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Strife Feature – Can We Trust Ourselves? The Evanescence and Revival of Democracy

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By Ashley Pratt

British Prime Minister David Cameron (L) poses for a photograph after addressing pro-EU “Vote Remain” supporters at rally in Bristol, Britain June 22, 2016. REUTERS/Geoff Caddick/Pool

Over the past year, various political events have raised questions about the Western emphasis and reliance on democracy and democratic values. Despite predictions made by newspapers and pollsters, the world watched the United Kingdom voting to leave the European Union. In the months after the referendum, ‘the will of the people’ was invoked more than once to argue for staying the course on Brexit. There were also those who asked whether the people had in fact willed incorrectly, or whether it was the responsibility of the elected representatives of the people to make course corrections when democracy resulted in potentially catastrophic decisions.

Across the Atlantic, Americans were watching the rise of a failed businessman-turned-reality television star who first joined the Republican presidential primary, then won it against all expectations; then ran a campaign filled with dog-whistle racism and encouragement of (and alleged commission of) sexual assault. None of this stopped him, though, from winning the national election and becoming the 45th President of the United States of America. The general understanding is that the will of the American people elects the President, but in the world’s foremost democracy, the candidate with the largest proportion of the vote did not place her hand on the Bible on Inauguration Day. Many Brits watched in horror, appalled that the same forces that persuaded their fellow citizens to vote to leave the EU were at work in the victory of a right-wing populist candidate in the U.S. election.

In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte ran for the presidency of his country in an election held in May. He was democratically elected to the position on the platform of cleaning up the Philippines’ drug problem, among other promises. Rival candidates claimed he would be little more than an executioner. In the intervening months, he has admitted to killing people with his own hands. However, he is the democratically elected executive, chosen by the people, among them those in whose deaths he possibly participates or at least orders. Just days ago, a referendum in Turkey gave Erdogan extensive new presidential powers. What do these results and others like them mean for the global political community’s reliance on democracy?

This article will examine both longstanding and more modern critiques of democracy and ask: What are we to make of the democratic foundations of modern political society? Are they strong enough to hold all of the weight we expect them to carry? There is, in the liberal democratic Western discourse, a notion that democracy will course-correct itself. All too often, though, commentary overlooks the fact that democracy is not tamper-proof. Can democracy as a means in and of itself ensure consistent societal improvement and progress towards societal equality? We are accustomed to believing that, as Martin Luther King Jr. offered, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” However, since the quote made its way into the vernacular, many have argued that we must bend it. Does democracy rely on the natural moral arc of the universe, or is democracy the act of bending?

The roots of modern democracy can be traced back to the Enlightenment when the old became new again and much was made of the Greeks and Romans. When the lauded intellectual and philosophical father of the modern age Immanuel Kant set out to describe his imagined world consumed by “perpetual peace,” it was not to democracies he turned, but to republics.[1] He distrusted democracies. Kant’s republic was founded on three principles: freedom for all men, one common unified law for all subjects, and “the principle of legal equality for everyone.”[2] Such a vision neither looks nor sounds very different from the same principles on which the United States of America was founded. Kant took issue with what he refers to as the “despotism” inherent within democracies, “because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent.”[3] To Kant, the contradiction of “one and the same person…at the same time [being] both the legislator and the executor of his own will” was no more apparent than the similar contradiction at the heart of a democracy. Kant would rather suffer under the despotism of an individual than the despotism of the masses.[4]

Pressing forward chronologically, a new question arises. Is a presumption of democracy as the teleological end for systems of government simply another mechanism for neocolonial enforcement of western ideals? The Enlightenment had very little faith in women, people of color, or even the common man. Modern democracy could be the fruit of a poisoned tree. Throughout modern political philosophy, there is a through-line that democracies – especially liberal democracies – are inherently better than any other form of government. Rawls advocated a realistic utopia of liberal democracies that were on good terms with just but hierarchical (nondemocratic) societies and allied with them against unjust hierarchical societies. However, he had some arbitrary ideas on how human rights are required for a hierarchical society to qualify as just as opposed to unjust. In the field of international relations, readers consistently encounter democratic peace theory, the idea that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war. In response, many theorists append “with each other”: liberal democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, but still just as likely to go to war with non-democracies. Democracy may not be any more inherently peaceful than autocracy, but simply provide a modern nation with more allies.

The foundations of democracy are one thing; what of its use in practice today? In a ‘post-truth’ world, the very foundational concept of democracy – that the best, most qualified candidate will receive the most support – is not at all certain. Populist anti-establishment sentiment throws its weight against those with the most experience in government. In some cases, this is because they have records that are completely legitimate cause for mobilizing against them; in other cases, it simply prevents the wisdom of experience from being placed where it can do the most good. The same is true for the sort of reactionary sentiment that wanted out of the EU; rather than vote in a way that alters the parts of the status quo that are disliked, British Leave campaigners upset the entire table. It remains to be seen if any good will come of it.

 

“Congratulations to the new president of the United States Donald Trump and to the American people free!” Marine Le Pen tweeted.

Such anti-establishment sentiment is not the only issue in modern elections and referenda. If ‘fake news’ and verifiable, objective facts look overly similar to large sections of the population, there is no reason to think they will ask questions of sources that tend to confirm what they already believe. Democracy relies heavily on free, open exchanges of information and a civil society capable of distinguishing between fact and absolute fiction. There will always be partisanship in government until such time as the global structure achieves some cosmopolitan utopia (which does not appear to be on the horizon). However, for democracy to have any hope of serving the people, there must be a modicum of faith in the press.  Someone somewhere must be assumed to be trustworthy and to be telling the truth.

Many of the governments we call democracies today are in essence democratic republics. An actual democracy is a government in which all citizens vote on all matters. Republics are usually made up of representatives or some patrician class who do the actual voting, though there may be varying levels of input from the common citizen. Does this help forestall the despotism Kant saw as inherent in a democracy? If consulted, many of the planners of the various democracies might confess to building republics for simplicity’s sake: there were too many people for them to vote on each issue that arose. Logistically it simply was not feasible. Here again, however, a structural issue emerges: can a system of government conceived by people who generally distrusted the white man on the street – and gave little or no thought to the women and men of color – ever evolve into a system that is truly egalitarian and just?

The global political order today is not all doom and gloom, despite what the BBC Breaking News banners might suggest. This October, an anti-immigrant referendum in Hungary did not pass after 50 percent of the electorate chose not to cast a vote; Polish women’s protests prevented abortion laws that infringed on the rights of people capable of bearing children in that country. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders and his far-right Party for Freedom recently lost the general election in that country, despite their anti-Muslim populist rhetoric that has recently been popular with voters, both in Europe and in the United States. Democratic principles are not only mechanisms for showing the worst sides of a population. The voice of the people is just as loud when it speaks to demand a more open, egalitarian, compassionate society. If democracy becomes an end in itself, the very principles it is entrenched to protect may fall by the wayside.

Are those principles strong enough to hold what we expect them to hold? We the people who rely on democracy must be willing to face and acknowledge its weaknesses if there is to be any hope of keeping it functional. To know what lacuna are built into democracy and then act accordingly, building safeguards and shoring up weaknesses, is the best option for democracy’s survival. Democracies were built to be malleable; the people must take advantage of that malleability.

What do democratic decisions like Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and Rodrigo Duterte’s election mean for our reliance on democracy?  They mean it is working. They mean that the people will get exactly what they ask for. They mean that an electorate who will not critically engage, an electorate that does minimal independent research, an electorate of analog people in a newly-digital world will get exactly what they vote for. Confirmation bias did not disappear when the entire world of information arrived at our fingertips. Kant didn’t think women were people in the same way men were; most of his contemporaries, many of his heroes, and no small number of those who followed him all agreed. Kant was an intellectual giant, and he may have been right – democracy may in fact be the truest despotism. But Winston Churchill also looms large over our global political landscape, and he said, quoting an unknown writer, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms.” In September, Germans go to the polls, with the far-right Alternative fuer Deutschland as one of their options. The French will vote until the 7th of May; they have their own far-right candidate, Marine le Pen, with whom to contend. If 2016 was the year that shook our faith in democracy, 2017 is capable of becoming the year that restores it.

Ashley Pratt is an International Relations Masters student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She previously completed a degree at Arkansas State University in theatre with a minor in philosophy. Her research interests are on insurgency, just war theory, and human rights.

Notes:

[1] Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” 99. In Kant’s Political Writings, 93–130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 101.

[4] Ibid., 102.

Image 1 source: https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/europes-extreme-right-leaders-revel-in-trumps-victory/

Image 2 source: https://pixabay.com/en/protest-protesters-demonstration-1300861/

Feature image: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/01/opinions/trump-speech-to-congress-reaction-opinion-roundup/

Do we need a European Army?

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By: Sarah Katharina Kayß

The EU Parliament passed a resolution in November 2016 to create a defense union in the wake of numerous threats to the continent and also calling for increased defence spending.

The 2016 White Paper[1], concerning the development of German defensive interests, defined an inter-European military coalition to be at the centre of Germany’s role within the European Union (EU). The opinions of young officer cadets in the United Kingdom and Germany, however, were highly divergent in relation to a European defence alliance. The results of a study carried out in 2014 with 755 officer cadets from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Military Officer School (Offizierschule des Heeres) in Dresden did not only reflect the Euro-skeptic position of the British people (which reached its peak in 2016 with “Brexit”), but also the German soldiers’ sceptical position in regards to a Europeanisation of military matters.

Approaches Towards a European Army

More than half of the British and German army officer cadets were unable to imagine the creation of a transnational European army serving as a supplement to their existing national forces. Although more British than German cadets were able to imagine the creation of a European army, considerably more British (65%) than German cadets (40%) opposed such an enterprise overall.

The majority of British cadets who were not in favour of the establishment of a European army referred to language and educational barriers between Europe’s soldiers and were not able to imagine being commanded by officers from other European nations. Many of them also questioned the fighting strength of a European army, since they believed that most of their comrades’ occupational motivation was nationally focused, making it difficult for them to represent European and not primarily British interests. The majority of the German cadets, in contrast, felt no potential conflict of interest regarding this matter and referred to already existing commitments to NATO as well as collective interests within the EU.

Both British and German cadets reckoned that logistical and conceptual problems would hinder the realisation of a European army: soldiers from both countries referred to problems in terms of sovereignty, deployment issues, and the balance between family and work just as much as the cultural and economic differences within the EU, possibly hindering international cooperation in a European Army framework.

Noticeably, many of the British soldiers referred to Britain’s “special relationship with the continent”–“geographically we do belong to Europe, but mentally I feel that Britain is a separate state,” one of the British cadets explained, adding that many British people feared the establishment of a European super state. In such a state, according to the aspiring British officer, Britain would only be one of many countries, which would not do justice to Britain’s imperial history as a world power. Furthermore, the officer cadets at Sandhurst feared that increased cooperation on a European level could amount to the dissolution of British military traditions that have existed for centuries.

Although in total, more German than British officer cadets were positive about the establishment of a European army, the German soldiers also referred to cultural differences between European nations and their fear of a unified military due to the EU still being in its infancy. One German cadet noted that “many Europeans don’t perceive themselves as European and therefore cannot cooperate on a European [army].”

Joint Combat Training for EU officer cadets?

Regarding the costs and benefits of a European Army and the budget cuts in many European forces, the attitude of the British cadets was considerably more dismissive than that of their German counterparts. The biggest difference between the soldiers’ approaches related to the joint combat training of EU junior leadership staff–whereas more than half of the German cadets welcomed joint combat training, the same proportion of British cadets strongly opposed it.

The British cadets were only willing to accept a merging of the aspiring European officers’ training in the framework of direct operational preparation for deployment in missions abroad. Many of the German cadets, in contrast, welcomed joint military training within the EU in order to improve their level of interoperability. Officer cadets from both nations who advocated the merging of combat training on a European level referred to the chance to learn from the strengths of their counterparts in order to develop a better understanding of the culturally-shaped conduct of their future coalition partners.

Only German cadets, however, spoke about the development of a multinational camaraderie and the attainment of equal standards in the framework of this training. The British cadets referred to the dangers of potentially losing national identity through joint training and the danger of disclosing sensitive information and specific army tactics towards a potential enemy nation. The last point was also picked up by the German cadets, implying that some British and German cadets can still imagine a potential war between EU states.

The British cadets’ critical attitude towards joint military training was, however, not always attributable to a collective disinterest in cooperating with soldiers from other European nations, but rather directed towards their perceptions of a dysfunctional EU. One of the British cadets explained his generally critical attitude towards military cooperation on a European level by stating that, “everyone wants to do what they are accustomed to and barely anyone wants to give up their own traditions just to work as part of a collective.”

The officer cadets’ views of Europe’s past did account for a large proportion of their different perceptions towards the EU today. Whereas a large proportion of the British cadets saw the European community as a quarrelsome, unstable construct, the majority of the German cadets considered the growing European community as profitable and empowering.

The Perception of Europe and the EU

What first came to mind when the majority of British soldiers talked about European history was war, violence and destruction, as well as disunity and chaos. The German cadets, by contrast, placed concepts such as community, cooperation, and a strengthening of the continent after the Second World War at the centre of their perceptions of European history. Although the majority of the German cadets, like the British soldiers, did not class themselves primarily as Europeans, the German junior leaders considered themselves as a part of Europe, and interpreted the collective growth of European states within the EU to be a result of the continent’s history stamped out of war. Only a few Sandhurst cadets shared this attitude. For example, one cadet stated that his “perception of Europe is entirely based on my knowledge of European history, a (…) continent transfixed in a vicious circle of crises”.

The aspiring British officers frequently indicated that they lacked an understanding of and were confused about European history ̶ seemingly always pervading to claims of power and competitiveness. “What I have learned about Europe seems to me like a big mess. It could be said: British history went back and forth – but I see more durability here than with European history. (…) Perhaps the Europeans have a crisis of identity resulting from all these wars, crises, and conflicts, which they try to fill with their notion of a United Europe,” one of the British cadets explained.

Regarding the British people’s decision to leave the EU, the outcome of the referendum—the so-called “Brexit”—in June 2016 had already been alluded to in 2014. That is, in contrast to the majority of German cadets (71%), only one in four British cadets acted on the assumption that their country’s relationship with the EU would grow in the coming years. The result was similar regarding the EU’s role in military affairs. Whereas 62% of the German cadets assumed that the EU would play a bigger role in future military affairs, 44% of the British cadets dismissed such a change.

“Britain increasingly isolates itself from Europe. Unfounded anxieties are the basis for this. It has become trendy to talk negatively about the EU and to demand that we are able to trade and act with self-determination”, one British cadet reported in an interview in winter 2014. Whereas the  cadets at Sandhurst considered British history to be the foundation of their national pride, the majority of the German cadets considered German history as a lesson. For example, “I believe history helps us to recognise what we do not want again; namely a war between the nations of Europe,” one of the aspiring German officers explained. One of his comrades added, “I simply have to listen to the history of my parents and grandparents, and compare it with the current positive situation – the EU is a peace project.”

It remains to be analysed whether the ongoing refugee crisis, Brexit, the rise of nationalism in different European states, and the uncertain role of NATO after the election of Donald Trump to the White House have changed the British and German cadets’ perceptions towards European military defence. Should European politicians continue to call for a European army, not only should the possibility of implementing this army in the future be examined more thoroughly, but it should also be ascertained whether the soldiers and officers of European nations are actually willing to serve in such an army.

Dr. Sarah Katharina Kayß studied History and Comparative Religion at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Modern History at King’s College London. Her PhD research at the War Studies Department at King’s College London examined British and German army officer cadets perceptions of history and their influence on the professional identity . She is currently teaching in the War and Conflict Studies Masters programme at the University of Potsdam, Germany.

This article was translated from German by Harry Prestwich (harry_prestwich@yahoo.co.uk) who is a student at the University of Manchester, studying History and German. You can read the article in the German version here.

Notes:

[1] http://bit.ly/2m5tNIf

[2] https://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image source: http://www.awdnews.com/images/14670245351.jpg

Strife Feature – The Internet as a Tool for Self-Actualization: The Cuban Experience

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By Jack Revell

“Over the last five years, the government has undeniably and irreversibly lost control of the dissemination of information. Hidden in water tanks and behind sheets hanging on clotheslines, illegal satellite dishes bring people the news that is banned or censored in the national media – Yoani Sanchez

Havana at sunset. The scaffolding on the Capitolio Nacional, centre, has been in place since 2012. It was removed during Obama’s visit but promptly replaced soon after. Photo by Rod Lewis

Baracoa is a small city on the far side of Cuba. Closer to Jamaica than Havana, and cut off by treacherous mountain roads, Baracoa has a distinctly Caribbean feel unlike anywhere else on the island. Despite its remoteness, Baracoa has perhaps the island’s only vegan restaurant. The owner is an eccentric former photojournalist for the Granma, Cuba’s national paper. Due to the nature of his work, he is part of the small minority of Cubans allowed to travel abroad. What he returned with, besides his pictures, was an awareness of Western culture that few Cubans understood. His home-cooked vegan cuisine served in coconut shells has made him somewhat of an outsider. The food was a welcome relief from the plates of rice and beans I survived on during my month-long stay and the owner knew it. He implored us to explain to his 17-year-old son that diversity is valued by Westerners, something to be capitalised upon. He recognised that one day when Baracoa’s beaches are filled with tourists, his restaurant would be a draw for yumas like us.

Vegan food in Baracoa. Passion fruits were picked from the tree above us and served as juice minutes later. Photo by Jessica Lundholm.

There is clear interest in academic and political circles, not to mention the business and tourism sectors, in assessing what changes Cuba will undertake in the coming years. I traveled to Cuba in May 2016 after President Obama’s historic visit but prior to the death of el comandante en jefe – Fidel Castro. In this article, I seek to highlight some of the more hidden routes toward economic and political stability that are evidently emerging on the ground. What is apparent is that the steady rise in internet usage is enabling enterprising Cubans to construct their own political and social identities, outside and beyond the authoritarian state. Not only this, but the internet has enabled those in the private sector to expand and promote their businesses in ways unthinkable just a few years ago.

Woman crossing road near The Malecón, Havana. Photo by Jack Revell.

Cuba currently stands in a very delicate position. Official economic growth forecasts for 2014 were 1.4%, the lowest growth rate since 2009.  This is a significant indication that the 2011 economic reforms pursued by Raúl Castro – who succeeded Fidel in 2006 – are yet to have any effect. Raúl himself considered a growth rate of at least 5% necessary to re-establish economic stability. In addition, the country is still coming to terms with the death of Fidel, and with politics and economics intertwined here more than most, the argument that Él must be de-mythologized before Cuba can progress is a strong one. Raul will hand power to his Vice President, Miguel Diaz-Canel, 56, in one year’s time, bringing almost six decades of Castro rule to an end. It is hoped that Diaz-Canel will push forward with social and economic liberalization, in an effort to bridge the widening gap between youth politics and the party, but nothing can be said for certain.

Internationally all eyes are on the erratic Trump administration. It is unclear whether the new President will continue with the Obama doctrine or revert to Cold War-era travel bans. With characteristic inconsistency, Trump has both supported and rejected opening up to Cuba. Rafael Hernandez, director of the socio-political journal Temas, has said that Trump’s business instincts will likely dominate negotiations and that ‘lifting the blockade is nothing more than responding to the interests of business’. While it might make sense economically, it is unlikely the Republican Senate will allow it. Mayer Brown, the international legal firm, has advised U.S. companies planning to engage in Cuba to ‘proceed with extreme caution’. Again, only time will tell what the future holds.

Cuban industry in Havana. Photo by Rod Lewis.

In the recent Third World Quarterly focus on Cuba, Vegard Bye outlines a number of possible scenarios for Cuban development. Following Linz and Stepan’s framework for liberal democratic transition, Bye suggests Cuba could end up resembling the neo-patrimonial states of Vietnam and Russia, with authoritarian capitalism as its guiding principle. Equally, it could become a ‘mini-Florida’ if the present state is dismantled or withers away under the pressures of free-market neoliberalism. Bye himself leans more toward a social-democratic model practised by other Latin American countries as the most likely transition. These varied possibilities depend on whether or not the Cuban state acts on its ‘window of opportunity’ opened by the Obama administration – something which could be rapidly closing.

Cuban pay phones at Calle 19 in Havana. Photo by Jack Revell.

Within the Cuban political landscape exists a growing tension between the private sector and the party’s old revolutionary vanguards. Obama aggravated them when he made overtures to small businesses owners by increasing the limits on American investment in Cuba. Conservatives within the Communist party responded with a backlash of hostility. Fidel himself scolded comrades by stating ‘we do not need the empire to give us anything’. Private businesses in Cuba are not technically legal and operate in a grey area of regulation and restriction. Yailenis Mulet Concepción’s survey of self-employment in Cuba concludes that the main obstacles to the formalisation of private enterprises in Cuba are the concepts and culture still ruling in the establishment and political system. Nevertheless, the non-state sector is on the rise and currently accounts for an unprecedented 28% of the workforce. In the wake of Obama’s visit, Raul abruptly changed his tune from one of welcoming to suspicion. In his address to the 7th Party Congress, held just weeks after Obama’s visit, he stated:

‘We are not naïve, and we do not ignore the aspirations of powerful external forces who are betting on what they call the ‘empowerment’ of non-state forms of management, with the purpose of generating agents of change, hoping to do away with the Revolution and the socialism in Cuba by other means’

The establishment fears that once the non-state sector gains a foothold and the wheels of structural effect start turning, rampant free-marketeering will eventually dismantle the socialist state. The future they are keen to avoid might look something like Bye’s ‘mini-Miami’ model of Cuban development. Against the wishes of the Communist party, Bye argues that a more robust non-state sector is a ‘sine qua non for the economy to survive’. Unless it boosts small businesses, Cuba will find itself in a weaker position when it comes to negotiating the trade embargo with the U.S. This, may in turn, facilitate the very outcome that the establishment is trying to avoid.

International Workers Day parade in the Plaza de la Revolución, Havana. In Cuba, the first of May is a celebration of unions and workers’ rights. Photo by Jessica Lundholm.

In order to work through this paradox, what has not been thoroughly considered is the role the internet is now playing in helping small businesses to grow and develop. Parallels between the internet and the non-state sector are strong in that both are treated with suspicion by the state and operate in a legally dubious area. The internet was only introduced to Cuba in 1996 and has been heavily restricted since then. Currently, Cuba ranks 129th in the world in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Development Index, just behind Lesotho. Most Cubans now access the internet via smartphones – legalized in 2008 – as only the wealthiest can afford a computer. Getting online in Cuba is an experience in itself. The routine entails finding a crowd of Cubans hunched over their phones, generally outside a Western hotel, and waiting there until a dubious-looking gentleman sidles up to you and enquires if you want the internet like he’s offering you drugs. A three-dollar piece of paper with a code on it will grant you internet usage for an hour but the cost is prohibitive for the majority of Cubans whose earnings averaged $25 a month in 2015.

Getting online in Cuba. Photo by Rod Lewis.

In spite of these difficulties, internet usage has doubled from 15.9% in 2010 to 30% in 2015. The tourism sector is one area that clearly benefits from greater internet freedoms. Traditionally, tourists visiting Cuba stay in government licensed casa particulares, private homes acting as Bed and Breakfasts (B&B). Generally, this meant arriving in a city and asking around for someone with a room; however, these casas are now able to advertise their services on global sites like AirBnB and TripAdvisor. There are even casas with their own Instagram pages for attracting guests. Outside of tourism, Cubans buy and sell goods on the state-regulated site Revolico, an incredibly important market mechanism for those able to utilize it. In recent years, gray area sites like PorlaLivre have also sprung up in competition with Revolico. PorlaLivre developed out of the necessity to strengthening the small business market by empowering the self-employed through technology. It angles itself as a legitimate buy-and-sell site ‘for all Cubans’, including state organizations and employees, in opposition to the booming online black market. Much like in the west, tech-savvy Cubans exploit dark-web networks facilitate trade in prohibited items and prostitution. This is well known on the island and used to legitimize government restrictions on internet access. Through the creation and use of sites like PorlaLivre, Cubans are slowly changing both this perception and the mechanisms of trade itself.

Casa Flora, a casa particular in the upmarket Vedado neighbourhood, Havana. Photo by Jessica Lundholm.

It is not only within the non-state sector that the internet has enriched the lives of Cubans. Yoani Sanchez, a prolific Cuban blogger, knows more about the power of the internet for political change than most. Her popular blog, 14yMedio, hosts critical appraisals of Cuban life on a server in Mexico. Before 2008 Yoani had to disguise herself as a German tourist to be allowed into hotels where Wi-Fi was available for foreigners only. Once abducted and beaten for her critical views, Yoani now enjoys relative freedom from state persecution. Bert Hoffman calls this a ‘startling change’ considering 2003 saw the imprisonment of 75 independent journalists for their dissident views. Yoani argues that it is precisely the ‘emergence of bloggers who are critical of the system’ and ‘the maturation of independent journalism’ that has ‘eroded the state’s monopoly on power’.

Yoemnis, a Cuban artist, using his computer. The computer has no internet but is filled with pirated Western films and TV shows. Photo by Rod Lewis.

However, new technology is not a panacea for the ills of the island. Hernandez rejects this construction by arguing that to suggest so is to deny the ingenuity and skill of the Cuban people, portraying them as some sleeping beauty who will awaken to the benefits of neoliberalism once kissed by the internet’s Western charms. He argues that it is only deep reforms across the political system, the media, the communist party, and civil society groups that will enliven the Cuban economy. The internet, therefore, should not be seen as opening a window of opportunity for Western involvement in Cuba. It is merely a means for the Cuban people to engage with the rest of the world on their own terms. This means acknowledging the privileged position Cuba’s isolation has given it in world politics as it is able to reflect upon the actions of other nations and decide for itself the best path to take.

The Capitol building as seen from the streets of Cuba. Photo by Jack Revell

Fidel was right in his response to Obama’s visit. The country does not need gifts from the empire, whose embargo has profoundly stunted Cuba’s ability to construct its own economic position. The power of Cuba lies in its highly educated, highly motivated population, and their capacity to adapt to changing global relations. Facilitated by growing technological interconnectedness, subversive ideas, black-market, and pink-market economies are being emboldened. This non-state sector will no doubt find new strength and new avenues of development online and, in doing so, may force the government’s hand in enacting change. What remains to be seen is whether the new U.S. administration will recognise this potential. With Diaz-Canel’s ascendancy only a year away, the road to reform is close to its end. While the future remains uncertain, the survivalist instincts of the Cuban people, empowered by new technology, may help steer the island toward a stronger economic future.

Jack Revell is a current International Relations MA student in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His background is in English Literature and he focuses on sustainable development, international ethics, international poverty, and democracy. 

 

The Challenge of Operational Assessment in Contemporary Conflict

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By: Noah Cooper

1990-91: General Norman Schwarzkopf talks with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press conference regarding the Gulf War.

The immutable nature of war suggests that despite the form of warfare undertaken by the belligerents, conflict is a duel between opponents vying to subdue the other. The type of war dictates the character of the conflict and is subject to the myriad variables that influence its dynamics. For instance, there are characteristics of counterinsurgency that are distinctive to this form of warfare not typically present in conventional or violent conflicts waged between states or state-like entities (e.g., the demonstration of movement and maneuver techniques by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] employing captured Iraqi military equipment demonstrates that the execution of conventional warfare is no longer the purview of states).

A particularly prominent difference among the aforementioned styles of warfare is the methodologies employed to assess the progression of the military campaign. Logically, the use of quantifiable metrics dominates the assessment practices by entities engaged in conventional war. Commencing from the estimated enemy order-of-battle, or the assessed organization, disposition, and strength of its fighting forces developed through the intelligence process, battlefield commanders simply subtract the number of enemy assets destroyed or rendered inoperable. The practice of assessment in this type of environment, though iterative, ultimately seeks an end state consisting of the attrition of the enemy fighting force to a point that the opposing force renders it combat ineffective. In this scenario, the force focuses operationally on the attainment of military objectives and thus, operates relatively independent of the political goals of the campaign. Operation Desert Storm – the military means designed to respond to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait – illustrates this assertion. The well-defined purposes of the U.S. strategy to contend with Iraqi aggression facilitated an approach to attack the enemy’s military centers of gravity (i.e. leadership, infrastructure, and military forces) and to thus, focus on the military objectives of the campaign. The decisive victory of U.S. and Coalition Forces and the assessed attrition of Iraqi forces, particularly along the termed “Highway of Death,” contributed to the decision to declare a cease-fire, 100 hours following the initiation of the ground campaign. In this instance, the quantifiable assessment of military action was the principal element guiding the decision-making processes.

In contrast, the assessment of progress in counterinsurgency or “hybrid” warfare, such as the conflict waged against ISIL, is more challenging, as the intertwining of the desired political and military goals complicates the evaluative process. Commanders, in conjunction with their political counterparts, must contrive means to assess simultaneously the attrition of enemy forces, the population’s allegiance, and the overall stability of provinces, districts, cities, etc. This includes the appraisal of various measures of effectiveness that are criteria that an organization employs to assess changes in a system, or in the case of conflict, alterations to the operating environment. Indicators of changes in a counterinsurgency or hybrid setting, similar to those analyzed in conventional warfare, are often quantifiable and thus, defined and measured in a straightforward fashion. For instance, efforts to effect an insurgent organization’s sources of financing might include the targeted destruction of oil and gas facilities to degrade the enemy’s financial networks. In this scenario, a commander’s staff would fuse operational and intelligence information to include the number of facilities, equipment, and personnel successfully targeted; the total number of hours of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets levied to identify these targets; and the enemy’s estimated reaction, ascertained from intelligence analysis, to determine if such an effort is contributing to a stated objective.

Conversely, other indicators of change are not conveniently calculable, such as the enemy’s will to prolong the fight, the strength of the enemy’s narrative, and the level of entrenchment of the adversary’s ideology into the population, among others. These are challenging measures to determine, particularly in the current conflict waged against ISIL, in which the primary contributions of Coalition Forces are enabling assets (i.e., specialized military capabilities to include intelligence collection, precision artillery, and, most notably, aerial strikes), rather than ground forces to interact directly in the operating areas. Acquiring a knowledge of these elements will advance a commander’s knowledge of the effects of the campaign more effectively than transparent metrics.

Why then, do the assessments of progress reflect that of a conventional conflict (e.g., numbers of strikes conducted, enemy equipment destroyed, and territory regained)? Perhaps the obvious answer is the minimal presence of coalition ground troops, which marginalizes the coalition’s ability to develop a first-hand knowledge of the operating environment. However, this condition should not absolve those prosecuting the war from conducting a continuous and detailed analysis of the campaign’s progress that relies primarily on numeric facts. The appeal of employing quantifiable effects is the definitive nature of the data. For example, a quantity of enemy removed from the battlefield subtracted from the originally assessed number of fighters yields an amount that is easy to comprehend and thus, to incorporate in gauging the effectiveness of friendly force activities. Undeniably, the responsibilities of command are such that the availability of quantifiable metrics eases decision-making, as such, data, derived from mathematical calculations, acts to reduce ambiguity. However, the logic of such conclusions is not always concrete and metrics are often misleading. Were the fighters easily replaced foot soldiers or were they specialists (e.g., bomb-maker, sniper, financier, etc.), which are not replaced easily? Accurate assessments require the synthesis of such metrics with qualitative examinations of the enemy and friendly actions. Without such rigor, a commander and a war fighting staff will be unable to measure the mission accurately and that will undoubtedly affect the campaign’s outcome.

Noah Cooper is an MA candidate in the War in the Modern World Program at King’s College London. He received an MA from John’s Hopkins University and is an active duty U.S. Army officer. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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