the KCL Research Centre in International Relations. His research focuses on nationalism, identity politics and its effects on diplomacy and public political discourse. His Twitter handle is @drdeorellana. For more information about his research and teaching, please visit https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/teachingfellows/deorellana.aspx

 

 

Image Source

Banner: http://www.leganord.org/politiche2018 

Image 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FU_cIAJn91M&feature= 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part V – Brexit Defence Implications: Mind the Gap

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By Alfonc Rakaj

Divorces are messy. They separate families by turning parents against each other as they negotiate over their assets and determine child custody rights. Furthermore, children often have to make uneasy decisions and can find themselves pitted against one of their parents while siding with the other. Such actions resemble the British attempt to divorce from the European Union (EU) following the Brexit referendum. Commentators have rushed to consider the political and economic implications of the decision while shying away from potential security and defence effects. Economic strains imposed by Brexit and the transition-related hurdles stood up by the EU will further challenge Britain’s military status and defence role in Europe and beyond.

Internal political quarrels over the nature of the Brexit are in full steam. First, it was the High Court that challenged the pathway to Brexit, then the House of Lords on specific amendments, and now, the devolved government of Scotland led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to hold a second independence referendum. While political complexities regarding the nature of the divorce get worked out, Britain’s focus shifts more towards domestic issues. In this regard, its defence objectives and capabilities face tough political and economic challenges.

As Brexiteers celebrated, financial markets panicked. The British pound lost 10 per cent of its values against the U.S. dollar, a 31-year-low for the currency and its biggest daily loss in history, as investors weighed over the uncertainties related to the decision to leave the EU. The FTSE 100, London’s Stock Exchange, fell by £120 billion overnight. A report released shortly after the referendum by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) pointed the potential negative effects of such an economic downturn on UK’s defence spending powers. The report stated that the cost of procuring military hardware by the Ministry of Defence is estimated to increase by as much as £700 million annually starting in 2018-19. That is the equivalent of 2 percent of the current defence budget. This, according to the report, will force the UK government to reconsider its budget commitments with the likelihood of needing to delay or reduce its planned acquisitions. At the time the report was published, sterling was trading at £1 per $1.30. In the period between June 2016 and March 2017, the pound has declined against its US counterpart, its value ranging between $1.20 per 1£ to $1.27. This illustrates, that the figure provided by the report could even be higher than its initial estimates.

On the bright side, Britain boasts a large defence budget, the fifth largest in the world and second only to the US among NATO members. It is one of the few NATO members able to uphold its pledge to spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defence and it recently recommitted itself to that promise. In addition, Britain’s National Strategy and Strategic Review stated its intent to increase its equipment investment by 1 per cent annually up to 2020-21, while procurement spending is expected to reach £178 billion in the next ten years. In addition, the UK government has committed itself to exempt the defence budget from further government cuts.

However, as it is often the case, the devil is in the details. Such estimates will be impacted if the UK economy slips into recession caused by a hard Brexit; further, if the sterling slips against its rivals, the purchasing powers of the UK Ministry of Defence will decline. As the UK triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, starting the negotiation to leave the EU, the Sterling’s resolve against other currencies will be tested leaving the affordability of Britain’s acquisition plans in question.

Meanwhile, a second referendum in Scotland poses challenges for the political cohesion of the United Kingdom and tests the status of Britain as a global power, and could have negative ramifications for its economy. A Scottish exit from the United Kingdom would diminish the influence of Britain as its size, its population and its market shrink. Even Britain’s core defensive capabilities would be put to test. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to free Scotland from stocking nuclear weapons. Considering that the UK’s nuclear deterrents are all located in Scotland, this would significantly challenge the status of Britain as a nuclear power. Besides that, political consequences of an independent Scotland would impact the UK’s shipbuilding industry which is located in Clyde, Scotland. A relocation of such an industry is estimated to cost the UK government £3.5 billion.

Markets are wary to huge risks. A second Scottish referendum, and possibly a breakaway of Scotland would have a negative impact on the economy and the sterling currency itself. If Scotland leaves, then the UK would have experienced a breakaway from a market of over 400 million in the EU, to a single market of less than 60 million. Still, even if Scoxit does not materialise, Brexit is likely to have a profound effect on Britain’s global outlook. Even if the UK does not change its defensive commitments in the future, leaving the EU could diminish UK’s status. There’s already speculation that France could take over its position as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in NATO. As negotiations progress, the effects will become clear while sterling and the UK economy will be severely tested. The UK defence budget will surely be impacted, the question is how much and to what extent.

Alfonc Rakaj is a student in the War Studies Program and is a Chevening Scholar pursuing an MA in International Relations at King’s College London.

Image credit: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-security-will-we-be-more-or-less-safe-a7058551.html

 

 

 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part IV – Hard Brexit & Europe’s Foreign Policy Challenges

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By Aaron Burnett

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe” – British Prime Minister Theresa May. Photo credit: Jason Alden/Bloomberg

 

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe,” British Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her lengthy Brexit speech before heading to Washington, where she tried to secure Donald Trump’s support for the NATO Alliance he called “obsolete” only weeks before. Indeed, as Mrs. May sets out her plans for “a Global Britain” while paradoxically announcing that the UK would leave the world’s largest single market, i.e. the European Union (EU), she emphasized her wish for continued UK-EU security cooperation.

Coming to practical terms with such an agreement is both complex and unprecedented. The EU has signed ten Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) with countries like Canada and Brazil. But negotiations for a similar SPA between the UK and EU will not involve deepening existing diplomatic ties, but loosening them— with profoundly negative implications for British foreign policy.

As May’s early White House visit suggests, the UK remains resolutely committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even as it stumbles out of the EU. Other than the UK, 21 NATO states are also EU members, allowing Britain to retain multilateral military cooperation with its European allies even in a post-Brexit era. However, many foreign policy decisions are increasingly made at the EU-level. These include European sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea, sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program, and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens to incentivize that country towards greater democratization and political reform. The monthly meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council will soon function without the UK in the room. Britain will also lose its vote in the council meetings once Article 50 — Britain’s exit clause from the EU – is triggered on 29th March 2017. As such, major decisions regarding European security will likely be made in Paris or Berlin in the future. The question is the degree with which London will be consulted when its agreement is no longer required to carry an EU-level vote.

The “Canada Model,” referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently agreed to by both the EU and Canada following seven years of negotiations, is often cited as a potential template for a future EU-UK free trade deal. Similarly, the EU-Canada SPA gives us some clues as to what the future EU-UK security cooperation might look like. The EU-Canada SPA outlines common positions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Court, counterterrorism, and other areas of declared mutual interests. It also establishes bilateral consultation mechanisms such as an annual EU-Canada Summit and Joint Ministerial Committee co-chaired by the Canadian Foreign Minister and EU High Representative. Unlike Canada however, the UK maintains the sixth-strongest military in the world, a permanent UN Security Council seat and, rather obviously, remains geographically part of Europe. Thus, EU-UK security cooperation will remain higher than the EU-Canada level.

Months after the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May followed in the footsteps of previous British prime ministers vowing to veto increased EU military cooperation. It’s a rather peculiar statement from May especially considering that she will lose that veto right as soon as Article 50 is triggered. For its part, the remaining EU-27 will maintain that any deal the UK receives post-Brexit will have to leave it worse off than if it was an EU member. “Whoever wishes to leave this family cannot expect to give up all its obligations while holding on to its privileges,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before her Parliament shortly after the June referendum, receiving widespread applause. To achieve pragmatic security cooperation, the UK will have to accept an EU that makes decisions without it—including choices it may have vetoed had it still been a member. That may be difficult for a government that sees itself as implementing a referendum decision won on the basis of “taking back control”. On the continental side, one can expect increased influence from France, Spain, and Italy. Germany, as the EU’s reluctant leader, will be expected to increase its foreign policy leadership further yet.

On security cooperation, the UK is likely to continue sharing intelligence with its European allies to thwart terrorist attacks, implying that Britain will retain membership in Europol. The UK has made the decision to opt into Europol even after  Brexit, despite Denmark’s recent withdrawal from the agency. It would be unprecedented for a non-EU member to enjoy full Europol membership, but British withdrawal from Europol would be a setback for counterterrorism in Europe. One estimate holds that Britain is involved in sharing intelligence for nearly 40 percent of all cases that pass through Europol. Non-EU states also maintain liaison offices with Europol. The United States liaison office boasts around 20 officers, while it’s estimated that Norway enjoys roughly 80 percent of the agency’s membership benefits. Although not guaranteed, negotiations on internal security are less likely to descend into acrimony than other aspects of the Brexit talks.

All this considered, Brexit is highly unlikely to make Europe safer. The UK is set to lose a major source of its global influence and it’s not clear yet exactly how the remaining EU-27 will step in to fill that vacuum. Common decision-making and even counterterrorism coordination are likely to be more difficult in the future. On foreign policy especially, Brexit negotiations will not be about creating a stronger security partnership, but about minimizing the damage from the current arrangements.

Aaron Burnett is a current International Peace & Security MA student at King’s College London. He has previously interned with the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, United Nations, and German Council on Foreign Relations. He also holds a Master in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Journalism.

Notes:

“Brexit: The Security Dilemma”. Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP, Conservatives in the European Parliament (ECR Group). February 2017.