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Conflict & Health in the Eastern Mediterranean Series: Lebanon in Ashes: A Looming Mental Health Crisis?

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by Loubaba El Wazir

Beirut, Capital of Lebanon. Photo Source: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons

This article is part of our Conflict & Health in the Eastern Mediterranean Series. Read the Series Introduction.

As Lebanon navigates dark times, the country’s youth struggle to manage their mental wellbeing amid economic and political instability. The country witnessed a nation-wide revolution in October 2019 in reaction to rising taxes and projections of economic collapse. Adding fuel to the fire since has been the banking crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a massive explosion in Beirut in summer 2020. In less than a year, Lebanese youth were left with a devalued national currency, skyrocketing inflation, plummeting job opportunities, and a society poised on the precipice of conflict and self-division.

While there is evidence that riots and protests substantially increase the prevalence of Major Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder[1], research on the impact of economic and political unrest on mental health in developing countries remains widely unavailable. Our understanding of the latter dynamics could alternatively be informed by the narratives and experiences of mental health practitioners. In our interview*, Dr. Joseph El-Khoury argued that youth are at a high risk of developing mental health disorders in these circumstances due to a fluctuating sense of identity, belonging, and stability. Such issues have already been documented among Arab youth who experienced demographic and political crises[2]. Based on the increasing rates of care seekers, Dr. El-Khoury predicts that if the current state of affairs persists “we could witness more chronic disorders, including depression, anxiety, insomnia, and addiction, affecting an entire generation for the long-term”.

Unsurprisingly, signs of increasing mental health problems have already surfaced. The country’s national suicide hotline managed by Embrace, a mental health non-governmental organisation, has gradually been receiving more calls throughout the crises, with calls rising from 219 in September 2019 to 565 in January 2021. Their last report shows that 58% of these were received from individuals aged 18 to 34 years. One can also observe those struggles first-hand on social media platforms, where Lebanese youth express and share their trauma. Following the Beirut explosion, many tweeted sarcastically about the symbol of Lebanon being a rising Phoenix. Others explicitly denounced resilience, which for them is equivalent to an acceptance of their agonizing reality.

Nevertheless, according to Dr. El-Khoury, the number of people who actually seek professional mental health services reflects a treatment gap. This was previously documented by a national study conducted in 2006 and published in The Lancet, estimating that 89.1% of mental health disorders in Lebanon receive no treatment[3]. Yet, this situation is likely further exacerbated by the economic crisis, which has led most psychologists to raise their fees. Salem, a young Lebanese who struggles with mental disorders, told me that the cost of his sessions has more than tripled since last year, jumping from 75,000 LBP to 250,000 LBP per session. This spike is caused by the banking sector’s loss of liquidity and subsequent devaluation of the national currency. While the central bank of Lebanon continues to peg the Lebanese Pound (LBP) to the USD at 1$= 1515 LBP, banks currently operate at a different exchange rate (1$= 3900 LBP) and the black market has a yet different and constantly fluctuating rate that has reached around 1$= 12,000 LBP in the past couple of months. Given that therapy sessions are priced in USD and psychologists have the freedom to choose which exchange rate to operate with, the range of therapy fees has become vast across clinics, with sessions costing between 150,000 LBP and 800,000 LBP. Not only does this situation restrict the population that is financially capable of accessing mental health care, but it also affects the general public trust in the mental health sector.

The economic crisis has also impacted mental health by diminishing resources that are vital to the sector. The main damage it caused was pushing a big portion of the health workforce abroad. In our interview, Dr. El-Khoury expressed that mental health professionals are “both providers of care and in need of care… socially”, adding that many practitioners are forced to immigrate due to inadequate working conditions and salaries. Moreover, psychiatric medications and comprehensive mental health programs have not escaped the influence of the economic crisis, with many medicines and treatments either completely running out or becoming excessively unaffordable.

This dismal situation leads us to the question of mental health access for Lebanese youth. While many foreign donors, including the United Nations and World Health Organisation, have initiated and contributed to initiatives in Lebanon, these remain limited. Dr. El-Khoury said that although certain non-governmental organisations have programs that offer free therapy sessions, their capacity is likely capped at a couple of thousands of patients. This is certainly inadequate for a population of 6 million Lebanese, 55% of whom are in poverty, and more than 50% of whom have no formal health insurance coverage. Among those who do enjoy health insurance, a very small minority get their psychologist sessions covered, given that most insurance programs only cover psychiatric, but not psychological, therapy. The National Social Security Fund plans to incorporate partial coverage for these sessions soon, according to Rabih El Chammay, head of the National Mental Health Programme. Yet, little is to be expected, given that the institution is “broke” and has a history of fragile implementation.

The ability of Lebanese youth to re-establish their mental health well-being following the recent catastrophes seems to be inextricably dependent on political, economic, and institutional reform. Particularly, it is essential to establish a rigorous national mental health system that is funded and organised by the health branch of the Lebanese government. Given that this seems like a distant prospect, it is crucial for mental health organisations to coordinate efforts across the country to ensure accessible care for the most vulnerable. Yet, we should be cautious about claiming that the NGO sector can manage this crisis alone, an idea which, in the words of Dr. El-Khoury, “washes the government’s hands from providing sustainable, free, or at least low-cost services”.

The same oligarchy that murdered and terrorised thousands of families in the 1975 Lebanese Civil War is largely responsible for the economic and social collapse happening now. While strengthening the mental health system is essential to lessen the collective psychological impact of the crisis, what the small Mediterranean country ultimately needs is political reform and accountability, now more than ever.

[1] Ni, Michael Y., Yoona Kim, Ian McDowell, Suki Wong, Hong Qiu, Irene OL Wong, Sandro Galea, and Gabriel M. Leung. “Mental health during and after protests, riots and revolutions: a systematic review.” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 54, no. 3 (2020): 232-243.

[2] Mulderig, M. C. (2013). An uncertain future: Youth frustration and the Arab Spring.

[3] Karam, Elie G., Zeina N. Mneimneh, Aimee N. Karam, John A. Fayyad, Soumana C. Nasser, Somnath Chatterji, and Ronald C. Kessler. “Prevalence and treatment of mental disorders in Lebanon: a national epidemiological survey.” The Lancet 367, no. 9515 (2006): 1000-1006.

Loubaba is an MSc. Social and Cultural Psychology student at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She holds a Bachelor in Psychology from the American University of Beirut. She was involved in the Lebanese October 17 Revolution and has an interest in its impact on Lebanese society. Loubaba has completed internships at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and the United Nations ESCWA.

Conflict & Health in the Eastern Mediterranean Series: Medical Education under blockage, protected conflict, and constant warfare

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by Alaa M. Ismail

5th year medical students at the Islamic University of Gaza practicing in the suturing-skill lab

This article is part of our Conflict & Health in the Eastern Mediterranean Series. Read the Series Introduction.

Gaza Strip, a densely occupied territory where the majority are concentrated in refugee camps and living under austere conditions, has exceeded two million residents in 2020. Decades of protracted conflict, years of blockade, and deep poverty have caused profound suffering in Gaza. The local economy has witnessed multiple, recurrent crises with 53% of people falling below deep poverty line, more than half of residents registering as unemployed in 2019 and most of residents being dependent on humanitarian aid from national and international organizations. Such conditions have hindered normalcy in all aspects of life, particularly the educational process.

Although Gaza enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in the world, with a rate of 99.5% among college-age group in 2019, the educational process, in schools and universities, faces enormous difficulties. Since 2007, the government has rarely paid full salaries to workers in the public sector, including teachers, which has had deleterious effects on living conditions in general, and on education provision in particular. Students coming from families whose breadwinner is a public employee have struggled to access higher education due to financial limitations. The dropout rate jumped from 40% in 2018-2019 to 70% in 2019-2020 among postgraduate students as reported by Al-Mezan Center for human rights in Gaza.

High rates of unemployment and political instability have caused dire economic situations. Palestinian families in Gaza find themselves overwhelmed with their children’s basic needs such as books, stationery tools, and daily expenses. This has led to preferential gender treatment as many parents consider early marriage, which is relatively high in Gaza, for young female family members as a way to relieve themselves of the financial burden of education. As for males, it has also meant undertaking cheap, unregulated labour to escape from financial hardships whilst studying.

Turning to medical education, a large number of young doctors have quit their jobs and left Gaza to seek better opportunities. Gaza lacks proper educational hospitals, instead, all medical students and residents are trained in public hospitals. Consultants at those hospitals have to manage being full-time doctors serving in the hospital while taking on educational duties as well. This pushes graduates to seek better opportunities abroad. There is no available published data on the exact number of migrant doctors, but it has been an increasingly common occurrence over recent years.

The educational sector has also been damaged due to repetitive attacks under Israeli occupation. For example, the Islamic University, where I work, was directly targeted both in 2008 and in 2014. The science building, which includes all labs in the university, was completely destroyed in 2009 and was completely non-functional until 2020. Even though the building has been rebuilt, the devices and material needed to run the labs were either severely delayed or not permitted to enter Gaza for months by the Israeli authorities. During this troubled period, students in scientific colleges were obliged to study only the theoretical aspects of a subject without any lab-based training.

Another way in which the educational process is impeded are the travel restrictions facing residents of Gaza. Students in Gaza who have opportunities abroad have to go through a long process to obtain the required security permit in order to travel. Such security processes, the seemingly arbitrary delays, and rejections of permits make it nearly impossible for those planning to attend conferences or training courses. Moreover, students travelling to attend undergraduate and postgraduate courses abroad spend their entire study period without returning home because of the fear that they will not be able to obtain the required security permits if they came back to visit.

Challenges in learning and education processes have markedly increased with the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Ministry of Education has withheld all face-to-face activities since the 5th of March for fear of spreading the infection among students and has started using exclusively virtual methods to continue the education process. The new advent of E-learning has proven a significant hurdle for both lecturers and students, primarily as we did not experience it in our medical education and we have limited proficiency in online learning platforms and technologies. Beyond this, chronic electricity shortages continue to distress students and doctors. One the one hand, electricity cuts affect the work flow in hospitals. On the other, many students have had to miss online sessions and exams due to electricity cuts. Alongside electricity shortages, the needs for a personal computer for each student to attend online classes is impossible to meet for families in Gaza. As one study found, with large families crowded into small houses, most find it exceedingly hard for their children to keep up with online education.

Formidable obstacles face Gaza residents as pressure mounts from years of siege, rampant poverty, unemployment and poor health and economic circumstances. The educational sector, especially medical education, bears the brunt of those obstacles. Yet, students and teachers, especially in the health sector, in Gaza continue to prioritize education in the hope of brighter future.

Alaa is a Board-certified Obstetrician and Gynaecologist. She is the Obstetrics and Gynaecology department head at the Islamic University of Gaza. She is active as a women’s health advocate and medical educator. Learn more about Alaa at her LinkedIn Profile.

Series Introduction: Conflict and Health in the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Anas Ismail

Photo by Andrey Metelev on Unsplash

Conflict is known to affect health in a myriad of ways[1] including, but not limited to, attacks on health workers and facilities, disruption of access to health services, deterioration of water and sanitation infrastructure, and interruption of training and education for medical students and junior doctors. The more severe and long-lasting the conflict, the more significant its effects on health and the harder it will be to recover and improve health in post-conflict situations. Moreover, the impacts of conflict extend beyond the national borders in which they occur, and bleed over into neighbouring states whose governance, in the face of conflicts’ destabilizing effects and mass refugee flows, is significantly challenged.

The Eastern Mediterranean is home to one of the oldest conflicts, that between Israel and Palestine, and one of the most devastating, the Syrian civil war.

In Palestine, over five decades of occupation have taken their toll on all aspects of healthcare from medical education to patient care and life conditions, all aspects further explored in this series. In Syria, the conflict has been characterized by the weaponization of healthcare, i.e. attacking or withholding healthcare as a strategy of war. Moreover, while the parties to these conflicts suffer extensively, other countries in the region are also struggling from their spill-over effects alongside their own internal divisions and unrest. Lebanon continues to endure an unprecedented economic crisis, deep internal divisions, and lack of proper governance on the political level – all whilst hosting nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees. These have had a significant  impact on the country’s youth whose mental health needs seems to be far from being met in a country where psychiatric and psychological services are largely neglected, with a treatment gap close to 90%. Jordan, on the other hand, enjoys  relatively stable governance and economic conditions, but it has been strained  by surrounding instability. As a result of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it hosts 2.2 million Palestinian refugees, the most of any country, and over the past decade these have been joined by 1 million Syrian refugees, meaning that over 30% of Jordan’s total resident population are displaced peoples.

This series aims to capture various experiences of healthcare delivery and medical education in the region. The first article brings to light how medical education is being provided completely online for the first time in Gaza under settings of protracted conflict, chronic electricity shortage, and economic impoverishment. The second piece discusses the underlying causes of the looming epidemic of mental health disorders among the youth in Lebanon and how the economic crisis is impacting it. The third article illuminates the intricacies and security implications of patients in Gaza needing, and seeking, treatment abroad. In the fourth piece, the author, a Syrian doctor in diaspora, discusses how attacking the healthcare work force in Syria is affecting the provision of health and what needs to be done. The final piece describes the far-reaching impact of war-related amputations on civilians in the Gaza Strip and argues how modern warfare, such as drone attacks, are causing an increase in such injuries.

Series Publication Schedule

  • 26 April 2021 – Part I: Medical education under blockade, protracted conflict and constant warfare. By Alaa Ismail
  • 27 April 2021 – Part II: Lebanon in Ashes: A Looming Mental Health Crisis? By Loubaba Al Wazir
  • 28 April 2021 – Part III: Medical Referrals in Gaza: Uncertainty and Agony for Palestinians Patients. By Anas Ismail
  • 29 April 2021 – Part IV: How does the Syrian Civil War affect health care workers? By Abdullah Al Houri
  • 30 April 2021 – Part V: Life after traumatic amputations in the Gaza Strip. By Hanne Heszlein-Lossius

[1] Howard, Natasha, Hossain, Mazeda, Ho, Lara. “Effects of Conflict on Heath.” In Conflict and Health, 25–32. Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education, 2012.

Anas Ismail is a medical doctor originally from Gaza, Palestine, where he received his education and training. As a citizen of Gaza, and later as a medical student, he personally lived the impact that conflict has on life in general and on healthcare in specific. This led him to an interest in global health as a means of learning more about the relationship between conflict and health.

With a joint scholarship from the Chevening Awards and the Said Foundation, Anas is currently studying MSc Global health with conflict and security at King’s College, London. He is the Production Manager for Strife Blog and a Series Editor at Strife.

Pop Culture, Power, and Netflix

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by Zenia Duell

Photo Credit: Unsplash

The field of popular culture and creative arts fascinates me – in particular their overlap with or function as cultural diplomacy. Galia Press-Barnathan notes that there is a distinct lack of coherent research into the links between popular culture and international relations (IR).  She attributes this to the divide between critical and positivist approaches to IR, and the interdisciplinary nature of popular culture.[i] However, Press-Barnathan also emphasises that popular cultural products have a unique and unparalleled capacity for capturing stories, messages and emotions, and transmitting them in a format that is easy to understand and enjoyable to consume.[ii] This makes them extremely powerful tools of influence. ‘Entertainment informs audiences and shapes minds.’[iii] One medium through which this influential communication happens is historical docu-dramas, currently experiencing a surge of popularity on Netflix.

During my career as a TV producer, I have worked on several historical docu-dramas – a programme that is a combination of scripted drama and non-scripted documentary segments. But it is not just history that these programmes are communicating – the history itself is wrapped up in a landscape of communications about power. Media scholars have long been aware of these popular culture products as political texts, but as Press-Barnathan and Lisel Hintz note,[iv] they are not always factored into discussions in IR. There is also difficulty with classifying these creative products as part of the field of ‘strategic communications’ – which, by definition, precludes some political intent to the communication. Popular culture does not always have a clear political motivation behind it. This article will therefore take a different approach to three historical drama-docs currently on Netflix, and will analyse them from the other end of the communications transmission,[v] reviewing not their intent, but their effect.

Roman Empire was produced by an American production company, Stephen David Entertainment. It tells the stories of three infamous men in Roman history: Commodus, Julius Caesar and Caligula. Having worked on a couple of series about the Roman Empire myself, I can attest to the fact that Roman history sells well. But is there something more to it? A recent New York Times article sparked a fiery discussion around how the field of Classics has fed into colonial attitudes, and how Classics in turn features in neo-colonial narratives. Roman Empire (the Netflix series) does not make any overt parallels between the modern world and the ancient, but perhaps there is a more subliminal message – after all, the majority of actors in the series were white Caucasian, when a historically accurate skin colour would be olive or brown. There is a long and at times unpleasant history of white actors playing roles of multiple ethnicities – not least Liz Taylor’s famous portrayal of the Macedonian-Egyptian queen Cleopatra. It would be unfair to make assumptions about the political sentiments of the producers of Roman Empire, but this casting choice is part of the communications landscape around colonialism, in particular, the ownership of history.

Rise of Empires: Ottoman was produced by a Turkish/American production company, Karga 7 Pictures. The founders of Karga 7 are American, but as Fatima Bhutto notes, there is currently in Turkey a concerted effort to promote the Ottoman ‘brand’ as part of the soft power strategy developed by former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in his book, Strategic Depth. This series may not be part of official Government policy, but it certainly fits within the narrative of Ottomania.[vi] It is in its own right a riveting story of conflict and conquest. The majority of the last episode takes place in the Haghia Sophia: the largest church in the world at the time of its construction in the 6th century BC, and the focal point of Constantinople. We see the Byzantine flags, featuring the double-headed eagle, being taken down from the building and replaced with the crescent moon of Islam. The final shot of the series is a close up of Mehmet II’s face as he looks directly down the camera lens and says: ‘and so…we begin’. Six months after the series launched on Netflix, the Haghia Sophia was turned from a museum back into a mosque, following a court decision. There is no discernible link between the Netflix series and the court decision, but this powerful sequence adds emotional force to ‘nation-branding through culture, rhetoric and broadcasting’.[vii]

Age of Samurai: Battle for Japan was produced by a Canadian company. Like Roman history, Japanese history – and particularly the samurai period – sells well. Once again, we find no links to Japanese investors or political agendas. This can be seen instead as the ultimate soft power success: Japan’s commemoration and promotion of their rich cultural history has proved a self-sustaining investment. Now others invest in promoting their culture on their behalf – because it is powerful enough to stand up as a brand on its own.

The communications landscape is busy with powerful messages like these that are hard to place. Other cultural products with political influence include the K-Pop band BLACKPINK, which has recently launched a campaign to raise awareness of climate change. The fan community of another K-Pop band, BTS, has normalised progressive discussions around mental health and masculinity, led by the example of the band members themselves. These feed into wider communications about South Korea as a progressive, democratic, and artistically creative country – but are not overtly linked to a political agenda or funding. The comic writer Sharad Devarajan embarked on a personal mission to export a pop culture narrative from India through his latest animated series Hanuman – but he is an independent creative, not a government diplomat. These creative messages are both influential and ubiquitous – but there is very little analysis of their direct implications, and where exactly they sit in the political sphere. They certainly have political power, but they are not always driven or funded by an overt political agenda. Ian Thomas’ recent publication has gone some way towards tackling these important questions of how much and what kind of influence creative products can have in the political sphere, but it is clear that there is plenty of scope for further research in this field.

[i] Press-Barnathan, Galia. “Thinking about the Role of Popular Culture in International Conflicts”. International Studies Review (2017), 19, p167.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Dogan, Taner. “Taner Dogan on ideology and charisma in Erdogan’s communication”. Turkey Book Talk #136 [Podcast], 2nd March 2021.

[iv] Discussed with Hintz in a private conversation, 9th March 2021.

[v] See Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois, 1972.

[vi] I deliberately use the term ‘Ottomania’ here rather than ‘neo-Ottomanism’, as several scholars and analysts have raised issues with the latter. For more on this, see Howard Eissentat’s comments in this interview with POMED https://pomed.org/conceptualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-ambitions-a-conversation-with-howard-eissenstat/. The term ‘Ottomania’ I think characterises how Turkey is using the Ottoman brand without imitating the Ottoman Empire in terms of strategy or policy.

[vii] Dogan, Taner. “Taner Dogan on ideology and charisma in Erdogan’s communication”. Turkey Book Talk #136 [Podcast], 2nd March 2021.

Zenia is a documentary producer and part-time MA student in Strategic Communications. Outside of the office or the library, Zenia produces a podcast about ancient history, hosts dinner parties and trains at the gym.

You can follow her on Twitter at @Commsduell

Tracing Conflict Minerals – Blockchain Beyond Cryptocurrencies

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by Andrew Scanlon

Photo credit: Unsplash

The use of minerals to fund conflict presents one of the clearest cases of the vast complexities of globalisation. Materials extracted in one region will be sent to a second region to be used in production of goods which will then be sold in a third region. In some cases, this cycle fuels and prolongs conflicts near the origin points of the metal. Tracking these supply chains is crucial in cutting off the flow of funds which arms groups use for conflict. Blockchain technology is the most promising means of doing so. Blockchain is both inherently decentralised and integrated. No one person can control the entire chain of data, but all actors with permission can see the entire ledger. The peer-to-peer decentralized ledger within blockchain provides a credible and verifiable real-time tracing tool that provides clarity as to the origins of each product and trace inconsistencies to a specific point in the supply chain. 

Armed groups often attempt to control and profit from natural resources that fund and extended conflicts. Cases range the spectrum of minerals and regions including Myanmar, Afghanistan, Angola, and Peru. Amongst the various minerals that can fall into the classification of conflict minerals. One of the most famous examples are conflict diamonds. However, in recent years more attention has been paid to gold and the three Ts – tungsten, tin, and tantalum. These minerals have been the target of EU and US regulation. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required restrictions on these materials as a result of their use in funding conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On January 1, 2021 new EU import rules regarding minerals took effect. The regulations impose some new due diligence measures on importers and require them to determine if their import volumes exceed mandated thresholds, conduct audits of their supply chains and third-party contractors, and assess risk management strategies. This is a positive initiative and a step in the right direction, but it will ultimately fall short of what is needed to stem the flow of conflict minerals and the income they create if they do not incorporate emerging technologies.

The mineral industry can be incredibly important to local economies. Although armed groups may control a mine whose proceeds contributes to conflict, it must be noted that not all mining in the area is used to fund all conflicts. Previous efforts at regulating conflict minerals have imposed restrictions on locals who rely on the industry for a living while not sufficiently solving the problem of minerals funding conflict groups. These efforts relied on more traditional means of supply chain management and oversight that can be prone to mistakes, fraud, and bribery. Many of these issues are the result insufficient resources and the fragmented nature of supply chains. Blockchain offers a compelling new method to trace and verify goods and transactions along a supply chain. The use of distributed ledgers offers a number of advantages over traditional methods. Its core features increase transparency and reliability while reducing costs and corruption. A central component of blockchain is its immutability; once data is entered into the ledger it is not capable of being erased or overridden without a consensus approval from other nodes in the chain.

And blockchain has been noted to cut down on transaction costs along various points in the supply chain. If integrated properly it can help digitise and automate border entries. Recently, Brexit and the entry of British goods into French ports has provided a real-world lesson in the importance of efficient border crossings. Mexico, Peru, and Costa Rica have been working with the Inter-American Development Bank to develop CADENA, which uses blockchain to modernize their customs operations and mutual recognition agreements. These cuts in transit costs offer miners, importers, and manufacturers incentive to integrate the technology into their supply chains. 

The technology has already been utilised in efforts to increase sustainable supply chains management and strengthen fair trade practices in commodities such as coffee. The idea to introduce blockchain into the sphere of conflict minerals is not completely novel, Usman W. Chohan wrote on its applicability to the case of the mineral cobalt. Its interoperability is an asset that allows for various jurisdictions to combat a globalized problem more efficiently. 

However, blockchain, as with any emerging technology, does present a few challenges. First and foremost, the governance of blockchain is still in need of work as it continues to grow and mature. The same interoperability which makes the technology an asset also presents the challenge of coordinating policies across jurisdictions and enforcement bodies. Procedures for issuing certificates, verification of authorised actors, and end-station protocols would have to be agreed upon before it could successfully be implemented. 

Additionally, blockchain’s success in tracing conflict goods is dependent on its implementation at the origin point of the supply chain. If a percentage of miners are not willing to implement the system and tag their minerals at the source, then that same percentage of minerals may not be accurately labelled as conflict-free. At a certain point the percentage would negate the usefulness of the remaining supply chain. Ensuring that all legitimate miners are included in the blockchain is essential to the success of the overall project. 

However, as long as armed groups seize control of natural resources and use the profits to fund conflict, we will need to scrutinise supply chains. Traditional methods have left gaps open, challenged locals who rely on the industry for their livelihood and allowed bad actors to continue profiting. There are issues to any disruptive technologies, but the benefits outweigh the challenges. Blockchain offers the most innovative and efficient way to manage supply chains, cut the flow of conflict minerals, and ultimately help slow the conflicts they perpetuate.

Andrew Scanlon is an MSc student in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh and an external representative for Strife. His research interests focus on the Indo-Pacific region and the use of emerging technologies in international regimes.