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Is remote control effective in solving security problems?

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By: Chad Daniel Tumelty

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/MQ-9_Reaper_UAV.jpg
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/MQ-9_Reaper_UAV.jpg

Editors note: Remote Control is a project hosted by the London-based think tank Oxford Research Group, set up to examine changes in military engagement, in particular the use of drones, special forces, private military companies and cyber warfare. They recently hosted an essay competition for participants in response to the question ‘Is remote control effective in solving security problems?’ Both Chad Tumelty and Archie Jobson of King’s College London achieved runner up. Strife is proud to feature them as your long read of the week over the coming two weeks.

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Drones manifest both the concept and operation of remote control. As more states acquire and use drones to perform tasks previously performed by manned aircraft the effect that this transition of control will have upon wider state security will become clear. However as yet it is not. As such it is important to not only to think about how effective drones may be in solving security problems but also the wider impact this may have. The argument presented here is that the effectiveness of drones in solving state security problems will not be determined by the technology that allows them to be controlled remotely but in how states utilise that technology without impacting upon the security of other states. While drones can increase a state’s security by performing sorties that manned aircraft cannot, offering unparalleled persistence over borders and maritime interests, in areas where relations between states are strained such employment may be misperceived and create a security dilemma. Although drones enable states to conduct dangerous reconnaissance flights remotely without any risk to a pilot, epitomizing the concept of post-heroic warfare, this risks states becoming more inclined to conduct more politically precarious operations, potentially eroding security.

 

Introduction

Drones represent the perfect manifestation of both the concept and operation of remote control in technological form. The growing ubiquity and employment of drones represents one of the most salient technological developments to impact upon state security in recent times. Both the number of states acquiring drones as well as the number and variety they are acquiring is growing; with over ninety states now operating them, and a further twenty actively developing them.[2] Commonly referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or more accurately remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), drones allow states to exercise many of the same operations performed by manned aircraft through systems of remote control, sometimes at greater efficiently or at lower risk. Although certain elements of some drones operations are automated, such as take-off and landing, they are often confused as being autonomous systems; ones that can perform a task or function without human input once activated.[3] While drones are being increasing used to perform security tasks instead of manned aircraft, the effect that this transition to remote control will have upon on state security is not yet clear.

The current U.S. exceptional use of armed UAVs to conduct targeted killings of suspected terrorists and insurgents outside of traditional battlefields, such as in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, by President Obama’s administration has raised both the profile and controversy surrounding drones.[4] Despite this, even before the first armed General Atomics MQ-1 Predator was tested in 2001 the use of drones was a growing feature of state security activity in non-lethal intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles; such as the American use of such systems in the Gulf War and operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as frequent Israeli deployment of drones since the 1980’s.[5]  Historically drones have been operated as such intelligence gathering platforms, most notably by the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) throughout the Cold War.[6] Outside of military and intelligence applications, drones are now also being used for a variety of non-lethal ISR roles by both state and non-state actors, including counter-trafficking surveillance, border patrols, search and rescue operations, and environmental monitoring, while it is as widely considered that drones have the potential to be used in almost ‘endless’ commercial applications.[7] Many also view the limited use of UAVs by Hezbollah as the possible prelude to their widespread use by other terrorist groups.[8] Given their proliferation, it is important to understand how effective the use of remotely controlled drones will be in solving a state’s security problems but also to consider the wider impact this may have upon their security.

The impact that drones will have upon security will not be determined by the technology behind making an aircraft unmanned but on how states utilise the remote control that drones offer and how other states will react to this in turn. In order to evaluate how effective remote control is in solving security problems this essay will explore the employment of drones by states to perform security functions associated with ISR applications. It will argue that while the uses drones in such roles may increase a state’s security in a number of ways by performing onerous functions that manned aircraft cannot, the perceived low risk to their employment may potentially erode security however by increasing the inclination of states to undertake more intrusive operations against others, both politically and physically, which they would not do with manned aircraft. In order to illustrate this, this essay will consider both the ‘dull’ surveillance and ‘dangerous’ reconnaissance tasks that drones are commonly conceived as being especially suited for, as reflected in both British and American doctrines on RPA.[9] The first section will consider how by performing surveillance flights previously considered too dull for manned aircraft the remote control offered by drones can effectively increase a state’s security by enabling persistent loitering over borders, waters and other national interests, and then consider the potential impact this may have in creating a security dilemma. The second section will explore the issue of greater concern and the use of drones to conduct dangerous reconnaissance and intelligence gathering missions over an adversaries territory, and how this risks creating insecurity between states through this post-heroic use of airpower.

Dull Surveillance

It is often the limits of human endurance that constitutes the weak link in the time that an aircraft can remain airborne. Occasionally exceptional efforts have been made to overcome these limitations, such as during the Kosovo intervention when American Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bombers flew with two crews on-board during their thirty hour roundtrip missions from their base in the continental U.S. to Serbia.[10] However pilot fatigue has mainly been the constraining factor of flight-times and not aeronautical engineering. By removing the manned element in the aircraft drones ameliorate this issue through remote control and allow for missions requiring significant endurance that have been previously classified as either too dull or difficult to be flown. For example, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, often suggested in the U.S. as a replacement for their Lockheed U-2 spy plane, nicknamed the ‘Dragon Lady’, is able remain airborne in excess of thirty hours over long ranges but can operate either through automation on preprogramed flight paths or by pilots working in shifts through remote control, negating the constraint of fatigue.[11] Drones then, as put by former Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, enable the ‘holy grail of air power: persistence’ which in turn opens up new ways in which such aircraft can be utilised to increase state security enabled through remote control.[12]

It is through this persistence that drones offer states which confers upon them the ability to improve their security situation by increasing the protection of previously vulnerable areas or assets through extended surveillance. RPA are commonly referenced by many as a suitable solution to protecting and monitoring ‘vulnerable targets at sea’, such as merchant shipping, tankers, oil rigs and pipelines, through the exploitation of the persistence offered by remote control.[13] The British vision for drones primarily involves them undertaking many maritime security tasks, that are either not suited to naval assets or that are currently performed by manned aircraft but require multiple sorties; such tasks include littoral monitoring, anti-submarine patrols, counter-piracy tasks, fisheries protection and ocean scanning.[14]  Both the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy already employ a number of UAVs to conduct these tasks.[15] Drones can also increase a state’s terrestrial security by performing dull flights. In 2005, the U.S. Congress authorized its Customs and Border Protection to purchase unarmed Predators to conduct its border patrols and surveillance more effectively and easily.[16] Since then a number of other federal agencies including the Missile Defense Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration and Department of Transport, as well as growing number of local sheriff and police departments, have acquired a multitude of drones for the purpose of increasing U.S. national security.[17]

By offering the ability to perform flights previously considered too dull, laborious or costly drones can effectively increase a state’s security. The persistent ISR capability that drones offer through remote control at decreased manpower and aircraft fatigue means that previously vulnerable assets or exploitable areas can now be protected. For example, during initial operations in Afghanistan the U.S. Air Force was able to operate twenty four separate Predator missions to provide ‘coverage round the clock’ in supporting troops; a task that would have proven extremely demanding on both aircraft and personnel if attempted with manned assets.[18]  This capability can be easily adapted to increase national security or protect national interests. It should be noted that such operations do come at a high cost however, meaning that not all states could afford to mount such operations and most could not do so over multiple areas at once. A single Predator for example costs a little under $4.5 million, of which a quarter accounts for just the surveillance package, while it requires 168 people working across multiple areas to operate one for, and maintain it after, just twenty four hours of flight.[19] As developments in UAV technology continue to advance and market dynamics ensue it is likely that more advanced drones will be become widely available. It should be noted that not every state will require expensive high altitude, long endurance UAVs such as the Global Hawk or Predator, and will be able to adapt the wide variety of cheaper commercially available drones to meet their own unique security needs. The growing sophistication of drones costing even hundreds of dollars means that they have the potential capacity to produce significant security effects if sophistically deployed.[20]

The use of RPA in such dull surveillance roles may have unforeseen consequences however. Widespread state use of drones on interstate borders and over common waters may invoke a ‘security dilemma’; where steps taken by one state to increase their security undermines the security of other states.[21] When outlining the dilemma in 1978, Robert Jervis noted that ‘inspection devices can ameliorate the security dilemma’ by providing states with a ‘warning of coming dangers’ over their border and waters, but warned that; ‘attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm others who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased.’[22] It is through such employment that drones have the potential to create security problems for states. Although the widespread use of drones by various U.S. federal agencies over its shared borders has not concerned either Mexico or Canada this is jointly due to the historical norms of friendly relations between the U.S. and its neighbours and the bi-lateral security benefits of their border protection, ballistic missile defence and counter-narcotics missions.[23]  In regions where there are contested territorial disputes, such as the South China Sea, or where relationships between neighbours are particularly strained or actively hostile, then the introduction of similar practices with drones may increase tension between states.  For example, despite repeated calls to do so the U.S. has refused to provide even unarmed UAVs to Ukraine to perform ISR roles, fearing that it might antagonise Russia further and prompt an escalation in the use of force.[24]

A way of evaluating this potential effect of such security operations with drones is through the lens of the offense-defence balance. This theory suggests that when it is technologically easier for a state to mount offensive action there is a greater probability of conflict, but when defence has the advantage the reverse is true.[25] Therefore if drones are seen as an enabler of territorial conquest and annexation then their widespread use over international boundaries and waters may induce friction between states, however if they are perceived as performing a security function then they could reduce the potential for conflict.[26] While it is difficult to classify technology as either offensive or defensive, Jack Levy has argued that some characteristics such as mobility will inherently offer greater offensive potential than others, such as armament, protection, endurance or even striking power.[27] On a similar vein, recently Peter Singer has noted how emerging technologies such as drones and robotics ‘are perceived as helping the offensive side in a war more than defence’ due to their ability to be operated remotely.[28] Although a fierce critic of the use of drones to conduct targeted killing operations, General Stanley McChrystal has reported how RPA employed in ISR roles were an effective force multiplier for the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command when he led them in Iraq, in that they provided unparalleled situational awareness and improved command and control which enabled his forces to conduct multiple commando raids per night.[29] Therefore there is the potential that drones could produce friction between states when performing surveillance security tasks over shared areas or borders, regardless of their armament, due to the inherent quality of some of their traits, including remote control, in enabling states to conduct offensive operations.

Dangerous Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance flights over an adversary’s territory have historically been the most dangerous mission undertaken by aircraft.[30]  The recent downing and subsequent execution of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Muadh al-Kasasbeh at the hands of Islamic State and Iraq and the Levant over Syria on the 24th December 2014 illustrates the danger that ISR sorties over an enemy’s territory can entail.[31]  In addition to the risk to a pilot’s life reconnaissance flights have also carried the most political risk.  On the 1st May 1960 the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 flying over its territory, captured its pilot Major Gary Powers, and then proceeded to arrest him for spying and paraded him on television, causing ‘a devastating blow to the U.S.’s international prestige’.[32] The ensuing political fallout meant that American manned reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union ceased; ‘What had been an acceptable risk on 1 May became unacceptable politically and militarily on 2 May.’[33]  It was these very risks that drones helped to eliminate through remote control.  As previously noted, it has been in the ISR role over hostile territory that drones have historically been employed. For example, drones were extensively employed to monitor China’s nuclear program and throughout the Cold War the NRO flew numerous drone reconnaissance sorties over the Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nor to gain details of their nuclear testing and arsenal.[34] On the 15th November 1964 China shot down a U.S. Ryan AQM-34 Firebee in an event which ‘made the front page of The New York Times, but created little controversy.’[35] The loss of seven more drones over China between 1965 and 1975 ‘went virtually unnoticed’ with these events creating almost no political fallout despite conducting essentially the same activity that Powers had been over the Soviet Union.[36]  It is due to this record that Ann Rogers and John Hill argue that drones solve what they term the ‘Gary Powers problem’ simply by being unmanned and remotely controlled, appearing to ‘manifest a less obvious trespass than a manned incursion’.[37]  It is this perception of drone reconnaissance flights that may potentially carry with it the greatest risks to state security.

The fact that drones are piloted remotely means that the calculation of risk concerning their employment for dangerous flights such as reconnaissance sorties is altered. In other words, drones allow leaders to ‘take risks’ that they would ‘hesitate to do with manned aircraft’.[38] The legacy of RPA use throughout the Cold War as well as their current employment stands testament to this. David Dunn argues that because they are controlled remotely and therefore disembodied, drones ‘disrupt the calculus of risk’ in those who employ them by convincing them that their use in sensitive mission can be conducted with ‘domestic political impunity, minimal international response and low political risk’.[39] Peter Singer terms this the ‘dark irony’ of drones, in that by removing the potential risk of the loss of life related to dangerous missions through remote control drones ‘may seduce us into more wars’ by making it more likely that leaders would employ them.[40] The recent Birmingham Policy Commission report on drones stated that it found such arguments of drones ‘lowering the threshold to the use of force’, as they are unmanned and controlled remotely, unconvincing based on the evidence they heard.[41] It should be noted that this was only in a British context however, and this perception of drones may indeed invoke such reckless use by other states. In a 2011 doctrine publication on drones  the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence stated that; ‘an opponent that succeeds in shooting down an unmanned aircraft has little to show for it but some wreckage – which they can easily be accused of fabricating, or for which ownership can simply be denied’. [42] This illustrates that, contrary to the Birmingham Policy Commission’s findings, there may be some within British policy making circles that disregard the risk of drone employment on sensitive reconnaissance missions.

The view that drones may increase the risk of confrontation between states by presenting no risk to a pilot’s life is tied to the idea of post-heroic warfare. Coined by Edward Luttwak, post-heroic warfare describes a condition where force may be employed easily and without restraint by states provided that doing so carries no risk of casualties, enabled by the full exploitation of technologies which remove humans from harm.[43]  It is frequently noted that for many states; ‘It is becoming harder to envision sending manned reconnaissance assets into denied, hostile airspace’, due to the casualty aversion of their societies.[44] Drones solve this issue through remote control by offering leaders the ‘seductive’ ability to conduct dangerous missions without risking the sacrifice or political blowback entailed with manned aircraft.[45] In this way drones therefore embody the concept of post-heroic warfare. Peter Singer notes that; ‘By removing warriors completely from risk and fear, unmanned systems create the first complete break in the ancient connection that defines warriors and their soldierly values.’[46] The effects of this separation are not yet clear, but the wider employment of drones by many states would appear to clarify that it has changed the perception of risk in conducting dangerous or politically sensitive missions. Examples of this have already been seen with Israel’s extensive use of drones to gather targeting information and intelligence over Syria, or more recently Russia’s use of unarmed UAVs over Ukraine to support the separatists with artillery observation.[47]

Although there is some suggestion that states currently appear to view drone reconnaissance sorties as unobtrusive events politically, as these systems become more widely utilised by a greater number of actors this norm could become eroded. The Birmingham Policy Commission noted that many states are beginning to recognise that their air defence posture is unsuitable for drones and are already pursuing research and development projects into anti-drone defences in order to remedy this, indicating that this shift in norms may already be taking place.[48] For example, while current U.S. air defences can defeat a wide range of aerial threats a significant gap exists in that low flying, small UAVs cannot be detected by their ground based radar arrays, meaning that such drones could easily penetrate their airspace.[49] This is related to the offense-defence balance. Although the characteristics of drone technology may make it inherently suited to offense, the balance is also about the relative resources that a state must invest in their own defences in order to counter an opponent’s offensive capabilities; ‘When a technological innovation changes the relative costs of offensive and defensive capabilities, the offense-defense balance shifts.’[50] As most states do not possess the necessary means to counter the wide array of RPA that exist the continued proliferation of drones and their use in the air space of other sovereign state may upset the offense-defence balance. This issue may become more prominent as technical developments continue to make stealth technology cheaper and more widely available.[51] If this occurs then drones flying dangerous reconnaissance missions could destabilise relations between states, potentially leading to a security dilemma. This could be particularly perilous during periods of increased tension between states. A prominent example of this was on the 27th October 1962 when an American U-2 was shot down conducting reconnaissance over Cuba at the height of the Missile Crisis in an event that heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and almost induced miscalculation at a period when the potential of a nuclear exchange was very real.[52]

Conclusion

In conclusion, while drones may be effective in solving some state security problems this may come at considerable political cost that will have a profound impact on wider state security, the effects of which are not yet clear. Drones can increase state security by performing surveillance sorties that manned aircraft cannot by offering the persistence needed to protect national borders, waters and other national security interests through remote control. In areas where relations between states are strained however such employment may be misperceived under the security dilemma. By enabling states to conduct dangerous reconnaissance flights remotely without any risk to a pilot, epitomizing the concept of post-heroic warfare, drones create a perception of low risk to their employment which may potentially increasing the inclination of leaders to take risks. This carries with it the risk that states will be more inclined to conduct more politically and physically intrusive operations that will erode relations between states impacting security. The effectiveness of drones in solving security problems will not be determined by the technology that allows an unmanned aircraft to be controlled remotely but upon how norms of use are developed over time as to how states can utilise that technology to solve their security problems without impacting upon the security of another state.

Chad is currently studying for an MA in Science and Security at King’s College London. He is writing his dissertation on the bulk collection of metadata by the U.S. National Security Agency. Previously Chad completed a BA in War Studies, also at King’s College London, for which he was awarded a first class honours. He is currently interning at Realeyes, a tech start-up, which provides facial coding and emotions analytical services to brands, advertising agencies and media companies.

[1] An earlier version of this essay was submitted in partial requirement for the postgraduate module “Current Issues in Science and Security”, at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, on the 25th March 2015.

[2] Kelley Sayler (2015), A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer, (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security), p. 8

[3] Paul Scharre (2015), Between a Roomba and a Terminator: What is Autonomy?, War On The Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/between-a-roomba-and-a-terminator-what-is-autonomy/ , 18/02/2015

[4] Kenneth Anderson (2010), Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War,  testimony submitted to the  U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, (23rd March 2010), p. 1

[5] Air Chief Marshall Sir Brian Burridge (2003), UAVs and the dawn of post-modern warfare: A perspective on recent operations, The RUSI Journal, (148:5, pp. 18-23), p. 18

[6] Thomas P. Ehrhard (2010), Air Force UAVs: The Secret History, (Washington, D.C.: Mitchell Institute Press), pp. 2-5

[7] Medea Benjamin (2013), Drone Warfare: Killing By Remote Control, (London: Verso), p. 15

[8] Brian A. Jackson & David R. Frelinger (2009), Emerging Threats and Security Planning: How Should We Decide What Hypothetical Threats to Worry About?, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), p. 7

[9] Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), p. 1; and, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11(2011), The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, (Shivernham: Ministry of Defence), p. 3-4

[10] Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 2

[11] Richard A. Best Jr. & Christopher Bolkcom (2000), Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), p. 2

[12] Air Chief Marshall Sir Brian Burridge (2005), Post-Modern Warfighting with Unmanned Vehicle Systems: Esoteric Chimera or Essential Capability?, The RUSI Journal, (150:5, pp. 20-23), p. 20

[13] Peter W. Singer (2009), Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, (London: Penguin), p. 227

[14] Joint Doctrine Note 2/11(2011), The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, p. 3-4

[15] Jeremiah Gertler (2012), U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), p. 23

[16] Benjamin (2013), Drone Warfare, p. 75

[17] Gertler (2012), U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, p. 23

[18] John D. Blom (2010), Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press), p. 108; and, Singer (2009), Wired For War, p. 33

[20] Sayler (2015), A World of Proliferated Drones, p. 29

[21] Robert Jervis (1978), Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma, World Politics, (30:2, pp. 167-214), p. 169

[22] Ibid, pp. 169-181

[23] Benjamin (2013), Drone Warfare, p. 75

[24] Adam Rawnsley (2015), Ukraine Scrambles For UAVs, But Russian Drones Own The Sky, War Is Boring, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ukraine-scrambles-for-uavs-but-russian-drones-own-the-skies-74f5007183a2, 20/02/2015

[25] Sean M. Lynn-Jones (1995), Offense-Defense Theory And Its Critics, Security Studies, (4:4, pp. 660-691), p. 661

[26] Jack S. Levy (1984), The Offensive/Defensive Balance Theory of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis, International Studies Quarterly, (28:2, pp. 219-238), p. 223

[27] Ibid, p. 225

[28] Singer (2009), Wired For War, pp. 321-332

[29] Gideon Rose (2013), Generation Kill: A Conversation with Stanley McChrystal, Foreign Affairs, (92:2 , pp.2-8), pp. 4-5

[30] Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 2

[31] Martin Chulov & Shiv Malik (2015), Isis video shows Jordanian hostage being burned to death, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/03/isis-video-jordanian-hostage-burdning-death-muadh-al-kasabeh, 04/02/2015

[32] Major Christopher A. James (1997), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Assessment of Historical Operations and Future Possibilities, (Montgomery: Air Command and Staff College), p. 3

[33] Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 2

[34] Ehrhard (2010), Air Force UAVs, pp. 9-10

[35] Ibid.

[36] Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 2

[37] Ann Rogers & John Hill (2014), Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security, (London: Pluto Press), p. 2

[38] Lynn E. Davis, Michael J. McNemey, James Chow, James, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harding & Daniel Byman (2014), Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), p. 11

[39] David H. Dunn (2013), Drones: disembodied aerial warfare and the unarticulated threat, International Affairs, (89:5, pp. 1237-1246), p. 1238

[40] Singer (2009), Wired For War, p. 322

[41] Birmingham Policy Commission Report (2014), The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for the UK, (Birmingham: University of Birmingham), p. 59

[42] Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (2011), The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, p. 3-7

[43] Edward N. Luttwak (1995), Toward Post-Heroic Warfare, Foreign Affairs, (74:3, pp. 109-122), p.112

[44] James (1997), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), p. 55

[45] Singer (2009), Wired For War, p. 321

[46] Ibid, p. 332

[47] Patrick Tucker (2015), In Ukraine, Tomorrow’s Drone War Is Alive Today, Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/ukraine-tomorrows-drone-war-alive-today/107085/, 09/03/2015

[48] Birmingham Policy Commission Report (2014), The Security Impact of Drones, p. 29

[49] Davis et al. (2014), Armed and Dangerous?, pp. 4-6

[50] Lynn-Jones (1995), Offense-Defense Theory And Its Critics, p. 667

[51] Davis et al. (2014), Armed and Dangerous?, p. 4

[52] Rogers & Hill (2014), Unmanned, p. 21

Controversy over interpreters reminder of failures in Afghanistan

by

By Alex Calvo:

Corporal Natasha Richards Royal Military Police instructs some of the up and coming Afghanistan police. Continuing police training is having a real result bringing the Afghanistan police up to speed showing modern methods of policing. Captain Damian Coxon aged 24 from Folkestone and Corporal Natasha Richards aged 30 from Eastbourne have helped in the process of building a better police service for Afghanistan. The training is held at Musa Qala Camp where the focus has been at a lowe level training which involved demonstrations and reacting out some potential roles, going through discussing where things have gone wrong or just ways to improve better policing. Date: 21st Feb 2010 Location: Musa Qala, Afghanistan Unit: Royal Military Police Photographer: Staff Sergeant Will Craig Event: Showing local town and business in Musa Qalal Crown Copyright Media Ops Camp Bastion Helmand Afghanistan
Photographer: Staff Sergeant Will Craig, photo from UK Government.

The fate of the almost 3,000 interpreters who worked with the British forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province has recently been highlighted in the media, prompting a debate about whether they should be allowed to settle in Great Britain. The interpreters fear reprisals and some have already suffered violence or even death in their native country.

The issue illustrates two key aspects of the long Afghan campaign. First, the confusion concerning its ultimate nature: whether it was a punitive intervention against a regime which had protected those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or an exercise in counterinsurgency (that is, nation-building under fire). Second, is the lack of a political settlement in Afghanistan laying down the foundations for future peace and stability?

Afghanistan began as a light footprint expeditionary campaign designed to overthrow the Taliban regime for providing a base to Al Qaeda, and ideally capture the latter’s leader, once the ultimatum to hand him over had expired. The former goal was quickly achieved through a combination of local actors (Northern Alliance, previously pushed into a few pockets in Northern Afghanistan by the Taliban), Special Forces, air power, and ELINT (Electronic Intelligence). However, rather than disappear, the Taliban went underground, and to some extent across the border to their Pakistani sanctuaries. Meanwhile, Bin Laden remained in hiding.

In a short period of time a friendly regime had been installed in Kabul. This may well have been the end of the story – mission accomplished – with just the necessary measure of financial, military, and diplomatic support in place for the new government to survive and prevent the return of any international terrorist network.

However, soon more ambitious plans were in place, with Afghanistan designed to become a modern nation state, a democracy, and a developed country, and a large number of Western troops arriving to support the work of official development agencies and NGOs, while waging what would soon become an intense counterinsurgency campaign. None of these goals is negative in and of itself; after all, who is against elections, road-building, or female education?

Yet as the country’s history teaches us, no one has ever managed effective control over the whole of Afghanistan, and attempts to modernise from the centre have always met a violent response from her myriad valleys.

The transition from punitive expedition to nation-building under fire took place without a proper public debate, and enthusiasm to see Afghanistan become the Switzerland of Central Asia gradually gave way to impatience, as progress was slower and the cost in blood and treasure mounted. Finally, emphasis switched to training, mentoring, and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and policy, in a bid to pave the way for a quick withdrawal not followed by an immediate collapse and return of the Taliban to power.

With regard to the fate of Afghan translators, this is important because if the intervention had merely been designed to punish a regime that had granted shelter to international terrorists, preventing their return, then it would have made sense to grant refugee status to those Afghans who would otherwise be risking their lives and those of their relatives by staying behind once British and allied troops had left.

Despite there not necessarily being an international legal obligation, and setting aside moral duties, loyalty to auxiliaries may facilitate recruitment in future operations. On the other hand, if the purpose of the campaign was to provide the foundations for the emergence of a modern, developed, Afghan nation-state, depriving the country of 3000 of her best-prepared citizens would be damaging for the nascent nation. In addition to other skills, either pre-existing or gained though work with the British military, their command of English may be useful as Afghanistan moves forward in areas like foreign trade and tourism.

Already during the nation-building stage of the international intervention, there were discussions that the heavy presence of NGOs and government agencies were attracting the most qualified strata of the workforce with their higher salaries. This was apparently prompting a crowding-out effect in the labour market that saw, for example, a significant number of teachers choose to become drivers or interpreters instead of continuing their teaching.

The controversy over the interpreters is also a reminder that despite years of combat, diplomacy, and development cooperation, Afghanistan remains politically divided, with a violent opposition bent on returning to power by force of arms, with the civilian population caught in the crossfire. The 2001 Bonn Conference, where the blueprint for the modern Afghan state was approved excluded the defeated parties, Versailles-style, and despite later proposals and initiatives designed to achieve national reconciliation, such a goal has not been achieved. In the words of former British Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles, “the Bonn settlement that had followed (the US invasion) had been a victors’ peace, from which the vanquished (the Taliban) had been excluded.”

One of the aspects of any such settlement would be a guarantee on the life and property of Afghans who have worked for, or in any way cooperated, with international forces and institution. While a lasting settlement should lead to safety and security for the whole of the population, an explicit commitment by the Taliban not to take reprisals against their fellow Afghans who had worked for international forces would underscore that this was no mere ceasefire but rather true reconciliation, without victors and defeated. Otherwise, as in the current scenario, it is only normal that those who worked with Her Majesty’s forces should fear for their future.

The challenge remains how to promote Afghanistan’s modernization without prompting a violent backlash by her more conservative citizens. While it is unlikely that the Taliban can be defeated militarily, progress in this area by international and Afghan government forces should be enough to ensure that the resulting settlement does not threaten progress in key areas like female education.

if the international intervention in Afghanistan was designed as a mere punitive expedition, then the Afghan interpreters should be allowed to settle in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, if the intervention was intended to be a successful exercise in counterinsurgency, resulting in a political settlement and an end to violence, it would only be logical for the translators to remain in Afghanistan, contributing to the country’s development. In COIN force is only a means to an end, the establishment of a reasonably legitimate and efficient government and a working economy bringing tangible benefits to the population.

Since the purpose of the intervention has changed with time, and a lasting settlement has not been reached, none of these two principles can be applied. Therefore, the best and most honourable solution is to grant the interpreters refugee status, in recognition of their contribution to the British presence in Afghanistan, while taking note that future interventions must be preceded by a proper public debate on their nature, keeping in mind that limited expeditions, punitive or otherwise, are very different from counterinsurgency campaigns – always long, complex, and costly.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. His most recent work includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact“, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College, 23 December 2013. You can follow him on Twitter @Alex__Calvo.

Review: 'Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars' by Chris Woods

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By Harris Kuemmerle:

Sudden-Justice_web

Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars. London, UK: Hurst Publishers., 2015. Pages: 400. £20.00 (hardback). ISBN: 9781849044028. 

The recent growth over the past decade in the scope and complexity of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in warfare is remarkable not only for the immense pace by which the technology and procedural practices have matured, but also for the open secrecy under which that process has been shrouded. While their existence is common knowledge, true transparency as to the use of drones remains limited. As a result, getting a firm understanding of the historical evolution and contemporary role of drone warfare is a challenging prospect. But that is exactly what Chris Woods sets out to do in his book, Sudden Justice, which attempts to present an accessible and engaging narrative outlining the history and use of drones in warfare, while also coming to terms with some of the most pertinent moral and ethical questions that the use of drone warfare poses for the 21st century.

The book begins with a description of the genesis of the drone technology. It’s a history that is inexorably linked to a pair of individuals called the “Blue brothers”, and one which poetically echoes the history of the birth of aviation a century earlier. The Blue brothers were Colorado siblings whose ambition and a fateful flight across Latin America set them on a path which would see them – in partnership with the “Moses of modern drones”, pioneering Israeli engineer Abe Karem – essentially start up the entire drone industry in their garage. In the process they saved the fledgling drone industry from the same perceptions of inadequacy by established interests that once haunted the fledgling civilian and military aviation industry in the 1910s and 1920s. It’s undeniably a great story and an excellent, almost light-hearted, place to begin the historical narrative.

However, it does not take long for the history of drones to turn darker with the move into the post-9/11 “War on Terror” and the drones’ transition into the new role of both spy and assassin. The book charts the initial failures of the drone programme at the onset of the Afghan war, to the eventual rise of the targeted killing programmes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan during both the Bush and Obama administrations.

It is here that the book comes into its element; presenting a chilling tale of secrecy, bureaucratic infighting, ruthless pragmatism, and just what happens when humans are given the power to kill almost anyone on demand with only a few minutes notice. Indeed, the author seems almost in awe of the power and technical accomplishments of the drone programme; detailing their capabilities and clinical efficiency, yet also in equal measure presenting that path towards the modern state of drone warfare as a cautionary tale.

The chapter on the valuation of human life and the psychological impact on drone operators drive home the human consequences of drone warfare; with the description of the cold ‘boxes’ in which operators pilot their craft especially unsettling. Concrete rooms, lit bright by screen light, in which pilot and operator fight a cripplingly boring covert war against an unknown enemy on behalf of often equally unknown ‘customers’ who they communicate with via dedicated online chat rooms. In that space it becomes easy to see how the human life on the monitor can be reduced to a few words; words such as ‘target’, ‘rifled’, ‘kinetic’, ‘kill’.

To that end, it’s in its description of the behind-the-scenes workings of the programme where Sudden Justice presents its most interesting questions. Is assassination legal or justified? Are civilian casualties ever justified? What role should private military corporations be allowed to play? Are drones even legal? These are the critical questions that underlie many of the issues that Chris Woods tackles, and he generally succeeds in presenting these issues clearly and providing a fair judgement. However, the book does not really set out to give a final answer to any of these questions, which is both a limitation and a quality. Sudden Justice simply presents the issue as fairly and as completely as possible, leaving it up to the reader to decide. It’s a refreshingly honest and factual take on a muddled topic. Though one which may leave readers wanting more finality.

Furthermore, while Creech Air Force Base (from where the majority of the drones are piloted) is discussed in great detail, the author chose not to personally visit the site. The author felt visiting the site would not be necessary or in the interest of the work. However, I would argue that the decision not to go may have missed out on key first-hand insight into elements of the day-to-day processes of running the drone programme, which could have expanded upon our understanding. Although the decision not to go is not in itself a serious limitation, it is definitely a missed opportunity.

A more serious limitation is that while it is clear that Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan during the War on Terror served as the proving grounds for the concept of drone warfare as we know it today, their use has greatly expanded since 2003. By focusing on that area and time almost exclusively, Sudden Justice limits its applicability to a wider contemporary debate. For example, the author does not discuss in any great detail the implications for the further expansion of drone use outside of the US and UK to countries such as Russia, China, and Pakistan. Indeed, the limited scope of the book leaves some critical questions untouched: what are the implications for global security for other countries bringing online drone programmes? Will these countries use the legal framework developed by the US and UK during the War on Terror?

Likewise, the consequences of drone warfare in the context of inter-state global security more generally is not directly dealt with. While these issues are not within the aims of the work, their exclusion leaves the book somewhat unable to move beyond drones in the War on Terror and into the area of drones in contemporary global security. Though its discussions of the history, application, and legal and ethical aspects of drone warfare during the War on Terror remain excellent and widely applicable.

Sudden Justice is an excellent book which tells the story of the historical evolution of drone warfare, with only a few notable limitations. Sudden Justice is a must-read book for anyone interested in drone warfare. It effectively straddles the gap of being both clear and entertaining, while also offering insights for both experts in the field and the average reader.

Harris Kuemmerle is a PhD Researcher in War Studies at KCL. He received a BSc in International Relations from Plymouth University and a MSc from SOAS, University of London in Asian Politics. His professional experience includes working in journalism and US congressional elections. His areas of interest include; water politics, the impacts of water on state and human security, environmental security, health and security, US foreign and domestic politics, European politics, UK politics, UK foreign affairs, South Asia, and the domestic and foreign affairs of India and China. A native of the US, he has been based in the UK since 2008. Harris is a guest editor at Strife.

Punishing the cowboys: Blackwater, justice, and easier wars

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By Charlie de Rivaz:

A Blackwater Little Bird Helicopter flies over the Republican Palace in Baghdad, December 2007. Photo: jamesdale10 (CC 2.0)
A Blackwater helicopter flies over the Republican Palace in Baghdad, Iraq, December 2007. Photo: jamesdale10 (CC 2.0)

On Monday, four former employees of Blackwater, the notorious private US military contractor, were sentenced for the killing of 14 unarmed civilians and the wounding of 17 more in Iraq in 2007.

Paul Slough, Evan Liberty and Dustin Heard each received 30 years in prison after being found guilty of several charges of voluntary and attempted manslaughter. Nicholas Slatten, the team’s sniper, was sentenced to life for first-degree murder for his part in the killings, which took place while the four men were working as part of a security detail for the US State Department.

Slatten began the massacre by firing at the civilian occupants of a car caught up in traffic at the roundabout in Nisour Square, Baghdad. In the ensuing confusion three armoured vehicles opened fire, strafing the cars and pedestrians in and around the square with heavy machine guns and grenade launchers, causing what the lead prosecutor described as ‘a shocking amount of death, injury and destruction’. The defendants’ claim that they believed they were under attack did not convince the jury, who convicted them in October 2014.

After Nisour Square

In the fallout from the massacre in Nisour Square, Blackwater was blocked from providing diplomatic security in Iraq – the so-called ‘cowboys’ were sent home. Indeed, you might have expected a general cooling off in the relationship between the private security companies and state militaries.

But there’s been nothing of the kind. Between 2008 and 2011 there were more military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than soldiers. Compare this to the First Gulf War, when there was one contractor to every hundred soldiers. [i] Most of the contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan were working in logistics: building bases, doing the laundry, cooking the food. But a significant chunk – 18% in 2012[ii] – were involved in providing security, exactly what Slough, Liberty, Heard and Slatten were supposed to be doing on that fateful day in Nisour Square.

Even Blackwater is still involved, albeit under a new – less threatening – name: ‘Academi’. As part of the failed counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan, Academi has received $309 million from the US government. Erik Prince, Blackwater’s founder, escaped any liability for what happened in Nisour Square and is now gallivanting around Africa for Chinese mining, oil and gas companies as part of his new outfit, Frontier Services Group. In the war against ISIS, Prince has called for the US government to ‘let the private sector finish the job’.

Rotten apples?

The use of private military contractors by governments has increased, not decreased, since the Nisour Square massacre. But does it really matter? After all, weren’t Slatten and co. just a few rotten apples, caught up in the heat of the moment?

It is difficult to know how many ‘rotten apples’ are working for private military companies. In 2012, Faiza Patel, then Head of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, claimed that the rot was widespread, alleging that private military contractors had been involved in extrajudicial killings and sex trafficking. A 2008 RAND survey found that 20% of diplomatic personnel who had worked with armed contractors in Iraq found them to be ‘unnecessarily threatening, arrogant or belligerent’. This was echoed by a 2010 New York Times article, which claimed that American troops saw contractors as ‘amateurish, overpaid and, often, trigger-happy’.

It has also become clear that private contractors were heavily involved in the torture of Iraqi detainees during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. One of the most striking revelations from the CIA Torture Report, apart from the systematic use of brutal practices like ‘rectal hydration’ and ‘rough takedowns’, was that private contractors conducted 85% of the interrogations of terror suspects. In late 2012, L-3 Services Inc paid $5.8 million in damages to 71 former detainees of Abu Ghraib who allege that they were tortured by employees of the US defence contractor.

Hiding in the shadows

But the truth is that little is known about the behaviour of private military contractors, because they typically operate in the shadows, beyond the scrutiny of the media. Most governments do not publicise the military contractors they hire, and much of what they get up to on the ground is either classified, or obscured by layers of further sub-contractors.

Indeed, it is precisely this secrecy that makes private military companies so attractive to governments: they can hide both the violence and the cost of war. When a contractor dies no one lines the streets of Wootton Bassett, waiting for the flag-draped coffin to pass. Similarly, when a contractor abuses a civilian in a faraway warzone, the government doing the contracting can deny all responsibility. No pesky court-martials are needed; no reputations tarnished.

By employing private contractors, wars can be escalated on the sly, without the need for unpopular troop increases. This is foreign policy by proxy. The UK allegedly used SAS veterans in Libya, who claim they were paid £10,000 per month, to help topple Gaddafi in 2011. The US Congress was not made aware of the fact that Blackwater were assisting the CIA and JSOC in their ‘snatch and grab’ missions in Afghanistan (and even Pakistan) until it was disclosed by the CIA director in 2009.[iii]

At the same time, the costs of private contractors can be kept ‘off the books’ in a way that the costs of regular troops cannot, thereby making an expensive war seem relatively cheap. An estimated 70% of the costs to the US of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were kept off the books, funded by emergency appropriations approved outside of the Pentagon’s annual budget.

Regulating the cowboys

It is difficult to control what goes on in the shadows. Since the fifteenth century and despite Machiavelli’s warnings about the ‘undisciplined and treacherous’ nature of mercenaries, states have failed to effectively regulate the role of private companies in war. Even today, there is no effective system of legal accountability to check the behaviour of private military contractors; they typically operate beyond the jurisdiction of both national and international law.[iv]

For a long time it looked like Slough, Liberty, Heard and Slatten would evade justice too. It took over seven years before they were found guilty of the killings in Nisour Square, so long that the statute of limitations kicked in and prosecutors had to drop manslaughter charges against Slatten. In fact, the case only made it to trial after a personal intervention by Vice-President Joe Biden. Blackwater/Academi itself never got anywhere near the courtroom. If a case as high-profile and horrifying as Nisour Square proved so fragile, it is little wonder that private contractors rarely end up in court.

But even if there were effective regulation, even if we did live in a world where international law meant something and international institutions worked; even then it would still be better to reject the turn towards using private contractors instead of the regular state militaries.

More wars, bigger wars

This is because private contractors make war easier. With the support of private contractors, states can engage in more wars, and on a far grander scale than would otherwise be possible. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan would not have gone ahead without the support of private contractors: there just weren’t enough soldiers.

In particular, private contractors make unilateral wars easier. There’s a good reason that unilateral wars are unilateral: no one else supports them. If states could only entertain the possibility of going to war if that war had multilateral support, then both the legitimacy of the war and its prospects of success would be greatly increased.

Private contractors make war easier, and they also try damn hard to make it desirable. We should not kid ourselves into believing that these contractors are sitting quietly, twiddling their thumbs, waiting for the government to pick up the phone and call on their services. On the contrary, they are incentivised to lobby the hawks in government to make war. For the contractors, war equals money. It is no surprise that from 1998 Kevin Prince became a steady contributor to the Republican right – one of his recipients was, of course, George W. Bush.

Disturbingly, the more the government outsources its military needs, the more pervasive the war incentive becomes. Intelligence analysts working for companies like Blackwater are now judging security threats. Strategy experts working for these companies are now being asked their advice about the risk of prosecuting such-and-such a war. Those who stand to make money from war are gaining more and more influence in the corridors of power.

While we should welcome the weighty sentences handed down to the ‘cowboys’ responsible for the massacre in Nisour Square; it is no cause for celebration. There has been precious little change since the massacre. The state is still in thrall to the private contractors, and the contractors still operate in the shadows, beyond the eyes of the media and beyond the reach of the law. This matters. We have so far failed to tame the cowboys, we must not let them make violence an easy option.

Charlie de Rivaz is an MA student on the Conflict, Security and Development programme at King’s College London. For three years he worked in Argentina and Colombia as an English teacher and journalist. His main interests include the political economy of war, international human rights law, conflict resolution, and state-building. Charlie is the Managing Editor of Strife blog.

NOTES

[i] Pattison, James (2014), The Morality of Private War, OUP
[ii] Ibid, p.22
[iii] Ibid, p.149
[iv] Ibid, p.147

Interview – Journalist Sean Carberry on Afghanistan & conflict reporting

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By Mackenzie Weinger:

Journalist Sean Carberry shut down NPR’s Kabul bureau at the end of 2014 after more than two years reporting in Afghanistan. Photo: Courtesy Sean Carberry
Journalist Sean Carberry shut down NPR’s Kabul bureau at the end of 2014 after more than two years reporting in Afghanistan. Photo: Courtesy Sean Carberry

In December 2014, reporter Sean Carberry shut the doors of NPR’s Kabul, Afghanistan bureau. The United States public radio network had put the bureau’s closure on the calendar back in 2012, deciding to leave the country due to the planned reduction of US troops. After having a bureau in the city since 2006, NPR has now turned its coverage of Afghanistan over to its Islamabad correspondent, and Carberry has returned to the United States.

Carberry, currently a freelance journalist in Washington DC, spoke with Strife about closing NPR’s Kabul bureau, what’s next for Afghanistan, and his advice for reporting in conflict zones.

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What did you think about the bureau closing? Did the justification for shutting it make sense to you, or was it a case of a long war and a short attention span?

I think the decision was more financial than anything else. And the feeling was similar to what they did in Iraq — NPR closed the Baghdad bureau at the end of 2011 when US troops left, so they were following that model. I understand financially why there might have been a need or desire to do that. I certainly don’t think editorially it was a decision that a number of people in management would have made.

I did have a conversation with a senior manager last summer offering to extend and stay at least through the first half of 2015 because I felt that it was essential to continue to cover the story and see how things play out at least through the first half of the year after this transition period ends. And I was told that there was agreement that editorially that would be preferable, but, you know, it was a non-starter because financially there was not a dollar to put toward that. It was a done deal at that point.

What do you think we can we expect to see from the US-Afghanistan relationship going forward?

The recent Washington visit by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah appears to have been very productive. Ghani was extremely gracious and really bent over backwards to show his appreciation of US investment in Afghanistan – both in dollars and lives. It’s a stark change from former President Hamid Karzai, who became increasingly hostile towards the US.

President Obama agreed to delay his planned draw-down of troops, which both US and Afghan military officials have wanted for some time. The US also announced a new pledge of $800 million in incentive funds that Afghanistan will receive if it meets certain benchmarks. But, the question is, how long will this honeymoon last? There is a lot of Afghanistan fatigue in the US, and the public and many in Congress are wondering what the US is getting for its continued investment in Afghanistan.

Ghani’s going to have to reassure people that he is making progress on some of these key things like corruption, in terms of trying to build an economy, in terms of trying to further peace initiatives and end the fighting there. And it’s going to be difficult because he doesn’t have a lot to show on any of those, even some six months into his presidency, because he doesn’t have a full cabinet and so a lot of the ministries have been just running on fumes.

And just as Karzai gradually alienated many of his supporters in Washington, there is a risk Ghani could too. He was on his best behaviour during this recent visit, but he’s notoriously prickly, and he’s already dressed down a number of western officials and diplomats in Kabul. Some have warned that working with Ghani could become more difficult over time.

What’s your take on the prospect of a peace process? What do you think about Pakistan’s role?

I’m sceptical of that. I think there are a lot of reasons why it should be doubted right now that that process is likely to move forward. The Taliban have been making some gains militarily in parts of the country and so, from their standpoint, if they can continue to make gains then that strengthens their bargaining position. Unless some of the Taliban commanders believe that they’re actually likely to lose ground this year, then maybe they would see an incentive to start talking, but I think a number of Taliban figures are going to think they have an incentive to keep fighting and increase their leverage.

And there are still a lot of questions about Pakistan and whether Pakistan is really going to come to the table and use their influence over the Afghan Taliban to start negotiations. There’s been some optimism that Pakistan is turning over a new leaf, but from some people I’ve talked to that are close to this, they don’t really buy that there is any substantive change in Pakistan’s behaviour. For example, there’s a fundamental conflict that is unresolved between Afghanistan and Pakistan — that Afghanistan still does not officially recognise the border between the two countries. This is the Durand Line that was created by the British in the late 1800s. It took a big chunk of Afghanistan and gave it to what was British India at the time. And even though the international community, the UN, all see this as the legal, defined border, it’s a point of nationalist pride in Afghanistan to say ‘we will never recognise the Durand Line’.

As long as the Afghans refuse to recognise this line, there will be this existential angst and fear in Pakistan that has fuelled their desire to have strong influence in Afghanistan through proxies, whether it’s the Taliban or politicians or what-have-you. So unless Afghanistan decides to recognise this border, I think it’s going to be hard for Pakistan to give up this feeling that it has to have a weak neighbour that isn’t going to someday be strong enough to try to claim back this land. This is an underlying dynamic that doesn’t get a lot of attention, but I think it’s a real festering sore… It’s hard to see a peace process going forward without some resolution of this underlying border conflict.

But that’s just one of many reasons why some people are wary of Pakistan’s intentions and willingness to commit to a peace process. On the Afghan side, there are still questions whether different factions have reconciled and settled on a unified approach to a peace process as well, and they can’t move forward if some powerful people have reservations about the terms of a possible peace deal.

What would you say was the most surprising story you covered while in Afghanistan?

I keep coming back to this story about the police puncturing car tires in the city. It’s just a story that found us. I had someone over to our office that we were interviewing and when he went out, around 7 o’clock at night, his car parked in front of our compound had a couple of flat tires. And he actually had a flat tire on his way over to our house, so he thought that the repair was done badly and a coincidence he had another flat tire. Then, as my Afghan producer was leaving shortly after that to head home, he calls me and says, ‘Hey, I have two flat tires as well’. I said, ‘Ok, there’s something weird about this. Call the police office at our district and tell them this and see what they have to say.’

He calls them, and then calls me back and says: ‘I talked to the police commander and he said they did it, that this is a new policy to try to prevent car theft. If people park their car in the street at night, they’re going to puncture the tires so the cars can’t be stolen and used as suicide car bombs.’ When he explained this, I thought, this is unusual. It clearly is a solution to a problem — I’m not sure it’s the best solution to the problem.

What the police were saying was, ‘Look, there is no other way to solve this problem’. And this phrase is something that I heard constantly in Afghanistan, that ‘this is the only way’, or ‘there’s no other way’. It was a fascinating phenomenon that this was how decisions would be made and rationalised in a lot of cases.

That’s the one that’s always stuck with me as this weird, little specific thing, but it was emblematic of so many bigger aspects.

How would you suggest reporters entering war zones or areas impacted by conflict approach their jobs?

I spent time in Libya in 2011 and spent time in Iraq and other conflict zones, and I think one thing I would say is every conflict is different. Even though someone’s a war reporter, each situation has its own dynamics and things you do need to study and learn and pay attention to before you get on the ground. There are some places where it’s safe to associate with certain rebel groups and things like that, and they’ll take care of you, but in all these cases — especially when you’re doing any kind of embedding — you are taking a side in the story.

When you’re embedded with US troops, you are part of that. You are a target whether you want to be or not. You can try to argue to the Taliban that you’re a journalist, but they’re not going to see it that way. You’re part of that establishment. And the same thing in Libya. If you’re there, embedded with the rebels back in 2011, you’re taking a side. And there was, I think, a clear western narrative that the rebels were on the right side and the Gaddafi regime was on the wrong side.

That’s just one of the big ethical questions for all of us in this industry: Are we always neutral? There are times where there’s a decision that the Taliban is the enemy and so if you’re reporting there are you going to be biased against the Taliban? Conceptually, I would have loved to have embedded with the Taliban to cover their side of things. My greatest reservation was that I didn’t want to be with a group of Taliban when a drone strike happened and just felt the risk factor of trying to get that other side was pretty high.

You end up embedding with forces that you can logistically do it with, so you get that part of the story, but you don’t necessarily see the other parts. And sometimes, news organisations, countries, etc., decide: ‘Well, look, this group is bad, so it’s okay to embed with the good guys and do reporting that’s focused on how they’re trying to kill the bad guys.’ But, every once in a while, I see conversations about that and discussions asking: what are the ethics and journalistic responsibilities to try to cover these things in a more neutral fashion? Or should people buy into a narrative that says, ‘This group is the enemy and therefore the reporting is going to reflect that’?

There are different things that dictate how that’s going to come out, but, as I say, it’s easy to embed with the US army, it’s not so easy to embed with ISIS, Taliban, a militia in Libya these days… There are some people that are going out and doing that, trying to do that, and, journalistically it’s worth doing. But I almost feel like it’s people who are just trying to push the edge and I’m not always sure about the quality of the reporting that comes out of some of those efforts. I think often a lot of the reporting tends to be about the journalist rather than the people that you’re trying to report on.

I get the draw to want to do that kind of thing, but I am just very wary of stories that start with the word ‘I’ or ‘we’. It’s not about us. I think that’s the challenge, to realise that we’re witnesses, we’re not participants.

Mackenzie Weinger is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London focusing on the media and conflict. Twitter: @mweinger