By: William McHenry
During the last decade, the United States (U.S.) has engaged in protracted military conflicts with Islamist extremist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS). In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. committed immense resources to counter-insurgency campaigns waged against such extremist groups. Throughout these military campaigns, policymakers have focused on improving the US and allied military capabilities, rather than expanding the institutional knowledge necessary to understand the potency of extremist ideology. The way in which the ISIS responds to threats reveals a significant amount of the durability of the ideological bonds of its leaders. More particularly, ISIS has an ideological core that has allowed it to retain a fighting capacity well beyond the point where it would appear rational for its members to defect and for the organisation to collapse. Observations from the ground seem to support this argument. In Anbar province, Iraq military leadership has attributed recent military victories against ISIS to the withdrawal of its leaders from the battlefield before coalition forces arrive. Therefore, coalition forces should re-examine military strategy with the Islamic State, because it has durable ideological bonds that subsume individual survival into the survival of the organisation.
The Rise of ISIS
The founding of the Islamic State has its roots in real or perceived exclusion of Sunnis from political and economic processes in post-Saddam Iraq and Syria. Hence, ISIS’ ideology is ‘couched in a sectarian existential crisis’.[1] Additionally, it blames external power, namely the United States and Iran, for economic hardships and military incursions. Consequently, the Islamic State draws its appeal by waging jihad against such powers. ‘ISIS ideology began with Sunni grievances and is underpinned by religious beliefs”.[2] Sunni victimhood and Islamist extremism is ISIS’ main rallying cry.[3]
The rise of ISIS between 2010 and 2014 can be defined as the inculcation of this ideology among ISIS elites. During this period, the organisations’s leadership that consists of former Ba’athist party members and veterans of the Iraqi and Afghanistan insurgencies began to tie their fates to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the leader of the Islamic State). These elites achieved strategic goals through implementing theocratic repression and seizing significant amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria.[4] Moreover, they made progress toward their long-term goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Today many elites have doubts about its global apocalyptic goals, yet, feel obliged to maintain absolute loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. ISIS’ leaders recognised that a coherent ideology is necessary for recruitment and group cohesion. According a journal that describes the ISIS’ structure, ‘A criminal [ISIS] cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the ‘Caliphate’ and potentially their deaths’.[5] Furthermore, many ISIS’ leaders are former members of Saddam’s secular Ba’ath regime who realised the significance of having a charismatic leader to give the organisation an appealing ideology. Indeed, the Islamic State has adopted a similar leadership structure to the Baathist party. [6] Most experts argue that ISIS’ strategic victories are related to this perverse combination of ideological fanaticism and former Baathist thuggery.[7] As the caliphate has grown, the illusory power of the ‘caliph’ has expanded as its leaders perceive themselves as re-ordering the region and re-imagining Islamic identity.
Policy Implications: The Durability of the Islamic State’s Ideology
How can the U.S. defeat a group that has cultivated such durable elite loyalty? Recent U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East indicates that the current approach to fighting extremists focused solely on improving military capacity is flawed.[8] The emergence of the ISIS surprised most policymakers due to the group’s perceived lack of military capacity.[9] Yet, ISIS captured Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, by defeating a garrison of 30,000 Iraqi Armed Forces with only a small force between 800 and 1,500 fighters.[10] In response to its initial success in Mosul, it has experienced substantial military pressure from the U.S.-backed Operation Inherent Resolve anti-ISIS coalition. Despite this military pressure, the group has sustained only tactical (objective based) rather than strategic (enduring) defeats.[11] Walt therefore identifies one of the most difficult challenges facing the current anti-ISIS campaign: the lack of understanding of its social foundations.[12]
First, the US should link military support to the Iraqi Armed Forces with mandated Sunni participation in the Iraqi central government and re-structure the Iraqi government along the lines of the current Lebanese model. Ethnic inclusion and reconciliation within the Lebanese government helped resolve a similarly violent sectarian civil war in Lebanon. A similar political reconciliation with Sunni tribes will undermine its constitutive story of ethnic victimhood and absolutism. Third, requiring Sunni participation in Iraq’s political future could also create incentives for elite defections within the Islamic State. If elites perceive a political future for Sunnis in Iraq, there will be a greater probability they detach themselves from ISIS’s murderous ideology
We can already observe that the group has become more paranoid about leadership defections. These policies will damage ISIS’ military capacity more than the deployment of further conventional resources. If the U.S. does not adopt these strategies, it will continue to have its regional interests in the Middle East threatened by ISIS and similar organisations with potent and durable ideological bonds.
William McHenry is an independent research analyst focused on U.S. foreign policy, grand strategy, and national identity. He holds a Master’s Degree from the American University School of International Service and tweets at @wmchenry
Notes:
[1] Arango, Tim. “A Tour of Falluja Reveals Grim Remnants of Life Under ISIS.” The New York Times. June 22, 2016.
[2] Chulov, Martin. “Why Isis Fights | Martin Chulov.” The Guardian. September 17, 2015
[3] Smith, Rogers “Citizenship and the politics of people-building,” Citizenship Studies 5, 1 (2001), 73-96.
[4] Chulov, Martin. “Why Isis Fights | Martin Chulov.” The Guardian. September 17, 2015
[5] Reuter, Christoph. “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State – SPIEGEL ONLINE.” Spiegel Online. April 18, 2015.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Weiss, Michael, Martin Chulov, and Jade Parker. The Inner Workings of ISIS. Proceedings of The Inner Workings of ISIS, Atlantic Council, Washington DC. Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2016
[8] Youssef, Nancy, and Tim Mak. “Obama’s General Just Set an ISIS War Plan on Fire.” The Daily Beast. September 15, 2016
[9] “The Mystery of ISIS.” The New York Review of Books. N.p., 13 Mar. 2015. Web. 04 Mar. 2016.
[10] Knights, Michael. “Battle for Mosul: Critical Test Ahead for Iraq.” BBC News. June 11, 2014.
[11] Weiss, Michael, Martin Chulov, and Jade Parker. The Inner Workings of ISIS. Proceedings of The Inner Workings of ISIS, Atlantic Council, Washington DC. Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2016
[12] Walt, Stephen M. “ISIS as Revolutionary State.” Foreign Affairs. Web. 4 Mar. 2016.
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William McHenry
William McHenry is an independent research analyst focused on U.S. foreign policy, grand strategy, and national identity. He holds a Master’s Degree from the American University School of International Service and tweets at @wmchenry