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Generation Terrorists: The Politics of Youth and the Gangs of Freetown

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By Dr Kieran Mitton 

A poster in Susan’s Bay calls on Sierra Leone’s youth to be peaceful during elections (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

Youth at Risk – Youth as Risk

On the evening of the 15th February, six leading presidential candidates for the Sierra Leone presidential elections took to the stage. Over three hours of a live broadcasted debate, each answered questions about their plans for the country. Seen by some as a milestone in Sierra Leone’s post-war political development, the following morning the capital Freetown was abuzz with talk about who had acquitted themselves, who had failed to impress, and what – if anything – this might mean for the election result on the 7thMarch. In the offices of a youth development organisation, staff enthusiastically discussed the event.

In an adjoining room, I met with their colleague Mohamed*, a man with decades of experience working in the city’s poorest informal communities. What did you think of the debate? I asked. Was it a sign that Sierra Leone’s political scene is moving towards serious discussion of policies, or as one report put it, ‘growing up’?

Mohamed smiled. Pointing to his colleagues next door, he replied: ‘Each person there is arguing about why their preferred candidate won the debate. What the candidate actually said, how they performed – it doesn’t matter.’ He went on to make a familiar point; voters put party, tribe and personal loyalties ahead of policies. Whilst certainly not new or unique to Sierra Leone, this he contended, meant such debates had little bearing on the electoral outcome. The promise of some candidates to provide free education, surely a positive development for the country’s youth, was just rhetoric, he concluded. In fact, ‘politicians keep the youth uninformed and uneducated so they can use them to their own advantage.’

In Sierra Leone’s post-conflict era, great stress has been placed on engaging young people, providing solutions to severe unemployment and lack of educational opportunities to ensure the country never again experiences civil war. The idea that it was a ‘youth crisis’ that precipitated conflict dominates academic analysis and was a key conclusion of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This emphasis has entrenched a peacebuilding discourse that presents youth as both an at risk population – vulnerable to chronic poverty and exploitation of their grievances – as well as a risk – a potential source of violence, instability, or even renewed conflict. In its crudest form, this latter discourse is found in frequent characterisations of ‘idle’ and criminal youth in local media, where their economic hardship and violence is explained not so much by their circumstances as by their ‘bad’ character. Election campaigns, through rhetoric aimed at youth and through violence involving youth, have reinforced both. Mohamed’s scepticism towards political promises, and belief that politicians seek to exploit young people, is born of experience.

Recycled Rhetoric and Remobilisation

Successive elections since 2002 have promised much but delivered little tangible change for many young people.  Initial optimism that a new administration might bring transformation, or that political patrons’ offers of jobs in exchange for support would be honoured, has invariably given way to disillusionment and deepened cynicism. A bitter sense of betrayal pervades the stories of those who describe their past enlistment by ‘big men’. The ability to register this frustration at the ballot box is certainly valued – an important and too often overlooked contrast to pre-war Sierra Leone – but it underlines a fundamental problem of the country’s political landscape. Both major parties – the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – are seen as offering little deviation from politics as usual. The same old familiar faces of the establishment continue to dominate political life. And so, many of Sierra Leone’s youth believe they can change governments, but they cannot make governments change.

Violent clashes of past elections have done much to reinforce the ‘youth as risk’ discourse, reinvigorating tired tropes of idle youth and dangerous ex-combatants.  During 2007 elections, fighting between supporters of rival parties took place across the country, leading then SLPP President Tejan Kabbah to declare a state of emergency. Yet these incidents were not simply the boiling-over of pent-up frustration nor the wanton criminality of unemployed youth. In another sign of negative political continuity, parties and political patrons had actively courted – and importantly, been courted by – groups of youth and ex-combatants to act as security ‘taskforces.’ Incentives ranged from gifts of drink and cash to promises of jobs and education. Providing ‘security’ often equated to intimidating political opponents and interrupting rival rallies. In the years following, a small number of senior ex-combatants on the winning APC side had reaped the rewards of this bargain, but most others missed out.

In 2012, the situation was markedly different. In the run up, grave concerns were expressed as incidents of violence between rival party taskforces and youth groups continued to occur across the country. Much analysis warned of turmoil on a par with 2007, if not worse. Yet in the end the re-election of the APC’s President Ernest Bai Koroma was largely peaceful. Of encouragement was the role of civil society, including youth organisations, in actively campaigning against electoral violence. My interviews with ex-combatants also found a pronounced determination among some not to be ‘fooled’ again and drawn to violence on the back of false promises. That said, opportunities for their recruitment were comparatively scarce. The SLPP was wracked by splits and Koroma enjoyed strong support, winning over the 55 percent mark required to avoid a run-off vote. It is that second round that is associated with heightened violence, with the contest close and votes of minor parties up-for-grabs.

An APC poster in central Freetown thanks departing President Koroma on behalf of the young (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

2018 Elections and the Gangs of Freetown

In the years since 2012, the same challenges blighting youth mobility in Sierra Leone have not diminished. Official UN figures put youth unemployment and underemployment at 70%. A sense of weariness is detectable among many who held great optimism during Koroma’s first term. Whilst there has been visible infrastructural development, the poorest have felt little benefit. Hopes that mining profits might lead to economic transformation for the benefit of all have dissipated, and the response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014, no small challenge for any government, highlighted endemic problems of corruption and fraud against which Koroma had vowed to fight in 2007.

The vote on March 7th will see Koroma stand-down after serving the maximum two terms. For this reason alone, it will be significantly different to the 2012 ballot. But in a welcome shake-up, two new political parties have entered the fray. Former Vice-President Samuel Sam-Sumana leads the Coalition for Change (C4C). Sumana made international headlinesin March 2015 after seeking asylum in the US embassy following a fall-out with Koroma and the APC. He was subsequently sacked, a move which in November 2017 was ruled illegal by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Sumana’s support-base is in Kono, a key swing district that could prove decisive.

Another new player is the National Grand Coalition (NDC) led by Kandeh Yumkella, a former UN Under-Secretary General. Having split from the SLPP, he remains firmly opposed to the APC and could also take votes from both major parties. The entry of these parties raises the prospect of a much closer contest than the last, and the common view among Sierra Leonean and international observers is that the election will go to a second round.

With the expectation of a run-off vote, fears arise of a repeat of past election violence. But here there is also an important change from previous campaigns. In the immediate post-war years, attention was firmly fixed on ex-combatants and the potentially devastating consequences of their mobilisation. As that generation has grown older, and judging from the last election, moved away from direct engagement in violence, a new generation of young marginal Sierra Leoneans has taken their place in the discourse of dangerous youth: gangs.

Referred to as cliques, gangs and youth street associations have a long history in Sierra Leone. However, police, youth activists, researchers, local communities and gangs themselves agree that they have grown in size and significance in recent years, and are becoming institutionalised.** As mention of ex-combatants and party taskforces wanes in media reporting, discussion of the ‘clique problem’ has increased.  In 2015, news of fatal gang-related stabbings and public discussion of crime and violence led the Attorney General and Minister of Justice to describe gang activity in Freetown as ‘domestic terrorism’ , demanding immediate attention by the security sector. That attention saw police offer rewards for information on gang leaders, and in 2017, the Minister of Defence took to the airwaves to advocate his personal view that the solution to rising gang violence was to implement the death penalty. As the elections have drawn closer, general fears over gangs have narrowed to one specific concern: that they may be used by politicians to attack opponents and intimidate voters.

A ‘Member of Blood’ gangster proudly displays his tattoo (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

To what extent are the gangs truly a threat in upcoming elections? My research has sought to better understand Sierra Leone’s cliques and their violence, focussing on Freetown though gangs are to be found across much of country. There is not space here for in-depth detail of gang organisation and activity, or the responses to it. Here I wish to briefly explore the specific issue of election violence drawing on recent interviews and time spent with three factions: the red-wearing Bloods or M.O.B. (Members of Blood); the blue-wearing Cent Coast Crips (CCC); and the black-wearing So-So Black. In Freetown, Bloods dominate the west, Crips the centre, and Black the east, though boundaries are fluid and sub-cliques diffuse. Based primarily (but not exclusively) in informal settlements or slums, members are identified by bandanas – locally ‘mufflers’ – in their respective colours. They hang-out in ghettos and street-corners, listening to music, drinking, smoking and dealing marijuana. They range from young teens to those in their mid-thirties. Contrary to some portrayals, they are not significantly connected to ex-combatant networks, and in many neighbourhoods there are no ex-combatants among them. This is unsurprising considering some were born after the war.

When it comes to violence, a main driver is inter-gang disputes – ‘beefs’ over colour. One gang-member I interviewed had recently been released from a year-long prison sentence for stabbing a rival who had ‘provoked’ him by walking into his territory wearing a red muffler. Other larger-scale incidents have taken place during music concerts and football matches where rival groups come face-to-face. Running ‘rampages’ of vandalism and scuffles have accompanied the movement of east side gangs through enemy territory in the west and centre.

A sign outside a popular gang hangout in Susan’s Bay prohibits wearing gang colours (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

Personal disputes, often over women, also lead to vendettas and cycles of revenge. Opportunistic robbery, particularly at night, is a source of income alongside dealing marijuana. The latter is a subsistence game and there does not appear to be substantial conflict over the trade or dealing spots. But the elections, perhaps, offer new opportunities.

In the last couple of years, gang members have described one faction or another as siding with a political party. They recount stories of large payments being paid to gangs by intermediaries of parties, with the implicit (and sometimes explicit) expectation they would in turn give their support and cause ‘trouble’ for their opponents. Individual political patrons are alleged to have used gifts of alcohol, cash and job opportunities – the old familiar promises offered to ex-combatants in the past – to bring them to their side. Substantiating these claims remains difficult, but they are stories repeated across Freetown and regularly hinted at in news articles. They came to the fore on 26th January in the middle of the city, during a rally linked to the nomination ceremony of the ruling APC party. Fights broke out between youth wielding machetes and knives, and at least one individual was fatally stabbed. Pro-SLPP and APC outlets accused each other of being behind the violence, before police announced that the perpetrators were in fact gang members.

Fifty-five gangsters were subsequently arrested, including an individual who had previously been described in interviews as an intermediary between the government and cliques. In discussing the incident, members of various factions told a similar story, though again it could not be substantiated. The intermediary, they claimed, acted as a go-between with the government to tackle gang violence, often dispersing large amounts of money to gang leaders from the safety of a central police station. Several gangsters expressed the view that in reality, these were political payments to secure support, rather than investments in peace. On the specific occasion of the rally, they claimed, one clique suspected this individual of withholding funds for himself and began remonstrating. The dispute escalated to violence when another gang came to his defence, leading to the killing. Following the arrests, a Freetown judge sentenced the fifty-five to either three months imprisonment or payment of a Le1000,000 fine (roughly $130USD). Rumours quickly circulated that the fine was paid, and according to one confidential informant, that the money came from the ruling party.

The details of the above incident remain disputed and unverified. Beyond the usual challenge of rumour substantiating for fact, in the charged political environment of the election campaign there are clear reasons for parties to implicate each other in abuses. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that some gang members are seeking to profit as hired muscle, and political patrons have likewise courted them to this end. These stories mirror the mobilisation of ex-combatants and youth in past elections. Now, it seems, a new generation is becoming part of this old problem. Solo, a gang captain in his early twenties, commented:

‘At this election time we see them [the politicians]. After this time, we won’t see them. When they need us, they are our friends. They come with rum, cider, they offer small money. They want us to vote for them, go to the rally, to fight their rivals. All the parties come to us.’

This returns us to the opening concern. Has Sierra Leone’s political system, and specifically its relationship with marginalised youth, changed significantly? From the perspective of gang members, it has not. Elections still represent to some a brief window of opportunity for personal advancement, but at the risk of committing violence that only deepens fears of dangerous youth and perpetuates a political relationship built on mutual exploitation and distrust. Sierra Leone’s past shows that violence in such a context may become not simply a mercenary act, but expressive rebellion and defiance against those who seek to prosper from it. Whilst so much focus has been given by peacebuilders to the DDR generation and the supposed dangers of unemployed ex-combatants, a younger generation born after the war faces the same hardships of chronic poverty, limited educational opportunities, and a destructive relationship with political leaders. The feared growing ‘gang problem’ in Freetown and across Sierra Leone cannot be understood or addressed in isolation from these hardships.

To end on a positive note, anti-violence campaigning from civil society groups and the determination of Sierra Leoneans to maintain peace remains unwavering. Despite popular concerns, to date gangs do not appear to have been mobilised to the same extent as taskforces and youth groups in the past. This offers hope that elections will pass peacefully, though few will be surprised if they do not. Whoever emerges victorious, they will have an opportunity to inject renewed energy into tackling the root causes of youth marginalisation. This is an endeavour that by definition must be sustained long after the campaign posters have been taken down. It is a matter first and foremost not of a youth crisis, nor even a gang problem. It is about changing the very practice of politics and governing itself. A major but critical challenge that begins at the very top.

*Some names have been changed to preserve anonymity.

** For this observation and insights into the nationwide activity of gangs I am grateful to Professor Ibrahim Abdullah.

 

This article has been republished on Strife Blog with the author’s permission. It was originally published on Mats Utas Blog http://bit.ly/2FfefyA

 

Dr. Kieran Mitton is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Research Director of the Conflict, Security & Development Research Group, and co-Chair of the Africa Research Group, at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is developing a comparative research project – Youth at Risk/Youth as Risk: Global Responses to Urban Violence – that examines gang dynamics and interventions in Cape Town, Freetown, London, and Rio de Janeiro. He is the author of Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leonean Civil War . You can follow him on Twitter @kieranmitton

Images Source: all photos were taken by the author

Strife Series, Grand Strategy, Part IV: Implications of Trump’s Grand Strategy for U.S. Military Engagement in Africa

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By Tony Manganello

africamilitarymaplegend630

International relations scholars and observers have been clamouring to characterise the growing engagement of world powers on the continent of Africa as a ‘new scramble for Africa,’ dredging up the spectre of neo-colonialism. This sentiment has been fueled by recent developments such as the creation of a new U.S. combatant Africa Command (AFRICOM), and by increasing infrastructure investment and economic engagement by other countries like China, India, and Russia.

Long and intractable conflicts involving U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have altered U.S. grand strategy approaches to confronting and mitigating the spread of violent extremism in foreign lands. The U.S. has undergone a noticeable strategic shift from the utilisation of conventional ground forces to combat terrorism to a small footprint paradigm of engagement. This strategy has been on full display as the U.S. military has expanded into Africa via numerous ‘small’ installations such as forward operating locations, cooperative security locations, and other temporary-sounding names. Given the fact that the U.S. has deliberately and fastidiously constructed a constellation of military locations on the continent [1]—allowing for the projection of force and facilitation of development projects continent-wide—perhaps ‘scramble’ is not the best word to describe the state of affairs. Clearly, the U.S. has already achieved a dominant level of engagement, dwarfing the efforts of any other competing nation or bloc.

President Obama’s much-heralded geopolitical ‘pivot’ to Asia has failed to produce the well-defined strategic footprint and mission sets observed with the advent of AFRICOM. The administrations of both Obama and George W. Bush significantly grew U.S. engagement—both in terms of military and development aid—in Africa. After more than a decade of accelerated military expansion across the continent, what does a Donald Trump presidency portend for the United States’ Africa strategy?  At this point, not much is known about Trump’s foreign policy other than his ‘I would bomb the s— out of them (ISIS)’ strategy espoused during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Apart from the memeification’ of U.S. foreign policy, one of the U.S.’ primary security concerns (post-9/11)  is the franchising of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS to Africa. In fact, ISIS appears to be well on its way in establishing footholds in Libya and Somalia.[2] Considering president-elect Trump’s rhetoric on ISIS, U.S. unilateralism could become the prevailing approach.  If the U.S. abandons its current bilateral and multilateral partnerships in Africa, we could witness the unravelling of security and aid relationships that have been painstakingly crafted by U.S. commanders, diplomats, and development experts over the past decade.

For example, through the efforts of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the U.S. military has assembled a robust security cooperation infrastructure with countries in East Africa in order to support the multinational conflict against Al Shabaab in Somalia.  The CJTF-HOA approach has blended civil-military operations such as military-to-military training and local development projects (building wells and schools) with tactical Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployments against terrorist groups.[3]

Observers may debate the merits of AFRICOM’s expansionist approach—there has been significant push back in some, asserting AFRICOM is a manifestation of U.S. imperialism [4]—but regardless of one’s opinion of the U.S. strategy in Africa, it cannot be denied that the U.S. Departments of Defence and State have invested billions of dollars and much time cultivating key relationships with African countries. Stakeholders may argue over the way in which these relationships are carried out in the future, but one hopes Trump does not cast aside U.S. strategic commitments whole-cloth.

Since a robust framework for engagement has been established over several years’ time, it would be unwise to pursue a highly unilateral solution to ISIS and other violent groups on the African continent.  AFRICOM operations are already criticised for being ineffective at reducing violent conflict.[5] Ratcheting up unilateral kinetic operations along the lines of “bomb the s— out of them” could produce deleterious reactions from key nations that could impair or severe strategic relationships which have taken years to establish.

A complete strategic reversal in Africa—abandoning small footprint in favour of sending in conventional forces—could have disastrous consequences for important U.S. relationships on the continent, many of which are delicate at best. Presumably, the Trump administration will take a more circumspect approach to countering terrorism in Africa.  However, Trump’s 15 August campaign speech laying out his plan to confront terrorism described a return to utilising large contingents of conventional forces to protect U.S. overseas assets and to carry out U.S. foreign policy.[6] Relationships are built upon trust, and trust can take years to develop. Unfortunately, it can be broken very quickly. Hopefully, President-elect Trump is able to perceive the long-term importance of the arduous work of relationship-building that past administrations have undertaken and work to preserve those relationships even if his Africa strategy charts a new course.

Tony Manganello is a U.S.-based PhD research student in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His research focuses on U.S. military and intelligence engagement in Kenya.

Notes:

[1] Many journalists, including Nick Turse and Craig Whitlock, have closely followed AFRICOM’s development in recent years and reported on the U.S. military’s expansive growth on the continent.  For comprehensive reporting on this see Nick Turse, Tomorrow’s Battlefield : U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa (Chicago, US: Haymarket Books, 2015), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=11055831.

[2] Jeffrey Gettleman, “‘I’m Scared These Men Will Kill Everyone’: ISIS Takes a Somalia Town,” The New York Times, October 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/africa/im-scared-these-men-will-kill-everyone-isis-takes-a-somalia-town.html; Ahmed Elumami and Hani Amara, “Libyan Forces Press Forward Against ISIS in Sirte,” The Wire, November 23, 2016, http://thewire.in/81988/libyan-forces-press-forward-isis-sirte/.

[3] For an academic analysis of CJTF-HOA activities in Kenya, see Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya (Feinstein International Center, Tufts University Medford, Mass., 2010), http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/winninghearts-in-kenya.pdf.;  for a sometimes humorous description of CJTF-HOA’s beginnings, see Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Americans Have Landed,” Esquire, June 27, 2007, http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707.

[4] There are several voices in the academic literature on this topic ranging in cultural/geographical origins.  See Jeremy H. Keenan, “Africa Unsecured? The Role of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Securing US Imperial Interests in Africa,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 3, no. 1 (April 26, 2010): 27–47, doi:10.1080/17539151003594186; and Stefan Gänzle, “AFRICOM and US Africa Policy: ‘pentagonising’ Foreign Policy or Providing a Model for Joint Approaches?,” African Security Review 20, no. 1 (March 2011): 70–82, doi:10.1080/10246029.2011.561020; For an explicitly Kenyan perspective, see Edward Mogire and Kennedy Mkutu Agade, “Counter-Terrorism in Kenya,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, no. 4 (October 2011): 473–91, doi:10.1080/02589001.2011.600849; For the perspective of a former US ambassador to African countries, see John Campbell, “Is American Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa Increasingly Militarized?,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 6 (December 11, 2013): 346–51, doi:10.1080/10803920.2013.855547.

[5] Michael Shank, “Violence or Vaccines: Which Path for U.S. in Africa?,” Reuters Blogs – The Great Debate, accessed August 7, 2014, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/06/target-u-s-defense-aid-to-africa-on-real-threats-malaria-and-ebola/.

[6] David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump’s Terrorism Plan Mixes Cold War Concepts and Limits on Immigrants,” The New York Times, August 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/politics/donald-trump-terrorism.html.

Image Credit: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/09/us-military-bases-africa

Feature image credit: https://img.rt.com/files/2016.02/original/56cc0fb6c46188ad758b4614.jpg

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Introduction: Whither Grand Strategy?

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By: John A. Pennell

war-board-games
Grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power

In light of recent Western political developments—“Brexit,” Trump’s U.S. electoral victory, rise of populist and/or far-right movements across Europe—coupled with an assertive China, a resurgent Russia, bolder actions from Iran and North Korea, continued terrorist threats from ISIS and its affiliates, and an ongoing refugee crisis emanating from Africa and the Middle East, a number of experts have sounded the alarm regarding the implications of these developments for the cultural, economic, political, and security arrangements that have shaped the post-Second World War order and the role of “grand strategy” in the emerging world (dis-?)order.[1]

This series explores the impact of such trends on grand strategy in the specific country and regional contexts that include the U.S., Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Mexico. Before offering a summary of the pieces in the series, we should first take a step back and define what we mean by “grand strategy.”

According to British strategist Liddell Hart, grand strategy is the ‘policy which guides the conduct of war’ and its role is to ‘co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.’[2] In other words, grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power—the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—into the conduct of war and maintenance of peace.

With the exception of combatting terrorist organizations, the countries and regions reviewed in this series are generally not at war with any other state.[3] Thus, for the purposes of this series, we will refer to grand strategy in terms of its role in guiding states in their pursuit of political (including foreign policy) objectives rather than strictly military objectives.

Most authors in this Strife series explore how a new Trump administration’s grand strategy or policy priorities may affect a particular country or region, while one author considers how the strategic culture in Mexico has failed to adapt to the evolving global order.

First, Brian Babb focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the incoming Trump administration. He argues that the new White House leadership would use an “America-first” foreign policy based on transactional deal-making. The implications, Babb claims, are that the U.S. would prioritize stability over the promotion of liberal values (e.g., democracy, human rights), be more willing to work with certain authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia and Syria) and be less inclined to support security arrangements (e.g., NATO) or economic partnerships without a clear material benefit to the U.S.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti examines the implications of a potential U.S. withdrawal from or a decreased presence in East Asia. He argues that the U.S.’ maintenance of security arrangements with its allies—Japan and South Korea—is critical during a time of increased territorial disputes between powers in the region, a nuclear North Korea, and Chinese aspirations for regional hegemony. Without a significant U.S. military presence in the region, Fischetti fears the long-standing East Asian security architecture would collapse resulting in U.S. partners falling into Beijing’s orbit.

In the third article, Jonata Anicetti explores how the new U.S. administration would deal with the South Asian nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. On the one hand, Anicetti describes Washington’s improving relations with India since the Clinton administration as part of an effort to counter China’s rise within Asia, and on the other hand, its deteriorating relations with Pakistan over the past several years. Nevertheless, in Anicetti’s view, President-elect Trump’s recent overtures to Pakistan offer hope that relations with Pakistan could potentially improve and lead to greater stability in South Asia.

Tony Manganello considers how the incoming Trump administration would view the U.S.’ security partnerships in Africa in the fourth article of the series. He argues that the U.S.’ ‘small footprint‘ approach to addressing key issues (e.g., counter-terrorism) across the African continent has been highly effective, in no small part due to the time-intensive cultivation of cooperative relationships with African governments and security forces. Taking a unilateral approach to fighting terrorism, including the use of conventional forces, Manganello warns, would not only undermine these relationships but likely prove to be unsuccessful.

The fifth piece in the series, authored by Alexis Herrera, takes a different approach. Herrera, rather than focusing on potential U.S. strategy towards Mexico, examines instead the grand strategy and strategic culture of Mexico as a “middle power.” In his view, Mexico’s strategic culture is found lacking due to an inability to prepare for the long run and a misunderstanding of the evolving global order. Examples of this include Mexico’s continued faith in the North American integration process and economic benefits of NAFTA, despite surging headwinds against those processes dating back to the 2008 recession amplified with recent political developments in the U.S. and elsewhere.

The pieces in this series offer important perspectives regarding the effects of potential shifts within the emerging global order on some select country- and regional contexts. While a number of the trends described in these pieces may raise significant concerns over global stability and the future of the so-called liberal world order, it is important to emphasize that many of these trends have yet to fully take shape. Thus, their potential impacts, positive or negative, are still open to debate. It is also necessary to remind ourselves that there’s often a significant gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policy formulation; key elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere have yet to take place; the conditions under which “Brexit” moves forward are still underway; and so forth. Still, the rising tide of populism and right-wing movements across the West, along with emerging powers who pose a challenge to the liberal international order, indicate the potential for significant change moving forward. To reiterate, this order is still evolving. Our current assumptions will very likely need adjustments as the economic, social, and political trends described earlier reach their conclusion.

Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed in this document reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.

John A. Pennell is a Series Editor of StrifeBlog and a PhD candidate in the Defence Studies Department (DSD) within the School of Security Studies at King’s College London. Mr. Pennell is a Career Member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, currently serving in Kyiv, Ukraine. His prior assignments have included Afghanistan, East Africa, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Mr. Pennell has an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National Defense University/National War College (Washington, DC), an M.A. in Political Science from American University (Washington, DC), and a B.A. in Politics from The Catholic University of America (Washington, DC). You can follow him on Twitter @jpennell1970

Notes:

[1] Ian Buruma. November 29, 2016. “The End of the Anglo-American Order.” The New York Times Magazine. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-order.html); The Economist.“Trump’s World: The New Nationalism.” November 19, 2016. (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710249-his-call-put-america-first-donald-trump-latest-recruit-dangerous?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/trumpsworldthenewnationalism); Peter Feaver. November 29, 2016. “A Grand Strategy Challenge Awaits Trump.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/a-grand-strategy-challenge-awaits-trump/); Mike J. Mazarr. October 5, 2016. “The World Has Passed the Old Grand Strategies By.” War On the Rocks. (http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-world-has-passed-the-old-grand-strategies-by/); David Rothkopf. November 29, 2016. “Hitting the Reset Button on the International Order.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/hitting-the-reset-button-on-international-order/).

[2] B.H. Liddell Hart. Strategy. Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. (accessed from http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html)

[3] Although the U.S. and its allies are actively fighting the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I do not consider ISIL a state in the traditional sense. Rather, I consider it a terrorist organization.

Feature Image Credit: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/topics/war-military-strategy

In-article Image credit: http://img2.rnkr-static.com/list_img_v2/19293/1839293/full/war-board-games.jpg

ECOWAS, EAC, and the comparative efficacies of free movement protocols across the African continent

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By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille

ECOWAS_Bank_for_Investment_and_Development_headquarters_in_Lomé.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Africa, traditionally the poorest continent, has been undergoing profound changes, illustrated by higher growth rates for over a decade. This has brought a sense among African policymakers that trade facilitation measures and tighter cooperation around joint regional markets are crucial to make this burgeoning prosperity sustainable. Whilst a vast free trade zone potentially at the scale of the entire continent, organised around the recently agreed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)[i], will take some time to materialize, can results be achieved more rapidly at regional level?

There are currently eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa whose aim it is to promote intra-regional trade and investment. And yet, intra-African trade only amounts to 11.7%[ii] of overall African trade with the world, compared with 70% for intra-EU and 55% for intra-Asian trades respectively. This paper takes stock of the respective protocols on free movement of goods, services, capital and people of two of these preferential trade regimes: the long-established Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the more recent East African Community (EAC).

Both areas face comparable challenges and opportunities. Both have drawn ambitious free movement protocols that potentially offer excellent opportunities for their citizens and businesses. However it appears that, at the implementation stage, a lot remains to be done. Both the ECOWAS and EAC protocols offer a wealth of proposals that seem to lack a clear evaluation process and a proper implementation strategy. In both cases, new ideas are generated too promptly, initiatives are launched without waiting for previous ones to have been properly implemented and tested. This emerging rather than prescriptive strategy often leads to confusion and generates unnecessarily additional hurdles in an already rather complex process.

ECOWAS: Ambitious projects but difficult implementation

ECOWAS, the oldest of today’s eight African RECs, was launched in May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty Preamble and Article 27 outlined the key objective of removing obstacles to the ‘Four Freedoms’[iii] among its members. The first phase of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, of May 1979, guaranteeing the free entry of citizens of the member states without visa for 90 days, was ratified by member states in 1980 and became effective with immediate effect.  Visa and entry permit requirements within ECOWAS were abolished in the implementation of this first phase.

As a result, citizens of member states possessing travel documents and a health certificate were, in principle, able to travel freely within ECOWAS. However, any member state could still refuse entry into its territory to persons it deemed inadmissible under its national laws. In 1983 and in mid 1985, Nigeria used this clause to revoke articles 4 and 27 to expel immigrants mainly of Ghanaian origin from its territory.[iv] At that time, Nigeria was overwhelmed by a large number of immigrants from Ghana, and was also undergoing an economic crisis due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes.

ECOWAS subsequently revised its treaty to reaffirm in 1992 the right of citizens of its participating states to entry, residence and settlement. Later, in January 2008, ECOWAS redefined its common approach to migration, which is linked to the principle of free movement within the region. In its effort to strengthen free movement, ECOWAS developed ‘Vision 2020’ which shifts emphasis from an ECOWAS of states to become by 2020 an ECOWAS of people living within a single borderless economic space.

The ECOWAS Vision project envisages the introduction of a Schengen-type visa, the abolition of permit requirements, the removal of road blocks and security checks, the exchange of information by security operatives at the border, and an introduction of a single ECOWAS passport. There is however, still lack of general information on these initiatives at the national level as various member states have either enacted or retained a series of national laws that still restrict free movement of persons, capital and services. Furthermore, implementing free circulation in West Africa has frequently been thwarted by random shocks such as local military conflicts, political repression, not to forget the Ebola outbreak and its tragic consequences.

A similar situation within EAC

With a level of intra-regional trade at 12% of overall trade, EAC is at first glance more integrated than ECOWAS, whose internal trade between members only reaches 9.4%. [v] However, this difference is due to the impact in ECOWAS of the Nigerian oil sales outside the zone.

Although EAC is, in comparison to ECOWAS, considerably smaller in terms of economic size[vi], population[vii], and infrastructure development, it displays a number of similarities. For instance, the two sub-regions seem equally quick to formulate and launch new protocols without awaiting successful implementation of previous ones. Furthermore, both sub-regions are facing huge discrepancies in the levels of development among their member states, and poor infrastructure development. Whereas Nigeria, Ghana and also Ivory Coast act as immigration magnets among the fifteen ECOWAS member states, this imbalance between rich and poor is less pronounced within the five EAC member states, where citizens of troubled Burundi, and previously from Rwanda, have taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Kenya has also had to cater for an influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia.

Despite being a more recent experiment than ECOWAS, EAC members have been keen to speed up the process of increasing regional economic cooperation through ambitious proposals, regardless of substantial challenges in developing the region’s infrastructures. In November 2009, thirty years after ECOWAS took this step, the EAC partner countries established a Common Market which became official on 1 July 2010. Arguably, this was not a first attempt to set up a joint enlarged market in East Africa, since an initial experiment, initiated as early as 1967 by three of the EAC founding states[viii], collapsed ten years later. But it was the first successful one, even though numerous hurdles remained for it to be effective.

The 2009 Common Market Protocol comprises key provisions including free movement of persons, workers, goods, services and capital, the right of establishment and of residence, a schedule of commitments on the progressive liberalisation of services, and on reducing restrictions to the free movement of capital. But this document, as ambitious as the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, faces similar challenges that slow down its implementation. Indeed, the 2014 scorecard released by the World Bank at the request of the EAC Secretariat identified no less than 63 non-conforming measures in the trade of services and 51 non-tariff barriers affecting trade in goods. The assessment further found out that only 2 of the 20 operations covered by the Common Market Protocol were free of restrictions.[ix]

West and East Africa have both formulated ambitious protocols which constitute in each case a reliable framework for establishing an integrated economic region. The problem lies not so much in the ambitions displayed, but rather in a lack of political will to implement them, as reflected for instance by national clauses. Member states within both RECs still retain national laws that impede successful implementation of their own, mutually agreed protocols. Considerable efforts will continue to be needed in the implementation phase which, in any project, tends to be the most demanding one. The two RECs still face considerable challenges in terms of infrastructure development, economic inequalities among member states, alongside local political conflicts and health and security issues, and more generally a persisting lack of information on the advantages of regional economic integration. All these factors combined continue to hinder the successful implementation of free movement.

The example of the more advanced Single European Market illustrates that achieving free circulation within a sub-region takes time and effort. Recent developments in the Schengen area are a reminder that such achievements can easily be questioned.[x] In comparison, ECOWAS and EAC are still in the early stages of the process. Both sub-regions are distinct from each other in many respects. But in their endeavour to create a subnational framework favourable to local economic expansion, they face similar challenges. As is often the case in matters of regional economic integration, the gap between good intentions and proper action is substantial. Implementing measures to integrate neighbouring economies within a regional sub-set requires changing scale by sharing national prerogatives, which itself requires strong political will and leadership. This is a learning process which may take more time than the current speed of development in both East and West Africa would require in order for it to match the needs of their populations in the near future. A pan-African initiative on the model of the newly launched TFTA to coordinate trade policies between all eight African RECs could be the way forward towards economic integration on a continental scale.

 

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

 

 

Notes:

[i] The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) was officially launched on 10 June 2015 in Cairo. It brings together three of Africa’s major economic communities.

[ii] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[iii] Free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour.

[iv] Adepoju, A. 2009. Migration management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. In M. Tremolieres (ed.) Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives. Paris: EOCD

[v] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[vi] The EAC’s combined GDP is two and a half times lower than ECOWAS. EAC counts five participating states and ECOWAS fifteen.

[vii] 156 million compared to 336 million in ECOWAS.

[viii] Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

[ix]http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=117. Accessed on 10/10/15

[x] https://strifeblog.org/2015/10/06/schengen-and-free-circulation-at-the-crossroads-lessons-for-the-east-african-community/. Accessed on 10/10/15

NATO, State (Re)emergence, and Military Capabilities and Commitments: the Terms of the Debate

by

By: Alex Calvo

USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY
USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY

 

The possible (re)emergence of states within NATO, at a time of renewed international tensions and widespread concern over the capabilities and commitments of existing member states, means that any such country seeking recognition will have to answer a fundamental question: will the combined capabilities and commitments of the two resulting successor states be greater or smaller than those of the existing parent state? In the run up to the Scottish referendum last year for instance, this was discussed, with some voices in the United States expressing their concern at the possible impact on the military capabilities of Washington’s first and foremost partner.  The Atlantic Council, a US-based think-tank published a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia, which praised the latter, emphasizing plans for naval specialization which fit with perceived US and NATO needs. At the political level, US President Barack Obama expressed his hope that voters would support Scotland staying in the UK, while remaining silent on Catalan independence and deploying USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) to Barcelona a few days before the 9 November semi-official referendum.

The report by the Atlantic Council, and President Obama’s different attitude towards Scotland and Catalonia, are a reminder that each case is different. The (re)emergence of a state within NATO is neither good nor bad in and of itself. It would be as irresponsible to oppose any such internal expansion without a detailed look at the particular case as it would be to blindly welcome it without applying the same careful examinatio. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate, both in general and abstract terms, drawing on the case of Catalonia and Spain as a reference.

GDP. A state’s investment in defence is a measure of its total GDP multiplied by the coefficient determined by its political institutions. The division of an existing state can affect the size of the two resulting economies in different ways. On the one hand, it can lead to smaller and thus less efficient domestic markets. On the other, it can prompt more agile, dynamic, outward-oriented economies. Separation can put an end to the so called “rational underdevelopment” of some regions and to hard-to-justify discriminatory policies in areas like infrastructure, and regional and industrial policy.

A split can have a negative impact, at least in the short run, on both resulting economies if political risk assessments rise, or uncertainty remains over aspects such as the allocation of the national debt. If one of the successor states used to be a net payer to the common treasury (that is, it paid more in taxes than it received in public spending) and the other was a net recipient (it used to pay less than it received), then some questions arise. The short-term question is whether the additional post-independence growth in the net payer will compensate for the drop in the net recipien. In the longer run, the issue is whether the latter will benefit from more rational economic policies and an improved work ethic once it no longer enjoys funds from the former. Both Spain proper and Scotland are net recipients, while Catalonia’s yearly net fiscal transfers to the former are estimated at around 8 percent of the GDP in the last 15 years.

In the case of Catalonia, in 2000, 57 percent of Catalan exports were bound for the Spanish market, with the remaining 43 percent sent abroad; while in 2014, the percentages had reversed. In previous years, boycotts against Catalan products have been organized in Spain proper. The idea behind the boycotts was to prompt Catalan businesses and trade unions to oppose moves for further devolution (in particular the 2006 reform of Catalonia’s “Statute of Autonomy”, a law defining the powers of the regional authorities), for fear of losing market share in Spain proper, with the resulting negative impact on employment. However, rather than diminishing support for independence, such moves have largely backfired, while providing added momentum to the drive for internationalization.Regulated industries (such as banking) still under Madrid’s yoke remain shy when it comes to expanding abroad, but the myriad small and medium-sized enterprises accounting for much of Catalonia’s economic tissue less so, with quite a few having become “pocket multinationals”, that is not very large corporations which are nevertheless present in a wide range of countries. A post-independence boycott by consumers in Spain proper remains a possibility, and would have a negative short-term impact on Catalan GDP, however this would not translate into lower longer-term economic growth, rather the contrary. The reason is that, just like with the boycotts against the 2006 reform of the “Statute of Autonomy”, they would prompt businesses to expand in other countries, thus gaining size and competitiveness. Furthermore, in an independent Catalonia this trend would also involve those industries currently regulated by Madrid, such as infrastructure management and banking, which to date have internationalized to a very small degree. We should also remember that, while Spain’s Castilian core may remain hostile to the new state, Valencia and the Balearic Islands are likely to take a much more nuanced approach. In addition to sharing a language with Catalonia, their economic structure is similar. They also suffer a large fiscal deficit (difference between taxes paid and public spending received) and a lack of infrastructure investment, while their economy is based on small and medium-sized enterprises, which have been excluded by successive Spanish governments from the defence industry and related sectors such as airspace. A third consideration is that the value of Catalan exports to Spain proper include the value added by exporters plus the value of the intermediate goods used to produce them (that is, commodities, energy, and components, bought in Catalonia or abroad by Catalan companies to produce goods bound for Spain proper). Thus, taking the latter out, the effective percentage of Catalan GDP included in exports to Spain proper is lower, 22.5% of the GDP.

Concerning Spain proper, there are no Catalan plans for a boycott, and the independence movement has rather been careful and stress its desire to see good bilateral relations after separation. In that event, as Catalonia opens up further to world trade, and Spanish enterprises lose their current advantage in terms of common legislation and considerable overlap in the mass media sphere, they will face stronger competition from third-country producers in the Catalan market. This could be beneficial for Spanish companies, by forcing them to become more competitive. It would also promote their internationalization in two ways: thanks to this greater competitiveness forced by greater competition in the Catalan market, and due to a loss of market share in Catalonia pushing them to seek alternative markets.

In the short term, however, it is the loss of Catalan subsidies that may have the strongest impact on the economy of Spain proper, which has become structurally dependent on easy money from Catalonia and could suffer a significant GDP loss as these funds dried out. Although the EU and the IMF may push for a gradual easing out of financial flows, with some transitional agreements, Catalan independence would sooner or later mean that the more than 16 billion euros transferred to Spain proper every year would not longer be there. This would not necessarily be bad in the longer term. It could release Spanish entrepreneurial spirits and force a more rational set of economic policies, with for example greater infrastructure spending in industrial areas, more business-friendly tax regulations, and greater competition. Having said this, it is however likely to prompt further defence cuts in the short run. Ideally, this should prompt a fundamental transformation of Spain’s Armed Forces into a smaller, but non-political, agile, and better prepared military. Section 8.1 of Spain’s 1978 constitution reads “The mission of the Armed Forces … is … to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order”. This passage, believed to have actually been drafted by the military themselves, is widely understood to mean that Spain’s Armed Forces can be used to prevent Catalan independence, and seemed to be on Defence Minister Pedro Morenes’ mind when he said, in the run up to the 27 September election to the Catalan Parliament, that there would be no military intervention “as long as everybody does their duty”. If to the possibility of a military intervention in Catalonia we add the regular harassment of Gibraltar at sea, we can observe two very serious distractions for the Spanish Armed Forces.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. https://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1
Ski Company, First Pyrenees Regiment, training during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This elite unit was set up by mountain sports enthusiasts and served under the Catalan Government.†

Defence investment and procurement. Due to economies of scale, it could be argued that successor states will need to invest more simply to achieve the same capabilities as the parent state. In some cases, it could even be argued that some or all successor states will not be able to afford expensive hardware. On the other hand, this may facilitate greater integration and coordination with allies, with less duplication and fewer prestige projects. It may also lead to a renewed emphasis on maintenance and training, stressing not nominal capabilities, but real, deployable capabilities (which a country can effectively transport, deploy, and maintain).

In the case of Spain, procurement is deeply imbalanced, with the country embarking on expensive projects mainly motivated by a mixture of prestige and industrial policy, rather than operational considerations. The result: a large gap between nominal and real capabilities, problems in deploying and sustaining forces far from her shores, and a lack of funds for training, maintenance, and operations, with the bulk of defence spending going into personnel and procurement. To be fair, these problems are not unique to Spain. For example, the German deployment in Afghanistan was plagued by equipment failures, with a 2014 official report explaining that “only 42 of Germany’s 109 Eurofighters are available for immediate use because of fuselage defects. The navy faces similar problems with only 4 of its 22 Sea Lynx helicopters and 3 of its 21 Sea Kings currently operational.” However, the case of Spain is perhaps even more extreme, going beyond a lack of proper maintenance. A study on “Southern Europe Defence in Times of Austerity” noted that “[t]he Spanish military industrial base ranks tenth in the world and sixth in Europe thanks in part to its stake in EAD, one of the leading global aircraft companies. This means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain directly affects their national economies and aggravates the domestic economic crisis environment. This disparity could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments chose to primarily reduce personnel and operations/maintenance programmes rather than investment programmes, whereas the Portuguese and Greek governments reduced defence expenditures across the board.”

Catalonia’s national security community is keenly aware of such problems, as reflected in successive unofficial white papers by the Military Studies Society (SEM). Its latest on defence budgets, published in June, lays down a set of serious, realistic budgetary guidelines for an independent Catalonia, based on the experience of NATO allies. The text stresses that operations (expenditures covering costs for deployed operations outside member state’s territory) and equipment maintenance have “been a problem common to many Western armed forces” due to a lack of “available resources in this area” of maintenance, prompted by the “excessive costs of acquisition programs.” The white paper strongly emphasizes that “The Catalan Defence Forces (CDF) cannot make these mistakes,” and recommends that “the percentage of the defence budget devoted to operations and maintenance should be between 35 and 40 percen.” For Catalonia, starting from scratch after 300 years without her own armed forces, this is a golden opportunity to avoid past mistakes, by both the Spanish military and those of many allies. The result should be a more agile, balanced military, where equipment is purchased according to perceived needs, rather than by industry lobbying, and then properly maintained.

Turning to the legitimate question of whether Catalan defence budgets will be large enough to sustain acquisition programs in areas like strategic airlift, a quick look at the numbers shows this should not be a problem. Catalonia currently accounts for roughly 20 percent of Spanish GDP, Madrid in turn spending 0.6 percent on defence. An independent Catalonia following NATO guidelines, as suggested by the SEM, would thus be spending the equivalent of 0.4 percent of current Spanish GDP. Adding in the expected long-term greater economic growth from the end of fiscal transfers, irrational economic policies, and sabotage to key infrastructures, it is not easy to imagine total Catalan defence spending surpassing the figure for today’s Spain. Spain may well find herself unable to sustain current levels of defence spending, however, since much of these capabilities are either not being properly maintained and used in training, or are directed towards fellow NATO member states (UK) or American allies (Morocco), it is not something that should concern alliance planners much.

Intra-alliance conflict (between successor states, or between the existing parent state and other partners). Concerning post-independence relations between successor states, at one end of the spectrum we could imagine two good neighbours leaving behind tensions and now able and eager to work together, both bilaterally and within wider permanent alliances and ad-hoc coalitions. At the other end of the spectrum, two hostile states with unresolved disputes and at least one failing to rule out a resort to force, prompting most of their capabilities to be addressed at each other rather than available to allies.

When the parent state has persistently been employing non-lethal force against a fellow NATO member state, the question arises whether once reduced in size it will persist in this policy, now with fewer resources, or whether it will abandon such an approach. In the latter case, the impact on the alliance’s capabilities will be doubly positive, since capabilities devoted to intra-alliance conflict will now be available to NATO, as will be those employed by the other member state to defend itself.

In Spain’s case, the country seems able to work with some of her former colonies, as shown by the successful incorporation of some 30 Portuguese commandos in the Spanish Legion’s detachment deployed in Iraq in a training and mentoring capacity. Unfortunately, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, with Madrid unable or unwilling to recognize Gibraltar’s right to decide her own future, and the ensuing policy of constant harassment. In 2015, from 1 January to 23 June, the Spanish Navy had engaged in 23 violations of British territorial waters, while absent from BALTOPS201 , in a reminder that in a world with limited resources, failing to rule out the use of force against a fellow ally puts a dent on any potential contribution to NATO. It also has an impact on that ally’s contribution. Thus, when measuring Spain’s net contribution to the Atlantic alliance, we should subtract all the assets and capabilities devoted to the harassment of Gibraltar, plus the corresponding British assets and capabilities employed to defend the people of the Rock. Catalonia, having excellent relations with Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, which the national security community sees as a key partner, does not suffer such handicap. The new state will not have to spend a cent on disturbing the life and property of her Majesty’s subject

Ceuta and Melill, two cities located in North Africa, the former right in front of Gibraltar, administered by Spain but claimed by Morocco, also merit a mention. While this conflict is more low key, a significant portion of Spanish forces are deployed with their defence in mind. Since Morocco is a US Ally, again we would have to subtract them when measuring Madrid’s potential contribution to NATO. Not a problem for Catalonia, which is not party to any territorial conflict with the North African country. To add insult to injury, Ceuta has become the main logistic support base for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean and North-East Atlantic, with Madrid blatantly disregarding Western sanctions in the wake of the Crimean crisis. In 2014 for instance, Russian warships docked at Ceuta on 13 occasions, while nine such visits have taken place in the first six months of 2015. By opening up Ceuta to Moscow, Madrid has forfeited the claim that it is in NATO’s interest to see Catalonia, including key ports like Tarragona and Barcelona, remain in Spanish hands.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. http://webs.racocatala.cat/cat1714/milicies2.htm

Defence industrial policy and international defence industry cooperation. Smaller domestic weapons markets can be cited as having a potentially negative impact. On the other hand, in those states where the dominant nationality has excluded another from the defence industry, the resulting end to the defence industry “apartheid” may enable weapons development and production to take root. In particular, where the excluded territory used to have an arms industry earlier in its history, and retains a significant civilian industrial base, as is the case in Catalonia.

The issue for third countries — in particular those involved in international consortia featuring the existing parent state — is the net impact. This may depend on possible synergies with existing civilian industries in the territory previously excluded from arms production.

Successive Spanish governments have excluded Catalan enterprises from the defence industry and many dual sectors, while subsidizing production in areas like Seville (Airbus Group), with little or no industrial tradition. A 2015 official report on Spain’s security and defence industry provides details of 47 companies, none of which is based in Catalonia, with only three in Valencia Region. Madrid has also strived to keep Catalonia isolated from southern France, home to most of the country’s aircraft industries. An end to this defence policy “apartheid” would allow Catalan enterprises to expand into the defence—and dual—industries, in a move which would benefit maritime democracies, including partners in the F-35 consortium. Spanish industry would contract, but this would liberate the country’s partners from the extra costs involved in manufacturing in regions with no industrial traditio. A look at FDI (foreign direct investment) reveals a completely different geography from that of the defence industry programs jointly sponsored by Spain’s Defence and Industry Ministries. In the second quarter of 2015, 35.1 percent of Spain-bound industrial FDI went to Catalonia, while none of Spain’s at least 300 8×8 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) based on General Dynamics’ Piranha 5 will be manufactured in Catalonia. The initial order is expected to be worth EUR1.5 billion.

The location of Airbus Group’s plant in Seville, in the southern region of Andalusia, where there is little private industry, does not make sense. From a French perspective, a Catalan town would seem more logical, since French aeronautical industry is concentrated around Toulouse, close to Catalonia. This would also benefit UK taxpayers, given the significant connection between the Spanish and British defence industries, to a large extent due to the two countries’ cooperation in aircraft projects. According to the official Spanish report on 2014 weapons exports, the United Kingdom ranked first among the country’s customers, with purchases worth 862.7 million euros, 26.9 percent of the total. The report explains that three aerial refuelling tankers accounted for 573,9 million euros and a transport airplane for 121.8 million euros, with a portion of the balance coming from parts for the EF-2000 fighter and the A400M military transport plane. As we can see, this is not trade in finished weapons systems, but rather intra-industry trade among countries cooperating in joint projects, where the distribution of the work involved is often related to the volume of orders from each defence ministry. Therefore, by excluding Catalan industry and imposing manufacture in areas like Seville, with little tradition of private industry, Madrid is raising the total cost of production of these aircraft.

Cohesion, internal security. When an existing state resorts to force, or the threat of force, to retain its present territory and population, a portion of its security and defence capabilities will have to be devoted to this task, and thus unavailable to NATO. Distracted by the need to coerce part of their population into remaining, collective defence may not be a priority.

This is the case in Spain, where the military granted itself the duty and right to employ force to keep the country together in the 1978 Constitution. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy, Catalonia’s last attempt to find a reasonable accommodation within Spain, also prompted sabre rattling, and on 17 May 2015 Catalan police caught three Spanish soldiers stealing an independence flag in Figueres. Stealing flags is obviously not the best way to train for NATO operations, while wasting Catalan police’s time does not contribute to the fight against Jihadist terrori. Every minute spent by Catalan police officers investigating such deeds is a minute not spent fighting against international terrorism and organized crime. The extent to which the resort to force to prevent Catalan self-determination distracts and perverts Spanish defence policy is clear from available statistic. While the defence budget has shrunk by 32 percent since 2008 (68 percent according to some sources, but this may not fully take into account defence spending from other departments’ budgets, for example the Industry Ministry to fund weapons programs involving domestic manufacturing, as well as extra-budgetary liabilities), that of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) grew by 9.7 percent in 2015. Details may not be available on open sources, but it is suspected that the bulk of this increase is devoted to the “dirty war” against the Catalan independence movement.

Catalonia, on the other hand, has made clear from the outset that Val d’Aran, with her own language and culture, was free to join the new state or go her own way. No Catalan military capabilities will be needed to keep inside those who want out. Whether Spain without Catalonia will stop seeing the military as a political actor is not clear at this stage. Ideally this change should take place, releasing military capabilities currently not available to the Atlantic alliance.

Citizens’ loyalty: Draft and reserves. If some citizens within the parent state feel little loyalty, or even a measure of hostility towards it, for whatever reasons (justified or otherwise), there may be a gap between its theoretical manpower pool and the actual number of deployable citizens, be they regular or reserve. While the parent state may resort to a purely professional military to avoid this problem, it may then translate into a lower degree of political support for defence policies.

This is clearly the case in Spain, where there is little love between the state’s Castilian core and many of her non-Castilian citizens, leading to a downward spiral where the more the centre uses—or threatens to use—force against those wishing to leave, the less the latter feel bound to support the former’s resort to force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Many Catalan citizens who feel alienated by the Spanish military may well wish to support their Catalan counterpart, for example by joining the reserves, making the combined manpower pool available to the two successor states larger.

Transitional issues: Inheriting defence assets and personnel. Downsizing and building one’s military. In addition to wider economic issues, the transition from parent state to successor states also features some aspects specific to the military. Among them, the distribution of existing defence assets and personnel and the accompanying downsizing of the parent state’s and (re)creation of the successor states’ armed forces.

Concerning the distribution of Spanish military assets, preliminary defence planning in Catalonia has featured two views, with some analysts favouring the taking over of some naval and air assets, while others prefer to avoid systems not necessarily best suited to Catalan and allied needs. With regard to Spanish military personnel wishing to join Catalonia’s Armed Forces, the issue is highly sensitive and has not been publicly discussed by the Catalan Government. However, both the Catalan Government and parties have stressed that Spanish Government employees in Catalonia will keep their jobs after independence, and in so doing they have not excluded any category. The Advisory Council on the National Transition, a government agency tasked with preparing a number of white papers to prepare for independence, also refers to Spanish Government workers without excluding the military, although again without referring to them explicitly. Some members of the Spanish military may have discreetly enquired about the possibility of joining Catalonia’s Armed Forces, but they are unlikely to do anything which may put their jobs at risk until this possibility is a real one. We could also mention that when Catalan Police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, began to expand in the 1980s to become responsible for most public security duties, Spanish Police and Civil Guard (a constabulary-type force) officers in Catalonia were given the chance to join. Catalonia may also need to provide for those members of the Spanish military who do not wish to follow this route but who refuse to follow orders contrary to international law and fear subsequent reprisals.

Conclusions. The factors discussed are only a sample of those that may have an impact on state succession within NATO, resulting in greater or lesser capabilities and commitments towards the alliance. This work should ideally be followed by more extensive research and case studies, but should at least serve the purpose of underlining that, no matter how distressing the (re)emergence of states can sometimes be, the consequences to defence policy should be approached rigorously. It is also a reminder that any new state wishing to be recognized by existing states will have to explain to the international community how it will not only defend itself but also its allies and partners. Even more so at a time of increasing tensions, a country’s contribution to collective security is bound to be one of the main factors determining its recognition, or lack thereof, by the international community.

In the case of Catalonia, preliminary defence planning is geared towards the creation of a modern, capable, and agile military, ready to protect the country’s territory and population and make a powerful, positive contribution to NATO. This scenario could also give Spain the chance to reform her own military, in which case the Atlantic alliance would gain two net security contributors. However, it is still too early to say whether Catalan independence will prompt a rationalization of Spanish defence policy and thus a positive contribution to NATO from Madrid.

 

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work, which includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College,  23 December 2013, is available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Working-Papers/Documents/WP1-Calvo.aspx, can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo

† http://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1