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Order of Battle Analysis and Military Intelligence in the 1973 Yom Kippur War

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By Leonardo Palma

Israeli Tanks advancing during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/yom-kippur-war

The 1973 Yom Kippur War has been regarded by traditional historiography as an intelligence failure. Western intelligence services, as well as Israeli military intelligence, failed in anticipating President Anwar Sadat’s intentions, to the point that the war provoked the intervention of both the US and the USSR and the risk of a nuclear confrontation. However, declassified archive materials, interviews, and memoirs allow us to tell a different story: though it is true that the Israelis underestimated the Egyptians, the former had all the information they needed to anticipate the invasion. Western intelligence services correctly sensed Sadat’s intentions in waging war but failed to grasp Egypt’s military capabilities and misread the expulsion of Soviet advisors. The Italian foreign Intelligence Service (SID), however, communicated to its Israeli military counterpart (Aman) in 1971 how Egypt would attack. Thanks to intelligence gathered in Eastern Germany and a brilliant order of battle analysis of the Egyptian Army, the SID inferred that Sadat’s generals would intend to use a new concept of tactical movement tested by the Soviets to cope with Israel’s air superiority: the static coverage of the battlefield. After having examined British and American intelligence evaluations, misconceptions, and cognitive dissonance, this post will assess the Italian order of battle analysis, Egypt’s tactical concept, and the delicate balance between failure and success in military intelligence.

Foreseeing the War. Western Military Intelligence before October 1973

Between 1970 and 1973, military intelligence failure was not due to an inability to understand motivations and intentions, as previous historiography has argued, but rather capabilities. Sadat, facing domestic turmoil, low-popularity, and the risk of being overthrown, needed a limited military action to bolster his role as president. Moreover, he knew that it would not be possible to ensure the Israelis’ withdrawal from the Sinai without Soviet-US mediation. Therefore, in the second-half of 1973, Sadat sought a war that could allow him to reinvigorate Egyptian prestige by demonstrating its military prowess on the battlefield and the ability to negotiate from a renewed position of strength. In effect, it was necessary to prove that the Israeli invincibility was a false myth. While British and American intelligence analysts broadly understood that fact, they still failed when it came to judging Egypt’s ability to carry out such goals, and the result was the same as not having understood Sadat’s intentions in the first place – an erroneously reduced perception of threat. 

It happened because they could not distinguish the ʺsignalsʺ correctly (that is, Egypt’s true intentions and capabilities) from the ʺnoiseʺ (that is, the boisterous and frequently pompous political rhetoric emanating from the region). The British and the Americans rightly applied a cultural approach to their analysis, but the latter had a double-edged effect. At the same time, the ʺspecificity of Arab political culture were a major contributing factor to analytical strengths in reading Sadat’s intentions in 1973, yet similar cultural beliefs culminated in a fundamental misreading of Egypt’s military capabilitiesʺ. Western intelligence services, as well as their Israeli counterparts, believed that the Arabs were not good fighters and that even if rhetoric and intentions overlapped, capabilities were largely scarce. Further, they also misread the Soviet role in the crisis after Egypt expelled them in early 1972. As long as Soviet advisors were in Cairo, analysts consciously resisted the temptation to look at the USSR-Egypt relationship only through the prism of the Cold War; instead, they focused on regional dynamics. Ironically, as soon as the Soviets left, these analysts reversed to a more simplistic assessment of Egypt’s capabilities within a Cold War-framework, in which they lacked Soviet backing, In such an assessment, Egypt stood no chance of military success.

Whatever the reasons for failure, Richard Aldrich, a leading intelligence historian, concludes that the war “was not foreseen by any of the world’s major intelligence services”. We know now that that is not the case, since the Italian SID correctly predicted not only the war but even the tactical concept beneath the Egyptian army doctrine of operation.

The Italian Job. SID Order of Battle Analysis and Predictions

At the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to NATO intelligence-gathering network, the Italian SID acquired details about some Soviet military exercises in Eastern Germany. The 8th Guards Combined Arms Army was a Soviet elite unit comprised of mechanized and armoured divisions and deployed nearby the Fulda Gap. The latter had tested a new kind of anti-aircraft defence that Italian analysts had labelled as ʺstatic coverage of the battlefieldʺ. The Army moved at a slow pace, a few miles per day, which was nothing compared to the speed of the Nazi armoured divisions during the 1940 French Campaign. However, slowness was compensated by a five-layered anti-aircraft coverage: four SAM (Surface-to-Air) systems at various heights and one of mobile anti-aircraft artillery. This new approach to manoeuvre was a Soviet answer to the Western air-superiority in the European theatre.

Nonetheless, the Soviets had thousands of military advisors in Egypt and Syria, and Italian intelligence tracked the shipment to Cairo of several SAM-1, SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Admiral Fulvio Martini, Chief of the Service, recalled in his memoir that his analysts foresaw the connection between Sadat’s strategic goals and the ʺstatic coverage of the battlefieldʺ. The latter could indeed serve the purposes of the former. 

Italian SID adopted a more pragmatic mindset than their British and American counterparts, leaving aside cultural aspects while focusing on the material ones. They assumed that Sadat would behave as any leader would do once he had assessed that, to survive politically, he needed to wash the shame of the 1967 naksah (setback) and recover the Sinai Peninsula. If he could have managed to keep even one soldier beyond the Canal before a ceasefire, he would not only have avenged the 1967 defeat but altered bargaining positions to his favour too. Accepting this assumption, it was only a matter of understanding how the Egyptian President intended to do so tactically. Egypt had to cope with three problems: ensuring surprise, combating Israeli air-superiority, and creating a strategic cushion of time before the superpowers would inevitably get involved. Yom Kippur celebrations and the operations’ secrecy (platoon commanders knew that they were going to war only five hours before the beginning of the invasion) guaranteed surprise. The ʺstatic coverageʺ offset Israeli air-superiority, allowing ground troops to cross the Bar-Lev Line, consolidate strategic positions and earn time waiting for international diplomacy to work things out. 

Between 1971 and 1973, Israel was aware that both Egypt and Syria needed only 6-hours to shift from defensive to offensive posture along the borders. Conversely, Tel Aviv required at least 30-hours for a full-scale mobilization, and its operational doctrine was built on the assumption that air-superiority was enough to halt enemies’ advance and gain time. This ʺstrategic conceptʺ revolved around the assumption that Egypt would not attack Israel without acquiring Soviets fighter bombers to provide air-superiority. However, the use of static coverage rendered Israeli air-superiority less efficient. 

Admiral Martini, then Chief of the ʺUfficio Situazioneʺ (Situation Section, i.e., the Directorate for Analysis), presented his analysts’ conclusions in 1971 to General Shalev. The latter, his counterpart within the Aman and a close friend of prime minister Golda Meir, rebutted the warning, claiming that Egypt could not put in place such a complex tactical manoeuvre and that war was simply not possible.

The ambiguous utility of military intelligence

The case of Israel in the 1973 war is altogether singular and shows the flaws beneath the idea that knowledge superiority, or a lack of it, is essential to military success. Tel Aviv possessed objective superiority over its enemies and, thanks to Western intelligence services and a presumed mole, knowledge superiority as well. What it lacked was flexibility in political and military thinking, which, matched with a misplaced sense of hubris, pushed the military evaluators to underestimate Egypt. Nonetheless, after the US airlift and the start of the counter-offensive, Israel’s military strength remained unmatched throughout the remainder of the war. Therefore, we should remember that knowledge of the enemy’s intentions ʺcannot destroy or deflect or damage or even defy an offensive initiative by an enemy unless the possession of knowledge is also allied to objective forceʺ.

 

Leonardo Palma attended the Military Academy of Modena (196th Commissioning Course) and holds a MA in International Relations and a BA in Political Science from University of Roma Tre. He has been visiting student at King’s College London (War Studies).

Feature – The Nuclear Dimension: Pathways of Proliferation and Failings in Qadhafi’s Libya

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Colonel Muhammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya from 1969 until 2011 (Image credit: Wikimedia)

The Libyan nuclear weapons program started in the 1970s and lasted for thirty years. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities was sustained by the country’s oil wealth and by December 2003, Libya “had succeeded in procuring from abroad most of the technical pieces of the nuclear-weapon jigsaw”.[1] Colonel Muʿammar al-Qhadafi, however, never got the Bomb, proving that money and the black market are not enough to go nuclear militarily.[2] In March 2003, a few weeks before the Iraq War, Musa Kusa, then head of the Libyan Foreign Intelligence (Mukhabarat al-Jamahiriya), contacted the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to start talks aimed at dismantling the program in return for removing sanctions. After having examined the key drivers behind the program and how Libya proliferated, this post will assess the scale of the threat that the Libyan nuclear programme posed to the international system and how and why a potentially successful project failed.

The Colonel’s Nuclear Ambitions: Deterrence, Security, and Prestige

Libya’s position regarding the nuclear issue was characterised by ambiguity and duplicity from the start. In July 1968, the Kingdom of Libya signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but it was not ratified until years later, in May 1975; and only because of pressure from the Soviet Union. Qadhafi’s statements against the production of nuclear weapons were oftentimes disavowed by fierce appeal to the desirability of an “Arab bomb” to deter Israel.

Qadhafi’s key drivers for a military nuclear program were: security, deterrence, and prestige. Initially, deterrence from outside intervention relied primarily on the building of a conventional apparatus and the targeted neutralisation of dissidents abroad. The outcome was counterproductive: the Colonel spent billions accumulating the greatest arsenal of Africa but it remained almost useless due to the lack of skilled manpower. Meanwhile, the killing of people abroad and financial support for terrorism made him a public enemy for the West.[3] Furthermore, political and economic support for the Palestinians put the Colonel in the crosshairs of Israel as well.

Consequently, the parallel non-conventional weapons programme assumed over time a more relevant role as security insurance for regime survival, but it also triggered a race against the clock since Tel Aviv had already demonstrated its willingness to use preemptive strikes. Indeed, the 1981 bombing of Saddam Hussein’s Osiraq reactor, as well as the 1985 attack against the PLO headquarters outside Tunis, had a great impact on Qadhafi’s mind.[4] Following the US strike on Tripoli one year later, the regime became seriously concerned that a similar attack could occur in the future and decided to speed up the military nuclear programme.[5]

Security for regime survival and deterrence against Israel and the West matched the Colonel’s eagerness for the spotlight and desire to bolster his image and prestige in the Middle East, seeking to promote himself as the defender of the Arab masses in the face of Israel. Therefore, going nuclear militarily was perceived also as a means towards this end. To sum things up, security insurance for regime survival, deterrence against Israel and the West, and personal prestige were the main drivers of Libya’s nuclear programme.

Pathways of Proliferation: From International Assistance to the A.Q. Khan network

Nuclear proliferation in Libya came through three different periods of research and supply, running from the early 1970s to late 2003. The first period, from 1970 to 1981, encompasses Libya’s efforts to build a civilian program but also to start a parallel nuclear military procurement. Broadly speaking, these attempts were slowed down by a general respect for non-proliferation in relation to Libya, and that was due more to the mistrust of the main suppliers towards Qadhafi, rather than to a sincere adhesion to the NPT regime by the Libyan leader.[6]

The failure to get tactical nuclear weapons in 1970 from Beijing proved to the regime that an “off-the-shelf” weapons procurement was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, Libya decided to seek assistance for a civilian programme and to secretly divert that technology for military purposes, starting a simultaneously multi-track procurement. In so doing, the regime approached Argentina, Egypt, the US, India, and France.[7] Paris halted the acquisition both of a nuclear power reactor and of twenty calutrons, while New Delhi soon stopped cooperating due to growing concerns about Qadhafi’s ties with Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan. [8]

These failures pushed Libya towards the Soviet Union and from the mid-1970s, Moscow became the main source of nuclear assistance to the Colonel.[9] The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF) became the centre both of peaceful research and illegal uranium conversion experiments. At the same time, the regime sought to procure a stockpile of uranium but the absence of exploitable deposits prompted it to seek external sources. Some have speculated that the invasion of the Aouzou Strip in 1973 was partly related also to the hope of seizing uranium deposits.[10] According to the IAEA, in the end, Libya did succeed in acquiring yellowcake (a type of uranium concentrate powder) from Niger between 1978 and 1981.[11]

The second period lasted from 1981 to the mid-1990s, and it was characterised by attempts to acquire the fissile material required for weapons based on both plutonium and uranium enrichment. The plutonium route came to nothing. Experiments conducted at Tajura allowed the regime to separate a very small amount of plutonium.[12] The regime then pressed the Soviets for the building of a light-water reactor in Sirte. The deal never went beyond the development stage, apparently because of proliferation concerns influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev’s new foreign policy.[13]

Dissatisfied with Moscow, and worried by the safety of the Soviet-reactors after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Qadhafi sought assistance in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, while initiating discussions with Belgonucleaire, a Belgian company specialised in reprocessing nuclear materials. The talks were halted under US pressure.[14] Despite these setbacks, Libya kept looking for fissile materials. The regime started to seek Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF) “no later than 1981” but no uranium hexafluoride (UF6) was ever produced.[15] Moreover, between 1983 and 1989, Libya held experiments to acquire experience in the dissolution and purification of yellowcake. In short, in this period Libya violated every single article of the NPT Safeguards Agreement but achieved very little in terms of becoming a nuclear power.

The third period, from 1995 to 2003, saw the rebirth of the program, especially in the enrichment field, thanks to the A.Q. Khan network.[16] Libya contacted Khan for the first time in 1997 and acquired from his syndicate centrifuges, UF6, and nuclear weapon designs. Contacts started in 1997 with a series of meetings in Istanbul between Libyan intelligence, Khan himself and his associate, Abu Tahir.[17] Further meetings were held in Dubai and Casablanca between 1998 and 2002. Those locations reflected the transnational nature of the network and its complexities since it involved nuclear specialists, middlemen, and unaware supplier companies.[18] Countries with weak export-controls such as Malaysia and UAE became the terminal for shipments to Libya and other countries such as Iran and North Korea. Sensitive components were assembled thanks to dual-use materials exported from Europe.[19] Shipments to Libya were specifically made possible thanks to a Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering (ScoPE).[20]

Not only did Qadhafi buy centrifuge-related technology from A.Q. Khan, Libya also received gas handling and heat-treating materials, mass spectrometers, and perhaps even unemployed nuclear scientists from South-Africa.[21] The network sold to Libya two types of centrifuges as well: L-1 and L-2. The former incorporates aluminum rotors while the latter includes maraging steel rotors. Both designs were probably stolen by Khan while he was working for the URENCO consortium. In addition, the procurement included systems for process gas feeding as well as frequency converters for a total amount of more than 20 complete L-1 centrifuges.[22]

By April 2002, several machine cascades were either set up or ready for installation. However, two “demonstration models” sent by Khan were not in workable conditions.[23] Despite all the expenses, by the late 1990s and early 2000s Libya had still failed to produce UF6. In time, they would ask the Khan network to procure some, providing Libya with 1.7 tons of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU, enriched to around 1% U235) and some natural and depleted uranium. These contacts also came with designs and blueprints relating to nuclear weapons manufacturing. However, the projects came from an old 1960s-era Chinese design and one drawing was even missing a key part.[24]

Explaining the Failures and Assessing the Threat

When Musa Kusa contacted British SIS in mid-March 2003, Libya had by now procured most of the technology needed for a weapon but, despite the efforts and millions of dollars spent, Qadhafi had not stockpiled a single nuclear warhead. No threshold had been reached. In her work on the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear programs, scholar Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer noticed that in 1991 Saddam Hussein was on the threshold of a breakthrough towards the bomb. Then came the Gulf War and everything halted. But Iraq did better than Libya anyway, even if the Colonel had more money, more time, and access to the black market.

Hegghamer argues that in both cases what prevented the two from getting the bomb was a lack of “prioritization” and “State-capacity,” or the professionalism of this state apparatus.[25] Both Saddam and Qadhafi weakened their states to maximise their personal hold on power. In so doing, the strongmen endangered their respective countries’ ability to launch, plan, and micromanage some complex technical projects such as a military nuclear program. However, they went about weakening Iraq and Libya in different ways: Saddam created a bloated state with competing agencies, leaders, wrapped in paranoia, emulating Stalin’s Soviet Union; Qadhafi almost dismantled the State entirely, only the informal dimension of power worked. Consequently, Saddam had a bigger toolbox to fix his WMD program.[26]

The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility Centre (TNRF) in Tripoli, Libya (Image Credit: Global Security)

In Libya, any kind of success was a remote prospect. Every initiative fell apart because of the lack of organisational resources. When Colonel Qadhafi launched his Cultural Revolution in 1973, the nuclear and chemical weapons programs were shielded from the Revolutionary Committees. However, the program still suffered indirect consequences as well. Moreover, fearing dissents and radicalisation, the regime did not train enough engineers or physicists. The whole program suffered a lack of continuity and poor management, as well as the absence of a high-tech industry and an associated education system.

While the regime spent billions on procurement, it failed in finding Libyans qualified to assemble the nuclear-puzzle. According to the IAEA inspectors, only a handful of them was specialised in nuclear-related matters.[27] The lack of organisational resources was compounded by a general respect for non-proliferation towards Libya and by the constraining effect of UN sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing. By the late 1990s, the A.Q. Khan network appeared as the only route available, and it was indeed pivotal for the program but it showed that access to technology does not equate to building-capacity.[28]

How far, then, was Libya from building the bomb in 2003? Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s son, declared in 2009 that they believed that they were just five years away from getting the bomb. Instead, they were far away.[29] While it was not impossible for the regime to go nuclear militarily in the future, it was highly improbable. However, back in 2003, the threat-assessment of the Libyan nuclear program was radically different, matching with that of Saif, because it was influenced by the ongoing dynamics of the international system at the time.

After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s foreign policy overlapped with national security and countering proliferation became one of the main goals of the Global War on Terror. On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi’s offer to dismantle his program was perceived both as a political opportunity to bolster the US administration and as an effort coherent with the broader strategy of the White House of countering the spread of WMD. Consequently, one may argue that the threat-assessment of the Libyan program ended up reflecting the context of the post-9/11 altered perception. A mix of political opportunism and sincere security concerns were the mirror through which both the British and the US looked at Libya.

In summary, the history of Qadhafi’s nuclear program proves that money, dual-use materials procurement and black-market are not enough to get the bomb. Without a top-priority programme led by the government and handled by highly-specialised scientists, acquiring all the pieces of the nuclear puzzle can result in a dead-end. Furthermore, it proves that threat-assessment of a nuclear program is easily and dangerously altered by the general dynamics of the international system (even those which are not immediately related to WMD) and to the approach and perceptions that policy-makers have regarding nuclear proliferation and international security at a given time.

[1] Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping Back from the Brink (Routledge, 2017), p. 25.

[2] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2016).

[3] Derek Lutterbeck, “Arming Libya. Transfers of Conventional Weapons”, in Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, 2009, pp. 505-528.

[4] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak. Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks”, in International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 101-132.

[5] Ronald Neumann, Senate Testimony on US Policy Toward Libya, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 2000. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf

[6] “Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapons”, in The Risk Report, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1, No. 10, December 1995, pp. 1-4.

[7] Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (Routledge, 2016), p. 68; “Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil”, in Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001, http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/digest_2_2001.html.

[8] Ibidem, p.68, Cooley, Op. Cit., pp. 232-233. See also: Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb. The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 98–99; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397. On the Libyan–French deal: Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 63–65.; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397.

[9] Bowen, Ibidem, pp. 29-30.

[10] Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Authority, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; Project Number LIB/3/004, Nuclear Raw Materials.

[11] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by Director General, IAEA, May 20, 2004. https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf.

[12] IAEA Report, May 2004, Op. Cit., p. 6.

[13] K.D. Kapur, Soviet Nuclear Non- Proliferation Diplomacy and the Third World (Konark Publishers, 1993), p. 148. See also: “Soviets Draw Back from Helping Libyan Program”, in Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, p. 27.

[14] OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, Op. Cit., p. 380; MacLachlan and Knapik, Belgium and Libya, p. 5, quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 33.

[15] IAEA Report, Implementation of the NPT, Op. Cit., p. 4. See also: “Japanese Parts Used in Libya’s Nuke Program,” in Herald Ashi, March 13, 2004. Quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 34.

[16] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2006).

[17] Royal Malaysia Police, “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Program”, February 20, 2004, http://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm.

[18] Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 37.

[19] Anwar Iqbal, “Khan Network Supplied N-Parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004. See also: James Doyle, Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Non-proliferation. Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008).

[20] Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network: Confession of a Proliferator”, in Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 2004.

[21] IAEA Report, Implementation of NPT, Op. Cit., Annex 1, p. 6; Stephen Fidler, and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans Helped Libya’s Secret Nuclear Project”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004.

[22] David Albright, and Corey Hinderstein, “Libya’s Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered”, in Institute for Science and International Security, March 1, 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya.

[23] David Albright, International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-proliferation Initiative, Statement before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 23, 2004. http://www.senate.gov/∼govtaff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=673.

[24] IAEA Report, Op. Cit., p. 3. See also: Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network. Chinese Warhead Drawings Among Libyan Documents”, in Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2004.

[25] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons”, Seminar at Woodrow Wilson Centre, September 15, 2017.

[26] Braut-Hegghammer, Ibidem.

[27] Richard Stone, “Agencies Plan Exchange With Libya’s Former Weaponeers”, in Science, Vol. 308, No. 5719, April 8, 2005, pp. 185-186.

[28] Chairman Hon. Laurence H. Silberman, and Hon. Charles S. Robb, Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, March 31, 2005, pp. 259-260. See: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf .

[29] Braut-Hegghammer interview with Saif al-Islam. Quoted in: W. Wilson Centre Seminar, September 2017.

Leonardo Palma attended the Military Academy of Modena and holds a B.A. in Political Science and a M.A. in International Relations from Roma Tre University. He has been visiting research student at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Twitter: @HadrianPAelius.

al-Shabaab’s Anatomy: A Study in Context

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by Leonardo Palma

15 May 2019

al-Shabaab militants during a training session near Chisimaio, Somalia (Al Jazeera)

Chronic instability in the Horn of Africa, with clear repercussions for Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Mozambique, has reinforced a process of aggregation within Islamists groups that include nationalist fringes, maritime pirates and organised crime groups. While this region is under the influence of al-Qa’ida in Eastern Africa (AQEA), the group that is the strongest cause of concern – both numerically and militarily – is al-Shabaab.

From the Islamic Courts to the Battle of Mogadishu

After the Somali state’s collapse in 1991 and the failure of UN Operation “Restore Hope”, the country fell prey to local warlords spurring overall disintegration. The result was the birth, especially in Mogadishu, of the so-called “Islamic Courts Union (ICU)”, which assumed certain administrative and social duties including the settling of civil lawsuits through a rigid application of Sha’ria. Through their private militias, the Courts were also able to handle public order and counter numerous warlords. In 2006, to make the system more efficient and coordinated, several Courts decided to meet in a Union called Midowga Maxkamadaha Isaamiga (ICU). Thanks to strong popular support, the Union was able to recapture Mogadishu after years of anarchy in an institutional vacuum. The Courts established some order, opened up both the harbour and the airport, enlarged the market of Bakara and extended their influence far beyond the city towards Baidoa. The latter was the seat of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a body born in 2004 after the dissolution of the National Transitional Government (NTG). At that time, the Union’s project of renewal included the introduction of Sha’ria as source of law, but Somalia’s highly stratified tribal system made that almost impossible. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IAD), created in 1986 by neighbouring countries, kept supporting the Baidoa transitional government, suggesting that the neighbours were – at least – suspicious if not worried about the birth of an Islamic State in Somalia.

al-Shabaab fighters under the black banner (The Independent)

In December 2006, the TFG, militarily supported by Ethiopia, promoted a campaign against Islamic Courts rule. Within a few weeks, the TFG managed to regain control of the city, marginalising the ICU until its complete and utter defeat. It was during those chaotic days that, inside the crumbling ICU, the al-Shabaab movement was born[1]. Previously a minority Islamist group that involved youth inside the Courts, al-Shabaab emerged as an autonomous organisation with wider aim and appeal. The leaders, most of whom were veterans of the Mogadishu battle against the old warlords, decided to carry on the war against the TFG while promoting a three-phase plan: overthrow the federal government, establish an Islamic State and drive the multinational African force (ANISOM) out of Somalia. The latter has led to a progressive tightening of attacks against Kenya, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, all of them responsible for the supply of military equipment to the TFG and for operations against the al-Shabaab training camps.

Evolution, adaptation and ideological clashes

Al-Shabaab evolved quickly, eventually pledging allegiance to and integrating with al-Qa’ida. On 26 January 2009, al-Shabaab insurgents besieged and conquered Baidoa, to the detriment of the weak, and former allied, President Sharif Ahmed[2]. In the following months, several suicide attacks in the cities of Belet Uen and Mogadishu caused the death of hundreds of students, civilians, officials and TFG cabinet members such as Interior Minister Omar Aden[3]. The group extended its control over the country between 2009 and 2011, including much of southern Somalia. In those areas, al-Shabaab reduced the import of low-price food to increase the local wheat production and shift wealth from urban centres to rural areas, where the application of the Sha’ria was less problematic. Over time, al-Shabaab also changed its mind about maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, the group realised that tolerating pirate activity would have had a huge impact over public opinion against the weak federal government. Nevertheless, following the loss of the Bakara market, and needing to secure financing, al-Shabaab started to engage in economic activities with the pirates, receiving money in return for the use of its territories as “sanctuary” for logistical needs and as routes for weapons and supplies.

In addition to engaging with pirates, its attempts to expand into Somaliland and Puntland shifted al-Shabaab’s ideology closer to that of AQAP (al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula) in Yemen. These new ties led to a divide within the group, since several local leaders and fighters were more rooted in a nationalistic view rather than in an international jihadist ideology[4]. This strife was worsened by the TFG and Kenya’s harsh repression, which weakened the widespread control that al-Shabaab had enjoyed over the coastal region and in the south.[5] Between 2011 and 2012, TFG forces, supported by Kenya reconquered Afgoi, Laanta Bur, Afmadù (a core asset for road connections) and Chisimaio. Indeed, it is during 2012 that the war between the TFG and al-Shabaab for the control of Somalia advanced: in February, through an online message, the Shabaab leader, Ali Zubeyr “Godane”, swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of al-Qa’ida, thereby officially rendering al-Shabaab a branch of al-Qa’ida. Shortly thereafter, the TFG was disbanded and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) was sworn in, without settling the division between those who want a federal unitarian nation, and those who prefer a tribal federalism with wide administrative autonomies[6].

The group has been also accused of recruiting primary school pupils (Intelligence Briefs)

With the loss of Chisimao and Jubaland, al-Shabaab started to direct its activities towards the consolidation of its territorial control, widening its influence over Somaliland and Puntland and strengthening its asymmetrical terror strategy against Somalia’s neighbours. The carnage of Westgate Mall in 2013 and Garissa College in 2015 were painful manifestations of that strategy[7]. However, al-Shabaab’s menace has increased not only through its adherence to al-Qa’ida (which led, as a direct consequence, to the birth of an international cell named al-Muhajirun) but also through the worsening divide between the fringe controlled by the late Godame (killed in a US drone airstrike in 2014) and the nationalistic faction, tied to the spiritual guru Hassan Dahir Aweys and led by Mukhtar Robow. [8]Indeed, al-Qa’ida decided to replace Godame with Ibrahim al-Afghani in 2010. The strife led to a harsh confrontation until Aweys accepted to move with a private militia in Adado, under SFG control.

The decentralisation strategy beyond 2014 

The death of Godame in 2014 left a dangerous power vacuum which the group tried to fill with a strategy of operational decentralisation, following the path marked by al-Qa’ida[9]. That phase of uncertain transition was overcome by a new wave of terrorist attacks in the region. This, on the one hand, confirms the prediction that when a terrorist group is weakened, it tends to strike back to show its vitality. On the other hand, these attacks forced the US military to intensify its counterterrorism operations with airstrikes and special forces. In June 2016, a drone airstrike killed both Mohamud Dulyadeyn, mastermind of the Garissa attack, and Maalim Daoud, al-Shabaab’s intelligence chief. The organisation retaliated over he Summer with car bombings, armed assault, kidnapping and suicide bombers, causing several deaths and re-seizing territory.[10] After the death of an American soldier in a clandestine operation, the US resumed its bombing campaign and struck, from June to August 2017, in several provinces and regions, killing, among others, the regional commander Ali Jabal. According to US intelligence, he was the man behind the suicide attacks in Mogadishu

From late 2017, al-Shabaab has shown great resilience and capacity to adapt to SFG, US, and AMISOM counterterrorism efforts. Decentralising both its operational branches and leadership, has allowed the group to relieve the military and police pressure they have experienced in the last years. The continuation of terrorist attacks is proof that the movement is trying to show that it is still active although weakened. Furthermore, al-Shabaab is attempting to remain on a relentless offensive, thereby exacerbating regional tensions and stability. Regional cooperation, humanitarian assistance, advanced training for the Somali soldiers, selected counterterrorism operations to cut ties between AQAP, al-Shabaab and its sponsors are the only means to drain the territorial control that the group at present still enjoys.

Leonardo Palma attended the Italian Military Academy of Modena and graduated in Political Science and International Relations at Roma Tre University. He is a postgraduate visiting research student at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

[1] For a comprehensive historical account, see: Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; but also James Fergusson, The World’s most dangerous place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia, De Capo Press, 2013.

[2] J. L. Anderson, Letter from Mogadishu, The Most Failed State, The New Yorker, December 14, 2009, p. 64, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state.

[3] Three ministers killed in Somalia attack, Newvision.co.ug, December 3, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20100106162350/http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/703172

[4] Where in the World is Sheikh Aweys? Somalia Report, February 1, 2012, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys; and Somali observers: internal divisions widening within al-Shabaab, Sabahionline.com, 4 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/04/05/feature-01; see also: Hansen (2013), Ibidem, p.103.

[5] Joint Communique – Operation Linda Nchi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, January 14, 2012; and Alex Ndegwa, Al Shabaab’s propaganda war, The Standard, 17 November 2011, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/category/2000046627/n-a;

[6] Somalia: UN Envoy Says Inauguration of New Parliament in Somalia “Historic Moment”, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 21 August 2012, https://allafrica.com/stories/201208220474.html;

[7] Kenya al-Shabab attack: Security questions as Garissa dead mourned, BBC News, 3 April 2015, and Okari, Dennis, Westgate’s unanswered questions, BBC News, 22 September 2014.

[8] Nation’s army in new battles as advance resumes, Allafrica.com. November 17, 2011, https://allafrica.com/stories/201111180120.html; and Al-Shabaab Leader Admits Split, Somalia Report, 7 November 2012;

[9] On Al-Shabaab and Al-Qa’ida: Tricia Bacon, Daisy Muibu, Al–Qaeda and al-Shabaab: A Resilient Alliance, in Michael Keating, Matt Waldman, War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 391;

[10] Somalie: le retrait des troupes éthiopiennes lié à des «contraintes financières», RFI, 27 October 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161027-somalie-le-retrait-troupes-ethiopiennes-lie-contraintes-financieres .

[11]  US confirmed the death of al-Shabaab’s Ali Jabal, Fox News, 4 August 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-confirms-death-of-al-shabaab-terrorist-ali-jabal; and US troops call in airstrike after they come under fire in Somalia, CNN, 17 August 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/17/politics/us-troops-somalia-airstrike/index.html.

Image source: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/al-shabaab-somalia-ban-single-use-plastic-bags-terror-environment-livestock-a8428641.html