Blog Article

From Syria to Sochi: The increasing role of women in terrorism

January 31, 2014 by Strife Staff

As the opening ceremony to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi quickly approaches, the security of both athletes and attendees remain at the forefront of international scrutiny in the wake of three recent bombings which killed 37 people.

Last weekend in Geneva, peace talks began in an attempt to negotiate an end to the three-year Syrian civil war that has culminated in a humanitarian disaster which has left over 130,000 dead.

What these two seemingly unconnected events have in common is the recent prominence of women, specifically in carrying out or supporting activities, related to terrorism. Examining the roles that women are taking in Syria and Sochi provides two unique and independent case studies that broaden the investigation of the positions that women are taking up in connection to terrorism, and how this is playing out in wider prevention and response.

In Russia, following three separate bombings in the town of Volgograd since October 21, 2013, information has started to surface on those responsible for the attacks and their motivations. The suicide bombers referred to as black widows, or shahidka’s, have seemingly returned. A female was cited as the perpetrator in the October attack on a public bus, and though reports released January 30, 2014 indicated it was two males that carried out the two subsequent attacks on a public trolley bus and train station, women were initially suspected in these cases. Police are also distributing posters seeking three other women at large in Sochi who were trained to ‘perpetrate acts of terrorism’.

Active in Russia since 2000, these largely Chechan and Dagestani female suicide bombers have been responsible for a significant portion of attacks in the Northern Caucasus since. A 2013 article by The Daily Beast stated that 46 women over the last 12 years have been involved in suicide attacks in the region. While fundamentalist Islamic motivations are often publicly cited, other sources point to independence aspirations, personal traumas, or revenge of the deaths of their sons, brothers or husbands and even romanticising love with ‘Islamic warriors’.

In the British media, over the last week there have been two separate cases involving a total of four female individuals detained en route to Syria. Two women aged 26 and 27 were charged with making funds available to terrorism after being caught with €20,000 cash, trying to leave Heathrow airport travelling to Turkey. Perhaps more shockingly, two girls aged 17 who were allegedly ‘inspired by jihad’ were also intercepted boarding a plane to Syria in a separate case. Recent reports have also indicated that there are growing numbers of women who are seeking al-Qaeda fighter husbands amongst British men in Syria.

While there are distinctly different roles presented here, that of suicide bomber, financier, jihadist fighter and potential wife, what this does point to is increasingly visible and potentially diversifying functions of women in terrorist organisations.

There are three key areas of particular concern when assessing gender in terrorism: actions, motivations and approach. While these areas certainly affect both men and women, it is worthwhile to ask if, and how, they may differ in their responses.

Do the actions of these women differentiate them from their male counterparts in terms of tactics, or ease with which they are able to carry out their activities? For example, are women screened less when travelling abroad and targeted by groups for these actions? What are the motivating factors that drive these women to become supportive of, attracted to, or involved in terrorist activities? How are these factors differentiated by their sex, age, life events or other factors? How do you effectively deter and prevent engagement in these illicit activities when trauma or romanticising of fighters is involved? Do we understand the social constructions and contexts associated with one’s gender and how these may cause one individual to act differently than another?

It is far beyond the scope of this article to ‘genderise’ how we approach security, nor is it the intent. It would, however, be apt to note the traditional descriptions of security, and arguably more specifically counterterrorism, are largely dominated by traits often viewed as masculine. Strength, heroism, bravery and protection are words that would comfortably fit into everyday public narratives which surround security. This then begs the question: have traits or actions associated with femininity yet had their due examination in the security sector which these cases have highlighted? This consideration should be used to call attention to gendered aspects of security, rather than challenge how security is structured more broadly.

We should use these two recent examples from Sochi and Syria to examine the robustness and depth of our understanding of, and approach to, security and specifically its impact on preventing terrorism. How and why terrorism appeals to different groups has critical implications to the prevention and deterrence of future participation, as well as extensions to the judicial framework and policy practice in place to manage them. If women are being left out of the wider security scope, this would, I suggest, require us to question just how comprehensive our approach to security is, and who or what else is being overlooked. This may also have critical, wider impacts on how our security approaches discriminate against, alienate or even harm, those it may be seeking to protect.

If we want to ensure that the most pressing security concerns of our day are met with comprehensive, thoughtful and, most importantly, preventative approaches which do not perpetuate situations which may encourage further acts, we need to take a closer look at how terrorism is perceived by and reacted to all groups, including women.

Joana Cook is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London researching the role and agency of women in counter-terrorism in Yemen. She is also a researcher at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook

CSD2014 Conference ‘Organised Crime in Conflict Zones’

January 30, 2014 by Strife Staff

CSD2014 Conference ‘Organised Crime in Conflict Zones’

The CSD2014 Conference ‘Organised Crime in Conflict Zones’ will take place on the 6th of March, 2014. Organised by postgraduate students from the Conflict, Security and Development (CSD) programme at King’s College London (KCL) and supported by the War Studies Department, the conference will be held at the Great Hall of the Strand Campus.

The one-day event will focus on transnational organised crime, a multi-billion pound global business and an area of growing international concern. The programme will address the conflict-crime nexus and focus on three key areas of organised crime. These are drug trafficking, terrorist criminality and human trafficking. The conference objective is to address gaps in policy and scholarship, and to encourage research into this subject of growing relevance.

The event will benefit from contributions of leading policymakers, practitioners and academics in the field. Confirmed speakers include:

Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and Chairman of the World Economic Forum’s Committee on Terrorism.

Lynellyn D. Long, Chair of Trustees at ‘Her Equality, Rights and Autonomy’ (HERA) – Women Entrepreneurs Against Trafficking and former Chief of Mission of the International Organisation for Migration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Charlie Edwards, Senior Research Fellow and Director of National Security and Resilience Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

Parosha Chandran, award-winning human rights barrister at 1 Pump Court Chambers in London and co-founder of the Trafficking Law and Policy Forum.

Lt. Gen. Jonathon Riley, former honorary Colonel of the Royal Welch Fusiliers and visiting professor at the War Studies Department of KCL. Lt. Gen. Riley commanded British peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq & Afghanistan and was Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (2007-2009).

The total of 14 speakers will address the root causes of organised crime, connections to conflict, strategic responses and forward-looking policy implications.

For more information on the conference and our speakers, please visit our website at: http://csd2014.wordpress.com/speakers-profiles/
Preferential rates are available for students, to purchase tickets please go to: http://estore.kcl.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=2&deptid=17&catid=16&prodid=318
For any queries please contact us at: csdc.kcl@gmail.com

We hope that you are able to join us at the Great Hall and be part of this exciting new venture.

Yours faithfully,

CSD2014 Organising Committee
CSD2014 Blog, Facebook, Twitter

The face of ‘the Other’: A visual reflection on moral obligation in the 21st century

January 28, 2014 by Strife Staff

Photography by Tom Bradley [*]
Introduction by Alister Wedderburn

* * *

For Emmanuel Levinas, the foundation of the ethical relation is what he calls ‘the face of the Other’. The face presumes a moral obligation to others, because it establishes a recognisable and mutual humanity that makes concrete one’s ethical obligations and responsibilities: ‘…the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all’.[1]

The photography of Tom Bradley visualises Levinas’ theory. Bradley has travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, India, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and the United States of America in order to photograph sufferers of leprosy. The subjects of these photographs have faces that to us are doubly ‘Other’: firstly, because they are mostly from countries that we consider distant or alien, but also because of the social difficulties that their disease creates: these people are often outcasts, an ‘Other’ within an ‘Other’.

Bradley says his project ‘is a record for the future of the varied lives of people affected by leprosy now’ – but he also makes clear that this is not just a documentary project: ‘It is also a call for attention, perhaps even for change, to a disease that can be so destructive and damaging – mentally and socially as well as physically. Leprosy is a disease that has been curable for almost three decades, yet is still alive in the world today.’ The disease is considered officially ‘eliminated’ if fewer than 1 in 10,000 people have it, but in a country the size of India – which declared leprosy ‘eliminated’ in 2005 – this still means up to 120,000 cases.

Bradley’s photography is a powerful record of this often-hidden, often-forgotten, often-stigmatised disease and the people who suffer from it. But it is worth looking at his photographs with Levinas’ ethical vision in mind. The fact that we are looking upon an image of a face rather than a face in the flesh is irrelevant – for Levinas, while responsibility is reciprocal between the connected or facing parties, this reciprocity is not interdependent. One’s own commitment towards the ‘Other’ is not contractual, is not contingent upon this ‘Other’ fulfilling his or her commitment towards oneself: ‘Reciprocity is his affair’.[2] This obligation must therefore be enacted unilaterally: ‘Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse’.[3] Looking at Bradley’s work will raise personal questions about the extent to which such responsibility is incumbent upon us, in the cosseted comfort of our internet connections – and how, by extension, we are to acknowledge it.

Tom Bradley will be travelling to Amman in the coming weeks to document Syrian-Jordanian relations. A selection of the resulting photographs will be published in Strife in February.

This member of the Association has damaged fingers and toes. He’s also a very hard-working carpenter. Here he has just finished sawing wood to make a wardrobe that will be sold in town. Adzope, Ivory Coast, 2012

John Annan (background) sits with another patient in the male ward. Some of the patients, like John, have had leprosy for many years, while others have been diagnosed recently. All are apprehensive about the future. Ankaful hospital, Ghana, 2012

Konan Josephine receives some care from Ouattara, one of Manikro’s voluntary health agents. Manikro, Ivory Coast, 2012

Mr Hope, the town chief, wheels himself in to get his dressings changed. Ganta, Liberia, 2012

John Enu used to be a shoemaker at the hospital. He got paid very little and retired with no pension. He relies heavily on help from the sisters at Ahotokurom. He makes some money by brewing herbal concoctions. Enyindakurom, Ghana, 2012

Pierre, one of the voluntary ‘health agents’ looks at Kouakou Hare crawling into the clinic. Kouakou was begging in Bouake during the war and returned to find the hospital gutted. Manikro, Ivory Coast, 2012

Konah, a former leprosy patient, is an expert craftsman despite having no fingers left. Ganta, Liberia, 2012

Patient during morning dressing changes. Karigiri, India, 2012

The same patient’s foot. Doctors later decided that the infection had spread too far and gone too and amputated the following week. Karigiri, India, 2012

Til Kumari, a resident of Khokana. He is blind, with no fingers or toes. He gets a stipend of around $5 worth a month to live off, his only income. Khokana, Nepal, 2009

A patient at the National Hansen’s Disease Centre in Louisiana. He is originally from the San Francisco Bay Area. He didn’t want to be identified. Baton Rouge, United States, 2012
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NOTES
[*] http://www.isleprosyeliminated.com.
[1] Levinas, E. (1985): Ethics And Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press), pp. 87-9.
[2] Levinas (1985), p. 98.
[3] Levinas (1985), p. 101.

‘The era of saving failed states is over’: The Afghan withdrawal and its regional implications, with special focus on Pakistan

January 24, 2014 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

Speaking at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) on Friday 17 January 2014, Ahmed Rashid, journalist and author of Taliban, Descent into Chaos, and most recently, Pakistan on the Brink, confidently asserted that the West will no longer be a major stakeholder in the Afghan region as ‘the era of saving failed states is over’. According to Rashid, all regional players must accept this and take responsibility instead of ‘weeping tears’ of betrayal or abandonment.

Another era of transitions

Rashid, addressing a gathering on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and its regional implications, argued that although the military transition in Afghanistan has been the primary focus of the West, it is the political and economic transitions that are more relevant in the short-term. He noted that the coming elections must give credibility to the next president (sans rigging); without a legitimate government, there may never be a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan between the government and the Taliban. This settlement, Rashid believes, will be the major deterrent to a multi-faceted civil war.

‘The Taliban are ripe for a peace settlement. There is a lobby for it within the Afghan Taliban. They are fed up of fighting, or living in Pakistan. They are fed up with al Qaeda. The older generation of Taliban understand that they cannot govern Afghanistan. [They] know that they are a basket case. Therefore, [they] need a peaceful power-sharing agreement.’

Just how supposed free-and-fair elections should take place during a ‘dodgy transition’ in a corrupt and battle-ridden country where everything is up for grabs is not a subject matter the speaker delved into.

Economically, Rashid reminds us, there has not been the creation of an indigenous economy, a reason that could deter the Taliban from taking over cities. ‘The Taliban are not in a position to take over cities. They need the cities for economic reasons. They will let the cities flourish and act sensibly.’ Rashid rejected the ‘Helmand paranoia in the UK’ (that the Taliban will re-enter their former provinces), arguing that it is only inevitable for them to return to their natural habitat.

‘Of course, they will come in. They come from Helmand; the population in Helmand is pro-Taliban; poppy production is allowed by the Taliban; and [their] families reside in Helmand too.’

‘A Pandora’s Box is about to be opened’

At the moment, Rashid believes, there is power equilibrium in the region as all stakeholders are taking a hands-off approach. Nevertheless, he warns us that should even one country interfere, it could disturb the delicate balance within the region. India and Pakistan are the most likely to play out their rivalries in Afghanistan; Iran does not want the Taliban coming into power, which could upset the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan dynamics in the country; Russia and Central Asian countries are equally nervous, having been left out of post-war negotiations. China appears to be uninterested in mediation, but is likely to step in for economic reasons once the conflict comes to an end.

In Rashid’s opinion, all regional players want stability in Kabul, especially Pakistan. ‘Backing Taliban for the second time will have a blowback in Pakistan’, he argued, as an insurgency across the border is likely to keep trickling into Islamabad’s territories. Because of this, current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has been working on bettering civil-military relations, as both organs of the state finally have a consensus for a peaceful resolution in Afghanistan.

For this, Pakistan (as well as the US) needs to speed up the facilitation of dialogue but efforts towards dialogue as part of the reconciliation have not been good, argued Ahmed Rashid. There appears to be a lack of clarity for Americans, Pakistanis, as well as Karzai.

‘More authoritarian regimes in [Islamic] states will emerge the West takes a hands off approach towards failed or failing states [and] if they don’t be careful with nation-building. Right now, the US do not have a clear agenda for the troops that are intended to remain in Afghanistan’.

A Pakistani official, who wishes to remain anonymous, addressed the Afghan question vis-a-vis Pakistan:

‘Pakistan has limited influence in Afghanistan. Pakistani army and the civilian government are on the same page. Pakistan does not have favourites in Afghanistan anymore [but] it does not want to abandon the Taliban [again]. But also, we don’t have Mullah Omar in our pocket.’

Much of Rashid’s analysis echoed that of other Pakistani analysts. Journalist Zahid Hussain, speaking at the London School of Economics in November 2013, rejected the theory that Islamabad has strategic depth in Afghanistan. Rather, Hussain claimed, it is the Afghan Taliban has that has strategic depth in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistani official quoted above and Ahmed Rashid both maintained that there is no longer a doctrine of strategic depth for the Pakistani army or state.

‘Fixing’ Afghanistan

Nevertheless, some of the arguments put forth by the speaker require further analysis. Rashid pointed that Afghanis have done nothing to fix themselves (‘What have Afghanis done to fix themselves? There is still intrinsic corruption – shameful!’), without clarifying how they should be expected to ‘fix themselves’. On elections, it seems that the speaker emphasised that the centre (Kabul) cannot hold unless the next government is legitimate. But can western-style, free-and-fair elections take place in Afghanistan, minus corruption and minus political agreements signed covertly?

Anatol Lieven, a professor at the Department of War Studies (King’s College London) writing for the New York Review of Books, has already pointed out that this view may be too idealistic.

‘The choice Afghanistan faces is not between some idealized version of Western democracy and a corrupt state; it is between a corrupt but more or less consensual Afghan state and the horrors of no state at all.’

Furthermore, Rashid highlighted the supposed desires of the Taliban to stop fighting and work towards improving their economic conditions. While it could be accepted that the insurgency may have reached exhaustion, to expect a group that is acknowledged historically as trained fighters, known to have battle in their blood and revenge in their code, to simply go home with weapons and work in the fields is unconvincing.

Lieven has also pointed out, like Ahmed Rashid, that there is no risk of the Taliban taking over Kabul, but, is less optimistic about how things may progress if the West disrupts its flow of cash.

‘US and international aid now account for around nine-tenths of the Afghan national budget… Today, we too have created an Afghan state and army that cannot survive without our help, and that will also disintegrate again into warlord anarchy if our help is withdrawn. The West has a deep moral and historical responsibility to make sure that this does not happen.’

Rashid also placed little emphasis on the Durand Line (the 2,640 kilometre border between Afghanistan and Pakistan): ‘It’s an issue, but I don’t think this is occupying people’s minds’. It is unclear why the question of the Durand Line has been sidelined, when it is still not recognised by the Afghan Taliban – and the Pakistani Taliban for that matter – who move freely between the porous territorial divisions. It also remains to be seen that, should there be a peace settlement with the Taliban, could it amount to the recognition of the Durand Line? If not, what is to stop the Pakistani Taliban from travelling across the Line, making Pakistani military efforts against its own militant groups in its tribal areas that much more futile? And without a clear understanding of how the Afghan Taliban seeks to deal with the Pakistan Taliban (and vice versa), can you reasonably expect all regional players to just sit tight?

_________________________
Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

From riots to vigil: The community, the police and Mark Duggan’s legacy

January 20, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Jill Russell

January 11^th’s vigil in Tottenham, a response to the findings in the Coroner’s Inquest that the shooting of Mark Duggan was lawful, was promised to be a peaceful though disappointed demonstration in response to the official findings.

I would go. It was a public order event to observe and in support of any work I find this eyes-on style offers more insights, views, knowledge and awareness than can be anticipated. Being directly related to my riots research my attendance was imperative. But not knowing how things would turn out on the day, I noted to a friend as I made my way to North London, it was either the best or the worst idea I could have had.

This the last in the series of thought pieces on my way to a historical treatment of the 2011 London riots, I have chosen the vigil as the moment to open the piece whose focus is the local Haringey and Greater London communities which identified with the personal tragedy of the Duggan family. More than an understanding of them as an independent subject in the story, adding the people and the rioters also has the effect of completing, if not perfectly, the picture of the event. Looking upon a complete, if abstracted, landscape one is compelled to consider such issues as the greater meaning of the events. For me, the most satisfying path forward leads to better policies and approaches, and so the final section of this piece dovetails into my thoughts on those.

As it turned out, returning to the vigil, although confronting contentious and difficult issues the event was mild, almost pleasant. Of course, as the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Haringey Police must have scrambled to prepare given the short notice, to complicate matters there was also a home football match scheduled for the day. Between both events, the surrounding area was awash in hi-viz yellow. At the vigil site outside the police station I would dare say that it felt as if there were as many if not more workers, observers, police, clergy and pastors, and members of the media than demonstrators. Above all, there was palpable in the atmosphere a commitment by all present to maintain as much geniality as was possible given the context.

Those identified as the street pastors stood out as an intellectually inspiring and engaging image. There not with a position on the vigil, it seemed their purpose was to provide a caring and sympathetic voice and ear to attendees who might be distressed. Their sweet countenances were an unexpected though much appreciated sight. In addition to other members of the clergy participating in the event itself, the senior chaplain to the MPS, the Reverend Jonathan Osborne, was there and by my observation his presence seemed to be for the police themselves. In all, the spiritual component had a positive influence upon the atmosphere.

A similarly important image was the demeanour of the police. Against the chants of “No Justice, No Peace” and those calling for an end to violence and injustice, the officers tasked with the public order function stood back and maintained a low-key presence. They strove quietly for the objective of facilitative, even in the face of anger towards them, and they succeeded. [1]

In all, it was a much more than simply the passage of time since when last these groups assembled outside the Tottenham police station.

Thus, the event, without the sturm und drang of violent chaos but nevertheless full with the pathos and problems expressed on those turbulent August nights, provides an apt vantage point from which to highlight what I have found to be important to consider about this side of the riots.

At the outset I should point out the certain limitations to sourcing for this side of the story. I have sought out what there is by way of published material, and hounded as well as many of those individuals willing to talk with me. Lacking hubris, I do not claim to fully know the this side of the story. But there are impressions which have emerged from the research.

Complicating any understanding, one must accept that there is no single identification or entity which represents the community or all of the rioters, even as my purview is limited to London. For example, while there are shared broad or meta motivations – anger with the police, despair over dismal future prospects, an overwhelming sense of unfairness in society, the hypocrisy within the economic landscape – the proximate initiative to act on those nights was nearly uniformly independent and hyper-local. [2] Such heterogeneity characterizes the actors at the granular level.

What does become apparent is that emerging from this mix was – and remains – a shared understanding of the Mark Duggan shooting, the immediate aftermath, the riots and the response. The direct anger with the police and the next layer of political authority is palpable. Said one rioter on one of the Guardian/LSE’s ‘Reading the Riots’ videos, ‘It was a war, and for the first time we was in control…we had the police scared.’ (@9:55m) But more, beneath, either because it is as yet unacknowledged or remains simply unspoken, is dissatisfaction with society at large for having forsaken them as well. The riots and attacks upon the city itself were seen by the participants as an act of revenge, whether for poor treatment at the hands of police or society.

Whereas the Guardian/LSE’s effort was of dispassionate outsiders looking in, Fahim Alam’s “Riots Reframed” documentary is the voice of the participant as creator of the narrative. Although much about the film and its contents is difficult to contend with – there is so much anger, disappointment and alienation – the fact of its creation is the embodiment of optimism.’Riots Reframed’ is a work of thoughtful art and discussion, including not only voices from the community, but respected scholars and leaders (to include KCL’s own Professor Paul Gilroy.) It is in fact an opening for dialogue, as its contents and existence must signal a fundamental hope that things can improve. At the very least, what becomes quite clear is that these were not mindless, thoughtless, merely criminal events. [3]

Thus, whether we can understand that side fully it still must be accepted that there was more meaning in the actions of the rioters and looters than mainstream commentary has been willing to admit. Even the ‘common looting‘.

Moving from the nature of the group to the events themselves there are points I have consistently found compelling throughout my research. The first concerns the diplomatic brinksmanship that occurred that fateful Saturday night in front of the Tottenham Police Station. On that first night, when anger and disorder erupted out of the frustrated demonstration, one must wonder what might have been spared had the family and the police representatives been able to find enough common ground to retire to the station for a cup of tea while they awaited the arrival of officers of sufficient rank for the family’s peace of mind. [4] I attach responsibility for this to those in a community leadership position. They did not serve the family or community well in their recommendations for a rigid stand not to engage that evening. I am not suggesting or asserting malice in this act. Rather, my point is to highlight the risks of such brinksmanship, as this case more than demonstrates the ramifications of failure.

From this perspective I have to believe that community leaders should follow the ethos set out for the police in public order, approaching their interactions in such events from the starting point of being a positive and productive force, of facilitation. And in that many of them have extant relationships with the police it becomes almost a duty for them to use their ‘good offices’ in such situations.

I make the point about this because, amidst the discourse on powerlessness in the community, it was on that night the Duggan family who held the strongest position. In that moment their satisfaction was vested with the interests (and hence power) of the entire community. Power can be used to crush your opponent or raise up all. Inadvertently the former occurred, but who would not have chosen the latter? Furthermore, by correctly framing the relationships in this case the police can understand better the (potential) nature of such situations.

Another key point relates to the depths of cynicism that taint perceptions of the police on that first night. The rumour that the police had beaten a young woman was believed and spread as the rallying cry for disorder and violence. Making the entire matter very compelling, there seemed to be direct proof, a video which captured the event. However, the “girl in the video” as the spark of events must be questioned and examined with a critical eye. All evidence seems to suggest that this was not appropriately a casus belli for the riots; it was more Gulf of Tonkin than Pearl Harbour. To begin, it is nearly impossible to see what is happening in the video – the viewer is moved more by the shouting female narrator than what is actually visible. As well, the timing is wrong: it is dark and the police are in full public order kit.[5] The disorder has thus already begun. I understand that a young female suffering police brutality has terrific cachet as a framework to justify the anger, but it is far better to render events accurately.

Finally and most importantly the influence of community sentiment must shape understanding and responses. The grievances of the immediate and greater London communities of concern here cannot be dismissed. The issues within the community, the added burdens of budget reductions and cuts to services, the brewing antipathy to how stop and search was conducted, were known to Boris Johnson and David Cameron. A strong response may have been the obvious answer, but the better one was for these leaders to recognize that party affiliation notwithstanding all members of society must be able to rely upon their government. Reasonable and fair are neither signs of weakness nor do they promote future bad action. [6]

What could the political leadership have done differently at the time? I think an amnesty was in order. This path, not harsh justice was the choice of greatest benefit to all. The repercussions of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Graibh are the lessons that matter here – don’t sully your own character, don’t create disaffected citizens. Boris could have pulled it off with a charming nod to the police effort – by containing the riots in the least confrontational, less aggressive approach (supported by the overall casualty statistics), the former served their public order function while setting the stage for healing and reconciliation in the aftermath.

I take the position that this was the best policy because the unavoidable truth made clear with ‘Reframed’ and other similar efforts is that the emotion and desires of the riots did not deserve incarceration.[7] In fact, too many of them need release from the prisons of poverty, maleducation, and un(der)-employment. Responding to the riots offered a powerful moment to act with generosity, so contrary to expectations that it would have had the capacity to achieve much progress against the issues. Great leaders seize such moments because they recognize this potential.

If we have dealt with the past and the present, what should be considered for the future? Returning to the opening scene and last Saturday’s vigil, for its public order efforts the MPS should take note of the result. A careful reckoning of what was done will serve future public order efforts well. Nevertheless, even an initial cursory review makes clear that their approach to the event and demeanour went a long way to maintaining as pleasant an atmosphere as possible.

The Street Pastors are a fantastic idea for public order and their future use should be considered. Not just for events with a religious facet, such as a vigil, this role could serve profitably across a much broader spectrum of public order activities. Protest is inspired by varying levels and forms of distress, and it seems to me that the pastoral function could serve quite well. More than that, the presence of the MPS senior chaplain suggests this resource has potential value for the police themselves in public order events. Certainly, when it is your function to stand amidst crowds at various moments of anger and emotion, at times directed at you specifically, a pastoral voice could serve as an influence of equanimity. And it bears considering whether such a presence, by humanizing the police might reduce tensions in public order events. Where NATO helmets and shields are seen as elements which can put negative distance between the police and protesters, it must be equally plausible that other visual cues can have beneficial effect.

On the broader issues of social justice, how does anything move forward from this moment, how will progress be pursued? Where the Coroner’s Inquest judged the shooting to have been lawful, that the officers honestly held belief stands, community dismay, especially locally, is understandable. Nevertheless, as difficult as it clearly must be, they will have to move to the more productive stance that even when things are done correctly tragedy and the wrong outcome can still occur. From there, the path forward is clearer, which is how to improve where that ‘honestly held belief’ lands with respect to members of the public (e.g., being able to know with reliability that Duggan was not the sort to resist in such a moment). What can the community do? What can the police do?

There are any number of tactical, doctrinal, strategic and policy recommendations I could make on the policing side of the issue of police and community relations. But if I understand the context, the environment, the tone of the situation correctly, no first move from the authorities will overcome scepticism. Yes, to any community initiated overtures it will be imperative for the police will have to respond well and with timeliness. But the first and critical barrier will only fall to action and intention from within the community.

Contrary to all that might seem fair or just, healing and progress on this will only come at the end of the community’s outstretched hand. Nobody can say that they want no policing, so improving the relationship between the police and those whom they serve is necessary. The community and its consent are critical elements in British policing generally, and in this instance specifically, and so any progress will come in large measure from that quarter. By their positive and constructive actions the members of the community can lead the way to the greatest change.

Some – OK, many – will decry this as unfair and question why it should be their burden to go first. In my mind I am chastised by one young Londoner in the documentaries who commented that the ‘police are not for us’. To that I will say that it is for you to make them yours. It is time to overturn the ‘culture of distrust’. Mentioned above, as on that first fatal night, it is a matter of which side holds the power. Here as well, it is the community which has the greater power in this matter. But furthermore, if this tragedy can have any meaning, wouldn’t its best be to serve as a bridge to a better state of relations between police and community so as to avoid such tragic errors in the future? More importantly, I return your attention to the vigil. The reasonable discourse on the issues between police and community opened on Tottenham High Road is an opportunity. This is a moment to act.

When you are shouting about undue police violence while standing amidst a smiling constables giving directions you have to ask whether it isn’t time to give at your own end as well.

Jill S. Russel is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently doctoral candidate at King’s College London looking at military history.

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NOTES:
[1] Commentators should stop using the ‘softly, softly’ description – it is snarky and derogatory of a stance that is not only necessary but often proven effective stance.
[2] Do I really need to acknowledge that there might have been a purely criminal element? But they were not the leaders, nor the inspiration, nor even likely the majority of those present on London’s streets those nights. It is obfuscation to lay the blame for this upon criminality – comfortable, perhaps, but not at all useful.
[3] Another documentary that I found interesting was ‘Perfect Storm’ to be found at http://wideshut.co.uk/perfect-storm-the-england-riots-documentary/ There are very many independent documentaries about the riots, some quite compelling others less so, some searching for a truth others attempting to build a narrative. What is clear is that these events have inspired very real urges to consider the events and create something by which to understand or explain it. It is clearly an important phenomenon.
[4] MPS, Four Days in August: Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011 – Final Report, p. 32 discusses the events surrounding Chief Inspector Adelekan’s efforts to engage the demonstrators.
[5] MPS, Four Days in August, p. 42, ‘By 2045hrs all the officers were deployed in full protective kit….’
[6] Before he made his fame as the father of modern British policing, Robert Peel was responsible for the rationalisation of the criminal law which, though aimed at its muddling nature, had the effect of making it more fair and defensible. Douglas Hurd, Robert Peel: A Biography, pp. 74 ff.

[7] There were clear dividing lines, thresholds below which it could be profitably argued taht emotion, not criminality, was at work.

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