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Review: 'The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East' by Efraim Karsh

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Reviewed by: Bradley Lineker & Samar Batrawi

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Efraim Karsh. The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East. London & New York: Bloomsbury/ Continuum, 2015. ISBN: 978-14-72-91046-2. Pp. 236. Hardcover. £21.99.

The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East is the latest book from Efraim Karsh, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and King’s College London. While situated in his wider project of challenging the supposed orthodoxies inherent in the study of the region, Karsh’s core argument in this book is the alleged need to shift explanations for the region’s instability away from external pressures and instead place them squarely upon ‘Middle-Easterners’[i] themselves.[ii]

While the simplicity of the book’s title intimates that this argument is embedded into a straightforward package, the ambiguity of the subtitle (for the uninitiated, it reads: ‘a complex discourse in a complex geographical region’) hints at the dichotomy between the stated aim and the text’s actual structure and content. On the one hand, Karsh manifestly fails to give a voice to the apparent orthodoxy inherent to scholarship on the Middle East – which considerably weakens his claim to disprove it – and on the other hand, Karsh, instead of taking an approach based on assessing the work of other scholars, chooses to try and prove how this other position is incorrect by retelling the history of the modern Middle-East across a paltry 192 pages of generously-spaced text. While these two dichotomies would be themselves enough to mar the text, together, with the book’s polemical style, Karsh’s blithe historical determinism, the use of a narrow selection of English-orientated sources, and the seemingly random selection of chapter topics, they mortally undermine any attempt to construct a convincing platform to change approaches to the Middle East.

Situated within the same paradigm of Karsh’s other work, then, this book is at best a  sketch of the professor’s reading of the formation and present make-up of the modern Middle East, book-ended between an argument that does not explicitly resonate in the detail of the text; at worst, it is a disjointed collection of chapters written to support a charged political stance without enough meaningful evidence-based discussion, aesthetically covered by a singular-deterministic narrative on a region known for its complexity. Indeed, ‘Middle Easterners’ (as Karsh calls them[iii]) are subject to sweeping and unverifiable generalisations, such as the following assessment:

‘[f]or Western observers, the passage “from dark into light” that was the “Arab Spring” meant transition to a liberal, secular democracy. For Middle Easterners it meant a return to the Islamic sociopolitical order that had underpinned the region for over a millennium[,] as the schizophrenic state system established in its place after World War I failed to fill the void left by its destruction.’[iv]  Perhaps the most toxic misunderstanding of ‘Middle Easterners’ and Muslims in Karsh’s book is illustrated by his casual replacement of the word ‘Islamist’ by ‘Islamic’, equating the collective, organised, and political Islam, denoted by the word ‘Islamist’, with the personal religious devotion designated by ‘Islamic’.[v]

The book begins in the early 20th century[vi] and is thereafter divided thematically into 8 other chapters that follow a loose chronological structure and which range from the Israel/Palestine conflict,[vii] American policy in Iran,[viii] Soviet engagement in the Middle-East,[ix] an assessment of American policy since 2001,[x] as well as a breezy chapter on today’s Middle East. While historical in scope, the book is stylistically a right-leaning polemic tentatively based in international relations discourse. Indeed, one of the core historical premises used by Karsh is that Islam was born in fire[xi] and that this ‘imperial aggressiveness,’[xii] and the wider predisposition towards violence,[xiii] survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire ‘to haunt Islamic and Middle Eastern politics … [in] the twenty-first century.’[xiv]

However, at times, it appears that Karsh has constructed – with a remarkably fine-tooth comb – a specific historical narrative, coloured by patterns of thinking that have emerged in the post-American intervention world, to support his own political stance on the modern Middle East. His own narrative, as he openly admits, is to expel the influence of foreign powers on the Middle East;[xv] to thereby pointedly blame indigenous groups for the relative instability. This is mirrored in the detail used to prove fairly basic points, which does not, as he surmises, facilitate reader understanding but rather seems self-serving and out of place. This is certainly evident in his discussions of the birth of Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians: the former is accorded significant attention and detail – to promulgate a specific founding narrative – whereas, in the case of the latter, he makes no mention of the forced displacement in 1948, excepting one cryptic defensive paragraph that makes the bold claim that Palestinians left despite the wishes of the Jewish forces.[xvi] Moreover, in the sub-section ‘Courting Hitler’, Karsh lists every Arab overture to the great enemy of ‘perfidious Albion’[xvii] in the 1930s and 1940s in a way that is inescapably spiteful, especially upon reflection of the way his argument unfolds in the rest of the book. For instance, while Arab overtures towards Hitler are judged in moral terms,[xviii] Karsh upholds the same patterns of behaviour – of playing one great power off against another – as the accepted norm in international relations in his depictions of the Cold War (he essentially glorifies Egypt on this regard)[xix]. Finally, Karsh often criticises the Middle East’s preponderance to harmful religious exclusivism, while, often within the same sentence, arguing that Israel is an example against this trend – despite evidently being an entity enthused with patterns of institutionalised religious exclusivism.[xx]

While ultimately lop-sided to Karsh’s political paradigm, the book does manage to provide a decent overview of some of the events that it covers: such as the politics behind the post-First World War fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire’s possessions in the Levant and ancient Mesopotamia, as well as a good American-based summary of the intelligence failure during the Iranian Revolution. However, even the book’s strongest sections are marked by the fact that the issues they cover are always better covered elsewhere in more specialised studies.

 

Bradley Lineker is currently a fully-funded ESRC doctoral candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he studies refugee shelter provision in Jordan. He has extensive experience working as a consulting research analyst with the UN and the private sector on contexts like Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria. Follow him @BradleyLineker.

Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she studies social movements in Palestine. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi.

 

 

Notes:

[i] Karsh, The Tail Wags the Dog, p. 2, p. 157.
[ii] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[iii] Ibid., p. 157.
[iv] Ibid., p. 183.
[v] Ibid., p. 188.
[vi] Ibid., p.9.
[vii] Ibid., pp. 31-48, pp. 49-62.
[viii] Ibid., pp. 63-80.
[ix] Ibid., pp. 81-102.
[x] Ibid., pp. 153-174.
[xi] Ibid., p. 188.
[xii] Ibid., p. 155.
[xiii] Ibid., p. 187.
[xiv] Ibid., p. 155.
[xv] Ibid., p. 2.
[xvi] Ibid., p. 59.
[xvii] Ibid., p. 19.
[xviii] Ibid., pp. 35-37.
[xix] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[xx] Ibid., p. 189.

 

 

 

 

Why the Israeli “wall” is a flawed model for the U.S.-Mexican border

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By: Lauren Mellinger

Mauer-betlehem
Source: Wikimedia

Since announcing his candidacy for president of the United States, Republican candidate (and occasional front-runner for the GOP nomination) businessman Donald Trump has chosen to make reforming American immigration policy a primary focus of his campaign. Central to his plan is the construction of a wall spanning the U.S.-Mexican border. During the fourth Republican primary debate held on November 10, in response to a question from the moderator about his immigration plan, Trump emphatically stated: “[t]he wall will be successful. And if you think walls don’t work all you have to do is ask Israel.”

This was not the first time that Trump cited the separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank as evidence that his wall will succeed in curbing illegal immigration into the United States—at least insofar as immigration from Mexico and Central America are concerned. Indeed, the comparison between the two walls is a frequent refrain as part of Trump’s stump speech on the campaign trail. Given the centrality of Trump’s proposed Mexican border wall to his campaign, closer scrutiny is merited as to his overall understanding of the Israeli wall and his assertion that it has been a “success.”

From the outset, the comparison between the two walls is flawed. In the first place, the border wall that Trump plans to construct, if elected, and the so-called Israeli “wall” serve vastly different purposes: Trump’s wall is intended to deter illegal immigration, whereas in the Israeli case, as Trump perceives it, the purpose of the wall was to save lives by rendering it difficult, if not impossible, for terrorists to continue launching attacks against Israelis from the West Bank. It is worth noting that in the Israeli case the structure itself is technically not a wall, but a hybrid construction project consisting mainly of a chain-link fence bolstered by electronic sensors and tracking paths, interspersed with concrete barriers (comprising only about 10% of the route)[i] in strategically sensitive locations (largely heavily populated urban areas such as Jerusalem, and Qalqilya in the northern West Bank). Thus the term barrier is a more accurate description.[2]

To test the veracity of Trump’s assertion that the Israeli wall is a success and therefore worthy of modelling his proposed U.S.-Mexican border wall on, one must first evaluate the Israeli barrier in terms of its impact on Israeli security when construction began during the second intifada, followed by the long-term implications of the construction.

Has Israel’s separation barrier been a “success”?

In terms of the barrier’s success as an effective element of Israel’s counterterrorism policy, this claim has been somewhat overstated. Proponents of the barrier often defend its construction with a fairly straightforward argument—the wall was built, and soon after, acts of terrorism emanating from the West Bank against Israelis dramatically declined. There is certainly truth to this claim. For instance, according to statistics from Israel’s Foreign Ministry, by 2004—two years after construction began—there was a significant decline in the number of Israeli civilians killed in acts of terrorism.[3] The main impact of the barrier was its success in halting suicide bombings, which at the time were wreaking havoc on Israeli society. However, it was, and continues to be, less effective in preventing other forms of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians—including sniper attacks, roadside bombs and stabbings.[4] Moreover, as time went on, terrorists studied the barrier and the corresponding security arrangements and adapted their methods. This much has been confirmed by the terrorists themselves. In a 2008 interview with the Qatari publication Al-Sharq, Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, admitted that the barrier did in fact hinder the PIJ and other terror organizations from carrying out attacks during the second intifada, claiming “We do not deny that it [the barrier] limits the ability of the resistance to arrive deep within [Israeli territory] to carry out suicide bombing attacks, but the resistance has not surrendered or become helpless, and is looking for other ways to cope with the requirements of every stage [of the intifada].”

While it is undeniable that the barrier was successful to a degree, in part even this success is attributed to a variety of other policies implemented by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli law enforcement in conjunction with the barrier, including widespread arrests and targeted killing operations.[5] In fact, according to Israel’s domestic security service, the Shin Bet, while terrorist attacks against Israelis emanating from the territories declined significantly by 2005, this result was largely due to factors other than the barrier, namely the truce in the territories, and the improved coordination between the IDF and the Shin Bet. The report noted that by 2005, the terrorists had adapted to the barrier and found ways to bypass it.

In a 2008 article questioning the utility of the separation barrier, former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens wrote, “[t]error is coming over and under the fence.” Indeed, Israel’s borders are largely surrounded by some form of physically constructed border—be it a wall or a fence, particularly along the Israeli-Gaza and Israeli-Lebanon borders. Yet, in both cases, despite the existence of a physical barrier and routine surveillance, Israel has endured ongoing terrorist attacks—including aerial assaults in the form of rockets, mortars, Katyushas and other missiles that over time have increased in range and sophistication. In recent years, Israel has also had to confront a new challenge at its borders—the subterranean threat, whereby terrorists including Hamas and Hizballah, two of Israel’s most formidable enemies, have opted to construct elaborate tunnels under the barriers into Israel. Tunnels underneath the Gaza border have already played a significant role in several IDF operations in Gaza—including 2006’s Operation Summer Rains, in response to Hamas’s use of these offensive tunnels to abduct an IDF soldier, and Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014—while the extent of the tunnel threat from Lebanon remains unclear (at least in terms of open-source information), albeit ominous. Thus, purely from the perspective of counterterrorism, the effectiveness of the separation barrier has proven somewhat limited.

Israel’s separation barrier: the less-desirable option

Assessing the long-term effectiveness of the barrier is more complicated, and at first glance one would not suggest the barrier has been a rousing success for Israel. Indeed, while credit can be given to the barrier’s success in assisting the IDF and Israeli law enforcement with thwarting terrorist attacks, the barrier has caused a host of problems for Israel on a diplomatic level, and has contributed to delaying the prospect of a final-status accord.

In his latest book Crippled America Trump writes that: “The Israelis spent $2 million per kilometre to build a wall—which has been hugely successful in stopping terrorists from getting into the country . . . While obviously we don’t face the same level of terrorist threat as our closest Middle East ally, there is no question as to the value of a wall in the fight against terrorism.” This suggests that despite everything we now know about the consequences of Israel’s separation barrier, Trump believes that it should be held up as a model for the effectiveness of a border wall in protecting national security.[6] While Trump is correct in noting that the wall played a role in curbing terrorism aimed at Israel during the second intifada, his understanding of Israel’s security barrier is woefully misguided. Though construction was approved in 2001, the barrier itself was not simply a response to the violence.[7] Rather, the decision to construct the barrier is rooted in a concept that emerged among Israeli policymakers decades ago, that in order to preserve Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state, so long as the prospect of reaching a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians remains unlikely, Israel may need to take unilateral steps to “separate” from the Palestinians.[8] Hence to a certain degree, the existence of the barrier itself is an “admission of failure.”[9] That “separation” or unilateral steps are suboptimal choices compared with actual resolution of the conflict was even recently noted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In remarks during his recent visit to the U.S., Netanyahu stated that “unilateralism works less well than a negotiated solution.” In the case of Israel’s security barrier, the ramifications of implementing this “suboptimal” step were evident from the start.

Almost as soon as construction began, so too did the public relations campaign against Israel. The barrier provided a new means for galvanizing critics of Israel in their campaign to delegitimize the state. For years the Israeli government has been confronted with accusations, including claims that Israel was in fact constructing an “apartheid wall” and worse, that Israel was “ghettoizing” the Palestinians (as understandably, invoking the Holocaust is always a particularly sensitive allegation against Israel). Critics also asserted that the real purpose of the barrier was not security-related as members of the government claimed, but rather to serve as a “land grab”—a claim bolstered by the fact that the barrier’s route has deviated from the Green Line.[10]

Construction of the barrier also added a new dimension to the ongoing territorial dispute with the Palestinians—the creation of a “seam zone”—a reference to areas trapped between the Green Line and sections where the barrier was built east of the Line. This has further complicated the efforts of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, and serves as another element that has kept Israel mired in litigation over the past decade—both in Israeli courts and abroad. Moreover, international condemnation of the Israeli separation barrier is not limited to left-wing groups—both the International Court of Justice and the UN General Assembly strongly criticized the barrier on the grounds that Israel could not invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify the construction, and in particular, for the human costs associated with its route.[11]

In addition to the terrible impact the the separation barrier has had on the daily lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank, perhaps the most harmful consequence of the barrier is that it has in fact succeeded in separating Israelis and Palestinians from one another. The ramifications of this are indeed dire, leading to an environment that over time has fostered a lack of empathy with the concerns and struggles of each side, and which arguably has reduced the sense of urgency, particularly among Israelis, to pressure the government to work towards a final-status agreement with their Palestinian interlocutors.

The construction of a fortified boundary between countries is certainly not a new concept: a recent study noted that since 1945, 51 such boundaries have been built, most with the intention of curbing immigration and the activities of clandestine criminal networks. [12]  Construction on one such barrier along a 700-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexican border was authorized by President George W. Bush in 2006.  Yet this border wall has failed to adequately deter the cartels from utilizing tunnels and other means to traffic both illegal narcotics and humans across the border. Certainly in the case of immigration, as examples from Ceuta and Melilla, and the U.S.-Mexican border suggest, the availability of options to circumvent a border wall suggests that its usefulness in stemming the flow of illegal immigration may be limited, particularly when such immigration is often a result of dire economic need. In the case of Trump’s proposed immigration reform plan, many of the challenges that Israel and the Palestinians have grappled with since the construction of the separation barrier, in particular the significant humanitarian cost of the barrier to the Palestinians living in the West Bank, do not apply to the U.S.-Mexican border, where there is already a clearly delineated, internationally recognized border—all the more reason why his comparison of the two walls is deeply flawed. And, much like the Israeli case, the construction of a physical border on its own will not adequately address the problem of illegal immigration in the U.S., nor should it be the central element of immigration reform. In terms of ultimately resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in dealing with the long-standing challenge of immigration reform in the U.S., what is necessary in both cases is a holistic approach that addresses the root causes of the conflicts paired with effective leadership to bring about the desired results. In the meantime, perhaps Trump’s immigration reform plan would be best served if he were to find a more suitable case upon which to base his proposed model for a U.S.-Mexican border wall.

 

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism and foreign policy, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

 

Notes:

[1] Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), p. 179.

[2] Israel’s Security Fence, “Operational Concept,” Israel Ministry of Defense, http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm; Jerry Markon, “Trump says building a U.S.-Mexico wall is ‘easy.’ But is it really?” The Washington Post, July 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-on-the-us-mexico-border-building-a-wall-is-easy/2015/07/16/9a619668-2b0c-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html.

[3] See for example Nadav Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: the Israeli Case,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 28, no. 4 (2005), p. 307-320.

[4] Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 329.

[5] Ibid, p. 333; Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle Against Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 122-124.

[6] Donald J. Trump, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (New York: Threshold Editions, 2015).

[7] Hillel Frisch, (The) Fence of Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of “The Fence” in Judea and Samaria, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 75 (The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies), October 2007, p. 11-16.

[8] See for example Dan Schueftan, Korah Ha’hafrada: Yisrael Ve Harashut Ha’Falestinit [Disengagement: Israel and the Palestinian Entity], (Israel: Zmora-Bitan and Haifa University Press, 1999); David Makovsky, A Defensible Fence: Fighting Terror and Enabling a Two-State Solution (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), p. 3-10.

[9] David Makovsky, “How to Build a Fence,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, no.2, pp. 50-64 (2004), p. 50.

[10] Shlomo Brom, “The Security Fence: Solution or Stumbling Block?” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 6, Issue 4 (2004), p. 7-10.

[11] See for example “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion”. International Court of Justice. July 9, 2004.

[12] Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 157-190.

ECOWAS, EAC, and the comparative efficacies of free movement protocols across the African continent

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By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille

ECOWAS_Bank_for_Investment_and_Development_headquarters_in_Lomé.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Africa, traditionally the poorest continent, has been undergoing profound changes, illustrated by higher growth rates for over a decade. This has brought a sense among African policymakers that trade facilitation measures and tighter cooperation around joint regional markets are crucial to make this burgeoning prosperity sustainable. Whilst a vast free trade zone potentially at the scale of the entire continent, organised around the recently agreed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)[i], will take some time to materialize, can results be achieved more rapidly at regional level?

There are currently eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa whose aim it is to promote intra-regional trade and investment. And yet, intra-African trade only amounts to 11.7%[ii] of overall African trade with the world, compared with 70% for intra-EU and 55% for intra-Asian trades respectively. This paper takes stock of the respective protocols on free movement of goods, services, capital and people of two of these preferential trade regimes: the long-established Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the more recent East African Community (EAC).

Both areas face comparable challenges and opportunities. Both have drawn ambitious free movement protocols that potentially offer excellent opportunities for their citizens and businesses. However it appears that, at the implementation stage, a lot remains to be done. Both the ECOWAS and EAC protocols offer a wealth of proposals that seem to lack a clear evaluation process and a proper implementation strategy. In both cases, new ideas are generated too promptly, initiatives are launched without waiting for previous ones to have been properly implemented and tested. This emerging rather than prescriptive strategy often leads to confusion and generates unnecessarily additional hurdles in an already rather complex process.

ECOWAS: Ambitious projects but difficult implementation

ECOWAS, the oldest of today’s eight African RECs, was launched in May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty Preamble and Article 27 outlined the key objective of removing obstacles to the ‘Four Freedoms’[iii] among its members. The first phase of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, of May 1979, guaranteeing the free entry of citizens of the member states without visa for 90 days, was ratified by member states in 1980 and became effective with immediate effect.  Visa and entry permit requirements within ECOWAS were abolished in the implementation of this first phase.

As a result, citizens of member states possessing travel documents and a health certificate were, in principle, able to travel freely within ECOWAS. However, any member state could still refuse entry into its territory to persons it deemed inadmissible under its national laws. In 1983 and in mid 1985, Nigeria used this clause to revoke articles 4 and 27 to expel immigrants mainly of Ghanaian origin from its territory.[iv] At that time, Nigeria was overwhelmed by a large number of immigrants from Ghana, and was also undergoing an economic crisis due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes.

ECOWAS subsequently revised its treaty to reaffirm in 1992 the right of citizens of its participating states to entry, residence and settlement. Later, in January 2008, ECOWAS redefined its common approach to migration, which is linked to the principle of free movement within the region. In its effort to strengthen free movement, ECOWAS developed ‘Vision 2020’ which shifts emphasis from an ECOWAS of states to become by 2020 an ECOWAS of people living within a single borderless economic space.

The ECOWAS Vision project envisages the introduction of a Schengen-type visa, the abolition of permit requirements, the removal of road blocks and security checks, the exchange of information by security operatives at the border, and an introduction of a single ECOWAS passport. There is however, still lack of general information on these initiatives at the national level as various member states have either enacted or retained a series of national laws that still restrict free movement of persons, capital and services. Furthermore, implementing free circulation in West Africa has frequently been thwarted by random shocks such as local military conflicts, political repression, not to forget the Ebola outbreak and its tragic consequences.

A similar situation within EAC

With a level of intra-regional trade at 12% of overall trade, EAC is at first glance more integrated than ECOWAS, whose internal trade between members only reaches 9.4%. [v] However, this difference is due to the impact in ECOWAS of the Nigerian oil sales outside the zone.

Although EAC is, in comparison to ECOWAS, considerably smaller in terms of economic size[vi], population[vii], and infrastructure development, it displays a number of similarities. For instance, the two sub-regions seem equally quick to formulate and launch new protocols without awaiting successful implementation of previous ones. Furthermore, both sub-regions are facing huge discrepancies in the levels of development among their member states, and poor infrastructure development. Whereas Nigeria, Ghana and also Ivory Coast act as immigration magnets among the fifteen ECOWAS member states, this imbalance between rich and poor is less pronounced within the five EAC member states, where citizens of troubled Burundi, and previously from Rwanda, have taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Kenya has also had to cater for an influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia.

Despite being a more recent experiment than ECOWAS, EAC members have been keen to speed up the process of increasing regional economic cooperation through ambitious proposals, regardless of substantial challenges in developing the region’s infrastructures. In November 2009, thirty years after ECOWAS took this step, the EAC partner countries established a Common Market which became official on 1 July 2010. Arguably, this was not a first attempt to set up a joint enlarged market in East Africa, since an initial experiment, initiated as early as 1967 by three of the EAC founding states[viii], collapsed ten years later. But it was the first successful one, even though numerous hurdles remained for it to be effective.

The 2009 Common Market Protocol comprises key provisions including free movement of persons, workers, goods, services and capital, the right of establishment and of residence, a schedule of commitments on the progressive liberalisation of services, and on reducing restrictions to the free movement of capital. But this document, as ambitious as the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, faces similar challenges that slow down its implementation. Indeed, the 2014 scorecard released by the World Bank at the request of the EAC Secretariat identified no less than 63 non-conforming measures in the trade of services and 51 non-tariff barriers affecting trade in goods. The assessment further found out that only 2 of the 20 operations covered by the Common Market Protocol were free of restrictions.[ix]

West and East Africa have both formulated ambitious protocols which constitute in each case a reliable framework for establishing an integrated economic region. The problem lies not so much in the ambitions displayed, but rather in a lack of political will to implement them, as reflected for instance by national clauses. Member states within both RECs still retain national laws that impede successful implementation of their own, mutually agreed protocols. Considerable efforts will continue to be needed in the implementation phase which, in any project, tends to be the most demanding one. The two RECs still face considerable challenges in terms of infrastructure development, economic inequalities among member states, alongside local political conflicts and health and security issues, and more generally a persisting lack of information on the advantages of regional economic integration. All these factors combined continue to hinder the successful implementation of free movement.

The example of the more advanced Single European Market illustrates that achieving free circulation within a sub-region takes time and effort. Recent developments in the Schengen area are a reminder that such achievements can easily be questioned.[x] In comparison, ECOWAS and EAC are still in the early stages of the process. Both sub-regions are distinct from each other in many respects. But in their endeavour to create a subnational framework favourable to local economic expansion, they face similar challenges. As is often the case in matters of regional economic integration, the gap between good intentions and proper action is substantial. Implementing measures to integrate neighbouring economies within a regional sub-set requires changing scale by sharing national prerogatives, which itself requires strong political will and leadership. This is a learning process which may take more time than the current speed of development in both East and West Africa would require in order for it to match the needs of their populations in the near future. A pan-African initiative on the model of the newly launched TFTA to coordinate trade policies between all eight African RECs could be the way forward towards economic integration on a continental scale.

 

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

 

 

Notes:

[i] The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) was officially launched on 10 June 2015 in Cairo. It brings together three of Africa’s major economic communities.

[ii] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[iii] Free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour.

[iv] Adepoju, A. 2009. Migration management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. In M. Tremolieres (ed.) Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives. Paris: EOCD

[v] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[vi] The EAC’s combined GDP is two and a half times lower than ECOWAS. EAC counts five participating states and ECOWAS fifteen.

[vii] 156 million compared to 336 million in ECOWAS.

[viii] Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

[ix]http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=117. Accessed on 10/10/15

[x] https://strifeblog.org/2015/10/06/schengen-and-free-circulation-at-the-crossroads-lessons-for-the-east-african-community/. Accessed on 10/10/15

The role of strategic outsourcing in preventing the spread of ISIL

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By: Cheng Lai Ki

British_PMC_with_G36K_and_ANA_soldier.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Over the last eleven months, Sunni-jihadi extremists known as the the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) have been directly involved in multiple crises resulting in the deaths and displacement of civilians in Syria[1], and more recently, in Paris. For ISIL, the battlefield is not constrained to one country but is the world, visible from the bomb placed on the Russian plane and the Paris attacks (i.e. Charlie Hebdo). Their use of unconventional warfare strategies[2] and association to unconventional resource avenues makes their pacification extremely difficult and time consuming for international intelligence and security agencies.

The aim of this article is to briefly demonstrate how a strategic private-government relationship with private military and security companies (PMSCs) can benefit existing operations against extremism and does not aim to criticize existing governmental efforts. PMSCs provide multiple benefits for governments either through force multiplication and contributing valuable skills or networks. To reveal how strategic privatisation of security services (SPSS) can assist operations against ISIL on domestic and foreign fronts, this article will briefly illuminate the benefits of PMSCs in contemporary intelligence and security operations, followed by contextualising operational contributions against various areas of security, intelligence and infrastructure support.

Benefits of PMSCs in contemporary security operations

Since the end of the Cold War, intelligence and security has evolved alongside the development of new communication and information technologies. The rise of the internet, secure packet sharing and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are hallmarks of how security and intelligence sectors have entered the information era. PMSCs provide a broad range of services, ranging from operational manpower, training, logistical support and analytical assistance. The Research Institute for European and American Studies[3] revealed that 70% of the Untied States (US) intelligence budget authorised by Congress is spend on PMSC contractors. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly conducted rendition operations and clandestine raids with the assistance of Academi (formerly known as Blackwater) contractors to provide operational manpower between 2004 to 2006 during the height of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq[4]. Another example is the close relationship Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI), who possess extensive history in training support, and the US military. The utilisation of contractors are also exhibited in the United Kingdom, where British PMSC Minimal Risk was procured to provide security manage and intelligence analysts for operations in the Middle East[5].

Within the contemporary domain PMSCs are becoming increasingly involved in governmental security and intelligence operations. However, unlike governments, PMSCs are not necessarily constrained by political boundaries to assist in security and developmental operations in post-conflict domains. With strategic integration, PMSCs could be highly beneficial towards re-establishing security and critical infrastructures. This is arguably visible from the application of approved private vendors by the United Nations (UN) for humanitarian and security operations[6]. The extensive use of PMSCs by Western governments have made states more effective in developing security, assessing intelligence and developing infrastructures. The follow sections examine how PMSC effectiveness can be translated to operations against ISIL on foreign and domestic domains in security, intelligence and infrastructure.

Translating effectiveness into operations 

When engaging the problem of ISIL, governmental operations have focused on training rebel forces in Syria, directly engaging ISIL forces in the battlefield, developing intelligence for follow-on missions, and strengthening domestic security and warning procedures. When tackling ISIL, privatization can assist governments in three foundational domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations.

Addressing security domains within counter-extremism, PMSCs can provide effective manpower support and operational training in foreign and domestic theatres. Within domestic theatres, PMSCs can provide additional and improved static security support of private and public locations. In addition, PMSCs can also provide valuable training to local police and security agencies to respond to various threats.

Like other extremist organisations, ISIL possesses operational characteristics that have come under analysis by governmental agencies, academics and private entities. PMSC staff are often ex-governmental employees with extensive academic or practical experiences in various security domains. Domestically, the knowledge of PMSCs can provide valuable training and manpower support, as is with the MPRI-US relationship. In foreign domains, PMSCs can also provide manpower support through directly participating in hostilities. A South-African PMSC, Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Training (STTEP), a reminiscent of a former PSMC, Executive Outcomes (EO), has been successful in combating Islamic extremism in Africa through directly engaging hostile forces[7].

Some critics might argue against the incorporation of contractors into security infrastructures based on grounds of unaccountability and legitimacy. However, as corporate entities, PMSCs rely on providing effective and quality support to secure future bids. In addition, although not necessarily legal institutions, the Montreux Document and International Code of Conduct are two guidelines outlining the legal and practice recommendations to PMSCs[8]. Contrary to popular belief, PMSCs do not operate in a legal vacuum but are also privy to being indicted under international humanitarian law. In addition, weaker or post-conflict states might possess operational and security capability gaps in comparison to their stronger counterparts (i.e. US) that can be supplemented by PMSC services.

Efficient security

Efficient security relies on effective “intelligence” provision. The privatisation of western intelligence communities (IC) arguably started from the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the globalised information era, giving rise to multiple new international threats. Rathmell argues that intelligence privatisation benefits ICs in three main areas of collection, analysis and costs.[9] Since Rathmell wrote in the late 90s, technology has advanced, the world has seen the rise of surveillance drones with strike capabilities, the monitoring of fibre optical traffic by national agencies and the outsourcing of intelligence analysis to private firms (i.e. Control Risks).

The outsourcing of core intelligence functions can facilitate agencies to focus on high value targets and more immanent threats against national security. In addition to privatising various analytical components, intelligence organisations have also procured PMSCs for manpower purposes – previously indicated from the CIA procurement of Academi for rendition operations. With regards to ISIL, privatisation not only can provide governmental agencies support from other experienced intelligence analysts, usually employed by PMSCs after leaving governmental service, but such privatisation can also incorporate skills and networks that analysts would have obtained from working on other intelligence operations in other geographical or target domains.

This can be done while still acknowledging the risks and difficulties instigated by the politicisation of intelligence, alongside the “consumer-producer” dilemma[10] within ICs. However, the argument could be made that the plausible deniability of PMSC services could not only repair the once secret nature of ICs (arguably lost since the dawn of the information age and intelligence crises such as WikiLeaks and the actions of Edward Snowden), but also benefit intelligence operations in politically and legally conflicted areas.

When security and intelligence domains are reinforced, PMSCs can provide effective logistical assistance for “infrastructure support.” As a private entity, PMSCs can also be contracted by other PMSCs or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are not providing security or intelligence but logistical support. Again, the benefits are similar to being employed by governments in the provision of direct security and consultation services.

A tripartite relationship between governmental agencies, NGOs and PMSCs would highly benefit existing operations against ISIL. For instance, domestically, NGOs can provide logistical support to hospitals or community outreach programs can benefit from governmental subsidisation and also the consultation knowledge from PMSC analysts. When engaging extremist organisations, community cohesion is just as vital as intelligence and direct action as outlined by the counter-terrorism, or CONTEST, strategy in the UK. On foreign soil, NGOs, charity organisation and the UN have been known to cooperate with select PMSCs to provide risk consultation, security and intelligence for operations in post-conflict regions with unstable civil infrastructures or governments[11].

Through cooperative efforts with the ICoC Association, NGOs, PMSCs and Governmental Agencies alongside some strategic planning and cooperation, states can quickly re-establish control over regions affect by ISIL attacks by providing secure healthcare and refugee support. The integration of PMSCs in developmental infrastructures would both improve ties between nations – though on a corporate level – but also potentially improve the quality of infrastructure management, training and operation for future expansion. It must be emphasized that his component of PMSC support focuses more on infrastructure redevelopment to prevent follow-on attacks by ISIL in the future.

Moving forward

The supplementary roles of PMSCs in the three domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations have been briefly illuminated above. ISIL in particular, like other extremist organisations, rely on underground networks and sympathetic communities to operate beyond borders. When confronting ISIL, international authorities need to establish effective communicative, warning and investigative channels. PMSCs, being private companies, are not necessarily bound by as many political ‘red-tape’ as some organisations when providing security and intelligence services. The corporate ties and networks between companies would inadvertently benefit the governments procuring their services. However, there are grey areas of legitimacy, accountability and power distribution when assigning privatised firms too much authority and jurisdiction over inherently governmental operations.

In conclusion, security and intelligence provisions of PMSCs can inform better governmental decisions alongside assisting in logistical support capabilities to re-establish control and provide care for those affected. To prevent further spread of ISIL, the world needs to unite through application of hard and soft power strategies in public and private domains.

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

Notes:

[1] Global Overview 2015: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, International Displacement Monitoring Centre: Norweigian Refugee Council, (6th May, 2015), Accessed November 16th, 2015, http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/201505-Global-Overview-Highlights-document-en.pdf

[2] Counter-Unconventional Warfare, White Paper, United States Army Special Operations Command, (28th September 2014), Accessed November 16th, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-CounterUnconventionalWarfare.pdf

[3] Liaropoulos, A. & Konstantopoulos, I. ‘Privatization of Intelligence: Turning National Security into Business?’, RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies, Accessed November 14, 2015; http://rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1319:privatization-of-intelligence-turning-national-security-into-business-&catid=14:transatlantic-studies&Itemid=89

[4] Mazzetti M. & Risen, J. ‘Blackwater Guards Tied to CIA Raids”, The New York Times, (December 10, 2009), Accessed January 12, 2015; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/politics/11blackwater.html?r=1&_r=0

[5] 2012 FCO spend on hiring private military and security companies’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Freedom of Information Release, Accessed December 15, 2015; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foi-ref-0293-12.

[6] Cheng, L.K., Private Contractors, Governments and Security by Proxy: An analysis of contemporary challenges, governmental developments and international impacts of private military and security companies (2015), BA Dissertation, University of Leicester.

[7] Freeman, C. “How to defeat a Caliphate: Private military contractors have a bad name, but a great record against the Islamist insurgency in Nigeria”, The Spectator, (May 30th, 2015), Accessed November 18, 2015; http://new.spectator.co.uk/2015/05/mercenaries-could-transform-the-fight-against-isis-if-we-let-them/

[8] Cheng, Private Contractors, (2012).

[9] Rathmell, A. “Privatising Intelligence”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 11:2, (1998), 199-211, DOI: 10.1080/09557579808400199

[10] Herman, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

[11] “List of UN Secretariat Registered Vendors: Level 1 and 2”, United Nations, (March 23, 2015), Accessed April 2, 2015; https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/un-secretariat-registered-vendors

 

 

 

Despite a Historic Summit, Cross-Strait Relations Faces the ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’

by

By: Jeroen Gelsing

Ma Xi Grin2
Ma’s grin belies a fraught reality. Source: AFP/Roslan Rahman

On November 7, the world’s press thronged into the Island Ballroom of Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel. The occasion marked a historic meeting between the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) – erstwhile foes in the Chinese Civil War, which reached its present stalemate with the KMT retreat to the island fortress of Taiwan.

Today, sixty-six years on, a mutual cordiality prevails that, until the inauguration of Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, had been unthinkable. Nonetheless, such cross-strait congeniality may prove evanescent. Rising from Ma’s China engagement policy, he has become increasingly unpopular at home. Indeed, in defiance of Ma’s broad, toothy grin throughout his lengthy 80-second handshake with Chinese president Xi Jinping, the future of cross-strait relations is fraught with uncertainty.

As is often written, Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province; a breakaway territory listed for recovery as China fulfills the manifest destiny of rounding out its Qing Dynasty borders. The biggest threat to the CCP’s undertaking, Beijing warns, are the ‘splittist’ forces across the Taiwan Strait – a pejorative phrase rather effective at delegitimising Taiwanese aspirations to arbitrate their island’s own future, be it as a part of China, an independent country, or in some form of compromise solution.

Playing Beijing’s cherished ethnicity card, Xi proclaimed in his summit speech that ‘blood is thicker than water’, referring to the common Han Chinese bond of people on either side of the Taiwan Strait. This asserts the naturalness of subsuming Taiwan into a pan-Chinese nation, a view strongly supported by his domestic audience. Indeed, a fiercely nationalistic education system emphasises historic grievances, yielding a younger Chinese population that overwhelmingly supports their government’s position on China’s various territorial disputes.

Things are a little different across the Taiwan Strait. Unlike Xi, Ma travelled to Singapore as the beleaguered leader of 23 million Taiwanese – unpopular, ironically, partially because of his accommodating cross-strait policy that helped to engineer the historic summit in the first place. Under this approach, Ma has negotiated economic integration with China that has nonetheless not revivified Taiwan’s economy, as Ma originally claimed it would. Far from experiencing an economic boom, fragile growth and a loss of regional competitiveness are putting downwards pressure on the island’s economic prospects.[1]

In tandem, Taiwanese fret over the geopolitical consequences of the Ma administration’s cross-strait economic integration strategy. Increasingly, this approach is felt to be jeopardising the island’s de facto sovereignty – some 85-90% of Taiwanese indicate determination to preserve this status quo. As such, the confluence of economic disillusionment and sovereignty concerns after seven years of cross-strait rapprochement have left Ma impressively unpopular, even if under his guiding hand an unparalleled tranquillity has descended over the Taiwan Strait.

The November 7 Ma-Xi meeting came with little warning, announced only on November 3. Whatever the precise motivations behind this short notice, it conveniently denied Taiwan’s domestic opposition, both political-institutional and, as will be discussed below, within civil society, the opportunity to raise concerns regarding the meeting’s timing, which comes just several months ahead of Taiwan’s January 2016 national elections.

That such considerations may have prevailed in the KMT camp underlines the extent of public discontent with Ma’s vision for Taiwan’s future as it has unfolded over the past seven years. Yet, a broad cross-strait cooperation and integration strategy initially enjoyed at least tacit approval of the electoral majority. In 2008, Ma was first elected on a platform aimed at reviving Taiwan’s flagging economy, oriented particularly at developing closer economic relations with China. First and foremost, the Ma campaign claimed the elimination of cross-strait trade barriers would directly aid GDP growth. Secondly, it anticipated that a Taiwanese demonstration of goodwill would gain Beijing’s reciprocation and lift  crippling restrictions against the island’s international space that serve to hamstring Taiwan’s export-oriented economy.

However, fast-forward seven years, and only part of this platform has been realised. The 2010 Taiwan-China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) cut tariffs and commercial barriers on cross-strait trade, which climbed to nearly 200 billion USD in 2014. Yet this trade volume increase did not herald the expected prosperity for Taiwan. To the contrary, while benefitting the operations of large corporations, ECFA has squeezed medium and small businesses, and given rise to the widespread perception that ECFA has made life harder for farmers, fishermen, blue-collar workers, and even white-collar workers, rather than easier. Indeed, over 85% of Taiwanese voice pessimism over their country’s economic trajectory.

Further, Taiwan’s anticipated greater international space has not materialised. Beijing still blocks Taiwan’s ascension to regional political forums, such as ASEAN, and prevents its participation in trade blocs rising up throughout Asia, such as the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), which Taiwan is eager to join, and similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Equally, Beijing’s political clout makes impossible the conclusion of bilateral FTA’s – token ones with Singapore and New Zealand excepted, which comprise but a small portion of Taiwan’s foreign trade. Because of this diplo-economic isolation, the island is losing valuable competitive ground to direct competitor South Korea, which has forged trade agreements with the European Union and ASEAN, among others. Thus, Taiwan’s gamble to brave closer integration with China has not reduced sovereignty risk, but rather furthered it, while also not resulting in commensurate economic compensation to warrant this danger. For this, too, the Ma administration is held accountable.

Such grievances are exacerbated by disillusionment over the Ma administration’s lack of transparency in conducting cross-strait negotiations. Indeed, the unsupervised backdoor character of KMT-CCP talks has further fuelled fears that Ma is not adequately protecting Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. Such concerns, rightful or not, reached a boiling point in March 2014, when the student-led Sunflower Movement prevented the ratification of ECFA’s follow-up service trade agreement. Taken in sum, the aforementioned factors have halted further cross-strait integration along the Ma administration’s blueprint.

Mistrust of Ma’s charted course for the island’s future is mirrored in Taiwanese identity trends. Presently, KMT-CCP cooperation is premised on the so-called ‘One China Principle’, which, despite critical interpretative differences, holds that both Taiwan and the mainland are part of a single ‘China’.[2] However, given the expanding contingent of islanders who consider their nationality to be Taiwanese – to say nothing about ethnicity – this is fast becoming a precariously narrow basis for conduct of political negotiations with China. Instead, a clear majority of the Taiwanese population prefers – if the circumstances permit – a cross-strait framework that explicitly recognises Taiwanese sovereignty, or at least acknowledges the existence of a self-governing entity on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Thus, Ma’s direction of and foundation for cross-strait cooperation are increasingly at odds with Taiwan’s identity trends.

Underpinning this sense of distinctness from China is over a century of geographical separation and independent development. Time and distance have made Taiwan and China very different places. Having experienced its ‘economic miracle’ in the second half of the twentieth century, Taiwan is a developed nation with living standards rivalling those of Japan and South Korea. While China, as a developing country, struggles with the extension of social security under its troubled hukou-system, Taiwan’s national healthcare, for instance, is high-performing and often lauded.  And critically, Taiwan’s democratic political system contrasts sharply with China’s authoritarianism – a distinction that resonates strongly in Taiwan. Altogether, Taiwanese are keenly aware that the products of their own politico-economic history are, in fact, accomplishments to protect, and that closeness with China is likely to jeopardise rather than preserve these achievements. Thus, to invert Xi’s November 7 comment: for many Taiwanese water trumps blood – a sentiment not easily overruled by Chinese statements of ethnic unity.

These deep-societal identity trends, backed by a profound sense of alternate development and independent accomplishments, are merging with the aforementioned diplo-economic frustrations in the run-up to the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for January 2016. KMT candidate Eric Chu trails opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ying-wen by as many as 20 percentage points. Tsai is widely considered a shoo-in for the presidential office. In fact, KMT weakness is such that the opposition may also gain a legislative majority – unprecedented in Taiwanese history.

This would certainly make China nervous, as it would grant the DPP the power to make constitutional changes to the status quo. It is, however, not expected to do so. Nonetheless, the likelihood of cross-strait instability remains even in the absence of a legislative majority, if only for the fact that the DPP’s explicit objective to, at a minimum, preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence clashes with China’s long-term vision of the island’s recovery (or annexation, depending on your viewpoint). Indeed, the DPP rejects the One China Principle as a valid basis for cross-strait relations.

The KMT has frequently criticised Tsai for failing to develop an alternate framework for cross-strait conduct, sounding her out on offering few specifics beyond a basic commitment to preserve the status quo. Regardless, Taiwanese now appear sufficiently disenchanted with the Ma administration that they are prepared, unlike in 2012 presidential elections where Tsai ran unsuccessfully, to embrace the ‘certainty of uncertainty’. Indeed, in recognition of this possibility, China has already warned of a ‘tidal wave’ if the One China Principle is not upheld. Whatever the case, Tsai’s election will necessitate both sides to establish a new cross-strait modus operandi, and the present cordiality in Taiwan-China could thereby well be ruptured.

For Ma personally, the November 7 Shangri-La summit crowned seven years of careful cross-strait politicking, securing a tête-à-tête that had been unthinkable in 2008. However, unlike Xi, Ma attended the Shangri-La meeting as a head of state strongly criticised at home. The broad grin that paired his historic handshake with Xi, then, felt somewhat pyrrhic – the road to this smile coming at the expense of a divorce from the Taiwanese body politic. Through the Singapore summit, the CCP has tried to lock the DPP into the One-China framework, and convince the world that its approach to cross-strait relations is paying dividends. However, the summit may prove a transient high-water mark, with both the CCP and KMT recognising that under a DPP president more attuned to Taiwanese societal trends, waves – tidal or not – are to be expected.

Jeroen Gelsing is a doctoral student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests converge on the Asia Pacific and include the region’s international security dynamics, geopolitics, and modern history. His work has appeared in Asian Affairs, International Affairs Forum, and the Daily Telegraph, among others.

Notes:

[1] While the domestic structural problems of stagnating wages, labour market rigidity, and rising real estate prices command much discontent of their own, these problems are exacerbated by the feedback loop that exists between cross-strait policy and Taiwan’s overall economic position.

[2] Specifically, the KMT utilises the tenuous construct of the 1992 Consensus as its foundation for cross-strait negotiations with China. Under the 1992 Consensus both KMT and CCP agree that there exists only one China, while both sides disagree on the party – KMT or CCP – that is the sole legitimate representative of this one China. Taiwan’s main opposition party rejects this 1992 Consensus. Note also that China’s 2005 ‘Anti-Secession Law’ directed at Taiwan does not permit any political party on Taiwan to declare de jure independence, else it provoke ‘non-peaceful means’ of intervention by Beijing.