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Trouble in paradise? On racism in Sweden

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By Josefin Hedlund:

The Swedish town of Eskilstuna. Photo: Fredrik Alpstedt (creative commons)
The Swedish town of Eskilstuna. Photo: Fredrik Alpstedt (creative commons)

I was sad and shaken to hear about the arson attack on a mosque in my hometown of Eskilstuna, Sweden, on Christmas Day. The speculations and reactions that ensued in both “old” media outlets and “new” social media were an ugly but necessary reminder of the problems of structural racism in the country, once known as perhaps the social democratic utopia. Sweden needs to face up to, and deal with, these issues through educational, socio-economic, and positive discrimination policies, rather than just blaming it on racist parties such as the “The Sweden Democrats” (SD). This is something that all liberal societies can learn from, instead of sustaining the myth of Sweden as the land of equality and welfare.

The fire happened in broad daylight, 70 people had gathered inside the mosque for prayer. A Molotov cocktail smashed through a window and set fire to the venue, leaving five people in hospital and a heavily damaged building. Since the attack, another two mosques in small towns in Sweden have been set on fire – fortunately not resulting in any further injuries or serious damage.

Speculations as to who was responsible started almost immediately, and suspicions quickly fell on different types of neo-Nazi and racist groups. This is partly because such groups have a strong history of support in the old industrial town of Eskilstuna, but also because attacks on mosques – as well as Islamophobia and racism – have increased significantly in Sweden over the last couple of years. The anti-racist investigative magazine Expo reports that this is the 12th attack on mosques in Sweden in 2014.[i] Although they suspect that the actual number is much higher, since evidence points to how “smaller” attacks, such as racist and Islamophobic graffiti, are usually not reported to the police. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities recently reported that 41% of mosques that participated in a recent study had experienced some sort of vandalism.[ii] Meanwhile, Facebook groups such as “Mosques in Sweden – no thanks!” has a staggering 67,786 “likes”, and the accompanying group “Islam in Sweden – no thanks!” has 14,124 “likes”.

Moreover, on a parliamentary level, the racist party “The Sweden Democrats” increased their share of the vote from 5.7% to 12.9% at the latest elections in September 2014. This is a party that, just like their peers all over Europe, claims they are not racist but just oppose immigration and “different cultures” (such as Islam) in defence of “Swedish culture and values”. In fact they refuse to spell out what they mean by “different cultures”, instead reproducing circular arguments about Swedish culture being “what Swedes do.”[iii] And, importantly, a real “Swede” here is not just a Swedish citizen, but also someone who has fully adopted Swedish values. So a Swede is someone who does things that the mythical breed of Swedes do. This means that they can call any group of people they don’t like “non-Swedish.” Of course, these groups always consist of “Black” or “Middle Eastern-looking” peoples (or “racified peoples”- an expression I will explain later).

Recently, this became shockingly obvious when the new party leader, Björn Söder, stated that Jews and Saami people (indigenous to Northern Scandinavia) are not Swedish.[iv] Their success in the last election therefore shocked many and caused havoc in parliament as SD voted down the proposed Green/Social Democratic budget and thus opened up the possibility of another election. This was only prevented by an agreement between the Left-wing bloc and the Centre-right parties. Some polls showed that support for SD would have been as high as 16% had there been another election.[v]

The successes of the SD have meant that the themes of racism and Islamophobia have been a central focus of recent debates in Sweden. Consequently, the message of anti-racism, as well as religious freedom, was common in condemnations of the attack in Eskilstuna. The anti-racist network “Together for Eskilstuna” organized a demonstration the next day, where people were encouraged to “Love bomb” the mosque by putting up messages of support on heart-shaped bits of paper. Several hundred people turned up and left messages on the wall of the mosque and many of these called for an end to racism and for religious freedom. Prime Minister Löfven strongly condemned the attacks by saying: “the most important thing is that we all, together, stand up for what Sweden really is. And this is not what Sweden is.”[vi]

Yet Sweden’s racism problem is, in fact, part of “what Sweden is”. As commentator Valerie Kyeyene Backström has argued, this type of “empty” anti-racist condemnation is highly prevalent in Swedish debates.[vii] Backstrom and her colleagues at the separatist web platform Rummet (“The Room”)[viii] repeatedly point to the lack of awareness of the structural racism that pervades Swedish society. Racism is instead always discussed as a marginal problem. A popular slogan after the election was, for example, “87% versus 13%,” thus insisting that “the racists” only make up a small minority of the population – i.e. the SD voters.

Many parties and commentators have even been hesitant to call SD “racist,” and instead use the term “xenophobic,” which further entrenches the idea that Sweden does not have problems with racism. This became even clearer in the debates around the suggestion, put forward by previous Minister of Employment Erik Ullenhag last summer, to remove the term “race” from Swedish law. Ullenhag’s reasoning for this was that “race” is an outdated social construction, and as such should not be used. Many liberal debaters supported this suggestion by arguing that “race” does not exist in Sweden. Thus, anti-racist arguments in Sweden are mostly symbolic rhetoric against “outdated” ideas that “others” hold, not about issues that Sweden as a whole needs to address.

But racism is a much bigger issue than these debates suggest. The “Afrophobia Report,”[ix] which was commissioned by Ullenhag himself with the aim of improving knowledge about racism in Sweden, showed precisely this. The findings, published in March 2014, showed that Afro-Swedes are over-represented by 240% as victims of hate crimes, and that this figure has increased by 24% since 2008. Moreover, the unemployment figure for people born in Africa or Asia in 2009 was around 24.7%, compared to 3.5-4% for people born in Sweden. This is the highest difference in employment in Western countries between foreign-born and native-born citizens.[x][xi]

The report also pointed to studies that show how people with an “African-sounding” name have to apply for three times as many jobs as applicants with “Swedish-sounding” names before they are called to an interview – even though they have similar qualifications. What’s more, 38.7% of Afro-Swedes had a “limited economy”[xii] in 2007 compared to 10.5% among Swedish-born residents; and 19.9% were considered “poor” compared to 3.7% of Swedish-born residents.

All of these findings were also supported by the UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, which visited Sweden in December 2014. They concluded that “the Swedish philosophy of equality and its public and self-image as a country with non-discrimination and liberal democracy, blinds it to the racism faced by Afro-Swedes and Africans in their midst”.[xiii]

This is the reality of racism that Sweden needs to face up to: namely, that racism is a structural problem that the whole society is responsible for. Thus, it needs to be dealt with through affirmative socio-economic and educational policies with the aim of changing economic, political and discursive structures, rather than with an empty rhetoric of anti-racism that assumes racism is something that “others” do.

Following some of the recommendations of the Afrophobia report and of the UN working group, this could, for example, take the form of educational programs on Sweden’s role in the transatlantic slave trade and more information on the history of the slave trade and racism in general. Another idea is for the government to mobilise a large national campaign against racism, which importantly should seek to get rid of the “us and them” mentality that separates “Swedes” from “immigrants” (and which does not refer to people with and without citizenship) that exists in public discourses.

The verb “racify”, which many anti-racist campaigners and commentators already use, is an excellent way to begin changing this mentality. It aims to draw attention to the social and discursive processes that produce people as being of a different race – “racified people”. Furthermore, in order to get better information about racism on different levels, the judiciary and Office for National Statistics need to start collecting data on people’s perceived “racified” appearance. Perhaps a way to employ the verb “racification” here could be to ask people to self-identify, but also to ask how they think society, employers, and institutions perceive their identity. The types of positive discrimination initiatives that already exist in tackling gender inequality with quotas and diversity plans in employment, housing, and politics, are also needed.

In doing this, we need to stop talking about positive discrimination as something negative, which is opposed to equality, but instead need to realize that positive discrimination already exists. This is because discrimination doesn’t just mean that some people receive unjust and prejudiced negative treatment; it also means that some other people receive unfair and unjust positive treatment. Discrimination is hence a form of differentiation between people based on well-established, but problematic, categorisations of people.

This is the main lesson to learn from the case of Sweden’s failure to live up to the myth of the social democratic utopia of equality and welfare. There are always norms and structures that benefit some people and not others in a society. In Sweden, it seems that a lot of the existing norms and structures unjustly promote non-racified, so-called “white” Swedes in many spheres, including employment, economics and public spaces. While we cannot escape norms and structures altogether, we can change, transform and replace them. The suggestions above could be the first steps towards achieving this transformation in the case of Sweden.

The aim should always be to highlight and discuss what these norms are and how they currently work, in order to find ways to open up spaces for people who do not fit in and who do not benefit. This means that anti-racism and anti-discrimination – rather than being means to an end – need to instead be seen as never-ending processes that call upon us always to stay engaged in politics and to work towards the transformation of unjust norms and structures.

Josefin Hedlund is a second year PhD student in the Department of War Studies at Kings. Her research focuses on Swedish public discourses on solidarity as a way of exploring questions of ethico-politics in the work of Jacques Derrida and International Relations.

 

NOTES

[i] Anders Dalsbro, “Flera moskeattacker i Sverige,” [“More attacks on mosques in Sweden”] Expo Idag, 11th of December 2014. http://expo.se/2014/flera-moskeattacker-i-sverige_6737.html

[ii] Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund, “Främlingsfientliga handlingar mot trossamfund: En kartläggning av religiösa gruppers och individers utsatthet i Sverige 2014,” 12th of November 2014, p.13, http://www.sst.a.se/download/18.2fd784f81498e7bc198f3e27/1415783087001/ffattacker_helarapport.pdf

[iii] Sverigedemokraterna, “Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2011,” [The Sweden Democrats’ Principle Program”], p.15-17. Accessed on 12th of January 2014. http://sverigedemokraterna.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/principprogrammet2014_webb.pdf

[iv] Niklas Orrenius, “Den Leende Nationalismen,” [“The smiling nationalism”], Dagens Nyheter, 14th of December 2014, http://www.dn.se/val/nyval-2015/den-leende-nationalismen/

[v] “S och SD kraftigt uppåt i Novus,” [“S and SD up in Novus”], Aftonbladet, 16th of December 2014, http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article20033343.ab

[vi] Niklas Svensson, “Stefan Löfven fördömer attacker mot moskeer,” [“Stefan Löfven condemns attacks at mosques”], Expressen, 12th of January 2015, http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/lofven-fordomer-attacker-mot-moskeer/

[vii] Valerie Kyeyune Backström, “Antirasism är det tommaste ordet i svenska språket,” [“Anti-racism is the emptiest word in the Swedish language”], Nöjesguiden, 22nd of September 2014, http://nojesguiden.se/artiklar/valerie-kyeyune-backstrom-antirasism-ar-det-tommaste-ordet-i-svenska-spraket

[viii] Rummet.se [The Room]. http://rummets.se/

[ix] All statistics cited can be found in the report “Afrofobi: En Kunskapsöversikt över afrosvenskars situation i dagens Sverige,” Mångkulturellt Centrum, 3rd of February 2014, p. 79-87, http://mkcentrum.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Afrofobi-20140203-f%C3%B6r-webben.pdf

[x] Michael McEchrane, “Seeing Sweden’s race problem for what it is,”AlJazeera Opinion, 15th of December 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/sweden-racism-ultranationalism-201412151245833711.html

[xi] The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “International Migration Outlook 2014,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook-1999124x.htm

[xii] These terms are used by the Swedish National Board for Health and Welfare. ”Poor,” for example, refers to an income which is less than 60% of the average, ”Social Rapport 2010,” [Social Report 2010], Socialstyrelsen, p.91-100. http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Lists/Artikelkatalog/Attachments/17957/2010-3-11.pdf

[xiii] United Nations Human Rights, “Statement to the Media by the United Nations Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, on the conclusion of its official visit,”1-5 December 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15388&LangID=E

The Paris Attacks: a threat to French unity

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By Deborah Asseraf:

Photo: Olivier Ortelpa (creative commons)
The demonstration in the Place de la Republique, Paris, on 11 January. Photo: Olivier Ortelpa (creative commons)

As France mourns 17 of its citizens following the recent Paris attacks, hard times are also synonymous with national union. On 11 January 56 world leaders marched in Paris along with 3.7 million people to show their commitment to universal values such as freedom of speech and human dignity. Unanimous condemnation of the terror acts that occurred between 7-9 January transcends political divisions and ideologies. However the commemorations are likely to be subject to political appropriation by a range of actors and parties. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the spontaneous reaction animating civil society will result in any coherent long-term agenda.

A new form of terror

On 7 January, two masked gunmen stormed the offices of satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo during an editorial meeting (11:30 am), killing 12 people. The paper is well known for its publication of the prophet Muhammad caricatures. In just a few minutes the assailants shot a maintenance worker, a police officer assigned as a bodyguard for the paper’s editor, seven journalists and caricaturists, a guest at the editorial meeting and a national police officer. Armed with AK-47 assault rifles, a shotgun and an RPG launcher, the gunmen managed to escape by car and killed a wounded police officer lying on the pavement. The Kouachi brothers, who carried out the attack, escaped towards the Val de Marne, in the North-East of Paris. Taking a printing house, they resisted a siege by the police for hours in the afternoon of 9 January.

On 8 January, Amedy Coulibaly shot and killed a municipal police officer in Montrouge, south of Paris. The next day Coulibaly seized a kosher grocery store in Porte de Vincennes, a very quiet area in North Paris. Two people were shot as the gunman entered the store and two others during the three-hour hostage crisis. The police launched an assault against the assailant at the end of the afternoon at approximately the same time as the assault carried out against the Kouachi brothers.

The attacks have not been officially claimed by any terror organisation, suggesting the emergence a new form of terrorism that opens opportunities to individuals who are willing to die for a cause with no need to officially belong to a local or global movement. This operating mode is reminiscent of the 15 December Sydney hostage crisis, which involved a single individual who claimed he had links with the Islamic State. As Australian authorities fear copycat attacks, it seems legitimate for France to worry as well in a context where the range of possible threats is widening.

Blurry motives and difficult responses

What happened last week has been described as France’s 9/11, suggesting that the country has reached a critical turning point that will usher in a new era of war against its evil enemy. Nonetheless, the so-called ‘enemy’ seems hardly definable or reachable. Indeed, shedding light on the motives of the attack is difficult if not impossible. Recordings of conversations between Coulibaly and his Jewish hostages emerged in the media after the store’s telephone was left off the hook. They show a confused assailant who justifies his action by referring to France’s foreign policy, highlighting the fact that Muslims are being killed all around the world. He gives the examples of Mali and Syria, where France is part of the coalition against the Islamic State. In a video that emerged on 11 January, two days after his death, Coulibaly is seen pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, self-proclaimed chief of the caliphate, in very poor Arabic.

As the motives of the attacks are blurry, finding long-term coherent responses is extremely difficult. Implementing surveillance policies is one thing but it does not help with tackling the other issue of radicalisation. In this regard, French statutory law has recently been adapted to the jihadist threat with an anti-terrorist bill passed in November 2014. On the one hand it allows authorities to confiscate passports and IDs of volunteers for jihad willing to leave for Syria and Iraq. On the other, it also creates a new kind of criminal offence: ‘individual terrorist enterprise’, which targets self-radicalized terrorists-to-be.

The Paris killings will also feed in to political discourses that are likely to gradually undermine national unity. On 11 January, about 4 million people marched through the streets of Paris and other French cities under the banner of democracy and freedom against terror and ‘barbarity’. Rather than presaging a new political path, the support showed in unity rallies throughout France will only be transient. It goes without saying that ‘islamophobia’ is on the rise as mosques are now being targeted all across France. An aggravated context of discrimination won’t solve the problem but rather anchor some of its causes. Nevertheless, the security question and the fight against an internal enemy may shape French politics for a long time to come.

Jewish emigration to Israel

The reasons that brought the terrorists to Charlie Hebdo are clear: killing journalists and their subversive ideas. They also shot police officers for what they epitomise: the idea of order and law enforcement. By contrast, the last main assault at the Hypercacher of Porte de Vincennes was aimed at killing Jews. Indeed, the Jewish community appears as a constant in the terrorist equation. Only two years after the Toulouse killings at the Jewish school Ozar Hatorah by a French Muslim extremist, Jews feel abandoned by authorities.

In Paris Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid his respects to the victims of the kosher store at the Synagogue de la Victoire but also encouraged French Jews to make ‘aliyah’: which means ascend in Hebrew. According to Israeli leaders, French Jews are meant to emigrate to Israel as hostile Europe is not their home anymore. As a matter of fact, Jewish emigration has skyrocketed these past few years, reaching the peak of 6000 French Jews last year. As controversial as it sounds, the message got through. Because anti-semitism is on the rise, interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve announced the deployment of the army to support 4700 police agents to protect Jewish places of worship and schools. The government’s stance is aimed at reassuring French Jews, as shown in prime minister Manuel Valls’ speech at the Assemblée nationale.

France’s social fabric is loosening and its political context is deeply affected by recent events. Even though the union nationale is still being proclaimed, no solutions to the heightened tensions have yet been found. Not only do the French fear an internal enemy, but in the secular country of laïcité, religious communities are being set against each other. The prospect of appeasement seems distant.

Deborah Asseraf is a postgraduate student at Sciences Po, Paris, specializing in the field of public policy, and president of Sciences Po Public Affairs Master’s society. She is interested in international relations and politics.

Financing Terror, Part I: Private Kuwaiti donors in Syria's Civil War

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By Arne Holverscheid:

Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, northern Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution - Flickr)
Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, north Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution – Flickr)

What happened to President Bashar al-Assad? When Syria descended into civil war in 2011, he was the perfect enemy for the Western public: supported by his ally Iran, he preferred watching his people die and his country be torn apart than give in to demands for freedom, democracy and civil rights. The line between good and evil, between friend and foe seemed clear: it was the Syrian people and their democratic ambitions against Bashar Assad and his powerful friend, Tehran.[i]

Now, after almost four years of fighting, this clear line has become more and more blurred. The Syrian opposition has radicalized: extremists, among them jihadist and Islamist groups, seem to have become the dominant actors.[ii] The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once bearer of hope for Syria in the Western world, is weaker than ever. States from the Arabian Peninsula, considered allies of the United States and Western countries, have joined the fight and have been financing rebel groups in Syria. Many of these rebel groups allegedly belong to the spectrum of Islamic extremism, which is arguably just as opposed to liberal democracy as is Assad.[iii],[iv] But in this complex conflict, private donors from the wealthy state of Kuwait have played a significant part in further blurring the lines in a manner which is much less conspicuous yet leaves a lasting impact.

According to the Koran, giving alms is ordained by Allah. Donations are meant for ‘the poor and the needy…for those in bondage and in debt, in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer’ (Sura 9.60). Kuwaiti donors have taken their religious duty very seriously during the on-going conflict and have made substantial humanitarian contributions to ease the suffering of the Syrian population.[v] The Kuwaiti government has so far refused to go beyond financial contributions and arm Syrian rebels. But many private donors and fundraisers have decided to do exactly this, and the fairly liberal Kuwaiti political system has allowed them to advocate and conduct fundraising activities freely among the Kuwaiti public.[vi] Many within the Sunni majority even openly criticize the government for not arming the Syrian opposition, and influential Salafi figures have joined the efforts to raise money for the Syrian cause.[vii]

Donations are mostly collected using Twitter and other social media networks and are delivered personally by couriers who travel to the Turkish-Syrian border. Hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have entered the Syrian civil war in this way, and the proportion of funds that goes to radical groups is hard to determine. However, donors tend to support and actively encourage those rebels who are specifically aligned with their own religious or ideological beliefs. The Kuwaiti fundraising scene is dominated by extreme religious figures, and it has become clear that large donations were sent to prominent groups in the jihadi spectrum. Particularly close connections have been established with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The latter is known to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and both groups are reported to have recently come to an agreement with the Islamic State (IS), halting the fight against each other in order to challenge common enemies. In addition, the Sunni majority in Kuwait have recently developed a more sympathetic view toward the IS, resulting in a rift between donors about who to support (Al Qaeda/Al–Nusra or IS) and reflecting the overall competition between al-Qaeda/al-Nusra and IS.[viii],[ix]

In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch identified individuals responsible for the funding of an attack on villages and civilians in the countryside of Latakia, Syria’s most prominent seaport. Fighters of Ahrar al-Sham, IS and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar killed around 190 people and abducted over 200 civilians during the attack. Among the six primary figures who financed and organised the ambush were three Kuwaitis who actively used Twitter and YouTube to fundraise for the planned attack. One of them, Sheikh Hajjej al-Ajami, even travelled to the Latakia region and met the jihadists for whom he was fundraising. This journey suggests a high degree of cooperation between private donors and rebel groups and the possibility that donors are able to exercise control over the rebel groups they support.

Examples like this show the effect private donors are having on the Syrian civil war. Under the protection of Kuwait’s liberal and constitutional monarchy, they raise funds for extremists and jihadists who are aligned with their ideological beliefs and who are reportedly linked to acts of terrorism. By supporting these groups and strengthening their position, the donors implant their radical Salafi view of Islam into the conflict, fostering sectarianism among the Syrian opposition and reducing the chances for moderate forces to gain the upper hand. They also exacerbate the on-going competition between al-Qaeda and the IS over support from such donors, and are arguably partly responsible for the recent upswing in sympathy for the IS among the Sunni community in Kuwait. With the increasing friction between rebel groups and the apparent rivalry between two of the largest terrorist organizations involved in the conflict, a peaceful reunification seems less and less likely.

Now, after almost four years, who is the enemy in Syria? For the Western world, “Assad” no longer seems to be the only enemy. The conflict lines in Syria have blurred, extremists and terrorists have multiplied and the Alawite regime almost seems like a good alternative. The exemplary case of Kuwaiti private donors shows that when determining friend and foe, the situation is extremely complex. Syria has become far more than a proxy war between world powers. Private self-interests as well as opposing religious and ideological beliefs play an increasingly significant role in determining Syria’s conflict lines, conflict lines which must be understood in a wider regional context.

Arne Holverscheid is an undergraduate student of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies and History at Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. He is currently interning for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. His interests include terrorism funding, radical Islamic ideologies and the history of terrorism. Twitter: @AHolverscheid.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next few weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement.

NOTES

[i] “The long road to Damascus: There are signs that the Syrian regime may become still more violent”, The Economist, February 11, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21547305.

[ii] Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. fragmented Syria’s rebels”, The Washington Post, September 22, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/.

[iii] Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Saudi Jihadist Problem”, The Daily Beast, December 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/16/syria-s-saudi-jihadist-problem.html.

[iv] Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support”, Reuters, May 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

[v] “Kuwait launches Syria relief campaign”, Al Arabiya English, January 13, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/13/Kuwait-s-emir-appeals-for-Syrian-relief-aid.html.

[vi] Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight: Kuwaitis campaign privately to arm Syrian rebels”, Reuters, June 27 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-syria-kuwait-insight-idUSBRE95P0TG20130627.

[vii] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwait.

[viii] Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

[ix] Elizabeth Dickinson, “Kuwait: the crisis in Syria comes home”, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kuwait_the_crisis_in_syria_comes_home323.

Financing Terror: A Strife 4-part series

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By: Maya Ehrmann:

Photo: Wikipedia
Photo: Wikipedia

Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban are household names these days. Yet, in the climate of the ‘War on Terror’, how do organisations like these survive and even thrive? It takes more than just strong leadership and organizational skills to uphold the proper functioning of terrorist groups – it takes money. Terrorism is the culmination of costly planning. It includes the dissemination of ideology, maintenance of logistics, recruitment and training of operatives, and perpetration of the terrorist act itself. Financial activity related to terrorism accounts for an estimated 5% of the annual global output, or about $1.5 trillion USD. 1

The events of September 11th 2001 thrust the issue of terrorist funding into the limelight of the global arena. Globalisation of communication, the internet, and banking systems have enabled terrorist organizations to expand their activities and financial mechanisms needed to finance these activities. While state-sponsoring was previously a primary source of funding for terrorist activity, international cooperation through UN resolutions and economic sanctions has dissuaded state actors from sponsoring terrorist activities, thereby leading to the substantial decrease of this method of funding. Terrorist organizations have, as a result, increasingly turned to diverse and alternative sources of revenue, such as criminal activities – including drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and kidnapping for ransom – as well as private sources of funding through charities and individuals.

The methods and resources used to fund terrorism vary from region to region, and from group to group. Limiting the financial resources available to terrorist organisations is a crucial step in the fight against terrorism, and both national governments and international bodies have taken steps to address this.

The attacks of September 11th had highlighted the shortcomings of UNSC Resolution 1267, which called upon UN member states to identify, seize, and freeze financial resources of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their affiliates, but which lacked any means of enforcing its provisions. In response to these shortcomings, the UN adopted UNSC Resolution 1373 in 2001, which required all UN member states to criminalize direct or indirect support for terrorism, including terrorism funding.

As one of the leaders in the ‘War on Terror’, the US government issued the USA Patriot Act which created strict legal measures to counter terrorist financing. Also, the Financial Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body created in 1989 by the G-7 in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, issued a revised series of recommendations on how to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The World Bank and the IMF have since developed assistance programs for countries to ensure compliance with the FATF’s recommendations.

Current international efforts to combat this phenomenon have been largely focused on commitments by UN member states. This is problematic, as it does not provide a framework or incentive for non-UN member states or entities to effectively combat terrorist financing. Furthermore, current international legislation on terrorist financing is very general and does not take into consideration the unique situation of each state. Whereas the United States may easily implement some of the legislation on a national level, it is very difficult for a state such as Syria, which is currently in the midst of a civil war and is a hotbed of terrorist activity and chaos, to properly implement international legislation on terrorist financing. Ironically, it is precisely states such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq which may benefit the most from a crackdown on terrorist financing.

On a strategic level, despite a growing international focus on combating terrorist funding, increasingly sophisticated methods of financing terrorism have meant terrorists are often able to stay one step ahead of authorities. The illegal activities used by terrorist groups to finance their activities often do not leave a cash trail, making them difficult to track. Thus, terrorist financing continues to remain a major stumbling block to curtailing terrorist activity.

Over the next few weeks Strife will feature a four-part series on terrorist financing. Each author will examine a different method of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. Arne Holverscheid will discuss the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Samuel Smith will address the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Finally, Drew Alyeshmerni will shed light upon the use of charities as a cover for terrorist financing and the implication that defining certain organisations as terror groups may have upon the eradication of this source of financing.

The financing of terrorism continues to be a global challenge and an increasingly important aspect of counterterrorism efforts. We hope this series will pique your interest in the subject and lead to a more detailed understanding of the sophisticated and varied ways of financing terror.

Maya Ehrmann is a Guest Editor for Strife. She is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London and holds a BA in Government and Diplomacy from the Interdisciplinary Centre, Israel. Her primary areas of research interest include counterterrorism, international security, and Middle Eastern affairs. References: 1 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013), p. 167.