Blog Article

Enhancing Cyber Wargames: The Crucial Role of Informed Games Design

January 11, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Amy Ertan and Peadar Callaghan

“Risk – Onyx Edition (Ghosts of board games past)” by derekGavey.
Licensed under Creative Commons

‘A game capable of simulating every aspect of war would become war.’

Martin Van Creed, Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes, 2013.

The launch of the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory first Defence Wargaming Centre in December 2019 is an opportunity for future wargaming design. While current games do enable some knowledge transfer, the tried-and-tested techniques employed by the serious games community would enhance these exercises with more effective strategising and training mechanisms. This article highlights how the characteristics of cyberspace require a distinct approach to wargames, and provides recommendations for improved development and practice of cyber wargames by drawing on established games design principles.

The use of games in educational settings has been recognised since the 4th century BC. Wargames, however, are a more recent invention. Wargaming first emerged in modern times via the Prussian Army. Kriegsspiel, as it was called, was used to teach tactics to officers as part of the Prussian Military Reforms in the wake of their devastating defeats at the hands of Napoleon. Ever since, military wargames have become a feature of training military personnel. The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Red Teaming Guide defines a wargame as ‘a scenario-based warfare model in which the outcome and sequence of events affect, and are affected by, the decisions made by the players’. These games, as noted by the MoD’s Wargaming Handbook, can be used to simulate conflicts in a low-risk table-top style setting across all levels of war and ‘across all domains and environments’. Wargames have repeatedly proved themselves a reliable method in communicating and practising military strategy that can be applied to explore all varieties of warfare.

As cyber becomes an increasingly important warfighting domain, both by itself and in collaboration with other domains, cyber wargames have begun to be played with the same frequency and importance as the traditional domains. Since 2016, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) has annually coordinated Crossed Swords, focusing on technical training, while NATO’s annual Cyber Coalition focuses on goals including information-sharing and collaboration and the Atlantic Council’s Cyber 9/12 focuses on strategic policy-making. Military examples include the U.S. Naval War College’s Defending Forward wargames, where, in its simplest form, cyber defenders (‘blue teams’) defend against cyber adversaries (‘red teams’). While these games are a great step forward in understanding, analysing, and preparing for the problems of cyberwarfare, these exercises tend to draw on existing conceptions of traditional serious games. This represents a missed opportunity; the cyber domain differs from traditional conflict in ways that warrant a fresh look at the design of wargames.

By design, wargames create an abstracted model of reality containing primary assumptions and simplifications that allow the model to be actionable. Underlying assumptions include: that the enemy is known, rational and ruthless; that the conflict being modelled is zero-sum in nature; that the games are effective tools even without specifically conceptualising how knowledge transfer takes place; and that the scope of the game should mirror reality as closely as possible. While these assumptions are appropriate for—or at least not detrimental to—traditional models of kinetic warfare, they are problematic for cyber wargame design. The challenges with each underlying assumption are described in turn.

The Known, Ruthless, and Rational Enemy

As Larry Greenemeier noted a decade ago, in cyberspace, the fog of war is exacerbated. While traditional warfare often limits available knowledge on an adversary’s location, in the cyber domain the reality is that defenders may not know who the enemy is nor their goals. When the enemy is an unknown, they can appear to act in an irrational way, at least from the perspective of the defender. This is due to the inherent asymmetry of the attacker. Through reconnaissance, the attacker will more than likely hold more information about intended targets than the defenders. Each of these issues, individually and collectively, are typically under-emphasised in most rigid wargames.

A Zero-Sum Nature of Conflict

Rigid wargames use a unity of opposites in their design, the goals of one side are diametrically opposed to the other. This creates a zero-sum game in which the goal of both the red and blue teams is the destruction of the other side. However, cyber conflict holds features of non zero-sum games, such as how the victory of one side does not always come with an associated loss to the other. Additionaly, there is an asymmetry introduced that should be addressed in the game design stage.

Knowledge Transfer: What is Actually Being Taught?

Another assumption made in the deployment of wargames is that they teach. However what is being taught is not as closely examined. In general, serious games can be categorised into two broad types: low road (or reflexive transfer) games; and high road (or mindful transfer) games. Low road transfer games are concerned with direct training of a stimulus and a response in a controlled environment that is as similar as possible to the context that the player is presented with in real life. For example, a flight simulator. The second type high road games are designed to encourage players to mindfully make connections between the context of play and the real world. Reflexive games are more likely to emphasise speed whereas mindful transfers are more likely to emphasise communication between players. Games must be designed using the knowledge transfer type most appropriate to the intended learning outcomes of the game.

Overenthusiastic Scoping

Cyber operations do not exist in isolation from traditional models of warfare. The integration of cyber operations with kinetic warfare, however, dramatically increases the complexity. Even attempting to capture the whole cyber landscape in a single game runs the real risk of detail overload, decision paralysis, and distracting the player from the game’s intended learning objectives. The longer it takes to learn to play, the less time the player has available to learn from the play. In reality, one cannot accurately simulate the real-world threat landscape without sacrificing effective learning (unless the learning point is simply to illustrate how complex the cyber threat landscape might be). For example, if the cyber wargame is focusing on the protection of critical national infrastructure, then side-tasks focusing on several other industries are likely to confuse, rather than assist, participants in achieving the desired learning goals.

Recommendations

How should we best approach the challenge of effective cyber wargame design?

We propose that designed cyber wargames must be in line with the following four principles:

Include ‘partial knowledge’ states.If the cyber wargame player has full knowledge of the game state, the game becomes nothing more than an algorithmic recall activity where a player can predict which actions are likely to result in successful outcomes. Certain ludic uncertainties can be included to induce ‘partial knowledge’, simulating the fog of war as required for each game.

Include ‘asymmetric positions’ for the players.The character of cyberwar is better modelled through asymmetric relationships between players. Cyber wargame designers need to consider the benefits to having this asymmetry inside the game.

Confirm learning objectives and knowledge transfer type before commencing design.Both low road and high road transfer games are valuable, but they serve different functions in the learning environment. A conscious choice for whether the game is attempting to promote low road or high road transfer should be confirmed before game design commences to ensure the appropriateness of the game.

Clearly scoped game to explore specific challenges.A well-scoped smaller game increases players’ willingness to replay games multiple times, allowing players to experiment with different strategies.

Conclusion

As both cybersecurity and wargames increase in importance and visibility, so does research on the use of cyber wargaming as a pedagogical tool for practitioners, policymakers, and the military. Existing principles within the games design profession around clear scoping of goals, game narratives, and appropriate player capabilities may all be applied to enhance existing cyber wargame design. The inclusion of partial knowledge states and asymmetric player capabilities both reflect crucial aspects of the cyber domain, while explicit attention to a game’s desired learning objectives and scope ensures that the resulting designs are as effective as possible. In a world in which cyberspace is only expected to become a more common feature of modern conflict, it is strongly advised that the MoD’s Defence Wargaming Centre leverages these tools and training opportunities. In the asymmetric and unpredictable field of cyber warfare, we need all the advantages we can get.

Amy Ertan is a cybersecurity researcher and information security doctoral candidate at Royal Holloway, University of London, and predoctoral cybersecurity fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. She is an exercise designer for cyber incident management scenarios for The CyberFish Company. As a Visiting Researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, Amy has contributed to strategic scenario design for the cyber defence exercise, Locked Shields 2021. You can follow her on twitter: @AmyErtan, or via her personal webpage: https://www.amyertan.com

Peadar Callaghan is a wargames designer and lectures in learning game design and gamification at the University of Tallinn, Estonia. His company, Integrated Game Solutions, provides consultancy and design services for serious games and simulations, with a focus on providing engaging training outcomes. You can find him at http://peadarcallaghan.com/

Insurrection and Chaos in the United States: Capitol Crimes at the Centre of Government

January 9, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Owen Saunders

Swarms of Trump supporters storm the U.S. Capitol. Source: Reuters

If there was anyone left following 2020 that still held to T.S. Eliot’s words that the ‘world ends/Not with a bang but with a whimper,’ then the events at the U.S. Capitol on 6 January will have cured them of this misconception. In the course of an unprecedented mayhem, the seat of U.S. representative democracy was assaulted by a violent insurrection of Trump supporters intent on preventing the certification of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election in a bizarre attempt to keep Donald Trump in power. The event will undoubtedly consume the opinion pages in the days to come. It is therefore crucial to provide a clear account of the events as they happened and situate them within their context of the wider U.S. democracy.

What happened

The morning of 6 January 2021 began with all eyes focused on the run-off elections for Georgia’s two Senate seats. As no candidate had succeeded in reaching 50% of the vote in the general election of 3 November 2020, these plebiscites offered Democrats the opportunity to carry on the momentum of a victorious Presidential campaign and secure a Senate majority. Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff will be Georgia’s first Democratic Senators in seventeen years, having won by razor-thin margins.

On 6 January, Vice President Mike Pence and members of both Houses of the U.S. Congress began the process of formally certifying electoral college votes. Pence did so in spite of immense pressure from President Trump to reject the outcome of the election, with the President explicitly encouraging him to invalidate the results in the Senate. During the count, soon-to-be Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell and the current Minority Leader Chuck Schumer gave similar speeches defending democracy. However, Schumer warned how some on the Republican side might ‘darken this view of democracy.’ Republicans more recently, according to The Washington Post, are displaying dangerous authoritarian tendencies, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas who argued his colleagues should not ‘take the easy path‘ and should reject the election’s outcome.

Historically, the United States has transferred power peacefully, even when the opposing party won the election. This is why in a normal election year these counts rarely attract any attention; indeed, in the course of this year, with the rejectionist rhetoric of Trump, there was little widespread significance attached to these proceedings. This changed following the 3 November election as President Trump made increasingly strident calls for Congress to refuse to certify the Electoral College votes after losing over sixty legal cases attempting to overturn the election results

Just as Congress had begun debating a motion to reject the Electoral College votes from the State of Arizona, President Trump concluded a rally on the National Mall by urging his supporters to pressure Congress to reject the Electoral College results, overtly encouraging insurrection. Thousands flocked from the rally towards the Capitol and, upon arriving, were met with a relatively small force of United States Capitol Police – a significantly smaller force in comparison to the National Guard troops deployed in advance of a June 2020 Black Lives Matter protest at the Lincoln Memorial. The assembled Trump supporters eventually overran the security protections and took possession of the United States Capitol for several hours. As a result, the formal process certifying the vote came to an immediate halt.

Though eventually forced out of the building, thousands of protesters remained outside the Capitol, with the precinct formally under lockdown. The decision to deploy the District of Colombia National Guard, was made by Army Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy and Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller, and the order was approved by Vice President Mike Pence following multiple requests from the Mayor of Washington and Congressional leaders. Interestingly, Trump as the Commander-in-Chief would have been expected to give this order, however, according to press accounts he failed to do so.

Later that evening, after the 6:00 PM curfew imposed by the DC Mayor that evening, Congress reconvened and voting resumed to certify the outcome of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Other major takeaways from this disruptive day, which ended in the deaths of five people, included the significant delays by the President and Department of Defense to authorize the activation of the DC National Guard, the failure by the United States Capitol Police to adequately plan for an obvious threat, and the stark dissimilarities in the way law enforcement handled this event versus the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer after the death of George Floyd.

How did the United States get here?

The United States has always portrayed itself as a global leader and champion of democratic values, especially after World War II and again after the fall of the Soviet Union, where US power and influence became unparalleled. Over the last decade, however, with global power dynamics in shift, rapid advancements in technology, and the 2008 financial crisis, this position began to witness a dramatic transformation. The ‘Tea Party’ movement, a far-right branch of the Republican party, began to manifest during the Obama administration, notably in 2009 as a backlash to the Affordable Care Act, also known as ‘Obamacare’. The 2010 U.S. elections saw 87 Republicans elected to Congress in what was known as the ‘tea party wave’. They were known for anti-regulation and obstructionist domestic policies, an isolationist foreign policy, and a distinct lack of reverence for many democratic institutions and the role of the state in society.

As Donald Trump came onto the political scene as a serious candidate for President in 2015, he took advantage of what remained of the tea party movement, appropriating their populist rhetoric as his own. Throughout his 2016 campaign, he fed his growing base a populist message that appealed to the far-right elements of the Republican party. Trump’s populist approach, direct criticism of his opponents and President Obama, and self-styled image as a ‘fighter’ proved impossible to beat by his primary opponents or in the general election, Hillary Clinton. His victory represented an accumulation of a number of a number of grievances by Middle America, grievances which he continued to perpetuate and exacerbate throughout his presidency.

President Trump throughout his presidency pushed a narrative that the democratic election processes and institutions could not be trusted, that elections are ‘rigged,’ and that the ‘fake news media’ never reported the facts of his administration accurately. He used his impeachment in early 2020 to reinforce his narrative about the ‘fake news media’ and the alledged persecution of his administration. He set the stage for the post-election turmoil by stating in August 2020 that ‘the only way we’re gonna lose this election is if the election is rigged’.

His supporters have adopted his recent, far more deranged, and unhinged views which were disseminated through his constant stream of disinformation via his now-suspended Twitter account. This included spreading far right media misinformation from QAnon, giving OANN, another far right media outlet, priority to speak during presidential press conferences, and asking for the Proud Boys to ‘stand back and stand by‘ in the course of the campaign. These actions displayed a blatant disregard of the democratic process by the rejection of facts, the promotion of distrust of the media, and the removal of multiple members within his administration who stood up to his disinformation.

After this incident of domestic terrorism where thousands of Trump supporters, some of whom were armed, stormed the Capitol, Congress was forced to adjourn; the national guard was deployed and five people died. The media, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Speaker Nancy Pelosi and others have argued that the 25^th amendment should be invoked to have the president removed from office immediately, as his inflammatory rhetoric and disregard for U.S. democracy have made him incapable of fulfilling the duties of his office. The unprecedented incident that unfolded this week is a true test of the more than 200-year-old democracy.

Where does the United States go from here?

The Electoral College vote has been certified but the riots and takeover of the United States Capitol by supporters of the outgoing president will undoubtedly remain as a painful reminder of and stain on his Presidency. The violent incident at the Capitol is but one of the tainted legacies of his administration.

Taking office on 20 January 2021 President-Elect Joe Biden has much to do – and much to undo. His priorities will surely include undoing many Executive Orders from the Trump Administration and working to pass comprehensive legislation for millions of Americans currently experiencing unprecedented losses, restrictions, and economic hardship due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Most importantly, however, the Biden Administration must also work to repair the distrust, hyper-partisanship and extremism which have steadily spread and intensified throughout the United States over the past four years.

Biden will have to rebuild the reputation of the United States on the international stage, further damaged by the events of this week. Countries and international organizations around the world have reacted in disbelief and disappointment, releasing statements of shock and condemnation regarding the incident. Specifically, the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau released a statement saying Canadians were ‘deeply disturbed by the violence that unfolded’, violence he stated that was incited by the president. Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom emphasised that it is ‘vital that there should be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power’.

The United States, the supposed beacon of democracy, the ‘shining city on a hill’ and self-proclaimed ‘leader’ of the free world, largely failed at upholding their promise and self-avowed values.

Trump’s legacy will be one of immeasurable division, an explicit rejection of democratic values and practices, and the denial of rudimentary facts. Unfortunately, these systemic issues will not simply vanish after his term expires on January 20^th. Over the next four years, therefore, Biden must work closely with his cabinet, the Congress, Governors, and citizens across the country to undo the unprecedented division, mistrust, and right wing radicalization that Trump has sown and restore unity and trust in democratic institutions and traditions.

The challenge before President-Elect Biden is daunting. He inherits a highly divided country where one side believes he was democratically elected and the other side believes that he is the beneficiary of a stolen election. Finding a way to bridge that divide and heal the wounds created over the past four years will dictate the trajectory and prosperity of the United States and its place in the world for years to come.

Owen is an MA student in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He has taken advanced courses on U.S. Foreign Policy with Professors David Haglund and Joel Sokolsky during his time in Political Studies at Queen’s.

The Growing Threat of Armed Banditry in North-West Nigeria

January 8, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Adedeji Ademola

Nigerian authorities had earlier in April this year, deployed special forces in the country’s northwest to combat kidnappers and bandits. Source: Reuters Archive

For some time now, Nigeria has been a hotbed of conflicts. Apart from the perennial conflict between the farmers and herdsmen, there are other notable security challenges, which includes the activities of the Biafra separatists, militant Islamists in the North-East, kidnappings in many parts of the country, the Niger Delta imbroglio, and so on. However, the Boko Haram group remains arguably Nigeria’s biggest security threat. The group poses a significant threat to neighboring countries as well, especially Cameroon, Niger, and Chad resulting in grave economic, social, and humanitarian consequences. For example, the group recently gruesomely executed 40 rice farmers in Jere Local Government area of Borno State, Nigeria. The United Nations had claimed that the number of deaths were far more than reported.[1] But while the group is making lives unbearable for the people living in Northeast Nigeria, another organised group referred to as the armed bandits are increasingly making lives difficult for the people living in the Northwest area of Nigeria. Life is no longer sacred in these parts of the country and the overall impact will certainly last for generations. Government is clearly overwhelmed and the citizens helpless. It is therefore expedient to examine the dynamics of this recent surge in armed banditry, the challenges inhibiting the fight against banditry and how to prevent the total shutdown of the country by bandits and insurgents alike. But first, who are these bandits?

Banditry violence is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The history of banditry in Nigeria can be traced to pre-civil war period when government deteriorated in certain parts of the old Western region resulting in political violence, crime and organised insurgency.[2] Accordingly, during the civilian reign, local bandits were reportedly stealing domestic animals. [3] Recently, in the Northwest area of Nigeria particularly in Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Niger, Kaduna and Kebbi States, the activities of Bandits have been particularly worrisome. The activities of these bandits’ ranges from kidnapping to murder, robbery, rape, cattle-rustling, and the likes. Their modus operandi involves maiming and killing their victims when they least expect. Usually, they mobilized themselves through the forests into the neighborhood riding on fast motorcycles especially in the nights and shoot at will. Sometimes in the afternoon, once they were sure there were no security presence of the police or military around, they unleash terror in the communities. This growing threat is claiming victims in hundreds. Several children have been orphaned and women became widows overnight while the issue of food security as well as humanitarian tragedy will further make life unbearable for many Nigerians.

The facts are scary. While about “1,100 people were murdered in 2018 in the six states of North west Nigeria in 2018, over 2,200 were killed in 2019 and 1,600 killed between January and June 2020”. [4] About 247,000 people had been displaced while their activities alone have led to the production of more than 41,000 refugees. [5] In Zamfara alone, over 8000 people have been murdered in the last decade, 200,000 displaced internally and others fleeing to neighbouring states. [6] The situation is so porous already that the religious leader and Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa ad Abubakar opined that “Bandits now move in the North from house to house with AK47 and lamented that the region had become the worst place to live in Nigeria…”[7]In Sokoto, more than 250 people have been killed in about 20 attacks, [8] just to mention but few.

It is important to note that the newest Northwest conflict started because of fight over depleting lands and water resources between the farmers and the herdsmen with the farmers belonging mostly to the Hausa people and the herdsmen being predominantly Fulani.[9] As a consequence, there has been massive deforestation because of the impact of the Sahara Desert spreading south. [10]

Also, in an area where poverty is deeply rooted and illiteracy extremely high, rearing cattle is the preoccupation of many Fulani’. Thus, whenever this source of livelihood is threatened, whether by nature or human intervention, they are willing to do anything to survive. In addition, there is the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area, inequality and as John Campbell puts it, “weakened, stretched and demoralized security services.[11] There are also problems of failure of local justice and ethnic division [12] as well as uncoordinated and under policed borders. Indeed, in recent history, banditry also became the order of the day because of government’s inability to protect lives and property as well as failure to put the welfare of the people first.

Government has responded at both state and federal level. The initial reaction was the bombardments of the various abodes of the bandits by the military and police under different code names, but this did not yield much significant result.[13] The state governments have also tried to negotiate and give amnesty to repentant bandits. While this initially worked, the result did not last.[14]

There are salient reasons why government interventions are not yielding fruit till date. A major factor is the topography of the area. The terrain is such that security presence is virtually unavailable for most people in the area particularly, those living in remote areas. It takes hours sometimes for security personnel to respond to distress calls of victims.[15] This is further propelled by the massive forests surrounding the areas which is shielding the bandits from being easily captured especially as they make use of forests such as the Falgore, Kamara, Kunduma, Subudu, Kamuku and Kiyanbana forests.[16] This makes it difficult for the military to secure the lives and property of the people residing in the areas especially without modern technology systems. So, what is the way forward?

The Nigerian government has complained about not having adequate modern equipment to give to her security personnel to work and had appealed to the international community to help in this regard. Fighting terrorism or banditry is not a tea party. Government must be proactive and partner with affected communities to bring a lasting solution to it. How do these bandits’ source for guns and tools to fight with? Where are they hiding? How do they access finance? Do they have records that can be accessed? Is it possible to trace their roots and linkage? How can information leakage among security personnel’s or civilians partnering with them be reduced? Answers to these questions will show that the threats of bandits can be reduced if not nullified.

Civil-military cooperation is a necessity and infrastructural development is a must even to rural dwellers as well as access to communication, police presence and protection. Not only these, the vigilantes that have been formed in the various communities in the north to combat the activities of these bandits must also be professionally trained and well organised by the government to work better and aid their communities. Movement of small arms and light ammunitions through the porous borders must be checked in cooperation with other countries in the region but ultimately, poverty must be drastically reduced, and providing good education to all citizens must become the priority of the government.

Endnotes

[1] The Punch, “Anger spreads as UN says 110 Borno farmers killed”, 30 November 2020.

[2] Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, (December 27, 2018, “Banditry in Nigeria: A brief history of a long war”, The Punch.

[3] Mustapha Umar Nadama, (2019) Armed banditry and Internal security in Zamfara State”, International Journal of Scientific and Engineering research, 10 (8) : 1220.

[4] “Banditry violence and displacement in the Northwest”, (2020), retrieved from https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200723_acaps_short_note_northwest_banditry_crisis_nwbc_nigeria.pdf 30/11/2020

[5] Ibid.

[6] International Crisis Group Report (2020), “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem”, 288:3.

[7] Onyebuchi Ezigbo (2020), “Bandits now move in the north from house to house with AK47”, ThisDayLive, retrieved from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/11/26/bandits-now-move-in-the-north-from-house-to-house-with-ak47-says-sultan, 11/26/2020

[8] Rakiya A. Mohammed (2020), “Sokoto: Over 250 persons killed in 20 Deadly attacks’, Daily Trust, retrieved from https://dailytrust.com/how-bandits-killed-over-70-in-sokoto

[9] International Crisis Group Report (2020), “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem”, 288:3.

[10] Nduka Orjiinmo, (2020), “Katsina: The motorcycle bandits terrorizing northern Nigeria”, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53009704 11/26/2020

[11] John Campbell, “Not all violent problems require violent solutions: Banditry in Nigeria’s North-West, retrieved at https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-all-violent-problems-require-violent-solutions-banditry-nigerias-north-west 11/26/2020

[12] Emmanuel Akinwotu, (2020) “Waves of bandit massacres rupture rural life in northwest Nigeria”, The Guardian retrieved from https://theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/waves-of-bandit-massacres-rupture-rural-life-in-north-west-nigeria 11/26/2020

[13] John Campbell (2020), “Not all Violent Problems Require Violent Solutions: Banditry in Nigeria’s North-West, retrieved from cfr.org/blog/not-all-violent-problems-require-violent-solutions-banditry-nigerias-north-west, 5/12/2020

[14] The Premium Times (2019), “Northwest governors grant amnesty to ‘bandits’, herders”, retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/344330-north-west-governors-grant-amnesty-to-bandits-gerders.html

[15] International Crisis Group Report (2017), “Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly Conflict”, 252

[16] WANEP (2020) “Addressing Armed Banditry in the North West Region of Nigeria: Exploring the potentials of a Multi-Dimensional Conflict Management Approach”, 5.

Adedeji Ademola is an external representative for Strife Blog and a doctoral student at the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His main research interests include international relations, security, governance and development issues in West Africa, civilian casualties, and counterinsurgency.

The Arms Trade Treaty & Gender-Based Violence: Challenges Require Data & Willpower

January 7, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Hannah Papachristidis,

‘Non-Violence’ also known as ‘The Knotted Gun’, bronze sculpture by Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd, 1985. (Source: https://untappedcities.com/2020/05/15/art-while-you-walk-in-the-sculpture-gardens-in-nyc/10/ )

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the first global arms control instrument to acknowledge, and create obligations around, the connection between international arms transfers and gender-based violence (GBV). The treaty’s adoption in 2013 followed over a decade of campaign work led by Oxfam, Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which galvanised international popular support for the instrument as well as political engagement. Within this international campaign was a focus on the inclusion of references to the link between GBV and the arms trade by a group of civil society organisations, including Reaching Critical Will (the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom), IANSA and Amnesty International.

The ATT is the first arms control agreement that centres around humanitarian concerns and is notable for introducing the notion of responsibility on the part of exporting states. It obliges states to assess whether there is an overriding risk that the export of arms to another country will be used for, or to commit, violations of international humanitarian law or of the Geneva Convention. With regards to GBV, the treaty obliges state parties to assess whether items exported would contribute to or facilitate acts of GBV. It is the only human rights infringement which is addressed through a standalone article.

Acts of GBV take place in both conflict and non-conflict contexts, in both domestic and public spaces. Conventional weapons can, and are regularly, used to inflict discriminatory violence based on a person’s gender. Moreover, the trade, possession and use of arms have specific gender and power dimensions. The link between the arms trade and gender-based violence, therefore, is one which interrogates power relations and social norms. Article 7 of the treaty addresses the obligations of party states with regards to permitted exports and within this article, part (4) states:

The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

States are therefore mandated to undertake a gender-sensitive risk assessment of all potential exports. In order to produce an effective risk assessment, states need a comprehensive understanding of gender relations in the importing country and the implications for the risk of GBV, as well as data on the occurrences of GBV by the end-user.

It is widely recognised that data on violence against women and gender-based violence is significantly underreported and likely to be unreliable. Levels of reporting are impacted by stigmas surrounding this type of violence and power imbalances in society that create barriers to reporting. According to UN Women, less than forty per cent of women who experience violence seek help of any sort and, of those seeking help, less than ten per cent appealed to the police. Where data relating to gender-based violence is collected, it is further complicated by the issue that there is no universally accepted definition of GBV, meaning that countries collect different data on aspects of the violence. The lack of standardisation in data collection, therefore, means comparisons and global trends are hard to infer. Finally, data relating to how different categories and types of arms and arms users facilitate GBV are even more rare.

The challenges surrounding assessing the risk of GBV for arms exports are widely recognised by the international community. A paper presented by Ireland to the 2017 Conference of State Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (CSP), lambasted Article 7(4) for being ‘overly broad, unenforceable and unverifiable’. In 2019, the theme of the CSP5 was gender and arms-related gender-based violence. The CSP5 President’s working paper outlined issues around implementing GBV risk assessments including the vague language in Article 7(4) and the importance of sharing national practices with regards to undertaking this risk assessment. The ATT Monitor report reflecting on CSP5 emphasised again the “uneven understanding among States Parties of what constitutes or facilitates an act of GBV, the ways in which the ATT addresses GBV and how GBV can be incorporated into Articles 6 and 7 risk assessment obligations”. Whilst the ATT may have been groundbreaking for its references to GBV, it is clear now that this obligation should have been more specifically defined such to allow for uniform implementation.

The organisations which campaigned for the inclusion of GBV obligations in the ATT have moved to take on an active role monitoring the implementation of these obligations. In particular, many of these organisations have reflected on these challenges and have produced resources and guidelines on best practice for implementation. Reaching Critical Will, for example, has published a range of resources on the effective implementation of GBV obligations. Many of these have a strong focus on the need for more comprehensive data collection and sharing practices. Their 2016 report revealed that no country explicitly includes GBV in their end-user documentation and most countries rely on human rights reports rather than specific assessments of GBV. As such, there is often little evidence of the link between arms transfers and GBV because the data used does not interrogate the occurrence of systemic gender-based violence by the end-user. The report provides guidelines for export officials, including examples of how arms facilitate GBV and indicators of GBV that could be used for a risk assessment.

A similar ‘practical guidance’ report was published by Control Arms, which outlines a four-stage approach to incorporating GBV into export assessments. Their report also outlines an extensive library of information sources and datasets corresponding to indicators relating to the prevalence of GBV and state commitments. As with the RCW report, this report is written to provide export officials “with a framework within which to systematically consider GBV in export assessments”. These two reports provide foundational knowledge for states which do not have existing expertise on GBV risk assessments and go some way to cement understanding on the link between GBV and arms transfers.

A recent report by Greenpeace focused specifically on Germany’s arms exports and gender-based violence. The report emphasises the importance of gender-sensitive human rights assessments rather than a general human rights focus and the need for the German government to include a specific criterion relating to the risk of GBV in its risk assessment as well as to improve internal training on the relation of GBV to arms transfers. Greenpeace draws upon research by both RCW and Control Arms to present cases of ‘best practice’, which include Latvia’s questionnaire on the prevalence of GBV in the recipient country and the UK’s updated licensing criteria legislation which includes reference to the risk of GBV.

As Control Arms, Greenpeace and RCW highlight in their publications, gender-based violence is systematically under-reported. In terms of data collection, it is a hidden violence. Consequently, it is not enough to rely on a gender-neutral human rights assessment to assess the risk of GBV within the export of arms. That GBV is the only human rights concern to be addressed with a standalone article in the ATT, highlights the need for governments to specifically focus on overcoming tendencies to overlook GBV. Despite elevation within the treaty however, this need is hindered by the vague language of Article 7(4) and the lack of an agreed definition of GBV weakens systematic global monitoring.

For civil society and advocates of the treaty, the ATT has been disappointing. The UK’s continued exports of weapons to Saudi Arabia for use in the Yemen war, in the face of clear evidence that the Saudi-led coalition continues to target civilians and violates international humanitarian law, has been a significant failure for the ATT’s progress. With implementation of the most basic export assessments failing as in the case of the UK, it can be easy to disregard the importance of other components of the treaty. Perhaps, however, if there was a more comprehensive evidence base and a strong practice of collecting gender-disaggregated data, the clear evidence of the importance of GBV to arms transfers would be more difficult to ignore.

The international civil society has created a wealth of resources addressing the implementation of obligations around gender-based violence in arms transfers. Although the challenges are significant and will take time to surmount, it is critical that states step up, heed the guidance presented to them, invest in gender-specific expertise, and take their responsibilities seriously.

Hannah Papachristidis is a project officer at Transparency International Defence & Security, where she manages research outputs for the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index. She holds an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University and is an Emerging Expert at Forum on the Arms Trade.

Peace in the time of Pandemic

January 6, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Constance Wilhelm

While the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected professional and personal travel plans across the world, what happens when these plans can have a direct impact on cessation of hostilities in a conflict zone? What happens when a state or group may have an interest in allowing – or denying – individual travel in order to further their political aims?

Taking into consideration the current Afghan Peace Talks[1], as well as the ongoing political negotiations in Yemen, this article outlines how the pandemic has a potentially far-reaching impact on humanitarian assistance operations in conflict zones, and more broadly on peace.

Operational Environment

The pandemic has severely impacted the ability of aid actors to deliver assistance, including in countries facing enormous need. Beyond peace negotiations, humanitarian and development operations are also critical to providing security and opportunity to citizens in conflict zones. In Yemen, COVID-19 is yet another health challenge to a population already battling hunger, medicine and vaccine shortages, and diseases that have been long eliminated in other countries[2], all within a struggling medical system.

Afghanistan faces similar issues, where health clinics are already inaccessible for many citizens, especially women, and where scepticism concerning the virus further complicates limited medical capacity to treat it. At the same time, COVID-19 has not forced a break in fighting in the lead-up to the peace negotiations discussed below, with clear Taliban resistance to ceasefire attempts or a UN call for a humanitarian pause.

How does this affect peace and stability? While aid agencies struggle with their own operational limitations, they also operate in countries where they may not be popular with both governments and armed groups due to perceived ties with Western powers, and where securing access may already be a challenge. The pandemic is being wielded as an excuse to further deny access, travel, and movement to aid workers in areas where assistance is greatly needed. As such, this pandemic could deepen humanitarian crises, and threaten greater instability. This has been seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, but also in parts of Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere. In Yemen in particular, Houthis have used the pandemic to not only restrict access to the country, but also to exert greater control on needs assessments, aid distributions, and any potential involvement of international actors in political process[3], all by holding a firm grip on permitted operations. These limitations can threaten the fair distribution of aid to the most vulnerable.

Beyond access under COVID-19, aid agencies also face a great challenge to their duty of care and best use of their resources. They must determine how much risk they are willing to take in sending their staff to field sites potentially exposed to conflict as well as severe health issues, possibly requiring medical evacuation. While organisations improve their understanding of the degree of risk posed by the pandemic to staff health and movements, many UN agencies and other NGOs[4] have responded with variations on a reduced footprint. Some are keeping staff in compounds (creating its own risk for staff due to the impossibility of social distancing) rather than sending them to more remote field sites. As familiarity with pandemic realities have increased and additional medical resources have been mobilized to treat sick staff, operational capacity has also increased – but humanitarians can still be denied access to their areas of intervention, with the perfect justification: it is for their own safety.

Pandemic Peace talks – Strategy and Logistics

This unique opportunity for affecting operational contexts neatly extends to peace talks, as the challenging logistics of bringing together warring sides to negotiate settlements in a third host country are intensified under pandemic conditions. In September 2020, discussions between Houthis and the Yemeni government over the release of Houthi prisoners moved forward in Switzerland. The Houthi and Yemeni delegations utilized UN Special Envoy planes departing from Saudi-controlled airspace to reach Switzerland and secured exceptions for diplomatic travel when no other movement was permitted, even as the Houthis themselves closed airports in Yemen and restricted movement for aid actors – including UN agencies. The Swiss government worked around national pandemic restrictions to allow representatives to speak directly to one another and to maintain their negotiations schedule.

The ongoing Afghan Peace Talks in Doha have been similarly impacted by logistical issues, with strategic implications. Under normal conditions, countries compete to host peace negotiations to protect their interests, ensure they are part of the conversation, and bolster their reputations as key geopolitical players. This confluence of actors and interests can pressure a negotiation and complicate participants’ calculations. However, during the pandemic, countries that might typically host peace negotiations become more focused on their urgent domestic needs and give less attention and resources to peace delegates. Where many great powers and actors may have competed to hold the Afghan talks prior to the pandemic, fewer countries are currently willing to assume the risk of hosting such an event. As such, the pandemic favours wealthy, autocratic systems such as Qatar’s that do not have to justify their decisions and risk-taking to their public. Also, a second round of talks is unlikely due to these logistical concerns[5], so Qatar’s willingness to host prolonged talks amid few alternative options creates pressure to conclude discussions during this round.

Qatar’s hosting has additional advantages: a strong Qatari national health authority able to handle testing and tracing, combined with the ability to indefinitely block off a 5-star hotel for talks, to mobilize private jets for transport, and to offer luxury accommodations for Taliban representatives and their families, all as representatives arrive from high-risk countries and are granted entrance health waivers for indefinite stays. This pandemic then serves Doha’s goals: they are at the centre of peace talks, ensuring international – including American – support despite being in a hostile neighbourhood. Senior diplomats leverage personal relationships with Qatari officials to get clearance to enter, while others less favoured find that their travel has ‘accidentally’ not been cleared. While externally entrenching their centrality to the negotiations, internally Qatari actors are also using their roles to leveraging power against one another. At the same time, Doha is a relatively less experienced host[6], which has opened the way for interested third parties to establish strong support groups and facilitate consultative, collaborative assistance to the talks to protect their interests.

Actors at the margins also lose; with COVID-19 travel restrictions in place, meetings on the margins – for example, side events on gender, minority rights and protections – are less likely to happen. Participation of civil society in peace talks becomes more tenuous, and inclusive representation at peace negotiations, which are already often seen as elite-driven or elite-bargaining processes, also suffer. When citizens do not have the opportunity to directly challenge leadership, it becomes more difficult to ensure that a range of views are accounted for in a potential settlement. In Doha, conference organizers fought to secure access for 30 Afghan journalists to attend the opening ceremony of the talks, allowing for some interaction between national press and the Taliban. This benefits the overall objective of the talks – with fewer sideline attractions, attention can be focused on the single outcome of reaching agreement – but inclusivity can suffer.

Another key difference in the current climate is that peace negotiations are commonly preceded by (secret) pre-negotiation discussions where key agenda items, red lines, and starting positions can be clarified on both sides. These have the advantage of accelerating formal talks once they begin but can also create tension should personalities or political positions combust from the start. Partly due to the pandemic, parties have arrived at the Afghan talks without pre-existing personal relationships, resulting in increased caution on both sides when interacting with one another, but also creating an opportunity to focus discussions free from personal distractions.

While it is too early to make comprehensive conclusions, the COVID-19 pandemic directly affects peace. It is being used as a justification to exert greater control over humanitarian activities in fractious contexts, further complicating operations in already difficult environments. The direction and execution of peace talks are being similarly constrained, resulting both in more concentrated but also less inclusive events. Whether these factors will increase chances for resolution remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that lessons drawn from this unique time can offer insights to practitioners once the post-pandemic chapter begins.

[1] Formally, the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks.

[2] Such diseases include measles, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio.

[3] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, Yemen, 11 November 2020.

[4] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, 11 November 2020.

Interview with NGO worker, Afghanistan, 15 November 2020.

[5] Six months ago, at least 4 rounds of talks in Qatar, Germany, Norway, and Uzbekistan were envisioned, with all but Doha ultimately being scrapped.

[6] Capacity to properly address protocol and logistics are also a concern, for example with Doha releasing press statements concerning the talks without first clearing them on both sides, or releasing invitations and agendas to participants that are only available in Arabic (Dari and Pashto being the official languages of Afghanistan).

Constance Wilhelm is a Senior Editor for the Strife Journal, and a doctoral researcher with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she focuses on approaches to the return and prosecution of the European women that have joined Daesh. She is also an experienced researcher and Public and Humanitarian Policy consultant, specialising in conflict-affected areas and fragile states. She has worked with think tanks at Princeton University and New York University, with the Afghan Mission to the UN in New York, the OECD in Paris, humanitarian and international development organisations and consulting firms in Lebanon (leading teams in Syria), in Jordan (leading teams in Yemen), in Afghanistan, in Libya, as well as across both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel-Lake Chad region. Constance has an MA in Conflict Management and International Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA from McGill University.