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The rise of the far right in France

September 22, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Deborah Asseraf

French Interior Minister Manuel Valls announced last June the banning of two far-right militant groups: L’Oeuvre Française (The French Work) and Jeunesses Nationalistes (Nationalist Youth), the youth wing of L’Oeuvre. The government is clearly trying to show that it will undermine all forms of extremism that represent a danger for the Republic. However, the tense climate in which political issues are shaped these days in France recalls the heyday of far-right groups in the 1930s. Indeed, the very act of disbanding extremist groups required the use of a law from 1936. It has been a long time since issues such threats to the social order by extremist groups has been on the political agenda. However, even if a parallel can be drawn it would be rather inaccurate to compare the 1930s too closely with contemporary France. The 2010s will be remembered for a tough economic downturn and the growth of extremism. To understand this trend there are two different areas to consider.

To begin with, it is fundamental to distinguish the changes occurring in the traditional French political chessboard from the groups evolving outside of it. There are daily issues highlighting the growing influence of far-right ideologies within the French political system and violent extremist right-wing groups becoming increasingly more visible on the political scene. These two distinct levels ground the contemporary far-right phenomenon. One of my teachers at Sciences Po Paris once observed that modern French politics had grown more peaceful over the past few decades; ideology was not as significant as it used to be. People no longer vote for an ideal model of society. They are not strongly right-wing or left-wing, as they used to be during the Cold War, for instance. He concluded by saying:‘If we were in the 1960s or 1970s when I was a student here, you would not have had reasoned political debates as you do now, you would literally have fought for your ideas’. I also thought ideas did not lead to violence anymore; I thought there was no ideological motivation behind violence in France. Violence such as expressed in riots seemed rather to be caused by social distress and delinquency. However, far-right ideology as a motive for violence as proclaimed by extremist groups made the headlines in spring 2013.

These groups became so visible this year that they completely reshaped the political agenda. Gay marriage became a matter of national identity; with anti-gay marriage protesters denouncing the bill using arguments based on natural law, recalling a deeply conservative vision of family as a unit of only a man and a woman. Created on the 24 March 2013 on the occasion of a demonstration against gay marriage, the Printemps Français (French Spring) surfaced as the most violent branch of the movement. Their manifesto brings together various elements of right-wing ideology from social conservatism to anti-globalisation. and does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the republican state. Their slogan is “On ne lâche rien” (We won’t give up), and protests continued even after the bill was passed. A second event highlighted the sudden visibility of far-right groups: the death of the left-wing ‘anti-fascist’ militant and Sciences Po student, Clément Méric, in early June. Allegedly struck in the face by a member of the Nationalist Youth during an altercation, he fell in the middle of a crowded street in Paris and died of his wounds. The Méric case has shaken French politics and was the principle factor that led to the banning of the Oeuvre Française and Jeunesses Nationalistes.

The rise of the far right in France does not only concern violent underground groups. It is linked to the crystallization of social frustration and the legitimization of its discourse. Recent national election results highlight the fact that the far right is not only gaining voters from the traditional right but also from the left. Opinion polls show the disaffection of the working class towards the left and the very use of the word “class” appears to have become somewhat absolete. The Parti Socialiste in France is often described as falsely left-wing, whilst hard left appears to be not about liberalism and the acceptance of the free-market, but rather a strong anti-globalisation stance. Jean Luc Mélenchon (Front de Gauche, Left Front) gathered 11% of the votes in the presidential election of 2012. In comparison, FN candidate Marine Le Pen won nearly twice as many votes (19%). What the FN programme offers is quintessentially populist: a denial of the overwhelming power of economic liberalism crossed with xenophobia. Whilst Mélenchon’s Left Front with its strong socialism seemed like a short-lived phenomenon, the political recipe of the FN has worked over the years. The far right took the sovereign, anti-globalisation vision of the hard left and added social conservatism. Those stakes grounded the shift in the working-class vote (29% FN) from the left to the far right that political analysts depict.

This observation requires nuancing: the droitisation (movement directed towards the right) of the working-class vote does not only benefit the far right but also the republican right. Droitisation was considered a major contribution to Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 victory. Sarkozy’s strength came from his capacity to gather together very different trends within the right, extending his political rhetoric to delicate issues that traditionally serve the interests of the far right: security, immigration and national identity. Thanks for this are also due to his campaign adviser Patrick Buisson, who comes from the UMP’s (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, Sarkozy’s Party) hardline conservative wing. This shift crystallised resentment and frustration, becoming cornerstones of the discourse and action of his government. By openly courting FN voters at the end of his 2012 campaign he legitimized the FN. The growing influence of the far right is, therefore, also due to a process of legitimization as the Front National (FN) has strived to become publicly acceptable. After its founder, the controversial Jean Marie Le Pen who had been convicted of racism, anti-Semitism and Holocaust-denial over the past four decades, left the party to his daughter, the image of the FN changed considerably. Giving it a “modern” image, she stresses that FN is right-wing, not the “extreme” right. Marine Le Pen’s strategy was combined with the legitimization of the FN’s core issues at the top of the traditional republican right agenda.

This growing affinity is one of the scariest trends in the history of French right: the extremist party does no longer appears extreme and the boundaries between republican right and hard right have blurred. Extremism has not disappeared from the French or European political landscape. The far right phenomenon is not reduced to one party, its ideology has a broad influence that crosses political borders and is expressed in ballot boxes as well as in the streets of Paris.

Deborah Asseraf is a postgraduate student in Sciences Po Paris, specializing in the field of public policy, and president of Sciences Po Public Affairs Master’s society. She is interested international relations and politics.

#pañueloblanco

July 15, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Laura Hamilton

Symbols have been used for centuries to allow people to demonstrate they belong to a group, reflect their beliefs and show solidarity with a cause. With time they become icons – for better or for worse – and just one look at a symbol can evoke the memory of the cause associated with it. I will look at the movement of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and their trademark white headscarf (pañuelo blanco in Spanish), an example of a symbol prior to the age of the Twitter and Facebook, where solidarity to a cause is often shown in a digital format.

Nowadays, the use of a hashtag allows people to use social media in order to show their solidarity, or disagreement, with a topic or thought. It creates a group mentality and means that people are able to group their thoughts and beliefs together by simply adding a hash sign before an agreed word. This can be used in relation to pretty much anything, but often is used in campaigns or protests. However, this has not always been the case, and prior to the Internet, other methods were used to identify groups.

Although the Guerra Sucia took place in Argentina over 40 years ago, every day new discoveries are being made about what truly happened during those years of political violence, especially thanks to the tireless campaigning of a group of Argentine women.

The picture accompanying this article shows street art above a children’s playground in Buenos Aires. Although at first it seems like ghosts, or abstract cartoon characters, it is in fact depicting the trademark white headscarves of La Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (The Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo).

Street art covers the city: this piece has not been created at random, but has been put here to show that the Madres are protecting the children; watching over them; that they will not allow the atrocities of the ‘dirty war’ to be repeated. Wandering around the city, you can see this same design dotted around and it is even stencilled onto the pavement in the Plaza de Mayo.

The significance of a white headscarf in this context is that when the headscarves were first used it was because their protests began in a time when it was prohibited to meet in groups. Therefore members were able to identify one another by this item of clothing, but could not be arrested for protest, since it was not out of the ordinary. A white headscarf, something which most Argentine women owned already, was then transformed from a simple item of clothing into the symbol of their protest.

The white headscarf has served as a symbol, becoming a political icon due to the association with the cause and embodying the Madres political aims. It reflects the political action they have taken and the creativity used to show solidarity and further their cause in a way that meant they could not be arrested since they did not physically gather in a group but were able to identify one another through the white scarf, which has now become the symbol of their cause.

In the 21st Century, modern technology facilitates protests: live commentary appears on Twitter within minutes; Facebook statuses inform us of friends’ political views; YouTube videos go viral and make a global impact. Protests can be organised in a matter of minutes via social media, with hashtags allowing users to show their solidarity for a campaign. These women used what they had available and anyone who has visited, or lived, in Buenos Aires will be able to explain the meaning attached to these headscarves and the identity that they have now embodied. This demonstrates the impact something as simple as a piece of white cloth can have, a predecessor to the hashtag in identifying oneself as part of a movement, or the Guy Fawkes’ masks worn by Anonymous protesters in recent years. It demonstrates that using a symbol to signify group identity has been around for centuries, and leaves me to wonder what the Madres would use if they were to begin their movement today.

Unrest in Turkey: from ‘3 or 5 trees’ to ‘democracy’

June 5, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal

Recently, the Municipal Government of Istanbul decided to rebuild the Taksim Military Barracks (Topcu Kislasi) in Taksim as either a shopping mall or a hotel. This project involves building over much of Gezi Parki, in Taksim. However, Mayor of Istanbul Topbas and AKP (Justice and Development Party) officials including PM Erdogan denied any damage to trees, stating they would ‘dislocate and plant’ trees elsewhere. Protesters including young people, civil rights activists and environmentalists started to flock to the park after the beginning of demolition and construction on 29th May. When asked about the protest, Mayor Topbas declared PM Erdogan would make the final decision, but the latter refused to review the project.

This is not the first time this year that Taksim square has been at the centre of protests. On 1st May 2013 workers’ unions were denied the right to march into the square -arguing that potholes prevented a safe demonstration. Taksim holds vast symbolic importance in Turkey’s recent Republican history. On that occasion, police reacted with heavy-handed crowd control methods including gas rounds and water cannon, resulting in several wounded.

The present protests have seen unprecedented and disproportionate use of force by police –including burning down tents of civilian protesters, tear gas bombs, and water cannon. Undeterred and rallied through social media such as Twitter the number of protesters swelled to tens of thousands turning up on Saturday 31 May. Protests quickly spread to other big cities including Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Adana, Antalya, Trabzon, Gaziantep and Balikesir, Hatay and Tunceli. Simultaneous protests were also organised in cities abroad such as London, Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, the USA such as New York, Chicago.

This protest, unlike many in Turkey’s politically fractious past, includes protesters from different sectors of society. There are elderly and young, men and women, secular and veiled, Turkish, Kurdish, or other ethnic, Muslim, non-Muslim, Sunnis, Alevis, leftists, rightists, Revolutionary Muslims, anarchists, Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, environmentalists, conservatives, non-party partisans, LBGT rights activists. Some, who would not descend to what are becoming street battles with 7ft high barricades of cobble stones, make noise with cooking pots in their balconies. Additionally, on Monday the KESK union federation (with 240,000 members) has begun a two-day strike in support of the protests, accusing the government of ‘state terror’, as has the Istanbul branch of EGITIM-SEN. The level of individuality, and claims of citizen’s rights in these protests is highlighted by criticism of the main opposition parties, CHP (Republican People’s Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) for their inability and unwillingness to provide a concerted opposition or take action in parliament. On the other side of the spectrum, protesters have been unable to appeal to wider working class concerns, which makes participation of working groups unlikely, unless the growing protest movement is able to speak to dire economic, social and political concerns of workers.

Although demands and concerns are far from coordinated and comprehensively supported, a brief summary of the main ones seems necessary. For further reference, see at the end of the article for a list of sources and websites to follow the demands and developments.

-the reversal of plans for Gezi Park;

-the reversal of the decision to demolish the historic Emek Sinemasi (cinema) in Istiklal, Beyoglu, and Ataturk Kultur Merkezi (Ataturk Cultural Centre) in Taksim, Beyoglu.

-revision of the Constitution by the AKP government –the AKP government launched an amendment to change the first three articles of the constitution (which define the fundamental principles of the Republic), and to introduce a presidential system;

-opposition to the government’s Syrian policy, which they contend is bringing instability to the South of the country -with instances such as Reyhanli;

-reversal of policies restricting alcohol consumption

-concern about state control of the media

-widespread arrest, imprisonment and trial of opposition military leaders, journalists and intellectuals, activists since 2007 –symbolised by detention in Silivri prison.

-concern about rapid privatisation programmes and the role of private firm in rural areas

-accusations of corruption at executive government and judicial level;

-recent changes in the education system promoted without consultation and despite educators’ concerns;

-concerns about mistreatment of minority entities like Kurds, Alevis and others (see for instance the Uludere incident). The naming of the proposed third bridge over the Bosphorus as ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim’ –Selim the First (responsible for a massacre of Alevi in the 16th century) has become a symbol of this issue

-concerns about domestic and public, physical and verbal violence against women and LBGT

-call for PM Erdogan to resign

-wider environmental concerns

Evidently, it is no longer the issue of the park that is drawing such disparate groups together; the protests have now escalated with a rising number of diverse and, so far, uncoordinated demands. The park, however, is still the only issue that commands broad consensus, with requests to cancel the demolition of the park and the construction of the Ottoman-style barracks, accountability over recent police excesses in Istanbul and the right to protest. As of the time of writing protests continue, with hundreds camping out in city centres. Disproportionate use of force police has continued, with one casualty confirmed as of Tuesday afternoon.

PM Erdogan has notoriously criticised Syrian President Assad for his use of force against opponents and ignoring democratic demands. On the other hand, Turkish protesters are not spoken of in the same light, instead being labelled by government sources and the PM as ‘marginal’, ‘plunderers’, ‘drunks’ and agents of the Republican Party out to destabilise the country. Furthermore, he highlights that his leadership is supported by the 50% of the country that voted for him in the last election. On 3rd June Erdogan left for a scheduled visit to Morocco and today 4th, the Deputy Prime Minister Arinc has declared that the original protests against the redevelopment of the park were ‘just and legitimate’ and offered talks with the protesters on the subject of the park. He offered a very qualified apology to protesters victims of police excesses adding ‘I do not think we need to apologise to those who create destruction of public property in the streets and who try to prevent the freedom of the people in the streets.’

Another major issue has been the role of the mainstream national and independent media including NTV and even CNNTurk (the Turkish franchisee of CNN) have not been covering the protests except for the reverberations events have had on stock market valuations. This silence, notoriously including cooking shows and documentaries about penguins being aired during the protests, has revealed the extent to which the government is able to control major state and independent media outlets, provoking protests against the media. Smaller outlets such as Halk TV, Ulusal Kanal and T24 have been reporting on the protests, as well as foreign media including the BBC, CNN, Reuters, Al Jazeera, AP, AFP and others.

Considering the partial abstention of mainstream media from the events, not unlike events in North Africa and the Middle East in the last two years, observers following events are left with snippets of information from social media and online depositories of photographs and video. The evidence so far points to widespread abuse by police forces including thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings of protesters, excessive use of tear and other crowd dispersing gas agents, and serious injuries caused by the widespread use of rubber bullets, water cannon.

Amnesty in Turkey have published a report (3rd June) detailing round numbers for injured protestors on the basis of hospital data. In Istanbul, at least 1500 people received treatment during demonstrations. In Ankara, at least 424 people received treatment in hospitals; in Izmir, 420 people received treatment in last two days. Amnesty in Turkey calls for an immediate end to abusive use of force against demonstrators. It states that the use of tear gas and water cannons is not acceptable during peaceful demonstrations. It also calls for authorities to launch impartial and independent investigations into the policing of demonstrators. It also indicated that lessons should be for the future policing of demonstrations.

This is the biggest public protest since Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republic Protests) in 2007 against the candidacy of politicians from Milli Gorus –a predecessor of AKP. During these protests, many marched to ‘protect Republican values’ especially secularism. Although today’s protests include all Republicans, it goes beyond to include above-mentioned various groups.

It would not be accurate to describe these protests as a ‘Turkish Spring’. For a start, Turkey is already a democracy. On the contrary, I read the protests as a claiming its right to practice democracy beyond the ballot box and in protest form. A variety of dissatisfaction with the AKP government is certainly the key to these protests, and it is clear that the PM is unwilling to address or be seen to address this dissatisfactions, as many have read his persistence in continuing his scheduled trip to Morocco and the much-belated offer by Deputy PM Arinc to have a dialogue about the park.

Finally, I wish to highlight a crucial point that I feel is at the core of the non-park aspects of the protests: democracy is a right and principle that extends beyond the ballot box and includes freedom of expression and protest as well as demanding accountability from government. Peaceful protests, freedom of speech and government accountability are constitutional principles in Turkey; these protesters are actualising their claim to these rights.

Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: Understanding the 2013 Verizon DBIR

May 25, 2013 by Strife Staff

By David Grebe

Every year, Verizon publishes the Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR). This report, while far from perfect, gives us a glimpse into the state of the field, and allows us to challenge some common misconceptions about cybersecurity.

Firstly, it should be noted that the datasets used in the report are far from normally distributed. Firms and organizations freely volunteer the data used to create the report. Because of this, and the fact that Verizon is only partnered with organizations in the US, Europe, Australia, and Malaysia, the data can be expected to be skewed at certain points. Verizon makes a note of this in the report, but then still presents some bizarre data because the validity of the datasets is left unquestioned. For example, the claim that the Chinese government and its affiliates make up around 95% of all espionage cases seems a very bold claim. Another problematic claim by the report, that Romania is the second largest perpetrator of cyberattacks (as the origin of 28% of all external attacks), also seems fishy.

In addition, the report makes use of two separate datasets (one is larger, while the other uses better described security incidents), which ends up presenting problems. For example, one dataset claims that social means to gain access made up 29% of all attacks – the other claims 1%. This is because the report includes many cases of credit card fraud, misuse of equipment, and the user error of sending emails to the wrong people in the larger, rarely used dataset. As these types of cases make up over half of the dataset (and previously took up about one percent), it overwhelms the dataset as well as creating a mixed picture by having different sets of definitions. However, this reminds us that little changes in what a “data breach” consists of drastically affects the data that is presented. Thus, because of the nature of this data, the percentages in the findings ought to be taken with some salt – the importance of this data is to begin to understand about broader trends and possible misconceptions, not the individual values themselves.

As this report has been going on for several years, some trends have emerged that challenge our previous conceptions. For one, external attacks are far more prevalent that internal ones. If true, this turns a common fallacy taught to most of our IT professionals on its head. According to the report, in 2012 only 14% of breaches we committed by insiders, a trend that has held up for the last 5 years. While disgruntled employees striking back at their workplaces may be flashy and costly, most of the cases (92%) appear to be external (keep in mind that a breach may be both internal and external). That being said, once the data includes various extra types of misuse and error (such as namely, losing devices, mis-delivering emails, and misuse of equipment), this picture becomes murkier.

Secondly, people interested in cybersecurity often hear too many buzzwords about massive plans by states to exploit backdoors and use logic bombs to infiltrate their opponents. However, ‘95% of all state-affiliated espionage attacks relied on phishing’. While I doubt that the popularity of phishing is that high, I think it is safe to conclude that even states rely on simple means to steal data. Likewise, of the 631 reports that make up the main dataset, only one required significant customizations and advanced skills to perform. Over 75% of the attacks fit into the low or very low difficulty ratings, demonstrating that a hacker could perpetrate the attacks with little or no knowledge, and with little adjustment to existing hacking tools. In fact, just over half all data breaches studied involved hacking at all to gain access to the targeted computer(s).

Thirdly, even computer illiterate end users can make a simple change to help protect themselves. 76% of network intrusions exploited lost, stolen or weak passwords. Thus, simply taking a step such as two factor authentication (where a person does not just provide a password, but also a code sent by text to their phone or their thumbprint), while a hassle, could solve a large portion of all data breaches.

We thank Verizon and its various partners for making this report public. Open statistical data is incredibly difficult to come by in the field. While the report certainly has its problems, it is usually clear about them. From the data, hopefully we can start to understand some of the areas where our conceptions are not meeting reality, and start to change our tactics because of it.

The 2013 DBIR can be found here: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/

With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading

May 7, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Jill R. Russell

In late 2003 a colleague of General James Mattis wrote to him asking for a few words on the
importance of reading and military history for the officer, even where it might seem that one was
“too busy to read.” His response went viral over email – had it been in the time of Twitter this
blog piece would be unnecessary. But it enjoyed a wide distribution within the Marine Corps,
and eventually arrived in my inbox. As a military historian, I cannot minimize my appreciation
that he wrote so eloquently on the subject. If it were only for that, the essay would be valuable.
But his writing is valuable also because we rarely have opportunities to hear the unfiltered
thoughts of leaders as well for his role in the history of recent conflicts.

Much is written and [believed to be] known about the General as a warrior. Less is known about
him as a true student of his profession. I would submit that it is quite impossible to correctly
understand the former without a proper interrogation of the latter. By this I mean that one must
first accept that a significant body of intellectual material sustains his actions and opinions –
as is indicated in the messages, he devotes real effort to this aspect of his work. So, there is a
base of knowledge that is always growing. On top of that are the benefits which accrue to those
who think and critically engage with such material. Furthermore, there is his consideration of
the views of others – as in the breadth of his reading or response to my comments – suggesting
that he had not fallen prey to the hubris of the powerful, which is to believe they have all of the
answers. Good leaders don’t only hear “yes” from the people around them. Thus, the insight
these words give to his thinking and interests is invaluable.

I also have to note that from a historian’s perspective this professional practice is fascinating.
It is Hegel hurled at the maelstrom of emergent Clio, a manifestation of E.H. Carr’s “unending
dialogue between past and present.” There is an awful popular tendency to try to use history
prescriptively. This is a bad, bad idea. Very often the lessons relied upon are incorrect or
inappropriate. However, history – from quality works – as a critical thinking process, whose
substance also furthers understanding [of regions, types of events, etc.] can inform posterity to
good effect. The General’s essay is an exposition of this principle.

Published with his permission, I would like to make perfectly clear that except where I excised
personal details regarding his correspondent, these messages are as he wrote them. I have,
according to the current practice in the historical community, left them as they were in the
originals. If there is shorthand, abbreviations or minor errors, they reflect the reality that these
were originally private correspondence. It was not the General’s expectation at the time that they
would be made public. In return for the odd aesthetic wobble, what you get is a rare insight into
the thinking of a general officer, an experienced and battle tested commanding officer, on how
he thinks about materials and issues critically important to his profession and (by virtue of the
public nature of his profession) posterity.

Finally, note that these messages were written in the months leading up to his deployment to
Iraq in command of I MEF in February of 2004.

Message 1: from General James Mattis, on the matter of professional reading, 20 November
2003

….The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s
experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a
better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of
incompetence are so final for young men.

Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for
how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give
me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.

With TF 58, I had w/ me Slim’s book, books about the Russian and British experiences in AFG,
and a couple others. Going into Iraq, “The Siege” (about the Brits’ defeat at Al Kut in WW I) was
req’d reading for field grade officers. I also had Slim’s book; reviewed T.E. Lawrence’s “Seven
Pillars of Wisdom”; a good book about the life of Gertrude Bell (the Brit archaeologist who
virtually founded the modern Iraq state in the aftermath of WW I and the fall of the Ottoman
empire); and “From Beirut to Jerusalem”. I also went deeply into Liddell Hart’s book on
Sherman, and Fuller’s book on Alexander the Great got a lot of my attention (although I never
imagined that my HQ would end up only 500 meters from where he lay in state in Babylon).

Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.
For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of
war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say… “Not
really”: Alex the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right
now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying
(studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us.

We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their
experience. “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the
moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff
officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we don’t
know a hell of a lot more than just the TTPs? What happens when you’re on a dynamic
battlefield and things are changing faster than higher HQ can stay abreast? Do you not
adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? (Darwin has
a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing
circumstance — in the information age things can change rather abruptly and at warp
speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly
in our recent fights.) And how can you be a sentinel and not have your unit caught
flat-footed if you don’t know what the warning signs are — that your unit’s preps are not
sufficient for the specifics of a tasking that you have not anticipated?

Perhaps if you are in support functions waiting on the warfighters to spell out the specifics of
what you are to do, you can avoid the consequences of not reading. Those who must adapt to
overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed that luxury.

This is not new to the USMC approach to warfighting — Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I
read (and reread) Rommel’s Papers (remember “Kampstaffel”?), Montgomery’s book (“Eyes
Officers”…), “Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, “commanders’
relationships” being more important than “command relationships”), and some others. As a
result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that
many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives because I didn’t have the vision
in my mind of how to destroy the enemy at least cost to our guys and to the innocents on the
battlefields.

Hope this answers your question…. I will cc my ADC in the event he can add to this. He is the
only officer I know who has read more than I.

Semper Fi, Mattis

———-

Message 2: from Jill Russell to General Mattis, 26 November 2003

Sir,

Your message to [the] Colonel…was forwarded to me by a colleague – as I am a military
historian he knew I would appreciate its content. I offer here a response to one portion of your
message, which, taken as a whole, was as eloquent a statement on the value of history as I’ve
come across.

You wrote: “For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that
the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully
say… ‘Not really’ ….”

I would submit that the 4GW thinkers do not at all eschew the study of military history. If you
take Van Creveld’s On Future War as an example of the genre, his entire case is based on an
examination of aspects of war across the full span of military history. Take as an example of
this his treatment of the changing ideas about prisoners of war, who were at one time in history

allowed “parole” to travel home to collect a ransom payment. If there is any concern amongst
4GW thinkers regarding the use of military history to inform current thoughts on military affairs,
it is directed at the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success
and dominance are used to define the future, even if [the] future of warfare seems headed
elsewhere.

If I were going to Iraq in the winter of 2004, I might include a few books on the CAP and Evans
Carlson. (It’s a pity that the new bio of him will not be out in time.) I think of these not because
they are particularly or specifically prescriptive for the current situation, but rather as examples
of Marines in history who looked at a situation and arrived at an answer that differed from
the standard. (Are the donkeys a sign of genius rather than weakness?) That each of these
unorthodox answers turned out to be correct in many respects is gravy. Also, Evans Carlson
was himself an avid reader, bringing many varied volumes with him on his travels throughout
China during 1937/8. My favorite amongst his selections was The Education of Henry Adams.
Of course, I would be more than just curious to hear your selections.

Best wishes for a very happy Thanksgiving to you and your Marines.

V/R

Jill Sargent Russell

——-

Message 3: from General Mattis to Jill Russell, 26 November 2003

Dear Ms Russell: Thank you for taking the time to write. I quickly scratched my note off to [the
Colonel] in response to a question and regret if my comments about 4th Generation of Warfare
stuff touched a raw nerve on some folks. I did not intend it personally or to anyone who studies
war; I have a problem with those who carry an ahistorical view of war into acceptance of the
latest bumper sticker; war in its various permutations is not new to me and some folks have
glommed onto 4th Generation of War concepts to say everything is new, history has little (no?)
place anymore because of how different things are, etc.

I regret any misunderstanding that my hastily written note has caused, wholly my responsibility.
That said, I appreciate your reading suggestions (obviously you don’t triangulate using bumper
stickers). My own “list” changes from mission to mission, location to location, etc, and perhaps
one day we can shoot the breeze about good books (my best new ideas, of course, come from
the old books, which are a passion with me). Until then, I am happy to know that we have folks
like you studying military history, engaged in deciphering what is going on from an
unregimented, intellectually rigorous perspective.

Best wishes and Semper Fi, Mattis

Jill S. Russell is a military historian and doctoral candidate at King’s College London who writes frequently on contemporary foreign policy and security issues. She is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

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