Africa

Schengen and free circulation at the crossroads: lessons for the East African Community?

October 6, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille:

Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)

In many parts of the world, geopolitics is confronted with two contending trends. On the one hand, numerous countries are engaged in a process of regional economic integration, epitomised by the more advanced model of the European Union (EU), which requires ‘internal’ borders between participating states to become more fluid to facilitate the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, borders are regaining momentum. Inherited from colonisation, the post-war or post-cold war status quo, the validity of these borders is now a moot point. From Ukraine to Iraq, Syria, Mali, South Sudan or Nigeria, old borders are questioned, new demarcation lines appear. In Europe, the large influx of refugees has led to very different approaches across EU member states, with some overtly questioning the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Events currently taking place in Europe are of great significance to the East African Community (EAC) and Africa as a whole. Indeed, the EU is not only an important trade and development partner that can potentially provide an alternative to China, it is also a prosperous example of regional economic integration that can serve as an advanced model to African countries involved in a similar regional process. The five EAC member states, in particular, are currently on a path towards regional integration that bears striking resemblance with the process undergone by the EU.

In 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed the EAC Treaty to enhance trade cooperation and political relations. In 2005 a Customs Union was launched, followed in 2010 by a common market with zero internal tariffs. Talks about setting up an East African Currency Union with an EAC-wide Shilling started in 2011. Furthermore, the EAC has its own Legislative Assembly and Court of Justice. Plans to create an East African Tourist Passport are on the way. Establishing a sustainable economic and political bloc in the form of an East African Federation is also high on the EAC agenda. What’s more, in October 2014, the EAC and the EU signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that supports the EAC’s ambitious integration project and gives EAC member states extensive access to the EU Single Market.

Among these many parallels between the European and East African contexts, it is also important to note that the EAC is considering measures to establish free circulation between its five members, at a time when it is facing the challenge of a growing influx of refugees, mainly from Somalia. Before thinking of the feasibility of setting up an East African ‘Schengen’, it is therefore worth looking into the European model of free circulation: its strengths, weaknesses and limitations.

Abolishing borders has been one of the utmost achievements of the European project, and free movement is one of the dynamics of European prosperity. The dismantling of internal borders among Schengen participating countries was backed up by a strengthening of external borders. Article 25 of the agreement allows national authorities to re-establish border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for a period of time limited to ten days, which can be prolonged to two months. The current reintroduction of controls on several internal borders of the EU is therefore not the beginning of the end of the Schengen agreement, but rather a procedure faithful to the letter of the agreement.

It follows that Germany’s reintroduction of border controls in the aftermath of chaotic scenes at train stations and reports of bed shortages at refugee camps is more an attempt to process refugees in a more orderly fashion and better identify those deserving of help than an attack on European principles. This came after Germany reasserted important European values and Europe’s international commitments to host refugees, particularly those coming from war zones.

Despite this, tensions between member states, overwhelmed by the scale of refugees in search of a safe haven, have put Schengen‘s principle of free movement under strain. This has revealed a lack of solidarity towards member states more exposed geographically to the refugee crisis, as well as showing the generosity on the part of Germany, Sweden and a few others. Crucially, the tensions have also revealed very different attitudes from the East and the West towards traditional European values.

The reason why Schengen is questioned today is not Schengen per se, but rather the weakness – or lack – of policies that should have been adopted or consolidated to accompany Schengen and make it work better. Does Europe have a coherent EU asylum policy? No. Does Europe have a European police? No. Is the EU agency Frontex sufficient to guarantee European border management? Clearly not, in view of the human tragedies in the Mediterranean and of the Hungarian reaction to the influx of refugees, to cite only two examples.

By the end of the year the EU Commission will at last propose measures to set up a European corps of border guards to consolidate Frontex, which coordinates cooperation between national border guards on external borders to prevent illegal immigration, terrorist infiltration and human trafficking. But does Europe have a real foreign security and defence policy capable of stabilizing its close neighbourhood? No. Its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy is a shambles.

Europeans assumed that they would be able to enjoy a common area of freedom, in which people, goods, and labour would circulate freely, whilst keeping most features of their national systems. Today, Schengen is the victim of member states’ lack of a coherent vision. The so-called four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour) can only work efficiently with a set of rules and policies at the supranational level. Inward-looking attitudes will not solve the challenges Europe faces in view of the extent of Africa’s migration potential. In areas where European integration is more advanced, where Europeans share the currency, the market, the freedom to trade, work and travel across this market, full sovereignty belongs in the past. Without sharing more sovereignty, all these envied attributes are threatened by crises such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis, none of which, surprisingly, Europeans anticipated.

As is often the case in Europe when populists spot imperfections in the way that a new European framework has been designed, Schengen has been presented as a threat to internal security. And yet, to make up for the abolition of internal controls, member states are expected to cooperate in order to maintain a high level of security. First, by exchanging information to fight borderless organised crime and terrorism. Second, by intensifying policy cooperation. Finally, by using the Schengen Information System (SI).

Schengen is by no means a ‘wide open door’ to illegal migrants. Indeed, the Dublin agreements require the country of arrival to register migrants, take fingerprints, and consider their asylum application. But in the wake of vast flows of refugees, this rule has reached its limits. Nonetheless, it is not in the Europeans’ interest to dismantle the Schengen area and the freedom that it provides to EU citizens. Rather, this joint public area has to be managed by joint public action.

What lessons can be drawn by the EAC in the light of European developments? First, that free circulation leads to more wealth and not the opposite. All economists agree on these great advantages, which is in itself exceptional. Second, that an agreement on free circulation implies not only benefits, albeit significant ones, but also constraints in terms of sharing sovereignty in areas hitherto regarded as national prerogatives. Third, that any weakness in the design of the free circulation agreement will, one day, be subject to a random shock that tests its resilience. This happened with the Eurozone. This is now the case with Schengen.

Schengen is currently being challenged, though primarily by populist misrepresentations. It continues to work. But it faces some reluctance among certain member states and is not sufficiently backed up by effective policies. Its long-term survival will depend on EU member states’ ability to consolidate its design and back it up with more integrated policies in the fields of asylum, police and border management, foreign security and defence, particularly with regard to stabilizing the EU’s neighbourhood.

More generally, any step towards integration, whichever area is concerned, requires sharing sovereignty. This will be a substantial challenge. EAC member states would clearly benefit from a system like Schengen, it would potentially bring the shared reward of increased prosperity for each member state and for the region as a whole. But such a system must be accompanied by effective policies, joint public action, and greater integration in terms of shared sovereignty. Otherwise it may end up finding itself in a similar crisis to that faced by the EU today.

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

Should Kagame be given a third term? A constitutional clash in Rwanda

August 4, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Anisha Hira:

President Paul Kagame on voting day, August 2010. Photo: Paul Kagame (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

The debate over extending the executive term limit to allow President Paul Kagame to run for a third term in the Republic of Rwanda has been framed as a clash between exemplary leadership and constitutionalism. On the one hand, the Rwandan constitution was carefully constructed in order to rebuild the institutions of the country and, therefore, should not be amended. On the other hand, Kagame has propelled Rwanda forward, both socially and economically – in the 21 years since the genocide Kagame has rebuilt Rwanda’s institutions and developed a sense of national unity.

But a third term for Kagame will not necessarily contradict the constitution. Indeed, the only way that the fundamental goals laid out in the consitution can be achieved is through a third term for Kagame, precisely because he is the only person who can act as the guardian of the Constitution and guarantee national unity.

There are a growing number of African leaders, such as Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi, who have taken it upon themselves to amend their respective constitutions and thereby remain in power. In contrast, in Rwanda the call for Kagame to remain President has come from the people. On 27 May 2015 a petition calling for a consitutional amendment was presented to Parliament signed by 3.7 million Rwandans, which initiated the procedure to change the constitution specifically to allow Kagame a third term.

Article 101 of the Rwandan constitution explicitly states that the President of the Republic can hold a maximum of two terms lasting seven years each.[1] Reforming Article 101, as the petition requested, would allow Kagame to run for a third term. However, Article 193 poses restrictions on the amendment process because it states:

“…if the constitutional amendment concerns the term of the President of the Republic or the system of democratic government based on political pluralism, or the constitutional regime established by this Constitution especially the republican form of the government or national sovereignty, the amendment must be passed by referendum, after adoption by each Chamber of Parliament.”[2]

The petition has sparked speculation as to how the constitution should be interpreted. Some claim that the provisions in Article 193 include increasing the number of Executive terms as well as the number of years in one particular term. Others, particularly the opposition party the Democratic Green Party, strongly disagree and oppose any changes to the constitution as undemocratic and possibly catastrophic for Rwanda.[3]

On 14 July, the Rwandan Parliament supported a change to the constitution, by a landslide, and launched public consultations with citizens across the country. The purpose of the consultations is to determine whether there is enough support in favour of a third term to carry out a national referendum regarding the constitutional amendment. Like many other African countries, including neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda is facing a referendum of constitutional and national significance that has major political implications.

Yet there are other constitutional arguments for allowing Kagame to serve a third Presidential term. Primarily, Article 98 states that the President is the “guardian of the Constitution and guarantees national unity. He or she guarantees the continuity of the State, the independence and territorial integrity of the country and respect of international treaties and agreements”.[4] By amending Article 101, Kagame would be able to fulfill his responsibilities as a leader under Article 98 to further benefit Rwanda during its early stages of recovery.

After the genocide Rwanda needed severe institutional recovery, which required and still requires the strong leadership and state management that are embodied in Article 98. Furthermore, reports from the public consultations indicate that Rwandan support for the constitutional amendment is conditional upon Kagame remaining President because of his success in providing citizens with welfare and security.[5] Arguably, if the amendment is approved by a national referendum it will be considered an exceptional circumstance exercised for this particular leader at this particular time in Rwanda’s lifetime.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and many citizens of the country paint their President as a symbol of national unity. This stems from his role in bringing the genocide to an end and his efforts to rebuild the country. The new flag and national anthem, in addition to the constitution, were both instituted under Kagame to prevent the promotion of genocide ideology and eliminate ethnic divisions in the country. Moreover, under Kagame, the government has amended the law on the crime of genocide ideology (Law 84/ 2013) to make it more accessible and transparent, in accordance with recommendations made by the International Service for Human Rights.

This image of Kagame fits well with Article 98 of the constitution, where citizens can trace ideas of national unity and a respect for international organisations. As a leader Kagame embodies the idea of ‘Kwibuka’, which means that the genocide must not be forgotten, so that Rwanda can build a better future that is free from ethnic tensions.

Under his Presidency Rwanda has evolved both socially and economically to maintain “continuity of the State”, “independence” and “integrity”.[6] Rhetoric of good governance and development are often cited in conjunction with Rwanda.[7] In 2014, Rwanda’s real GDP growth rose to 7% from 4.7% in 2013.[8] The notion that underdeveloped countries need to experience technological advancement by adhering to liberal and democratic practices is demonstrated by Rwanda. In keeping with Kagame and the RPF’s manifesto pledges in 2010, ‘infrastructure’ and ‘communication networks’ have developed greatly.[9] For example, the Rwandan Development Board benefited 1500 people through buses that were equipped with computers and the Internet that transported digital services, including E-governance, and imparted ICT skills to rural communities.[10] The level of economic growth and development remains indicative of decisive management and institutional recovery that will further propel Rwanda in the global market.

The international community has lauded Kagame’s regime for its accomplishments. The President’s links with other leaders and organisations across the world have placed Rwanda firmly on the international stage. In 2014, the World Bank named Rwanda as the third easiest and most cost efficient African country in which to invest and carry out business.[11] Furthermore, the World Economic Forum rated Rwanda as the seventh most efficient government in the world due to a “low level of waste in government spending”.[12] Aside from being a model for efficient and effective use of donor aid, Rwanda has become a model for strong and non-corrupt institutions.

These factors ring in stark contrast to Rwanda’s past, and to the rest of the continent. For many post-conflict zones, particularly in Africa, the state has seldom been able to generate substantial economic and political reform. The level of socio-economic growth Rwanda has achieved under Kagame has implications for the future of democracy in the country. For example, a growing economy indicates a larger middle class, and the participation of women in government indicates a fair and equal society. Such attributes bode well for a genuine transition into a liberal democracy, which is deeply rooted in the country’s institutions. But Rwanda has been so successful in its economic and social recovery only because of the autocratic leadership of Kagame.

Presently Rwanda does not have a strong opposition party or another Presidential contender. A change in leadership risks de-stabilising or weakening the state and its progress in the last two decades. Furthermore, the experience on the continent and elsewhere demonstrates that institutions, including the constitution, can easily be manipulated and distorted without stable and decisive leadership, as is the case in Burundi and Uganda. Moreover, a third term does not necessarily represent a breach of democracy or constitutionality. Certain established democratic nations do not have executive term limits and leaders, such as Tony Blair in the UK, or Angela Merkel in Germany, both of whom have served more than two terms in accordance with the wishes of their respective electorates.

Much of what Kagame has accomplished in Rwanda over the past 21 years upholds the fundamental responsibilities bestowed upon the executive by Article 98. There is, however, the question of the President as the “guardian of the constitution”.[13] On the one hand, amending Article 101 contradicts this role; but, on the other hand, Article 193 left the country with the mechanism for such institutional recourse. Moreover, there is no evidence that Kagame initiated the petition – he has been publicly ambivalent about standing for a third term. As the guardian of the Rwandan constitution, he can only allow the national debate to run its course in keeping with the steps outlined by Article 193.

Over the past 21 years, Kagame has proven to be a positive force in re-building and recovering the country. At such an early stage of its recovery, Rwanda needs to sustain this trajectory of growth and through strong leadership. Despite the uncertainty about altering the constitution, the likelihood is that the result of the referendum will permit the constitutional amendment and Kagame will embark upon a third term and continue to lead Rwanda away from the scars of its past. Although removing the restriction on Presidential term limits is seen as undemocratic, the fact is that Rwandan citizens, rather than Kagame, have asked for such a change to be made. Furthermore, post-genocide Rwanda is still in its infancy and the short-term stability and security Kagame has instituted form a firm foundation for democracy to flourish in the long-term.

Anisha Hira is an Undergraduate Student at the Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College London where she studies Politics, Philosophy and Law. She is currently a Research Intern at the African Leadership Centre at King’s College London.

NOT`ES

[1] “The President of the Republic is elected for a term of seven years renewable only once. Under no circumstances shall a person hold the office of President of Republic for more than two terms.” The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (O. G N° Special of 4 June 2003).

[2] The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (O. G N° Special of 4 June 2003).

[3] White, David. “Third-Term Debate in Rwanda Allows Little Room for Opposition”, Financial Times, 24 April 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f8f28774-deda-11e4-b9ec-00144feab7de.html#axzz3hCRWcGIX Accessed 19 July 2015.

[4] The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (O. G N° Special of 4 June 2003), Article 98.

[5] “The National Consultation on the Amendment of Article 101”, Rwandan Parliament, 20 July 2015. http://www.parliament.gov.rw/yourviews/news-details/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=869&cHash=0c5a3a36845479166e654384b58d5260 Accessed 27 July 2015.

[6] The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (O. G N° Special of 4 June 2003), Article 98.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The World Bank: Overview of Rwanda. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview

[9] “3: Economy Development Performance”, Performance Contracts (2010-2017). http://rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-manifestos– Accessed 27 July 2015.

[10] The Rwandan Development Board. http://www.rdb.rw/news-pages/news-details/article/over-1500-benefited-from-ict-buses-last-year-rdb.html

[11] The World Bank Group. Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations. http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings

[12] The World Economic Forum. https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/07/efficient-government/

[13] The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (O. G N° Special of 4 June 2003), Article 98.

Drawing in the dragon: China's involvement in Africa's peace & security

January 29, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Semiha Abdulmelik:

Chinese engineers serving with UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan. UN Photo/Stuart Price. — Chinese engineers serving with UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan. UN Photo/Stuart Price (creative commons).

‘Meaningful participation in African conflict-resolution processes is not an important aspect of China’s current Africa relations. China is becoming increasingly important in the landscape of African politics, including in conflict-affected theatres, but is not as significant an actor as external perceptions contend. Nor has the Chinese government shown any particular inclination for more active engagement beyond spheres such as Sudan where the need is more compelling’’.^[1]

Dan Large (SOAS), 2008, in China’s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa.

These words, written just seven years ago, now seem out of date. We are now witnessing what might be described as a significant if incremental evolution in China’s involvement in Africa’s peace and security. It is more structured, purposeful, and beyond countries of immediate interest, if still exploratory.

China’s peace and security engagement on the continent has predominantly been characterised as driven by economic interests in countries in which it has significant investments. This is the narrative most commonly seen in the Western media and academia: strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and comprising of bi-lateral military cooperation and arms trade. How this has evolved will be the focus of this piece.

With China’s increasing focus on its global power and the associated reputational risks, as well as the emerging realities of its deepening political engagement in Africa, a number of defining shifts can be observed. China’s concerted efforts to resolve the South Sudanese conflict is a case in point. China has dispatched its Special Representative for African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua, to conduct shuttle diplomacy, support the Inter-governmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) efforts, and create forums for dialogue between the parties.^[2] He noted that China’s meeting with South Sudanese opposition was ‘pretty dramatic for us. I think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries… this is a typical domestic conflict. Usually when this happens, we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition because, to some extent we think, it’s a rebel force. When you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.’ ^[3]

But Chinese mediation efforts in South Sudan suggest that China is reconsidering its long-standing belief in non-interference as part of its commitment to support peace and security in Africa.[4] This change comes from an understanding that it is essential for the achievement of its development policy and goals in Africa that there be peace and security.

Interestingly, Jiahua was also clear that China did not have the academic or analytical expertise to understand internal African conflicts.^[5] Indeed, China’s approach has been less about a nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics but a kind of ‘oil diplomacy’ grounded in its ability to appeal to the economic rationale and incentives of the warring parties.[6] In this regard, the Chinese government is currently promoting African Studies^[7i] in its academic and research institutions – pointing to the growing importance of non-state (academic/research) linkages between China and Africa in mediating and informing this growing engagement.[8]

In contrast to Sudan and South Sudan, where China has a significant economic presence, and hence more evident engagement in conflict mediation efforts, there are other parts of Africa where China does not have the same immediate interests yet is still involved in fostering peace and security. In Mali, China has contributed over 500 military troops to the UN peacekeeping mission (a quarter of its total UN troop contributions).[9] This is significant because China does not often deploy military personnel; previously it had only deployed logistical and medical personnel.^[10] Interestingly, given the lack of significant Chinese interests in the country, Chinese efforts appear more in pursuit of broader regional stability where it has varied interests.

This attention to China’s role in UN peacekeeping in Africa suggests that China is now placing greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to peace and security partnerships in Africa. While this has often been seen by Chinese commentators and others following Chinese foreign policy[11] as an attempt by China to consolidate its ascendancy as a global power, this involvement has arguably been ‘evolving in an open-ended way’.^[12] China has, for instance, proven more progressive in supporting the use of force to protect civilians in through the UN mission in the DRC while at the same time continuing its traditional resistance to the establishment of a human rights office for the UN mission in Sudan.^[13]

China’s increasingly multilateral approach to peace and security cooperation in Africa is not only through the UN but also through regional organizations – the African Union (AU) in particular. The admission of the African Union Commission in October 2011 as a full member of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has undoubtedly paved the way from more concrete cooperation in the area of peace and security between China and the African Union (AU).

Three years later, the Government of China and the AU co-launched the AU-China Strategic Dialogue for Peace and Security in Africa.^[14] This regional multilateral cooperation is predicated on two pillars. Firstly, financial and technical support for various aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including AU peace support operations and mechanisms such as the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. Secondly, cooperation at an international level, particularly on African positions at the UN Security Council and on UN Security Council reform.

Chris Alden, one of the few writers to analyse China’s multilateral engagement with the African Union on peace and security issues, argues that China’s desire for more systematic and institutionalized cooperation on peace and security in Africa is in tension with Chinese foreign policy principles and economic interests. This is particularly so given the underlying normative basis for APSA, namely the principle of non-indifference and provision for intervention in Member States.[15] As such, he sees three emerging ways in which China could engage with the APSA, all of which it already exhibits to varying degrees: as architects (through the formulation of new or refinement of existing foreign policy and security norms); builders (through participation in multilateral security and peacekeeping operations); and/or as subcontractors (through offering specific and time-bound solutions for security challenges) of the APSA.^[16]

It is clear that China’s engagement in Africa’s peace and security has evolved, both with regards to its principles of engagement, geographic scope, and institutional interlocutors. As Alden’s exploratory research has indicated, there will continue to be interest – and a research agenda – in seeing how this evolves further and consolidates in the long-term with regards to Chinese foreign policy. Of further interest will be how this plays out in international efforts to secure peace and security in Africa, from possible tensions or cooperation between the West – Africa’s traditional peace and security partner – and China, to UN Security Council level reforms. Yet what is missing and crucial is African perspectives and experiences: this should preoccupy the new generation of African academics and researchers.

Semiha Abdulmelik is currently a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre in Kenya. Her research interests include humanitarian diplomacy, regional organizations, post-conflict reconstruction, and the security dynamics of the Horn. You can follow her on Twitter at @SAbdulmelik.

NOTES ^[1] Large, D. (2008), China’s role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa, Oslo Forum Network of Mediators, accessed at http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/20DanLargeChinainAfricaWEB.pdf, pp. 35-41. China’s significant resource interests in Sudan, including its substantial economic investment, presence of nationals and oil operations and facilities, particularly in Darfur, has put the Sudan conflict and its resolution as a top interest for the Chinese government.

^[2] China to hold consultative conference on South Sudan in Khartoum, Sudan Tribune, January 6, 2015 accessed at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53569

^[3] Fabricius, P. (2014), China plays mediator in Africa, The Sunday Independent, November 2, 2014, accessed at http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/china-plays-peacemaker-in-africa-1.1774195#.VK0zOyuUcT8

[4] Indeed, Chinese officials have been quick to point to the Chinese commitment during the 2012 Forum of China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) to do more in the area of peace and security in Africa.

^[5] Ibid

[6] Fabricius, P. (2014). In Fabricius’s interview with him, Jiahua admits that that he does not know the triggers for the South Sudanese civil war or who is to blame. Instead the approach has been to reiterate what was conveyed to both parties when oil production was shut down in 2012. “I persuaded them that this is the most important property not only of the government but also of the people of South Sudan. Look at this country; the biggest, the most important for the survival of the people is this oilfield. For some like Large (2008) however, this is an indication to a lesser degree of China’s lack of experience in ‘applied conflict resolution’ and more a demonstration of China engaging on ‘its own terms for its own ends’.

^[7] Ibid

[8] China-Africa scholarly exchanges and fora are not new. These are long-standing and have historical links to state-sponsored efforts to support communist Africa states. However, this was largely focused on technical areas such as agriculture and engineering. This concerted state effort to strengthen China’s knowledge and analytical capacity in the area of Africa’s peace and security, as well as non-state efforts to build linkages between Chinese and African researchers and institutions, such as Fahamu’s Emerging Powers Programme, are indicative of shifts that respond to current realities in the China-Africa relationship.

[9] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

^[10] Cordano, D. (2014), China’s role in Africa’s conflicts: Military cooperation, arms transfers and involvement in peacekeeping operations, 11 April, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, accessed at http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1672:chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265

[11] Wong, C. (2013), China Embraces Peacekeeping Missions, The Diplomat, August 9, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/china-embraces-peacekeeping-missions/

^[12] Fabricius, P. (2014),

^[13] Cordano, D. (2014)

^[14] http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/commissioner-chergui-concludes-official-visit-to-china-launches-au-china-strategic-dialogue-for-peace-and-security-in-africa

[15] Alden, C. (2014), China’s evolving approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, accessed at http://www.saiia.org.za/news/chinas-evolving-approach-to-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture

^[16] Ibid

Managing an epidemic: Security implications of the Ebola outbreak. Interview with Edwin Trevathan M.D., M.P.H.

August 19, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife
Interview conducted on 19 August 2014

Edwin Trevathan, M.D., M.P.H. is Dean of the College for Public Health and Social Justice at Saint Louis University (SLU), and Director of the Institute for Global Health and Wellbeing, where he is also Professor of Epidemiology, Pediatrics, and Neurology. He was Director of the National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, where he was responsible for many of the CDC’s activities in areas of maternal and child health as well as neurological, developmental, and genetic disorders. Under his leadership, the CDC engaged in several productive collaborations in China, Latin America and Africa. He was the CDC’s Strategic Lead for the pediatric response to the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, and was a senior investigator for epidemic investigations of Nodding Syndrome in Uganda. Dr. Trevathan was previously Professor and Director of the Division of Pediatric and Developmental Neurology at Washington University in St. Louis, and Neurologist-in-Chief at St. Louis Children’s Hospital. He has published widely in public health, epidemiology, neurological and developmental disabilities, multi-center clinical trials, and child health. His new research interest, working under experts at King’s College London, focuses on Global Health Diplomacy in conflict-affected countries. You can follow Edwin Trevathan at @edwintrevathan.

* * *

Joana Cook: What would you suggest are the key security implications related to the Ebola epidemic for international actors, in particular, governments around the world?*

Dr. Trevathan: There have been more deaths from other ‘expected’ causes (malaria, malnutrition, childhood diarrheal diseases) than from Ebola in theses poor countries of West Africa over the past several months. However, Ebola poses a risk of becoming more widespread, disrupting the life of a city, closing borders, and provoking unrest. Ebola uncovers the weakness of public health systems, which will need to be addressed; a disease-specific approach to control will not be sufficient.

In your view, have global health bodies like the WHO been able to coordinate with affected countries in an adequate fashion?

The coordination of epidemic responses is often most difficult in epidemics that cross borders of resource poor countries, or poor countries that simultaneously are involved in armed conflict. One of the great challenges in these responses is the often poor coordination between the local health authorities and the national Ministry of Health of these developing countries. Poor in-country coordination delays requests by the national Ministry of Health (MOH) for assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and organizations like the U.S. Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). These problems of coordination within countries are further exacerbated when disease outbreaks occur in rural areas in border regions, as occurred in this Ebola outbreak, and then extend into densely populated cities.

Why has the international response been so seemingly slow?

It is always difficult to analyze a response to an epidemic in the middle of a response. After control of this outbreak, there will certainly be investigations that will lead to recommendations for future action. These are some preliminary thoughts.

Although some of the initial response may have been somewhat delayed by poor in-country coordination, I do not perceive that the response has been significantly slower than previous outbreaks (i.e., Uganda, South Sudan, Eastern DR Congo). However, the efforts to control spread of Ebola have been less effective for a variety of reasons, primarily related to the local efforts of health workers. These reasons include:

The local authorities and health systems have been less well-equipped to prevent disease spread. For example, some local healthcare providers to not even have access to basic hygiene measures such as rubber gloves.
The local tradition of handling the bodies during funerals (large numbers of people embracing the body and kissing the bodies) has amplified the spread of Ebola in some areas.

International NGO responses seem to have been relatively rapid. Yet by the time they set up their response teams the disease has spread further for reasons more related to inadequate local initial responses.

Can you comment on the health system responses from the countries most affected by Ebola?

A few thoughts:

The outbreak has occurred in an area of relatively high population density close to borders, but with low density of physicians and other healthcare workers trained in how to recognize Ebola and use basic methods (gloves, gowns) to prevent disease spread when in contact with patients who may potentially have Ebola.
People with the initial symptoms of Ebola look much like the other people in the community with malaria or other diseases. Traditional management of these other infectious diseases in communities do not include measures to prevent transmission of Ebola.
Local health officials and public health officials have not implemented infectious disease precautions (“universal precautions”) in routine care before the diagnosis has been confirmed.
The prior Ebola outbreaks were easier to control because of remote and rural nature of the communities that were impacted, and by the local health authorities more coordinated response while working within a single country.

Have we seen previous Ebola outbreaks of this scale before?

No.

Is the US worried about the potential threat posed to its security by Ebola?

Ebola should not be a threat to the health of residents in the U.S. Universal disease precautions in hospitals and clinics should be effective in preventing disease spread. The security of the U.S. and of Europe is indirectly threatened by Ebola-exacerbated threats to security in West Africa.

Do you think Obama’s initiative to set up an African Centre for Disease Control is useful in responding to diseases such as Ebola?

Yes. The establishment of the China CDC has been very helpful in responding to epidemics in Asia. Most importantly, the nations of Africa will need to focus on epidemic and pandemic preparedness in order to best equip their countries to deal with Ebola and other emerging infectious disease threats.

Thank you very much.

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* The recent Ebola epidemic has thus far caused a recorded 1,069 deaths and infected 1,975 others around the world, with victims largely from West Africa, but these numbers are stated to ‘vastly underestimate the magnitude of the outbreak’. Ebola has a fatality rate of up to 90% and though Canada has now sent 1,500 doses of a new, experimental vaccine, there remains no proven cure.

‘Secret Diplomacy’. Should we engage with Boko Haram?

May 23, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood:

“All wars represent a failure of diplomacy”

According to Tony Penn, wars occur as a result of lack of diplomacy or the failure/unwillingness of both state and in the case of terrorist’s, non-state actors, to engage in lengthy negotiation – be it the traditional way i.e. secret diplomacy or the new way i.e. open diplomacy/negotiations as the case may be. This article explores the potency of “secret diplomacy” in averting conflicts and or wars, and recommends that it be taken seriously in tackling insurgency and terrorism in West Africa. This recommendation is in reaction to the often-too-cited mantra of ‘we do not negotiate with terrorist’ adopted by western countries, and which has also become a common dictum in Nigerian political discourses. Following a brief definition of what constitutes secret diplomacy in the next section; case studies from past international events will highlight the need to employ secret diplomacy as a means to ameliorate the threat of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria.

According to Berridge (2012) secret diplomacy entails keeping secret all or any of the following “the contents of a negotiation, knowledge that negotiations are going on at all, the content of any agreement issuing from negotiations, or the fact that agreement has been reached” (2012: 336). This means of resolving disputes is proven to be effective as it has and continues to be utilized by states in resolving difficult international political problems.

Secret diplomacy has been identified as a potent instrument in dealing with many domestic and international crises in the past. For instance, it is no secret that secret negotiations between the government of the United States and former Soviet Union, was instrumental in averting the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Stern 2003:33). Similarly, the “Good Friday Agreement” of April 1998, that saw an end to the crisis in Northern Ireland (BBC 2004, online), did not happen because the British government were so strong or kept to their words of not negotiating with terrorists (as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) at the time were seen as a terrorist organization). Rather, secret negotiations between the British government and members of IRA were instrumental to an agreement being reached (Fisher et al 2003, 57). What is more, despite the United States stance in negotiating with terrorists, there is evidence to suggest that they had and continue to have secret negotiations with the Taliban and Hezbollah on possible solutions to ending the crisis in Afghanistan and Syria respectively (Chandran 2011:60-61; RT 2014). These negotiations have almost always occurred hand in hand with a conventional (open) diplomacy, with the latter acting as the front for the real negotiations, while the back channel negotiations are on going (Roberts 2009:516).

Since the new wave of destruction fomented by radical Islamists group Boko Haram is threatening the very existence of nationhood in Nigeria, this author suggests that one possible way of addressing this menace is to have meaningful (secret) dialogue with their leaders. Notably, Islamic radicalism is not a new phenomenon especially in Nigeria, however the recent terror campaigns including the kidnap of over 250 girls by “Jamã’atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda’awatih wal-jihad – meaning people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teaching and jihad” otherwise known as “Boko Haram” –has brought Nigeria to the focus of international community. Although the history of this organization remains shrouded in controversy (Alao 2013:73-73), there is no denying that they have some influence in Northern Nigeria, and that influence is fast spreading beyond the borders of Niger and Cameroon.

Understandably, the incessant terror attacks by Boko Haram have led to public outcry for the government to do more. Some of the recent attacks including the kidnap of over 200 schoolgirls come with demands from the terrorist group – such demand includes the release of their imprisoned members in exchange for the release of the kidnapped girls (Abubakar & Jon 2014). In addition, since the Nigerian government, like United Kingdom and United States government, insists that they do not negotiate with terrorists, the prospects for ending the fatalities inflicted by Boko Haram looks dim. If precedence is anything to go by, then the best way of curtailing the activities of these dangerous terrorists is to engage with them and make some compromises.

Based on the evidence presented above, it is obvious that if the Nigerian government is willing to put an end to the problems of Islamist insurgency in their country, then they must be open to the option of secret negotiations. This is important because although Boko Haram has been identified as a terrorist organization, regrettably, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al-Shabab in Somalia (Tarzi 2009:306-308; Hansen 2013:2), Boko Haram have significant influence among residents in communities where they operate – as demonstrated by the facts that people are willing to provide shelter for them in their undercover operations.

Although it remains impossible to meet the core demand of Boko Haram, which is the Islamisation of Nigeria (Adenrele 2012: 21), the Nigerian government can engage in secret negotiations with them to figure out ways of ameliorating the unending murders and destructions to properties. While some people might argue that it is unethical to engage in any sort of negotiation with terrorist organizations, it is important to recognize that without engaging with Boko Haram, their influence would continue to grow. In addition, contrary to the belief that any engagement with terrorists undermines a state’s integrity, adopting secret diplomacy could boost a government’s ability to protect its citizens, especially when it matters most. Disengaging with terrorists’ in this case, Boko Haram increases their resolve to seek attention. Engaging with them militarily also put the state at a disadvantage, since terrorists have no rules of engagement. The surest hope of addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram is to have meaningful engagement with them and this author believes that this can be achieve through secret diplomacy.

_______________

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood holds an MA in Conflict, Security and Development and is an Alumni scholar with the African Leadership Centre, Kings College London and University of Nairobi. Her Primary research interests include diplomacy, African security and development, The Gulf of Guinea, maritime and human security.

FURTHER READING

Abubakar, A. & John, H. (2014). ‘Blasts at Market kill 118 in Central Nigeria, Officials say’. CNN, 21 May. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/21/world/africa/nigeria-blasts/. Accessed: 21th May 2014.
Adenrele, A.R. (2012). ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria as a Symptom of Poverty and Political Alienation’. Journal of Humanities and Social Science: Vol. 3 (5), 21-26.
Alao, C.A. (2013). ‘Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Nigeria’. In Gow, J. et al. (eds.) Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalization. Oxford: Routledge, 43-89.
BBC online, (9 December, 2004). ‘The Good Friday Agreement in full’. Available on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4079267.stm. [Accessed: 24thMarch, 2012].
Chandran, D.S. (2011). ‘Armed Conflict in FATA and NWFP: Continuing Violence’. In Chandran, D.S. & Chari, P.R. (eds.) Armed Conflicts in South Asia, 2010: Growing Left-wing Extremism and Religious Violence. India: Routledge, 44-66.
Fisher J. et al, (2003). Central Debates in British Politics. England; Pearson Education Limited.
G.R. Berridge, (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice. 3rd ed. United Kingdom: Palgrave Press.
Hansen, S.J. (2013). Al-Shabab in Somalia: the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. United Kingdom: Hurst Publishers.
Helander B, (1999). ‘Somalia’. In Westerlund D. & Svanberg I, (eds.), Islam outside the Arab World. New York; St. Martin’s Press,
Reuters. (2014). ;Kenya Defends Security Efforts After Weekend Bombings’. VOA News, 5 May. Available: http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-kenya-defends-security-efforts-after-weekend-bombings/1908334.html. Accessed: 20th May 2014.
RT. (2014). ‘US in secret talks with Hezbollah – Israeli reports’. Russia Today, 29 April. Available: http://rt.com/usa/155728-hezbollah-cyprus-us-talks/. Accessed: 21st May 2014.
Stern S.M, (2003). Averting “the Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. California; Stanford University Press.
Tarzi, A. (2009). ‘The Neo-Taliban’. In Crews, R.D. & Tarzi, A. (eds.) The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. United States of America: Harvard University Press, 274-310.
Wilson, G.H. (2013). Ilham Portrait of a President. United States of America: AuthorHouse Publications.

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