Archive

North Korea – more of the same, but where is it heading?

May 1, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Michael Jefferson

For those who follow North Korea the pronouncements of 30 March that it was entering a “state of
war” with South Korea followed by the 2 April declaration that it will restart its Yongbyon nuclear
complex were the latest in a set of provocative acts that the secretive regime has performed over the
past couple of decades. Looking at the media reaction you would think that it was a Cuban Missile
Crisis take two and we are on the brink of nuclear war. However, although they are undoubtedly
closer to an aggressive nuclear weapons capability, there is little evidence to suggest that North
Korea has the capacity to deliver any nuclear weapons beyond its own borders. In fact I contend
that these actions point to growing domestic instability in the country, which when combined
with the fledgling state of the Kim Jong-un’s regime are designed to cement and enhance power
structures in Pyongyang.

During the 90s and 00s North Korea used its nuclear programme, the ratcheting up and down of
its rhetoric and military actions such as missile tests, as a way to secure international concessions.
However, North Korea’s inability or more likely lack of willingness to meet commitments it has
made over the years means such offers are now unlikely. In recent times Pyongyang’s provocative
acts have been met firmly by economic sanctions from the international community while China
has quietly provided enough support to allow the regime to survive. I cannot imagine that even the
leadership in Pyongyang could have imagined that these recent moves would successfully secure
concessions such as food aid, or even North Korea’s stated aim to hold bilateral talks with the US.

All of these actions should serve to remind us that there has been very little outside contact, even
with China, since Kim Jong-un took power. It is still not clear whether he, his aunt and uncle (Kim
Kyong-hui and Jang Sung-taek) or a faction within the Armed forces are calling the shots. I think
this recent escalation is designed to elevate Kim Jong-un and secure his position among both the
Pyongyang elite and wider North Korean public, but the information mismatch makes it very hard
to ground analyses with certainty.

What is, however, certain is that North Korea is more porous with mobile phones now seemingly
available and some citizens able to access external radio and TV shows. In response to this, it
seems those in power have fallen back on their tried and tested way to demonstrate their value – the
protector against the capitalist threat. Here we need to remember that the ability of Pyongyang to
control information means that many North Koreans are genuinely petrified of capitalism and what
might happen without the Juche philosophy that they believe serves them so well.

The principal point of interest of this crisis is that it comes at a time with relatively new regimes in
China, South Korea and Japan and a new US Secretary of State. It was a new experience for them
and communications, protocol and expectations over North Korea have not yet been established
between them, I would hope that such communications are now being set up. The ultimate
achievement for Pyongyang would be securing bilateral talks with the US on their terms and,
although ruling out talks on North Korean terms, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated
by US Secretary of State John Kerry even mentioning talks in a press conference -with numerous
conditions attached.

In a strange way, this may actually benefit wider East Asian relations. An ever more unpredictable
North Korea means that South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and USA, the countries who primarily
need to manage Kim and North Korea, may build the lines of communication and relationship that
forms the basis of improved diplomatic relations. This can then be hopefully be leveraged for other
issues such as territorial disputes -and here the South China Sea looms large.

In the long run I think there is little doubt that North and South Korea will unify, however the
timeline and method of this unification is still very much up in the air. The key issues on this
prospect will be how to pay for it, and how to manage a population that is, as yet, unready to
join the consumer societies of East Asia. The population issue is one of particular interest as the
collapse of the current regime will undoubtedly unleash a wave of migration which will be hard
to manage in a ‘liberated’ country. South Korea will be most affected most by unification, but the
aforementioned regional powers and the international community will need to contribute to make
any integration plan viable.

Ultimately the timing of this collapse will probably come down to the time when China is either
ready to let the regime fall or Kim goes so far that it poses a danger to China itself. In the meantime
we can only expect more provocative actions from Pyongyang and an increased focus on the
military at the expense of the rest of the population as the economic and social situation further
destabilises the country.
—
Michael Jefferson

Michael works in public affairs for an international bank. He has extensive experience in public policy and
international relations from his current role as well as from his time working for the UK Government on
international trade. He has an MA in Japanese from St Catherine’s College, Oxford specialising in Japanese
politics and international relations.

Failed, failing, failure – Is Africa disgracing our family?

April 7, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Tim Glawion

All five of the most failed states in the world lie in Africa, calculates the Fund for Peace in its 2012 Index. Mali, as a case in point, has been failing for months now, the army even went as far as fleeing when the Islamist insurgency attacked them. Only mother France’s troops have turned the tables and are leading the recapture of the country’s North with astonishing swiftness and ease. After all we have done for you Africa, why do you prove us a failure time and time again? At least so the popular narrative reads.

Unlike the recent events in Mali suggest, however, Africa has not disappointed us. We have disappointed Africa. In light of the apparent failure of our imposed mode of order in form of a state system we persist and refuse to change our ways. In fact, most African countries never had a state system, at most borders and institutions left behind by colonialism. Africa’s political order, therefore, has neither failed, nor is it failing. Africa’s political orders are evolving and we might see states emerging from this evolution. But if we opened our minds and our international system, we might just witness new forms of political order different from what we know. While we condemn colonialism for the slavery and abuses it brought about, we still silently praise it for bringing order to a continent of anarchy. State systems with clear boundaries, infrastructure, and powerful governments. However, when independence movements kicked out European imperialists, indigenous rulers seemed incapable of containing their abusive and extractive measures to an economically viable level, as the former colonizers had been able to. The economy and the state quickly collapsed. It seems as though the circle began closing itself, when Mali called upon its old masters to bring about the stability they were unable to provide for themselves.

But does this patronizing viewpoint stand the test of reality?

To begin with, can we speak of states, in the European sense, in Africa? While the 1884 Berlin Conference painted lines on the ‘blank’ African drawing board, which have stayed surprisingly untouched for almost 150 years, is this enough to become a state? Were infrastructure developments, coercive rulers and ideological indoctrination, which came about as by-products of colonialism, enough to fill these borders with a common people? Unlikely. Colonial institutions did not create unifying causes and processes for the emergence of states, instead they were meant to increase the efficiency of exploitation. If any moment in time can be seen as a possible spark for state building during the twentieth century, it was not when Europeans entered the continent. It was rather when Africans in each country collectively decided to kick them out.

Along with the common enemy, disappeared the common cause. Identities and institutions other than the state persisted, such as tribes, kin-groups, clans and kingdoms. But the centralizing apparatus left behind by the imperialists and international incentives to uphold the central state empowered exclusive groups to exploit the rest of the population. Somalia’s dictator Siyyad Barre, propped up first by the Soviets, then by the Americans, went as far as starting massacres against north-eastern tribes simply to boost his grip on power. The same region declared independence in 1991 as Somaliland, and who could blame them after a history of violent discrimination under the pretence of a centralized state? Well, we are blaming them, as no state so far has recognized Somaliland’s independence.

Anglo-European powers did not bring about statehood, but these same powers upheld a ‘quasi-state’ system as a pretext to justify violent repression and avoid the emergence of an organic political order. How, then, can we believe that Western intervention is the key for peace and stability? When recognising a central Somali government for the first time in 20 years the United States took credit for supporting the transition to a central state. What kind of support did the US mean exactly? Propping up Barre’s regime for 12 years? Leading a failed attempt at pacification in 1993, and retreating in haste after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident? Supporting warlords against Islamist groups during the civil war? Encouraging the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 that toppled the only stable Somali regime since 1991 because it was “Islamist”? Or does it indeed refer to the most recent move to acknowledge as the sole representative of Somalia a government that itself effectively controls no more than the capital city?

With the French forces reporting one military success after the next, and newspapers’ daily self-congratulatory headlines on what a great impact we Europeans have on our ailing little brother Africa, as a European I must disagree: Africa has not failed us, we have failed Africa.

On the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union

April 2, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Adriano Mancinelli

It does not seem to be a good time for the European Union. During the last 5 years, the Euro-zone and the whole Union has been facing an economic crisis that has brought Greece to ruin and – some say – to give up democracy. A month ago, David Cameron announced that he wants to have a referendum on the membership of the United Kingdom in the EU. A few days ago, during messy national elections, the majority of the Italian people voted for anti-European candidates. Yet, at the beginning of this year, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize 2012, a decision which has been heavily criticised.

Who’s right, then? People in Italy, the UK and Greece, who see Europe as a big evil and a risk for democracy to be halted as soon as possible? Or is it the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which thinks that the EU ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’?

Maybe surprisingly, I stand with the Nobel Committee: the European Union fully deserved the prize. In order to understand why, it is necessary to start from two crucial observations.

1) The debate on the European Union, both in the press and the pubs, is incredibly narrow-minded and poorly informed. The vast majority of the public considers the EU as some (imperfect) economic organisation – even in the UK, which is not part of the Euro-zone;

2) Because of this narrow view, the vast majority of the public forgets that the EU is much more than that, the EU being a great – perhaps the greatest in history – political experiment, and quite a successful one.

The first European Community was created to overcome Franco-German bitterness and suspicions in 1951. Since that moment, the political project for a more united Europe developed quite steadily until the birth of the European Union proper in 1992 and the re-negotiation of the Treaties between 2007 and 2009. The process has been successful for so many reasons that it is easy to miss some of them.

After 30 years of total war (1914-1945), Europe is experiencing the longest period of peace since the Peace of Westphalia. At the same time, the members of the EU experienced incredible economic growth, and improved their standards of living at an unprecedented pace. Europe has become the biggest market in the world, and there is even more: it has become the most democratic region of the world, and its member states are usually in the first positions on the lists for freedoms and human rights. Since its creation, the EU has attracted more and more states: from the 6 founders, there will be 28 member states this summer; all of which freely joined the Union. Europe was able to control and help the re-union of East and West Germany, to dialogue first and then to welcome the post-communist countries, making stable democracies of them. Thanks to Europe, millions of young people – I myself being one of them – have been able to study, live, and fall in love in different countries; 350 million people are accorded more civil, social, and political rights than any other part of the world, thanks to the European court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. No other individual or organisation that has received the Nobel Prize can claim to have achieved so much, hence deserving the price more than the European Union – certainly not Obama, I daresay.

The EU comes with deficiencies and ineffectiveness, it would be unfair to conceal that; nonetheless, there is no future in leaving Europe, or dismissing it as a (failed) economic entity. The future lies in recognising EU’s countless merits, and working to change its several flaws. It is not realistic to address the economic problems of the Euro-zone in such an article, but it must be clear that the major reason for the situation is that there is not enough Europe. Moreover, Europe needs stronger political links with regard to foreign policy; in order for the EU to become a real international actor, the member countries must find common objectives and shared interests to pursue – and stronger legal mechanisms to abide by those objectives and interests.

These challenges require action and uneasy changes. The necessary measures and steps needed to strengthen the Union must be explained clearly to the European citizens: one crucial tasks is to create a system of effective information and communication to EU citizens, in order to destroy the idea of obscure technocrats working in Brussels’ bubble. It is fundamental to (re)create legitimacy in the European institutions; it is fundamental that the peoples of Europe know that the EU cannot be dismissed, and that nobody should raise eyebrows at the EU winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

Operation Iraqi Freedom’: Ten Years, 189,000 lives, and 2.2 trillion US taxpayer dollars

March 28, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Maura James

You may have noticed the ‘Reel Iraq’ film festival badge Strife hosted on the blog over the past week. Thursday I attended the festival launch which featured the documentary, ‘The Dreams of Sparrows’ directed by Haydar Daffar. Daffar chronicles 2003, the year of the US led invasion, in Baghdad Iraq, his home town. The film was very moving, and I encourage readers to view it. What I would like to share, though, is my experience Friday, when I participated in ‘Art, War and Peace: Responses to the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq’. The day-long conference featured Iraqi artists from the diaspora and was moderated by Dr Alan Ingram (UCL). The talks were presented by artists featured in the exhibition ‘Geographies of War: Iraq Revisited’

The first talk presented by Rashad Selim titled ‘Separation, Outflow and Attitudes of Return’, set the tone for the day. Selim, like all of the artists present, is a diaspora Iraqi artist. His talk focused on a sense of entanglement and loss that he feels as an Iraqi artist and that Iraq is currently experiencing. Throughout history, Iraq and Mesopotamia was the bed of civilisation. Art and culture flowed from there to the rest of the world, but today there is an outflow and talent drain that is leaving Iraq. Selim is very concerned about the cultural identity of exchange that has been threatened by the wars and turmoil in the land for the past fifty years. His talk was depressing, but Selim is focused on creating points of connection in his art to revive the historical exchange. Though Mesopotamia is the cradle of civilisation, Selim noted that the cradle can be the grave.

Satta Hashem described how his identity as an Iraqi was intertwined in his artwork because, according to Hashem, art reflects experience. As a youth he was tortured and forced to flee Iraq to go to school in Algeria. After university he returned to northern Iraq and became a partisan for three years before leaving Iraq in 1978. In 1991 his family, still living in Iraq, lost everything as a result of the first Gulf War. During the first Gulf War he was constantly watching the footage coming out of Iraq and he spoke to his family regularly. Much of his work reflects the horror of that time and his feelings of dislocation and despair. Unlike the other artists, Hashem called the American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq the ‘liberation’ of Iraq. He, like others, highlighted the recent history of violence in his homeland but emphasised the repressiveness of Sadam’s regime.

The afternoon sessions featured Nadje Al-Ali, a Gender Studies professor at SOAS and Hana Malallah, another diaspora Iraqi artist. Al-Ali just published the book We are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War which explores the ways in which Iraqi artists and activists produce art and activism and resist destruction. Malallah fled Iraq in 2007. As a recent refugee, a lot of her art focuses on, what she calls, the ‘cycle of ruin’. She watched her country rebuild after the first Gulf War only to be destroyed again during the US led invasion in 2003. She looks to create violence in her art to reflect the destruction around her. After Malallah presented her work and story, some in the audience were quite offended with her portal of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. She in no way endorsed or commended Sadam Hussein in her discussion. Since she was forced to flee her country during the American led invasion, though, it is clear that she does not support the current state of affairs which she sees as a result of invasion and occupation.

It was very interested to hear the exchange between Malallah and other audience members. The discussion got quite passionate, and Ingram had to step in to stop the talk from descending into shouting. The discussion on Friday between those who viewed the operation as an invasion and those who viewed it as a liberation illuminates the complexities of the Iraqi people and the core of the debate. A skit from ‘The Dreams of Sparrows’ articulates these nuances. Daffar interviews a female filmmaker in his documentary. She talks of the censorship under Sadam and how artists were forced to produce propaganda for the regime or be jailed. Daffar points to a picture of George W. Bush in her living room and asks her why it is there. She says she loves George Bush. ‘And the Americans?’ Daffar asks, ‘How do you like life under the Americans?’ The artist responded by saying, ‘Sadam was bad. The Americans are bad. It is all bad.’

The sectarian violence that now grips Iraq and the weak democracy that is in place does not give anyone much hope for the future of the country. As an American, the whole festival was somewhat surreal. Many of the European attendees had opposed the Iraq war since before it began. There were massive protests across the world in opposition to the invasion. It just was not like that in the US, of course there was opposition but not in the same way. One was unpatriotic or did not support the troops if one did not buy into the Iraq war as an integral battle in the War on Terror. I was young, and I opposed the war, probably because my parents opposed it. Ten years later, though, it does not feel very good to be able to say ‘I told you so’.

Operation Pillar of Defence Revisited

March 23, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Hayden Pirkle

The outbreak of violence between Israeli and Hamas forces that erupted in mid-November 2012 and captivated spectators’ attention across the globe is now just a minor blip on the radar of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is amazing how short-term the media’s and the general public’s respective memories can be. Our attention spans are seemingly short, as even major events quickly fall into obscurity. In review, at the time of the latest spurt of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there was widespread speculation among political pundits that the Israeli campaign in Gaza, dubbed “Operation Pillar of Defence”, was fuelled by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s motivations to ensure victory in the forthcoming elections in January 2013. The elections have come and gone. The results are in. As such, it is worth revisiting November’s conflict in order to connect the dots, if any, between Pillar of Defence and the 2013 Israeli elections.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Pillar of Defence on 14 November 2012 in response to sporadic rocket fire coming out of Hamas-controlled Gaza. That day’s most significant event was the Israeli assassination of Hamas’ military commander, Ahmed Jabari, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike. As a result of the assassination, there was a rapid intensification of violence from both sides, although the Gazan population shouldered a disproportionate amount of the force and destruction, as the IDF pounded the densely populated Gaza Strip with a formidable aerial campaign. The violence came to an end eight days later, as Egypt’s recently-elected president, Mohamed Morsi, brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The brief conflict killed nearly 150 Palestinians and injured upward of 1000, over 200 of which were children. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, six Israelis were killed, 17 critically or moderately injured, and some 220 ‘lightly’ injured throughout the escalation.

In the eyes of many, the November escalation, falling just two months before the 2013 general elections, was strategically instigated by Netanyahu as a means of diverting public attention from the numerous socio-economic issues that currently plague Israel. Such issues, which include the rising cost of housing and living, have resulted in domestic unrest within Israel. As such, it seems that Pillar of Defense could have been a pre-election attempt to distract the public from the real issues facing the country by drumming up a collective emotional response against a common enemy. This beating-of-the-war drum prior to an election has been used in Israel before. Israel’s politicians and ruling parties have utilized, with varying degrees of success, strategically timed military offensives as a means of galvanizing their respective electorates and redirecting national attention from detrimental domestic issues, as, according to Haaretz, “social and economic problems are edged off the national agenda.”

Perhaps the most telling evidence of an election-based ulterior motive is the event that led to the intense escalation of violence in the first place: Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ military- wing leader, Ahmed Jabari. Jabari was the key actor used by high-ranking Hamas officials to feel out how ceasefire negotiations between the party and the Israelis would be received by the local population in Gaza. He also played a critical role in the release of Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, last year while representing Hamas during the prisoner exchange negotiations. The assassination of such a crucial figure was imprudent for Israel in two ways. Firstly, Israel killed off a key, seemingly pragmatic, figure for potential peace negotiations in the future. Secondly, the Israelis should have no doubt expected a violent response by Hamas. Such a response would in turn result in an escalation of violence between the two sides. Perhaps this was the desired effect. In other words, if Netanyahu wanted to incite a skirmish with Hamas to overshadow burgeoning domestic issues right before an election, he certainly picked the right target. This is not to say that Jabari’s assassination is indisputable proof of an election-based ulterior motive for the Netanyahu regime. There is certainly no direct link in causation between the two; although in my opinion, assassinating such a strategic figure in Israel-Hamas dialogue and negotiations, and thus instigating a round of violence just before a key election, is highly suggestive of such an ulterior motive.

To return to the present, nearly three months since the Egypt-brokered ceasefire, the elections have been held and the process of coalition building has finally concluded. But what were the results? Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party, the expected favourite, in conjunction with its electoral ally, Yisrael Beiteinu, won a mere 31 of 120 available parliamentary seats. This is down from the 42 seats that the two-party alliance won in the last election. The surprise of the election was the success of the centrist party, Yesh Atid, which won 19 seats. Yesh Atid, led by Yair Lapid, campaigned for the alleviation of Israel’s socio-economic ailments and championed middle-class interests. Coming in third was the Labour party, which like Yesh Atid, also focused on domestic issues, albeit from a more leftist political position.

To Netanyahu’s chagrin, the coalition-building process proved to be far trickier than he likely ever could have imagined. Nearly six weeks since the elections and after considerable political wrangling, Netanyahu finally formed a coalition. However, although Netanyahu narrowly succeeded in forming a coalition, its composition is without question not the ideal result that he envisioned. Most notably, it includes the centrist Yesh Atid and the pro-settler Jewish Home party, and for the first time in a decade, the coalition government will not include any ultra-orthodox groups. Netanyahu’s new government is expected to focus on domestic socio- economic issues rather than the situation with Palestine. This focus is far more tenuous than posturing political support on the basis of national security.

In sum, Netanyahu and Likud experienced rather disappointing election results, which forced Netanyahu into forming a rather unstable coalition government. It appears that the socio- economic issues that parties like Yesh Atid and Labour based their campaigns upon could not be masked by conflict with Hamas. In other words, if Operation Pillar of Defence was intended to secure Netanyahu and his allies a decisive political victory in 2013, it was a complete failure. What now remains to be seen how the new government will handle the Palestinian situation. Will the presence of pro-peace Yesh Atid within the Netanyahu-led coalition result in the curbing of conflict and resumption of the peace talks with Hamas? Or will the more hawkish voices once again prevail and the tense and unproductive status quo remain?

Archive

Footer

Contact

Recent Posts

Tags