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This is the year of the nationalist reckoning

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By Dr Pablo de Orellana, King’s College London

 

Lega posters for the upcoming 2018 Italian Election (Photo credit leganord.org)

Nationalism is back. In the last two years, nationalists have conquered the core of conventional politics in an electoral resurgence that has brought it back from the fringes. Its support, discourses and arguments draw on old logics but directly address grievances born out of global effects of the economic revolution that begun in the 1980s. While 2017 saw the consolidation of nationalist successes in the West, 2018 will see their ideas put to the test.

Nationalism is now a dominant political paradigm. In 2015 I predicted that identity politics and especially nationalism would burst into the global mainstream. In 2016, nationalist ideas were by far the most successful political offering, able to explain grievances including unemployment, future prospects, poverty and social change while suggesting solutions predicated on identity. The vote for Brexit and Trump’s victory also show that mainstream politics failed to address such grievances, particularly poverty. Furthermore, besides bringing some nationalists to power, in cases like the UK, France and Italy, nationalist ideas have conquered traditionally democratic establishment parties. In non-democratic states like Russia and China, nationalism is reinforcing their rulers’ grip on power, which might otherwise have run short on legitimacy and support.

As the short film accompanying this article explains, the core premise of nationalism is that if “patriots” win power, rights and services should be allocated on the basis of identity. Nationalists vary in their definition of identity, from citizenship to religion, race or ethnicity. Some nationalists define identity on the basis of biological differences, which is why the body can be so important for nationalist ideas of identity. Furthermore, this impacts on ideas of gender, with some nationalists, particularly in populist movements, drawing on biologically-framed arguments to determine the social or political role of genders. In this worldview, identity struggle is the result of “natural” difference, which is how nationalists can conflate patriotism with nationalism while accusing critics of treason. As seen in Poland over recent months, the radicalisation of such ideas can seriously jeopardise democracy. It is also crucial to note that nationalism is an extremely flexible political paradigm, able to live under right-wing as well as left-wing political umbrellas.

Nationalism has changed since its previous mid 19th and 20th century incarnations. A crucial difference in terms of political practice and dynamics is that nationalist electoral forces like Vote Leave in Britain, Republicans in the US, Front National in France and Forza Italia in Italy have come to depend on alignment or direct coalitions with loose extremist coalitions such as Leave.EU, the Alt-Right, Génération Identitaire and La Lega, which add vital votes to extremely narrow electoral margins. The international outlook of this generation of nationalists is not simply reducible to isolationism. Rather, it seeks to reshape international relations to allow “natural” identity conflict – read as Darwinian struggle for survival – to determine winners and losers. The antisemitism that characterised previous waves of nationalism has been replaced by anti-immigration sentiment and especially islamophobia. The consolidation of transnational alliances like the Europe of Nations and Freedom coalition between nationalist parties shows that, like the liberal, feminist and socialist ideals they revile, nationalism is also a remarkably transnational force.

2017 was the year of nationalist consolidation. Internationally, four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now nationalists: Trump continued his conquest of Republicanism while overtly emboldening identitarian extremists and May’s Brexit has to a great extent became an anti-immigration endeavour. In France, however, while Le Pen convinced a staggering 33% of the French electorate, rival Macron decisively defeated her with 60% of the vote. Front National’s results in the subsequent parliamentary elections (8 MPs out of 577) show that French voters have rejected nationalism as a viable option for government. It is, however, likely that FN’s abeyance will to a great extent depend on Macron’s and possibly the EU’s performance in the near future. 2017 also witnessed mainstream politicians jumping on the “dragon of nationalism” for their own goals. The appeal of populist expressions of nationalism and movements has not only been evident in the US and France, but also elsewhere in Europe where it is having significant effects on all sides of the political debate. In Germany, the electoral surge of Alternative für Deutschland in the 2017 Federal Elections has led to attempts by mainstream parties to shift their policies towards the nationalist offering. In Italy, the current electoral campaign is witnessing the farce of Berlusconi proposing himself as a moderate while simultaneously promising to deport 600,000 migrants and disputing the elections in coalition with the extremist Lega and Fratelli d’Italia. A key development showing the broader appeal of nationalist politics in the last two years is the attachment of other agendas to a variety of nationalist ideas. In Britain, the Gove/Johnson wing of the Conservatives and the Corbynite side of Labour both regard Brexit as an opportunity to further their ideological models of the state, economy and society.

Nationalist rebels are no longer confined to fringe parties. In 2018, nationalists in power will need to prove that their solutions work or find ways to explain failure. It will be worth keeping a close watch on the success of Trump’s tax reforms and anti-immigration measures, whether difficulties in Brexit negotiations outweigh Brexiteer national liberation optimism, and the continued role of anti-immigration sentiment in polls such as Italy’s general election in March. Italy, still mired in the overtly racist debate as to the political rights of Italian blood, is also an excellent example of how the simple politics of birth and blood rights triumph in the face of complex economic problems and the failure or incapacity of mainstream politics to address them. In France, while Macron’s 2017 election is regarded as a centrist victory, Le Pen will indubitably benefit should he fail to address urgent grievances or please the complex “neither left nor right” coalition that brought him to power.

Crucially, the success of nationalists will not be assessed as an objective truth. As Trump, Putin, and the Brexiteers showed, one of the greatest successes of the contemporary nationalists is to link truth to identity rather than fact, expertise, reliability or science and treat criticism as sabotage or fake news. That is, as we have seen with Trump’s unwavering supporters, the believability of politicians will be determined by their identitarian credentials. In my assessment, this will aggravate the bubble effect where believability is determined by identity and political tribalism, leading to further radicalisation.

Much depends on the extent to which nationalists can address acute economic and social grievances on the ground as well as the sinking hopelessness for the future felt by the young. They might, as Trump has done over the past year, claim betrayal as an excuse for delay or failure. Ultimately, the future rests on whether the loose and small electoral constituencies forged by nationalists continue to believe in identity birthright as a political paradigm.

 

Nationalism: tales of love, fear, and hatred
A short documentary that explores the re-emergence of nationalism in our time, explaining how it works, why is it so powerful, and why it has returned. Written by Dr Pablo de Orellana of King’s College London and directed by Fernanda Marin of OuiShare Paris, the film introduces identityhunters.org, a student-led initiative to analyse and explore nationalist ideas and politics around the world.

 

 

 

Dr Pablo de Orellana is a Fellow of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and Co-Chair of the KCL Research Centre in International Relations. His research focuses on nationalism, identity politics and its effects on diplomacy and public political discourse. His Twitter handle is @drdeorellana. For more information about his research and teaching, please visit https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/teachingfellows/deorellana.aspx

 

 

Image Source

Banner: http://www.leganord.org/politiche2018 

Image 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FU_cIAJn91M&feature= 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part V – Brexit Defence Implications: Mind the Gap

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By Alfonc Rakaj

Divorces are messy. They separate families by turning parents against each other as they negotiate over their assets and determine child custody rights. Furthermore, children often have to make uneasy decisions and can find themselves pitted against one of their parents while siding with the other. Such actions resemble the British attempt to divorce from the European Union (EU) following the Brexit referendum. Commentators have rushed to consider the political and economic implications of the decision while shying away from potential security and defence effects. Economic strains imposed by Brexit and the transition-related hurdles stood up by the EU will further challenge Britain’s military status and defence role in Europe and beyond.

Internal political quarrels over the nature of the Brexit are in full steam. First, it was the High Court that challenged the pathway to Brexit, then the House of Lords on specific amendments, and now, the devolved government of Scotland led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to hold a second independence referendum. While political complexities regarding the nature of the divorce get worked out, Britain’s focus shifts more towards domestic issues. In this regard, its defence objectives and capabilities face tough political and economic challenges.

As Brexiteers celebrated, financial markets panicked. The British pound lost 10 per cent of its values against the U.S. dollar, a 31-year-low for the currency and its biggest daily loss in history, as investors weighed over the uncertainties related to the decision to leave the EU. The FTSE 100, London’s Stock Exchange, fell by £120 billion overnight. A report released shortly after the referendum by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) pointed the potential negative effects of such an economic downturn on UK’s defence spending powers. The report stated that the cost of procuring military hardware by the Ministry of Defence is estimated to increase by as much as £700 million annually starting in 2018-19. That is the equivalent of 2 percent of the current defence budget. This, according to the report, will force the UK government to reconsider its budget commitments with the likelihood of needing to delay or reduce its planned acquisitions. At the time the report was published, sterling was trading at £1 per $1.30. In the period between June 2016 and March 2017, the pound has declined against its US counterpart, its value ranging between $1.20 per 1£ to $1.27. This illustrates, that the figure provided by the report could even be higher than its initial estimates.

On the bright side, Britain boasts a large defence budget, the fifth largest in the world and second only to the US among NATO members. It is one of the few NATO members able to uphold its pledge to spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defence and it recently recommitted itself to that promise. In addition, Britain’s National Strategy and Strategic Review stated its intent to increase its equipment investment by 1 per cent annually up to 2020-21, while procurement spending is expected to reach £178 billion in the next ten years. In addition, the UK government has committed itself to exempt the defence budget from further government cuts.

However, as it is often the case, the devil is in the details. Such estimates will be impacted if the UK economy slips into recession caused by a hard Brexit; further, if the sterling slips against its rivals, the purchasing powers of the UK Ministry of Defence will decline. As the UK triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, starting the negotiation to leave the EU, the Sterling’s resolve against other currencies will be tested leaving the affordability of Britain’s acquisition plans in question.

Meanwhile, a second referendum in Scotland poses challenges for the political cohesion of the United Kingdom and tests the status of Britain as a global power, and could have negative ramifications for its economy. A Scottish exit from the United Kingdom would diminish the influence of Britain as its size, its population and its market shrink. Even Britain’s core defensive capabilities would be put to test. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to free Scotland from stocking nuclear weapons. Considering that the UK’s nuclear deterrents are all located in Scotland, this would significantly challenge the status of Britain as a nuclear power. Besides that, political consequences of an independent Scotland would impact the UK’s shipbuilding industry which is located in Clyde, Scotland. A relocation of such an industry is estimated to cost the UK government £3.5 billion.

Markets are wary to huge risks. A second Scottish referendum, and possibly a breakaway of Scotland would have a negative impact on the economy and the sterling currency itself. If Scotland leaves, then the UK would have experienced a breakaway from a market of over 400 million in the EU, to a single market of less than 60 million. Still, even if Scoxit does not materialise, Brexit is likely to have a profound effect on Britain’s global outlook. Even if the UK does not change its defensive commitments in the future, leaving the EU could diminish UK’s status. There’s already speculation that France could take over its position as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in NATO. As negotiations progress, the effects will become clear while sterling and the UK economy will be severely tested. The UK defence budget will surely be impacted, the question is how much and to what extent.

Alfonc Rakaj is a student in the War Studies Program and is a Chevening Scholar pursuing an MA in International Relations at King’s College London.

Image credit: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-security-will-we-be-more-or-less-safe-a7058551.html

 

 

 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part IV – Hard Brexit & Europe’s Foreign Policy Challenges

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By Aaron Burnett

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe” – British Prime Minister Theresa May. Photo credit: Jason Alden/Bloomberg

 

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe,” British Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her lengthy Brexit speech before heading to Washington, where she tried to secure Donald Trump’s support for the NATO Alliance he called “obsolete” only weeks before. Indeed, as Mrs. May sets out her plans for “a Global Britain” while paradoxically announcing that the UK would leave the world’s largest single market, i.e. the European Union (EU), she emphasized her wish for continued UK-EU security cooperation.

Coming to practical terms with such an agreement is both complex and unprecedented. The EU has signed ten Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) with countries like Canada and Brazil. But negotiations for a similar SPA between the UK and EU will not involve deepening existing diplomatic ties, but loosening them— with profoundly negative implications for British foreign policy.

As May’s early White House visit suggests, the UK remains resolutely committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even as it stumbles out of the EU. Other than the UK, 21 NATO states are also EU members, allowing Britain to retain multilateral military cooperation with its European allies even in a post-Brexit era. However, many foreign policy decisions are increasingly made at the EU-level. These include European sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea, sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program, and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens to incentivize that country towards greater democratization and political reform. The monthly meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council will soon function without the UK in the room. Britain will also lose its vote in the council meetings once Article 50 — Britain’s exit clause from the EU – is triggered on 29th March 2017. As such, major decisions regarding European security will likely be made in Paris or Berlin in the future. The question is the degree with which London will be consulted when its agreement is no longer required to carry an EU-level vote.

The “Canada Model,” referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently agreed to by both the EU and Canada following seven years of negotiations, is often cited as a potential template for a future EU-UK free trade deal. Similarly, the EU-Canada SPA gives us some clues as to what the future EU-UK security cooperation might look like. The EU-Canada SPA outlines common positions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Court, counterterrorism, and other areas of declared mutual interests. It also establishes bilateral consultation mechanisms such as an annual EU-Canada Summit and Joint Ministerial Committee co-chaired by the Canadian Foreign Minister and EU High Representative. Unlike Canada however, the UK maintains the sixth-strongest military in the world, a permanent UN Security Council seat and, rather obviously, remains geographically part of Europe. Thus, EU-UK security cooperation will remain higher than the EU-Canada level.

Months after the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May followed in the footsteps of previous British prime ministers vowing to veto increased EU military cooperation. It’s a rather peculiar statement from May especially considering that she will lose that veto right as soon as Article 50 is triggered. For its part, the remaining EU-27 will maintain that any deal the UK receives post-Brexit will have to leave it worse off than if it was an EU member. “Whoever wishes to leave this family cannot expect to give up all its obligations while holding on to its privileges,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before her Parliament shortly after the June referendum, receiving widespread applause. To achieve pragmatic security cooperation, the UK will have to accept an EU that makes decisions without it—including choices it may have vetoed had it still been a member. That may be difficult for a government that sees itself as implementing a referendum decision won on the basis of “taking back control”. On the continental side, one can expect increased influence from France, Spain, and Italy. Germany, as the EU’s reluctant leader, will be expected to increase its foreign policy leadership further yet.

On security cooperation, the UK is likely to continue sharing intelligence with its European allies to thwart terrorist attacks, implying that Britain will retain membership in Europol. The UK has made the decision to opt into Europol even after  Brexit, despite Denmark’s recent withdrawal from the agency. It would be unprecedented for a non-EU member to enjoy full Europol membership, but British withdrawal from Europol would be a setback for counterterrorism in Europe. One estimate holds that Britain is involved in sharing intelligence for nearly 40 percent of all cases that pass through Europol. Non-EU states also maintain liaison offices with Europol. The United States liaison office boasts around 20 officers, while it’s estimated that Norway enjoys roughly 80 percent of the agency’s membership benefits. Although not guaranteed, negotiations on internal security are less likely to descend into acrimony than other aspects of the Brexit talks.

All this considered, Brexit is highly unlikely to make Europe safer. The UK is set to lose a major source of its global influence and it’s not clear yet exactly how the remaining EU-27 will step in to fill that vacuum. Common decision-making and even counterterrorism coordination are likely to be more difficult in the future. On foreign policy especially, Brexit negotiations will not be about creating a stronger security partnership, but about minimizing the damage from the current arrangements.

Aaron Burnett is a current International Peace & Security MA student at King’s College London. He has previously interned with the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, United Nations, and German Council on Foreign Relations. He also holds a Master in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Journalism.

Notes:

“Brexit: The Security Dilemma”. Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP, Conservatives in the European Parliament (ECR Group). February 2017.

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part III – Security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws

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By: Felix Manig

The United Kingdom has remained largely unaffected by the refugee crisis which has rocked the Middle East and much of Europe over the last few years. As the UK has one of Western Europe’s most stringent refugee policies in place already, the Guardian recently placed Prime Minister Theresa May ahead of Donald Trump in her attempts to undermine the global refugee system.  Now, post-Brexit negotiations and political messaging of an anti-refugee nature have the potential to further shift European refugee policy to the right and result in tangible security risks for Britain’s military and counterterrorism strategies.

‘Refugee’ System in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has always retained opt-out clauses for most EU asylum policies, including the 2016 relocation quota of 160,000 asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and North Africa. Post-Brexit statements by Theresa May on asylum policies now point to a clear refusal to accept more refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, pledging a meagre number of 20,000 resettlements into Britain over the next four years. Instead, the PM believes that strengthening capacities and resources directly in the affected regions would help refugees more than bringing them to Europe. This February, the Government ended its commitment to the so-called ‘Dubs’ scheme, an agreement under which Britain pledged to take in vulnerable lone child refugees from camps in France, Italy and Greece. May also announced a campaign to leave the European Court of Human Rights, a separate entity from the EU, but representing a move which would discharge Britain from the special appeal rights and legal protections the Court extends to refugees.

Shifting European Refugee Policy

Perhaps the more far-reaching implications for refugees will manifest themselves in how Britain’s departure from the EU has the potential to further shift asylum and immigration legislation to the right of the political spectrum in remaining member states. A particular danger lies in the scapegoating and conflating asylum seekers and refugees, who are protected by international law under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention vis-a-vis more structural European problems such as economic marginalisation of rural areas and questions of national identity. Politicians in Europe already cater heavily to nationalistic and identity-driven sentiments to gain votes. This year, it is likely that far-right populists will gain votes in important elections such as in Germany, the Netherlands, and particularly in France. Most EU states have already passed sweeping legislation to strictly limit refugee inflows for the next few years. Anti-immigrant sentiments and hate crimes against refugees have reached all-time highs throughout the EU. A recent European-wide Chatham House study found that 55 per cent of respondents would like to see all future migration from Muslim-majority countries stopped. The prime victim of such developments is inevitably the asylum seekers who flee armed conflict and persecution.

UK Security risks for military and counterterrorism strategies

From a strict national security perspective, barring refugees from entry and catering to islamophobic sentiments in the population may create both immediate and more long-term security risks for Britain in its military operations overseas and counterterrorism efforts.  In August 2016, the BBC obtained pictures showing British special forces operating in Syria. While the UK Ministry of Defence declined to comment on the presence of personnel in the region, it should not come as a surprise to see limited ground operations taking place to complement the air campaign against Islamic State in Levant (ISIL) and other jihadist groups. However, the success of such missions often hinges on effective intelligence sharing and cooperation with local partners from host governments and their respective intelligence agencies. Extreme anti-immigration laws and the appeasement of nationalistic constituencies will lead partners to question the sincerity of their cooperation and the sustainability of their relationships with the United Kingdom.

On a more basic level, soldiers may also depend on translators and guides, who put themselves and their families in danger for assisting foreign troops. In 2015, a number of MPs warned that Britain will struggle to recruit interpreters in future conflict zones if it declines them shelter and asylum after completing their missions. Should tighter immigration and asylum legislation result in a culture of suspicion and alienation, the repercussions for the British military and the success of their operations would be considerable.

Constricting refugee flows and engaging in political messaging of an anti-refugee rhetoric nature also directly plays into the hands of groups like ISIL in two distinct ways. For one, refugees fleeing the region represent the inherent failure of the Islamic State and its envisioned society. By closing avenues and opportunities to escape violence and persecution, keeping civilians confined to the territory of ISIL will allow the group to continue to target non-combatants and extort money for arms and recruitment through taxes.

According to the UK’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, individuals within the United Kingdom who are at risk of radicalisation currently pose the biggest threat to national security. ISIL and other jihadist terrorist organisations directly benefit from Western anti-refugee rhetoric and legislation because it appears to reinforce their narrative of ‘Islam versus the West’. Adding fire to the propaganda messages of ISIL by contributing to the marginalisation and implicit criminalisation of mainly Muslim communities may pose a serious danger and contribute to radicalisation at home.

Accepting well-vetted refugees can have national security benefits when dealing with global terrorism as it pushes back against the idea of a cultural and religious war between the West and Islam. Incoming individuals may become part of a counter-narrative which is needed to push against transnational terrorist networks and their developing recruitment strategies.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. He is Series Editor at StrifeBlog and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2016/09/14/19/49/barbed-wire-1670222_960_720.jpg

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part II – Stormy Seas: The UK-US Relationship under Trump

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By: Christina Dutton

 

People demonstrate during a protest at Downing Street in central London against US President Donald Trump’s immigration ban.

 

The UK has spent the past half-century balancing two primary foreign policy commitments: its membership in the European Union (EU) and its ‘special relationship’ with the United States (USA). Primed and ready to pull the trigger on Article 50, However, Britain seems to be leaning hardest on its American ally at the worst possible time – after the election of President Donald Trump.

Brexit supporters feel validated by President Trump’s support for the country’s exit from the EU, while others worry about his strong “America First” policy.

What does this mean for the future of this historic Anglo-American relationship? Political commentators stand at the ready, critiquing every speech, meeting and tweet coming out of Washington, while UK leaders are forced to play a torturous waiting game. This is a special relationship, indeed. While some may have once cast Britain as the Greeks to  America’s Romans, such a parallel would require some form of veneration for the ailing UK – and Trump has little interest-holding vigil for anyone. His policies and decision-making patterns are proving hard to predict. Nevertheless, both sides seem to have renewed their support of the special relationship. No one is more dedicated to this cause than Prime Minister Theresa May, who seemed to have hurled herself towards her American ally by extending an invitation to the UK in January to welcome President Trump into office and to reaffirm the relationship. Many, including Trump, have been quick to draw a parallel between the close relationship between President Ronald Reagan and PM Margaret Thatcher and future relations between President Donald Trump and PM Theresa May, suggesting that leaders of the two countries will work together quite closely. While Trump may enjoy the historic romanticism of calling May ‘my Maggie’ for now, he is also keenly aware of the position in which he sits, and that May has very few cards to play. Those she does have may just turn out to be irrelevant to his future plans.

Traditionally the US-UK relationship has been maintained between presidents and prime ministers. Trump may choose to change the rules of this game, as we have already seen him engaging and collaborating with other UK political figures ahead of the PM, such as conservative MP Michael Gove and former UK Independence Party leader (UKIP) Nigel Farage. Farage, in particular, has developed a bond with Trump and other American conservatives. He was even invited to speak at this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference where he was greeted with a standing ovation. During his campaign, Trump supported Farage and UKIP’s campaign for Brexit.

President Trump has been quick to set the tone of his administration – ‘America First’. His definition of what ‘America’ includes seems to be highly selective. His controversial executive orders have made quick work of overturning the more liberal initiatives championed by President Obama. Both Brexit and Trump’s election seem to have given a voice to right-wing movements across the world. Some have highlighted that pledging close alliance with the US sends a dangerous message. Rallies, marches, petitions and debates are being held worldwide rebelling these shifts occurring in these ‘liberal’ democracies.

Potentially his most controversial order on immigration, now dubbed the “Muslim Ban,” regardless of its legality, puts Britain in a difficult position. Trump’s views on immigration stand in direct opposition to those of German chancellor Angela Merkel. Aligning too closely with Trump may sever any remaining ties or chances at negotiating new agreements with EU leaders. At present, Britain runs the risk of standing too close and getting scorched by Trump’s options or standing too far and being cast out into the cold.

Trump presented a renewed sense of hope for strengthening trade relations with the UK in contrast to Obama’s position that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ following Brexit. Theresa May seems determined to make things work, while also attempting to keep Trump somewhat in check. The US and the UK worked very closely to impose sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea, and maintain a ceasefire between the Ukraine army and pro-Russian rebels as part of the Minsk Agreement. However, Trump has stated that he could consider doing a deal with Russia, which would result in the lifting of sanctions. May was quick to denounce the idea during their joint press conference at the White House in January, supporting the continuation of sanctions until full implementation of the Minsk Agreement is achieved.

Additionally, during the press conference, May suggested that Trump has reaffirmed his dedication to NATO, which he had previously referred to as ‘obsolete’. Trump’s views on the NATO partnership worry many in the alliance, particularly when it comes to honouring the agreement in reference to Russia. Trump’s recent proposal to increase the US defence budget spending by almost ten per cent will also result in some benefits for NATO. With incremental spending cuts on the UK’s own armed services, the UK would be wise to maintain its longstanding relationship with US armed forces and keep them as their closest military ally.

The future of this special relationship will probably remain vague until the triggering of Article 50 and the UK is formally in a position to negotiate bilateral trade agreements. But until then, it is hard to map out the future of this relationship. By then, Trump may have found a new best friend – be it Russia or another power. At the same time, the legitimacy of Trump’s administration seems to be challenged on a daily basis, with reports of pre-election backroom chats and corrupt advisors shaking the legitimacy of his administration.

As Trump proves to be a volatile force, Theresa May must remain vigilant for now. It is her hand that must steady the rudder of this special relationship.

Christina Dutton(@cbdutton111) is pursuing an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College. She received her undergraduate degree at the University of St Andrews in International Relations, and works at a consultancy in the City of London providing research and risk assessment. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/763514/Donald-Trump-travel-ban-US-court-rejects-appeal-reinstate-Muslim