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Arctic Maritime Security Series

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – The Arctic Race – Western Sanctions, Energy Resources and Challenges to Arctic Maritime Security

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Ice Camp Skate in support of Ice Exercise 2018. Photo Credit: US Department of Defense, Public Domain.

Bordered by five states — Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States (US) — the Arctic Region is a resource bonanza, it is rich in both proven and unproven resources. It is estimated that the Arctic Region holds around 22% of the world’s undiscovered energy resources, much of which lies below melting sea ice, making the region a potential flashpoint for conflicting offshore claims. Environmental changes like melting sea ice, may make it easier to exploit these resources and raise tensions in the Far North. But key questions remain. What are the risks and challenges associated with the development of new energy resources in the Arctic and how will the Western sanctions against Russia affect the Arctic arms race?

Arctic energy exploitation has been ongoing since the early 1920s. And major resource extraction dates back even earlier, to the Klondike Gold Rush in 19th-century Alaska and 19th century whaling. Today, the US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic region accounts for 13% of the total undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas.

Around 84% of these resources are located offshore in the Arctic Ocean, making it a region of strategic importance for Arctic states and a potential resource battleground.

Within the Arctic, energy reserves are not distributed equally among Arctic states. Russia, for instance, accounts for around eighty percent of its remaining offshore oil and gas reserves in the Arctic Ocean, with the American resources constituting around 33% and 18% of the total recoverable offshore oil and gas for the whole region. The economic development of energy resources is also unequal and exacerbated by unequal production and exploitation. Norway ranks first in terms of gas production, despite having low access to offshore gas resources. Yet despite these discrepancies, this large amount of estimated resources has attracted the attention of various actors and competitors, from coastal and external states to private and lobbying companies. For instance, the Russian Federation has lately proposed opening its Arctic shelf to private energy companies, and intensified modernisation programmes for Arctic energy development. Bringing about concerns for a race to develop Arctic energy resources, Russia has pushed for new trade and shipping routes, established partnerships with external actors such as China and Saudi Arabia, and developing new pipelines, notably the ambitious Arctic Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 2 project. Despite the recent international sanctions on Russia and the halt in construction on the pipeline, years of increasing investments and multinational cooperation with other countries such as France, Korea and Japan, signal that the pipeline may yet have a future, albeit one that straddles geopolitical fault lines. Cancelled since the start of the war in Ukraine, deals like the LNG 2 project nonetheless demonstrate how Russia has added new players to the gamble for Arctic.

The arrival of new actors in the region, drawn by energy resources, increases the risks of conflict, as well as encroachment of new shipping routes over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Arctic nations have various, competing claims over the extent of their EEZs over the Arctic Ocean, notably Russia. Despite international agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Russia has frequently lodged submissions to extend its continental shelf next to Danish and Canadian EEZs, striving for access to extended rights of energy resources exploitation. As much as these claims do not indicate future conflicts over borders and continental shelves, they still illustrate how the race for Arctic energy resources institutionalises Arctic maritime security at the international legal level.

Furthermore, private and state-owned energy companies are also increasingly eyeing towards the Arctic for hydrocarbon drilling and exploitation like the British multinational oil and gas company Shell plc, or Russia’s semi-private and semi state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft. As the degree of state involvement in these companies varies, it indicates a divergence in policy frameworks for energy exploitation, and hence in the applicability of international regulations to private corporations. The sanctions against Russian energy giants Rosneft and Gazprom will surely tip the edge of the Arctic race, as Russian companies risk losing the benefits of their exploitation and production, given their dependence on Western technologies. Besides, Russia has seen its export markets shrink since the start of the war. Yet despite such challenges, Russia is unlikely to halt its Arctic developments. As Russia President Vladimir Putin had already stated in 2019, “sanctions have not stopped Russian Arctic hydrocarbons development.” And while the impact of the current sanctions on Russia is unclear and has largely avoided targeting the Russian energy sector, it remains that Russia will turn towards Asian markets, and increase its military presence in the North.

Tension between increasing availability and exploitability of offshore energy resources as a result of global warming, and concerns about the environmental impact of resource exploitation is another fault line in the Arctic. The emission of greenhouse gases has doubled in the last two decades, leading to increasing temperatures, rising sea level and melting ice. Companies such as Shell have considered increasing offshore drilling during summer, as ice melting continues opening new possibilities for oil extraction. However, critics argue hat this may risk further endangering maritime biodiversity, including the particular fauna and flora endemic to the region. What is more, the consequences of oil spills would be tremendous and further risk endangering human security in the whole Northern Pole. To mitigate the risks posed to the environment, some border states have launched initiatives to preserve Arctic biodiversity. The US has notably passed under Congress voting the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (1960), establishing  the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Tasked with protecting Arctic wilderness on the Alaskan territory and territorial waters, the ANWR is nonetheless subject to frequent Congress votings to pass legislations authorising the opening of some areas of the refuge to drilling and exploitation. Hence, resource exploitation risks taking precedence over environmental issues. The multiplication of transit routes and resources exploitation may well degrade the safety of sea routes, with frequent glacier melt endangering maritime circulation. Coupled with climate change, this concern for the preservation of Arctic biodiversity indicates well some challenges for Arctic environmental security at the maritime level. Indeed, the more fuels are burned for drilling resources, the more greenhouse gases are emitted. And the more such gases are created, the more glaciers melt, opening new routes and opportunities for offshore drilling. Further complicating the situation is that further Western sanctions on Russia will also risk jeopardising any environmental framework that could have existed between Arctic states.

The development and exploitation of energy resources in the Arctic present economic, environmental and human challenges for Arctic maritime security. The involvement of multiple actors and powers in resources drilling and exploitation, not yet heralding military or border conflicts, nonetheless risks endangering coastal states’ economic and environmental security, as competition is sure to take its toll on environmental cooperation. Western sanctions on Russia will speed the Arctic energy race up by closing Western markets to Russian resources and forcing Russia to turn towards alternative markets, hence bringing even more spotlight to the Arctic region. The multiplication of actors and EEZ claims risk increasing as Russia will strive to develop its access to offshore resources to satisfy new markets. The Arctic race may now lead to tensions over energy resources, amid renewed concerns over climate change. The Western sanctions on Russia will need to be even more focused to counter any Russian Arctic assertive endeavour.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – China’s economic activity as a reflection of Arctic great power competition

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Dr. Huigen Yang, Director of the Polar Research Institute of China leads China’s first successful attempt at crossing the Arctic using a non-icebreaking vessel. The expedition proved the possibility of transporting goods across the Northeastern passage using cargo ships. Source: International Polar Foundation, Licensed under Creative Commons

As global warming melts the sea ice in the Arctic, the region is being thrust into a new geopolitical environment. Changing geographies present emerging opportunities for resource extraction and new shipping routes but can also lead to increased militarisation and insecurity. The region is gaining significance on a global level, not limited to competition between the Arctic states. China’s attempt to establish itself as an Arctic great power is of concern to many Arctic states who worry this will affect global and regional power balances. I argue that Chinese economic activity in the Arctic demonstrates the increasing geopolitical importance of the region, as its resources produce potential trends for great power competition.

Despite being a region with several ongoing disputes, like the dispute between Canada and Denmark over Hans island, Arctic states have generally been surprisingly cooperative over regional issues. Through the Arctic Council, comprised of Arctic states and indigenous organizations, members have created a forum to address regional challenges. Governance has mainly focused on conservation, economic activity, and the preservation of Arctic indigenous communities. However, global warming is drastically changing the Arctic geopolitical environment as maritime control over and access to the Arctic Ocean gains economic and strategic importance. As a result, the Arctic as a region, is gaining political and economic significance. For example, Russian officials are politicising Russia’s Arctic heritage with arguments like “The Arctic is Russian Mecca” to legitimise increasing their military presence in the region.

By 2050, melting sea ice may trigger substantial changes to the global economy as trans-Arctic shipping routes will become accessible and can connect up to 75% of the world’s population and create new links from Asia to Europe. It is expected that the Northeastern Passage, also called the Northern Sea Route, will reduce the transit shipping time from Asia to Europe by 40% compared to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, as the sea ice melts natural resources will become accessible for extraction. The US government estimates that “the region holds an estimated 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves, 13% of global conventional oil reserves, and one trillion dollars’ worth of rare minerals” that await commercial exploitation.

Despite the relatively peaceful nature of Arctic governance today, Arctic states are already accounting and preparing for the threat of increased regional competition. In 2021, the US Navy published `A Blue Arctic´, a strategic document that proposed a regional blueprint for how naval power can be used to preserve American maritime interests in the Arctic in an era of great power competition. Significantly, the paper highlights Russia and China as the two biggest potential competitors for Arctic resources and maritime dominance. As a great power with historical links to the Arctic, more than half of Arctic coastline, and what is already the strongest military presence in the Arctic, it is not surprising that Russia is highlighted as a potential competitor. However, China has historically shown minimal interest in the Arctic, and it is geographically and culturally distant from the region. Why then, would the US specifically argue that China’s “demonstrated intent to gain access and influence of Arctic states… presents a threat to people and nations, including those who call the Arctic region home?”

In an attempt to legitimise increased influence in the region, China has identified itself as a “Near-Arctic state.” China argues that it holds geographical proximity to the Arctic Circle so significant that: “The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests.” Through a conscious identity-formation which interlinks itself with the Arctic, China attempts to legitimise itself as a significant stakeholder in Arctic affairs. This Chinese attempt at legitimisation has already manifested itself in a variety of activities aimed at supporting China’s interests in the region. An extent of Arctic identity may allow China influence in Arctic governance and its development, this agency will become important when policies and regulations over the Arctic’s shipping routes and resources will be determined. Highlighting some sort of shared identity with Arctic states can also be hoped to portray that Chinese Arctic involvement will be driven by common interests and cooperation.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Promoted as a project to increase economic interdependence and trade relations, has met resistance as it provides them with economic power over its participating states. It is therefore significant that the BRI plans to extend into Arctic maritime shipping through a `Polar Silk Road´ along the Northeastern Passage. China’s 2018 white paper, “China’s Arctic Policy,”outlines the intention to develop infrastructure for shipping routes which they expect will become important for international trade. Chinese investments in infrastructure for maritime trade will be of great economic significance to Russia where most of these investments will occur and would increase Arctic cooperation. A Polar Silk Road of Arctic maritime infrastructure nested under the BRI will finally give Russia the chance to become a major maritime power.

However, China’s influence in the region could challenge Russia’s position due to the likelihood of resource competition. Though the Arctic is expected to possess vast natural resources these alone will not satisfy future global energy insecurity, which may yet increase with future energy demands.  More Chinese influence in the Arctic could interfere with Russia’s desire to have a monopoly on exporting Arctic energy, and to do so at the highest possible profit. This is critical to Russia because the Russian economy is largely reliant upon energy exports which has been estimated to stand for 60% of its GDP, since the invasion of Ukraine Western sanctions have only made it more so. In Central Asia, China’s BRI has challenged Russia’s monopoly on purchasing Uzbek gas that Russia would resell for a high profit to Europe. China is using the BRI to control foreign energy prices by using the BRI’s investments to control who the participating states can export energy to and ensure that China purchases this at the lowest possible cost. Competition in the energy sector is intensifying competition between China and Russia and is likely to spill over into Arctic great power dynamics. Already, China’s dependence on foreign supplies of oil is at nearly 60%, most of which comes from the Middle East and Africa. As the MENA region is still experiencing instability it may be deemed an insecure source for energy supplies. Arctic energy, therefore, becomes attractive for China as the gradual genesis of the Arctic political and security environment presents less complexity compared to other energy-rich regions.

In the Nordic states, increased Chinese economic activity has been received with limited enthusiasm. China’s BRI has expressed interest in developing commercial port infrastructure in the Norwegian coastal town of Kirkenes to link it with the Polar Silk Road. Though the local community has engaged with the Chinese over the opportunity to develop Kirkenes, the Norwegian authorities remain suspicious of Chinese investments on such a large scale. The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) presents the increased Chinese influence alongside investments in Arctic military capabilities as potential causes for great power competition in the Arctic. In fact, the NIS argues that Chinese investments in Norwegian infrastructure are a potential threat to national security because it provides China with the opportunity of mapping vulnerabilities.

Chinese influence on Greenland, an island nation under Danish sovereignty, has in recent years increased tensions between the Greenlandic local authorities and the Danish government. Not only does Greenland hold geostrategic importance due to its proximity to the Northwest Passage, but it’s home to the United States’ key Thule Air Base and the island is also expected to hold large mineral deposits under melting glaciers. Danish intelligence perceives Chinese investments in Greenland as a potential threat because Greenland’s small economy would be vulnerable to China’s significant soft power. China’s effort to purchase an old US-naval base and to invest in two airports on Greenland was refused by Danish authorities due to security concerns. However, the Danish veto was unpopular in Greenland as Chinese investments would have a significant effect on the national GDP. Simultaneously, China has communicated support for increasing indigenous influence in Arctic governance which has been well-received by Greenland’s majorly Inuit population.

The weight of Chinese investments is already creating conflicting interests between local Arctic communities and national authorities as national security interests clash with local economic development goals. Through economic activity, China is not only attempting to strengthen its soft power but is also creating tensions between Nordic authorities and the local population of territories with geostrategic importance.

Even though China is mainly strengthening its economic power, its presence in the Arctic has created legitimate security concerns for the Arctic states. Through economic influence in the local communities China hopes to gain access to points of future geopolitical and strategic value. Arctic natural resources will be important for the increasing global energy insecurity, particularly for energy-poor nations such as China which is relying upon the import of foreign energy to sustain the domestic industry. Access to and control over global resource flows has historically fuelled great power competition due to the economic significance. China’s efforts to develop infrastructure to facilitate and control maritime shipping in future Arctic lanes and the resistance it is receiving from most Arctic states showcases this importance. Thus, China’s economic activity in the Arctic shows how great powers expect the region to become important for global power balances and a willingness to compete over its resources.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – Climate and the Securitisation of the Arctic

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A Russian icebreaker in the Arctic. Source: NASA, Public Domain.

The intersection of drastic climate change and the increasing securitisation of the Arctic is an issue policymakers and scientists cannot afford to ignore. With rising tensions between Russia and the West and prolonged disputes between the various eight Arctic States, Arctic conflict is increasingly a possibility despite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—the broad legal framework governing our oceans, including the Arctic, the work of the Arctic Council—and a general history of cooperation in the region. An increased likelihood of conflict is a direct result of increased securitisation of the rapidly changing, warming region that has historically remained excluded from global conflicts. Resolving this securitisation will require concerted cooperation between many states with competing interests across several issues, including territorial claims, climate change, and natural resource extraction.

Much of the geopolitical tension across the Arctic plays out in the maritime domain and is exacerbated by climate change. Because the region is easier to access due to melting sea ice and technological developments, arctic states are deploying more naval vessels for exploration, scientific studies, and defence posturing. Melting sea ice and increased accessibility can rekindle dormant territorial claims, or spark new ones, as new islands are uncovered and borders shift.

Future maritime skirmishes are likely to be limited to security incidents over local territorial claims, which could be initiated by climate change and technological advancements, which may lead to larger conflicts in the region. Despite the currently peaceful and passive nature of the contested territorial claims in the region, the combination of increased securitisation interwoven and climate change might collapse this fragile Arctic peace.

The Changing Arctic

The Arctic has been disproportionately affected by climate change and the region continues to warm over twice as fast as the rest of the world. From a maritime perspective, the most influential changes lie in the rapid decline of sea ice thickness, area covered, and age over the last few decades–determining factors. Recent studies suggest that there is a 60% probability that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free by the 2030s, which are only reinforced after disappointment in the lacklustre commitments and outcomes at the UN COP26 climate conference in Glasgow. Less sea ice and more open water not only impacts the Arctic’s important function in regulating global climate patterns but also redefines the boundaries of geopolitics: especially transportation.

It is now easier than ever to access the Arctic shipping routes like the Northwest Passage through Canada and the Northern Sea Route, sometimes called the Northeast Passage, along the Russian coast, leading to an increased economic interest in the region. The effects of anthropogenic global warming and the ramifications of an ice-free summer in the Arctic are evident: In 2017, a Russian tanker carrying liquified natural gas from Norway to Korea traversed the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic without an ice breaker escort for the first time ever. As shipping companies increasingly look to the Arctic instead of traditional maritime routes, the increase of marine traffic may increase both tensions between Arctic states due to maritime border disputes and the propensity for maritime incidents between vessels.

The geophysical transformation of the Arctic represents an opportunity for a departure from the traditional state-centric view of international security. As the ice melts, the map of the Arctic is literally redrawn. With access to new natural resources caches and shipping routes, Arctic states are prioritising their sovereignty and territorial integrity across the region, securitising the region.

Maritime Securitisation of the Arctic

The liminal nature of ice complicates the permanence that underpins modern concepts of sovereignty.  Not only can borders within the Arctic change between decades due to the ice melt, but it also complicates subsea mapping, which is central to UNCLOS determinations. New islands are continuously found in the Arctic, previously covered by ice. This has given rise to cartopolitics to expand sovereignty claims. Some attempts have led to disputes between several Arctic states, such as the Danish claim over the Lomonosov Ridge, over which Russia and Canada also claim sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite the non-ratification of the treaty by the U.S., UNCLOS has provided the Arctic states with a successful framework from which to peacefully resolve disputes. Besides UNCLOS, the remaining portion of Arctic governance is routed primarily through bilateral agreements and the Arctic Council. However, the council focuses primarily on developmental and environmental issues. It has also been criticized due to its “weak institutional structure, soft law status and ad hoc funding system.” Fundamentally, the Arctic lacks a comprehensive legal regime analogous to that of the Antarctic Treaty.

Before melting ice began changing the geography of the Arctic, there were already tensions between many nations present in the region. Canada and the U.S.  have prolonged disputes over both the status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Canada, Denmark, and Russia have clashing continental shelf claims over the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain intersection in the Arctic basin. These prolonged disputes are reemerging as heightened security issues due to the rapidly changing Arctic.

Despite the cold nature of Arctic competition, its warming is exacerbating tensions, which could eventually lead to open conflict over conflicting territorial claims. The increased uncertainty has led to the securitisation of both climate change and the region. U.S. President Biden has stated that “climate considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and national security.” His administration also recently appointed a slew of regional experts to “advance U.S. national security and economic security interests in the Arctic to keep the region secure and stable.” Despite its status as a non-Arctic state, China’s Arctic Policy directly links maritime navigational security and climate change together as key security concerns in Arctic affairs. Russia has also expanded its military footprint in the region to protect its northern reaches, despite general (public-facing) indifference from its leaders to the dangers of climate change.

Increased military presence in the region is following the rhetorical securitization, led by the maritime assets of Arctic and non-Arctic states alike: The U.S. Coast Guard is taking steps to address key challenges in the region, and expanding its fleet of icebreakers. Russia has upgraded the administrative status of its Northern Fleet for the second time in less than a decade. China is building a new heavy icebreaker and lift vessel for the Arctic, and the Canadian Coast Guard and British Royal Navy have signed a new agreement with Arctic cooperation. The increased number of naval vessels, in an area twelve times smaller than the Pacific Ocean, with at least as many competing interests, could easily lead to maritime incidents between naval forces.

Moving Forward

Climate change-induced transformation of the Arctic has increasingly led to its securitisation by numerous Arctic and non-Arctic states. The result is the increased presence of maritime assets in the region, which raises the propensity for Arctic conflict, and require concerted cooperation between states to manage. The rising tensions in the Arctic highlight the increasingly prominent intersection of climate change and geopolitics. While there is a need for global cooperation and continued information sharing between states, their militaries, and international organisations to reduce the likelihood of conflict in the region, the extensive problem of climate change and its contributory role in conflict remains unsolved. Comprehensive national security strategy should not only prepare for a ‘world on fire’, but also proactively work to reduce anthropogenic climate contributions to avoid conflict in the Arctic and beyond.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – ‘Wait, it’s always been militarized?’ The Royal Danish Navy in the Arctic

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The Knud Rasmussen class patrol ship HDMS Lauge Koch is seen from the deck of the Thetis-class offshore patrol ship HDMS Hvidbjørnen near Nuuk, Greenland, in May 2019 during an exercise. Photo Credit: Timothy Choi (original photo by author, not to be reproduced without permission)

Russian military resurgence and sea ice melt due to climate change have led to  a surge in academic and popular interest in the military balance of the circumpolar region. Many such discussions have tended to emphasize a new “militarization” in the Arctic, focusing on recent military acquisitions and exercises on the part of Russian, Chinese, and NATO members. The Kingdom of Denmark, by virtue of its defence responsibilities over the semi-autonomous territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, has received especial attention in this context. This article provides a brief overview of the capabilities and operations of three generations of the Royal Danish Navy’s (RDN) Arctic patrol fleet operating in these waters. It argues that although the RDN’s equipment reflected only a constabulary law enforcement role in the Arctic during the American-led unipolar moment, the decades preceding 1991 and years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 saw Denmark’s Arctic naval forces being adapted for notable, though limited, military tasks. This military emphasis will likely increase in the coming years. This multidecade approach reminds analysts that Arctic waters have long been militarized and regional actors have their own historical approaches to the enduring issues at play.

In the early 1960s, the RDN commissioned the four Hvidbjørnen-class offshore patrol ships, replacing the Flower-class Thetis that had been serving since the Second World War. The first in the country to be equipped with a hangar and deck for Alouette III helicopters, these new 1800-ton vessels provided a dedicated naval presence in Greenland and the Faroe Islands during the Cold War. Despite being armed with only one 76mm deck gun and basic depth charges, they were still earmarked for NATO’s SACLANT use in wartime and classified as “DE”, or destroyer escorts.[i] This reflected a unique position occupied by the Danish constabulary fleet in the Arctic, which had the only NATO ships that operated year-round in the oft-ice-covered waters of Greenland while regularly transiting the North Atlantic to and from their main bases in Denmark. These ships were also designed to be equipped with American Mk 44 antisubmarine torpedoes, though these were never fitted.[ii] The fears of Soviet submarine incursions into the waters around Greenland were not just figments of the Danish admiralty’s imagination. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Greenlandic police and Danish navy personnel either witnessed submarines on the surface or retrieved communication buoys broken off by sea ice.[iii] These military concerns were secondary to the Hvidbjørnens’ day-to-day operations, which were mostly fisheries enforcement within coastal waters. Their logbooks between 1964 and 1971 indicate the vast majority of their activities were unremarkable inspections of fishing vessels along the southwest coast of Greenland from Disko Bay to the southern tip of the island in areas well within sight of land.[iv] The fundamental soundness of the Hvidbjørnen design was proven by the acquisition of the Beskyterren, a slightly modified member of the class, in the mid 1970s in response to the establishment of the 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zone.

Regardless of the relative frequency of military versus constabulary activities, concerns over submarine incursions in Greenlandic waters during the 1980s led to enhanced antisubmarine capabilities in the form of a variable depth sonar for the Hvidbjørnens’ replacements. The new sonar was not accompanied by enhanced ASW weapons, however, and the replacement vessels maintained the single depth charge rack consistent with the “warning shot” approach of their predecessors.[v] These new ships, the four 3500-ton Thetis class, were also fitted with the “STANFLEX” containerized equipment system which theoretically allowed ships to be rapidly equipped with modules ranging from simple utility cranes to Sea Sparrow surface-to-air and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.[vi] Entering service as the Soviet Union dissolved and during the rise of American unipolarity, these ships never had the opportunity to operationalize swapping out their STANFLEX modules from peacetime equipment to wartime weapons. As of April 2021, the 2195 historical and contemporary photos on the Danish military’s photo gallery have shown no signs of any STANFLEX configuration on the Thetis-class beyond the bow 76mm and hangar-side utility cranes. The limited practicality of the modular approach was perhaps most clearly illustrated during the Thetis class’s midlife refit in the mid 2010s, when the STANFLEX slots next to the helicopter hangar were permanently replaced with hangars for rigid-hull inflatable boats that are more useful for the ships’ constabulary missions.[vii] Similarly, the variable depth sonars for locating deep-water submarines were removed from all ships during the 2000s due in part to concerns over their lack of stability when sailing at slow speeds in the ice-covered waters of coastal Greenland.[viii]

The Thetis class was augmented in the late 2000s and early 2010s with the three 1700-ton Knud Rasmussen class patrol ships. These replaced the 330-ton Agdlek class coastal cutters previously responsible for near-shore constabulary duties in Greenland and the Faroes. The Knud class’s much larger size reflected the increased concern over emergency scenarios that may arise in the 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zone which require improved seakeeping.[ix] Similar to the Thetis class, the Knud class also have STANFLEX modular equipment slots. Built with one on the forecastle and three on the helicopter deck, only one of latter has been equipped to fully interface with all modules.[x] As with the Thetis class, the Knuds’ STANFLEX slots have also not been exercised for increased armament. This is an important point, as many observers have tended to exaggerate the RDN’s ability to rapidly transition to a more robust wartime role thanks to the STANFLEX system and therefore signifying Denmark’s intention to employ military force in the region.[xi] Furthermore, the Knud class’s standard crew of 17-19 severely limits their ability to carry out multi-day operations.[xii] Without any training or crew to operate them, the physical compatibility of missile-armed STANFLEX modules is of limited utility.[xiii]

As Russia increases military activities in waters near the Danish Kingdom’s Arctic regions, there has been a notable clamor amongst the Danish navy and defence department for increased surveillance capabilities. The Danish Ministry of Defense’s 2016 document Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis, or which roughly translates to Future Missions in the Arctic, outlined a blueprint for of the RDN in the Arctic and highlighted an explicit interest in increasing the military capabilities of Danish naval units in the region especially in the context of the Thetis class replacement. As interim measures, the RDN has deployed its Iver Huitfeldt air defence frigates and Absalon class support ships to Greenlandic and Faroese waters in recent summers. These large 6000-ton vessels were designed to support Denmark’s post-Cold War policy of expeditionary operations in support of NATO missions far from home waters, but the concerns over increased Arctic military activity have resulted in their deployment to spaces traditionally reserved for constabulary concerns. Despite their lack of ice-strengthening, their more advanced radars were deemed necessary to provide aerospace awareness in parts of Greenland.[xiv]

Denmark’s naval forces in the Arctic have long had military roles since the Second World War, despite a predominant concern with constabulary tasks such as fisheries inspections. Popular discussions over the “new” militarization of Arctic spaces ignore the very long history of naval forces in the region. At the same time, the military capabilities of the RDN should not be exaggerated, as the limitations of personnel and logistics dramatically limit the practicality of modular weaponry.

[i] Søværnets Materielkommando, “Status Report on Material for NATO Naval Forces and Maritime Patrol Air Forces—Part 1—Initial Equipment: Form ‘A’: Country: Denmark” (1970 and 1971 versions), 5012 Søværnets Materielkommando: 1970–1985 KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret): 1968–1971 mm. Rigsarkivet [Danish National Archives].

[ii] Peter Bogason, Søværnet under den Kolde Krig – Politik, strategi og taktik (Snorres Forlag, 2016), 192.

[iii] Forsvarsministeriet, “Redegørelse for undervandsbådsobservationer ved Grønland.” Billæg [Attachment] 99, July 25, 1983, in 0028 Forsvarsministeriet Ministersekretariatet: 1976-1992 Emneordnede sager: Udvalg – Folketingets Forsvarsudvalg 1982-1983. Rigsarkivet [Danish National Archives]; Peter Nyholm and Christian Brøndum, “De mystiske ubåde ved Grønland,” Berlingske, October 31, 2015, https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/de-mystiske-ubaade-ved-groenland; Tom Wismann, Inspektionsskibene af Hvidbjørnen–klassen 1961–1992 (Helsinge, Denmark: Steel & Stone Publishing, 2015), 28; Per Herholdt Jensen, Støt Kurs: Flåden ved Grønland i 275 år – Grønlands Kommando i 60 år (Nautilus Forlag, 2011), 243.

[iv] Grønlands Kommando, Fiskeriarkiv Nr 4. 20/5 – 1964 til 28/3 – 1967, in V. Materiale vedr. fiskeriinspektionstjeneste (1924-1971) V-7, Søværnets Operative Kommando, Rigsarkivet [Danish National Archives]. Other logbooks referenced from the same box are as follows: Orlogskutterne Mallemukken og Teisten: 27-8 – 1960 til 2/6 – 1971; Fiskeriarkiv Nr. 2: 16/9 – 1964 til 10/12 – 1969; Fiskeriarkiv Nr. 3: 12/9 – 1969 til 31/3 – 1970, 12/11 – 29/11 1963; and Fiskeriarkiv Nr. 3: 6-14/7 – 1967, 1/2 – 1970 til 11/6 – 1971.

[v] Folketinget, “Første behandling af beslutningsforslag nr. B 114: Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om begyndende erstatningsbyggeri af helikopterbærende fiskeriinspektionsskibe til Grønland og Færøerne: Af Pelle Voigt (SF) m. Fl. (Fremsat 26/2 85).” Tillæg F, 1984-1985 session of Folketinget, March 21, 1985: 7802-7803.

[vi] Pelle Voigt (SF) et al., ”Beslutningsforslag nr. B 114. Fremsat den 26. februar 1985 af Pelle Voigt (SF), Margrete Auken (SF), Leif Hermann (SF), Hanne Thanning Jacobsen (SF), Gert Petersen (SF) og Ebba Strange (SF). Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om begyndende erstatningsbyggeri af helikopterbærende fiskeriinspektionsskibe til Grønland og Færøerne.” Tillæg A, 1984-1985 session of Folketinget, February 26, 1985: 3794.

[vii] The scope and extent of the refit was also confirmed during observations on board HDMS Hvidbjørnen in May 2019.

[viii] Interviews and observations on board HDMS Hvidbjørnen, May 2019, and Danish Defence Image Gallery at http://www.forsvarsgalleriet.dk/.

[ix] Per Herholdt Jensen, Grønlandssejlerne: Flådens Inspektionskuttere og Inspektionsfartøjer (Frederiksværk, Denmark: Nautilus Forlag, 2010), 190-191.

[x] Forsvarskommissionen, Bilagsbind 1: Dansk forsvar—Globalt Engagement: Beretningfra Forsvarskommissionen af 2008 (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 2009), 87, 100. (Appendix 1 to the 2008 Danish Defence Commission Report).

[xi] Examples include the following: Rob Huebert, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic?” in Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, eds. Myron H. Nordquist, Tomas H. Heidar, and John Norton Moore (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 53; Robert Smol, “Understanding the Delusion and the Reality behind Canada’s Offshore Patrol Ships,” Canadian Naval Review 14, No. 2 (2018): 26; Frederic Lasserre, Jérôme Le Roy, Richard Garon, “Is there an arms race in the Arctic?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14, No. 3&4 (2012): 1–2; Bob Weber, “Denmark joins Arctic arms race,” The Star, July 26, 2009; Doug Thomas, “Warship Developments: Those Innovative Danes!” Canadian Naval Review 4, no. 1 (2008): 40-41; Commodore Mike Cooper (Ret’d), “Comment about ‘Those Innovative Danes’,” Canadian Naval Review 4, no. 2 (2008): 34.

[xii] Interviews with Danish naval officers on HDMS Hvidbjørnen, May 2019; Adam Lajeunesse, “Canada’s Arctic Offshore and Patrol Ships (AOPS): Their history and purpose,” Marine Policy 124 (2021), 6.

[xiii] Interviews with Danish naval officers and crew of HDMS Hvidbjørnen, May 2019.

[xiv] Arktisk Kommando, ”Træning med udenlandske flådeenheder ved Grønlands vestkyst,” Forsvaret.dk, August 22, 2019; Lars Bøgh Vinther , “Fregat afløses I Arktis,” Forsvaret.dk, July 16, 2019; Thomas Ahrenkiel, Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 2016), 233.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – The US Navy should buy Ice Breakers

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US Coast Guard Cutter Healy (WAGB-20) and the Canadian Coast Guard Ship Louis S. St-Laurent (LSSL) performing Arctic operations in 2011. Source: US Department of State, Public Domain.

In 1940, the German Navy crew on board Kriegsmarine auxiliary cruiser Komet wreaked havoc on Allied merchant vessels in the Pacific. They would ultimately meet their demise in the Atlantic, but not before helping sink 41,000 tons of allied shipping in the Pacific and attacking oil storage facilities in Nauru. Unlike other Kreigsmarine raiders operating in the Pacific theater, Komet arrived undetected in the Atlantic via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with the assistance of Soviet icebreakers. She was the last foreign ship to pass through the NSR for nearly 50 years. In 1991, just before the fall of the Soviet Union, the USSR offered to escort foreign ships through the NSR. The offer, however, fell flat for nearly another 20 years.

The Northern Sea Route, sometimes called the Northeast Passage, is the sea line of communication (SLOC) that connects Europe and Asia along the shores of Northern Russia. The passage crosses along the periphery of the Arctic Ocean and connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans along the Northern edge of Russia. The first recorded mention of the Northern Sea Route dates to the 16th Century. However, the first successful transit of the route occurred nearly two centuries later, by Swedish mariner Baron Nils Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld in 1879.

Until recently, the NSR remained relatively dormant. In 2009, Beluga Shipping caused the international spotlight to reilluminate the NSR when the company’s two vessels transited this route, escorted by icebreakers. The Arctic has now become a hotbed of activity with the Kremlin investing in its own infrastructure, regulations, and icebreaker fleets while the Chinese Communist Party grows its Arctic aspirations. To ensure Arctic stability, the United States Navy should acquire a fleet of icebreakers to ensure open sea lines of communication through the NSR.

The Kremlin and the PRC

Receding ice floes and a commercial desire to decrease existing shipping route times has Arctic and “near-arctic“ nations racing for Arctic hegemony. While Russia has deployed its military to Arctic maritime chokepoints, the People’s Republic of China is racing to become a key Arctic player. In 2016, the Chinese Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO) dispatched five vessels through the NSR. COSCO’s Xia Zhi Yuan 6 sailed 8,000 fewer nautical miles and 32 days less using the NSR from Tianjin, China to Zeebrugge, Belgium than other available routes. In 2020, the Chinese deployed their second icebreaker, the Snow Dragon-2, to the NSR. According to Paul Goble, a Eurasian expert, Russians may prefer increased Chinese activity over the alternative of increased Western presence in the Arctic.

The Polar Silk Road Legalities

In 2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) unveiled “China’s Arctic Policy,” a white paper that detailed the CCP’s legal and commercial roadmap into the arctic. In it, the CCP reaffirmed its view of China’s inherent right to traverse the Arctic as a “near Arctic nation” and emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation in their “Polar Silk Road,” a subset of their prominent “Belt and Road Initiative.”

In the white paper, the CCP explicitly states the need to promote the construction of Arctic-capable icebreakers, highlights the importance of adherence to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and proclaims that “the freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries… and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be ensure[d].” The white paper’s terminology of explicitly using freedom of navigation instead of innocent passage highlights the nuanced legal war the CCP is currently battling. While this may seem like a superficial difference, the difference lies in the fact that ships engaged in innocent passages acknowledge the foreign government’s maritime claims whereas ships engaged in freedom of navigation could operate as if they are on the high seas or in their exclusive economic zone. The white paper also claims that “China attaches great importance to navigation security in the Arctic shipping routes,” while making no mention of the government entity charged with this duty throughout the document. Although China has made no claims in the Arctic, the United States can ill afford to let the CCP excessive maritime claims and narratives like those in the South China Sea metastasize in other regions.

Keeping the Sea Lines of Communications Open

The United States has conducted maritime operations since its inception to exercise the right of innocent passage and to “show the flag” and thereby protecting maritime rights for all nations. According to a US government official, “If you don’t periodically reaffirm your rights, you find that they’re hard to revive.” The arctic continues to be more accessible each year and, without a naval presence, the United States Navy needs to ensure the right to innocent passage has been lost through customary practice or law or unable to conduct FONOPs to contest excessive arctic claims. The NSR will continue to grow in importance as the arctic ice floes recede since it is the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia. When compared to the Suez for transiting between Europe and China, the NSR is 40% shorter and as much as 60% shorter when compared to the African Cape Horn route. In November of 2021, NSR shipping had increased by 66% since January; by 2024, Russia is targeting  80 million tons per year.

The brief blockage and subsequent closure of the Suez Canal in March of 2021 and its rippling effects across global supply chains showed the importance of multiple open sea lines of communication, which the US Navy is charged with protecting. Russia has pursued an aggressive disinformation campaign claiming that Norwegian critical chokepoint of Svalbard resides within their internal or territorial waters, despite international law clearly conveying an opposing view. Putin’s government also claims the NSR resides solely in Russian waters. As the NSR continues to gain importance, US naval icebreakers could ensure open sea lines of communications through the NSR and assist with regional stability.

The Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter

In July of 2020, the CCP deployed their second icebreaker, Snow Dragon-2, to the Arctic which highlighted that the CCP has every intention of executing their power as a self-proclaimed “near arctic-state.” Currently, Russia has 53 icebreakers and Canada has seven, while the US has a single operational heavy icebreaker. The US Coast Guard addressed this icebreaker deficit through the Polar and Arctic Security Cutter programs, requesting three heavy Polar Security Cutters and three medium Arctic Security Cutters. (The reason Polar Security Cutters are referred to as “Polar” instead of “Arctic” is because these heavy icebreakers will be tasked with Operation Deep Freeze to support McMurdo Station in Antarctica, in addition to their Arctic duties.)

Russia has already recognized the importance of military presence in Arctic. Its navy plans to operate two militarized icebreakers by 2023 and 2024 with a third currently in construction. The return of the US Navy carriers and surface escorts to the Arctic Circle after a more than three-decade hiatus shows the recognized importance of a US Arctic naval presence as well.  While the emerging Polar and Arctic Security Cutters would be appropriate for their icebreaking roles as naval escorts and have even been suggested for freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), these vessels would quickly become high demand, low density assets. Coast Guard icebreakers would have to balance the support of conventional naval surface forces abroad and arctic requirements at home over the vast 5.5 million square mile Arctic.

Conclusion

The NSR’s importance as a SLOC emerged during the Second World War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the NSR was all but forgotten until 2009 when the Beluga became the first ship to transit the route. Since then, the NSR has become more active, with Russia wanting a throughput of more than 80 million tons per year by 2024. While the US Coast Guard pursues their own independent program, their three planned vessels will be insufficient to cover the vast distances and ice floes that encompass the Arctic. CCP deployment of icebreakers along with Russia’s quantitative iceberg gap by orders of magnitude over the United States demand the US Navy reexamine the case for construction and operation of icebreakers in the Arctic to prevent a polar iteration of the flashpoints in the South China Sea.