Warfare

Ethics for the AI-Enabled Warfighter – The Human ‘Warrior-in-the-Design’

June 13, 2019

by J. Zhanna Malekos Smith

14 June 2019

(U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Shannon E. Renfroe/Released)

Can a victor truly be crowned in the great power competition for artificial intelligence? According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” But the life of a state, much like that of a human being, is always subject to shifts of fortune. To illustrate, let’s consider this fabled ancient tale. At a lavish banquet King Croesus asked Solon of Athens if he knew anyone more fortunate than Croesus; to which Solon wisely answered: “The future bears down upon each one of us with all the hazards of the unknown, and we can only count a man happy when the gods have granted him good fortune to the end.” Thus, to better prepare the U.S. for sustainable leadership in AI innovation and military ethics, I recommend a set of principles to guide human warfighters in employing lethal autonomous weapon systems — armed robots.

Sustainable Leadership

By 2035, the Department expects to have ground forces teaming up with robots. The discussion on how autonomous weapon systems should responsibly be integrated with human military elements, however, is slowly unfolding. As Congress begins evaluating what the Defense Department should do, it must also consider preparing tomorrow’s warfighters for how armed robots will test military ethics.

As a beginning point of reference, Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics require: (1) a robot must not harm humans; (2) a robot must follow all instructions by humans, except if following those instructions would violate the first law; and (3) a robot must protect itself, so long as its actions do not violate the first or second laws. Unfortunately, these laws are silent on how human ethics apply here. Thus, my research into autonomous weapon systems and ethical theories re-imagines Asimov’s Laws and offers a new code of conduct for servicemembers.

What is a Code of Conduct?

Fundamentally, it is a set of beliefs on how to behave. Each service branch teaches members to follow a code of conduct like the Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos, the Airman’s Creed, and the Sailor’s Creed. Reflected across these distinct codes, however, is a shared commitment to a value-system of duty, honor, and integrity, among others.

Drawing inspiration from these concepts and several robotics strategy assessments by the Marine Corps and Army, I offer a guiding vision — a human Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct.

The Warrior-in-the-Design concept embodies both the Defense Directive that autonomous systems be designed to support the human judgment of commanders and operators in employing lethal force, and Human Rights Watch’s definition of human-out-of-the-loop weapons (i.e., robots that can select targets and apply force without human input or interaction.

The Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct for Servicemembers:

“I am the Warrior-in-the-Design;
Every decision to employ force begins with human judgment;
I verify the autonomous weapon systems target selection before authorizing engagement, escalating to fully autonomous capabilities when necessary as a final resort;
I will never forget my duty to responsibly operate these systems for the safety of my comrades and to uphold the law of war;
For I am the Warrior-in-the-Design.”

These principles encourage integrating AI and armed robots in ways that enhance — rather than supplant — human capability and the warrior psyche in combat. Furthermore, it reinforces that humans are the central figures in overseeing, managing, and employing autonomous weapons.

International Developments

Granted, each country’s approach to developing autonomous weapons will vary. For instance, Russia’s military expects “large unmanned ground vehicles [to do] the actual fighting … alongside or ahead of the human fighting force.” Based on China’s New Generation Plan, it aspires to lead the world in AI development by 2030 – including enhanced man-machine coordination and unmanned systems like service robots.

So far, the U.S. has focused on unmanned ground systems to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. The Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is currently testing how AI can support the military in fighting fires and predictive maintenance tasks. Additionally, President Trump’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence encourages government agencies to prioritize AI research and development. Adopting the Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct is a helpful first-step to supporting this initiative.

How?

It would signal to private industry and international peers that the U.S. is committed to the responsible development of these technologies and to upholding international law. Some critics object to the idea of ‘killer robots’ because they would lack human ethical decision-making capabilities and may violate moral and legal principles. The Defense Department’s response is two-fold: First, the technology is nowhere near the advancement needed to operate fully autonomous weapons, the ones that could — hypothetically, at least — examine potential targets, evaluate how threatening they are, and fire accordingly. Second, such technological capabilities could help save the lives of military personnel and civilians, by automating tasks that are “dull, dirty or dangerous” for humans.

Perhaps this creed concept could help bridge the communication divide between groups that worry such weapons violate human dignity, and servicemembers who critically need automated assistance on the battlefield. The future of AI bears down upon each of us — let reason and ethics guide us there.

This article was originally published in The Hill

Jessica ‘Zhanna’ Malekos Smith, the Reuben Everett Cyber Scholar at Duke University Law School, served as a Captain in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Before that, she was a post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center’s Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy School. She holds a J.D. from the University of California, Davis; a B.A. from Wellesley College, where she was a Fellow of the Madeleine Korbel Albright Institute for Global Affairs; and is finishing her M.A. with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Europe’s Greatest Gamblers: Anticipating Wars of the Future and Why European Leaders Are Choosing to Ignore Such Possibilities

August 15, 2018

Anticipating war is out of fashion, yet the potential destruction and impact on global society of a major war are huge.

By James M R Thorp

Soldiers from Poland’s 6th Airborne Brigade and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, during The Poland-led multinational exercise Anakonda-16 (Credit image: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS)

Back in February, Elisabeth Braw wrote an article for POLITICO titled, ‘Europe isn’t ready to face modern threats’. Braw’s case is that NATO is ‘preparing for the wrong war’ and needs to ‘become more creative in defending against hybrid attacks’. ‘[H]ybrid’, a term coined by Frank Hoffman, is defined as incorporating ‘a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… and criminal disorder’ acting at ‘all levels of war.’[1] Braw’s point that Russia and China have the will and ability ‘to bring a country to a standstill long before a conventional war takes place’ is one that is only just being heeded; for a start, the rate of cyber-attacks has increased dramatically in the last couple of years.[2] But Braw’s article misses the greater issue at hand: Western policies, economics, and its way of life all rely on the notion that war between the leading states of the world is no longer a real possibility. So, not only is the West unprepared for modern ‘hybrid’ threats, as Braw states, but it is almost entirely unprepared for any type of modern major conflict, even a conventional one.

But how likely is such a war and why has that possibility been ignored? Firstly, the world today is increasingly unstable: it faces a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable North Korea, and a ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the form of an increasingly dominant China, which is expanding its power and influence through measures such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Secondly, it may be that the US is globally dominant, and any major war would inevitably involve it, but it is rare to find someone who would solidly wager that such a major war (involving the US) would break out in the next five, or even ten, years. Yet, by looking at the case of the UK in the 1860-1910s – like the US now – the UK was globally dominant yet its share of global GDP was declining compared to its rivals, leading to a competition that culminated in the First World War – it is only rational to assume a similar situation could arise by the late 2020s.[3] Despite this, we continue to live in an age where the idea of ‘permanent peace’ is prevalent.

The moral, ethical, economic, and systematic structures that were formed after 1945, a world system dominated by the US and the West, has led to a decrease in conventional war and direct military confrontation; which in turn has led to a widespread global illusion – in the West especially – that the peace is prevalent and violence has been mostly eliminated. In reality, violence has been suppressed; human psychology has not changed enough since we formed as a species for us to have suddenly become incapable of violence. We have and always will be biologically and psychologically capable of both violence and peace, regardless of our moral and ethical systems.[4]

Europe unequivocally relies on the stability of this post-1945 order to remain safe and prosperous. Yet, with President Trump’s unpredictability, largely unknown agenda and open condemnation of NATO, Europe can no longer rely on the US to lead and remain a bastion of deterrence. The US itself stands highly divided, to the extent that the small, but genuine, chance of a second American civil war has become a talking-point amongst some security experts.[5] Similarly, Europe and the EU also stand divided, with waves of nationalism sweeping through, particularly in Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. If one is to consider global issues that will greatly impact Europe, climate change is an existential threat that has the potential to violently destroy not just the post-1945 order, but our global society as we know it.[6] But, after the US pulled out of the Paris Climate Accord in 2017, neither can Europe rely on the US to lead us through that, nor is there much evidence to show that anyone in Europe is realistically stepping up to the challenge.

Then, in spite of these weaknesses among its members, NATO on the one hand is a powerful alliance with over three million troops and around ten thousand tanks, making it a force that is certainly to be reckoned with. But on the other hand, this force is significantly weakened by certain factors. As a fighting force weapons systems are disparate, for example 20 different types of fighter aircraft are used; in-theatre hierarchies and command systems are unclear [7]; and most importantly, there exists an adversary with capability to exploit NATO’s ‘Article 5’, by obfuscating whether a member state has been attacked by another state[8]. Then, despite NATO’s European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and the very recently announced ‘Four Thirties’ Plan, defence spending across member states has dramatically reduced over the past decade or two and it remains to be seen whether defence spending promises will be kept.

Perhaps most important of all is one of the key lessons taught to us by the father of modern military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz: that chance is an intrinsic feature of war[9], and because war is, in his words, a ‘continuation of policy with other means’, so too then is politics affected by chance[10]. If chance cannot be eliminated, it follows that the possibility of any type of war can never be eliminated from political interaction. On top of that, wars of a more ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ nature have become, and will continue to be, an even greater possibility.[11]

Some European leaders may have taken certain measures to prepare for a major modern war, including promises to achieve or come close to the two percent of GDP expenditure benchmark on defence. But are such promises little more than lip-service to NATO and the USA, with only four nations in Europe achieving the benchmark last year?[12] If one considers that the world’s population has grown faster than exponentially[13], leading to massive urbanisation – two-thirds of the world’s population in cities by 2040 –, it becomes entirely probable that a modern major war would be indiscriminate and catastrophic.[14] Then consider what this article has highlighted regarding the likelihood of such a war. Taking this combined consideration, it then follows that despite NATO’s usually significant efforts, defence measures by European leaders are not nearly enough, that most politicians are repeatedly betting on war not occurring and the European public are kept blissfully unaware of a perilous future. Meanwhile, the stakes remain high, and the gamble is at the greatest level.

James is a recent MA Intelligence & International Security candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He graduated in January 2018 and is currently based in both Suffolk and London. You can find him on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-thorp-280595/

Notes:

[1] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21^st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 8.

[2] Cyber-attacks increased by double in 2017, with Russia the main source of activity, see ‘Cyber-attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017’, Infosecurity, 11 August 2017.

[3] Look at the graph on page 335 and then go to pages 338-340, see Ian Morris, What Is War Good For: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 335 & pp. 338-340.

[4] Steven Pinker, in his seminal work, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’, highlights this inner battle within humans, who ‘are equipped with five distinct motives of violence, and four faculties that allow them to inhibit or avoid violence’, see Steven Pinker, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’

[5] See Chris Arkenberg, ‘What a new U.S. civil war might look like’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017 & Lt. Col. Robert F. McTague, ‘Some thoughts on how we might get from where we’re at now to a Second Civil War’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017.

[6] For the NATO special report on this, see ‘Special Report: The Importance of Climate Change for Transatlantic Security’, NAOC, 29 November 2017, also see Steven Jermy, ‘Perfect Storm?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 12 August 2013.

[7] This was displayed very clearly within ISAF in Afghanistan: ISAF was a coalition made up from NATO members and due to inequal commitments, cultural differences and (often) incompatible caveats a potentially unified command structure was fractured – information taken from lecture by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jonathan Riley, King’s College London, 17^th November 2016. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Lessons in coalition warfare: Past, present and implications for the future.’ International Politics Reviews, 1.2 (2013), pp. 78-82.

[8] Russia’s ‘little green men’ in Ukraine being a case in point, see Robert R. Leonhard and Stephen P. Philips, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), p. 3 & 43.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. University Press

[10] ibid, p. 30.

[11] For “grey zone” see United States Special Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone, September 2015, p. 1.

[12] Only France, Greece, Poland and Romania spent over 2% of GDP on defence in 2017, see ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

[13] Simon Lewis & Mark Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene, (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 6-7.

[14] ‘The Future of War: the new Battlegrounds’, The Economist, 25 January 2018.

Image Source: https://www.newsweek.com/europeans-are-quietly-preparing-war-russia-487307

Book Review: Belfast to Benghazi

October 10, 2016

Reviewed by: Andrea Varsori

Rupert Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi: Untold challenges of war, (Cirencester: Mereo Books), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1861515667

War is a notoriously complex event. It impacts the life of thousands of individuals, each of which with her own different perspective on the conflict. For this reason, personal records are invaluable in helping to grasp the multifaceted reality of war. Rupert Wieloch’s book, Belfast to Benghazi, is important in this respect. It is an account of contemporary conflict through the eyes of a British officer. The author aims at telling his experience, as he hopes that “this book [may open] eyes on some unheralded escapades”, as well as adding “colour to some historical events”^[1]. Thus, the book eschews the theoretical debates of academia as well as the short-term attitude of the daily news cycle. The book is a detailed account of Wieloch’s experiences. During his military career, he took part in some of the most important deployments of the British Army in the last thirty years.

Each of the six chapters focuses on a particular operation and, more briefly, on the years in-between. The first chapter relates Wieloch’s activity as a Rifle Platoon Commander in Belfast in 1981. The second deals with his deployment in Cyprus in 1989 and his involvement in the Gulf War, dealing with the logistical effort as well as with the actions of his men in Kuwait. The third chapter reports his squadron’s deployment in Maglaj, Bosnia, in 1995. The second half of the book is instead devoted to the post-9/11 world. Wieloch details his contribution in shaping the United Kingdom’s response to 9/11, in the frantic last months of 2001, as a member of the “concept team” that operated between Shrivenham and Whitehall for Operation Veritas. After experiencing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he volunteered for the role of Commander of the British contingent and Chief of Staff of the NATO Mission in Baghdad, serving in the place for six months in 2008. In his last role, he acted as Senior British Military Commander in Libya, starting some days before the death of Gheddafi until April 2012.

Throughout the book, Wieloch consistently delivers a detailed report of the events in which he was involved. However, care in relating his activity may at times seem excessive, as the author is keen on including several small, isolated episodes in his narration. These episodes are sometimes hardly necessary, other than for completeness’ sake. Yet, those who are interested in the campaigns in which Wieloch was involved will surely be drawn to understanding how his regiment contributed to each particular operation. For instance, with regard to Northern Ireland, the account covers such important aspects as the organisation of patrols in West Belfast^{^[2]}, the importance of collecting intelligence from the population^{^[3]}, and the reaction to terrorist attacks^{^[4]}. Besides the less important anecdotes, a positive aspect of the book lies in avoiding becoming a romanticised autobiography or an overly ambitious reflection on abstract concepts. Opting instead for sharing with the reader the real tasks and options for a British officer in conflict.

The completeness of Weiloch’s account includes not only the facts, but also a heathy degree of criticism, whose object changes depending on the areas and activities narrated. In chapter 3, he reveals the corruption and vanity of Bosnian politicians^{^[5]}; in the chapter on the post-9/11, he notes the reluctance of British policymakers in accepting changes to potentially wrong decisions on which their minds are already set (for instance, the importance of capturing Osama Bin Laden^{^[6]}). The overwhelming influence of the United States on Whitehall’s stance since late October 2001 is also duly noted^{^[7]}. In the chapter on Iraq, the inadequacies in managing post-conflict reconstruction take centre stage^{^[8]}. While Wieloch underlines the positive results in providing military training to Iraqi security forces, he also consistently points out the inefficiency and setbacks of the British presence in Basra^{^[9]}. Finally, in the chapter on Libya, the author explains how the government’s choice of not recognising the presence of British troops on the ground (choice on which the author does not express any judgement) nonetheless meant that the British contingent was formally without budget or mail deliveries.

Weiloch maintains a clear, coherent writing style with a critical drive. Despite covering a varied range of activities, such as managing humanitarian operations, shaping policy response, or coordinating entire military missions. As a result, the book equally reveals a view from the inside of policy-making and military management. The attempt to translate policy or mission objectives into a set of actions and practices clashes often with the reality on the ground. Wieloch has thus to face the need to take into account local powerbrokers (as in Bosnia^{^[10]}), to request vital new equipment for his soldiers (as in Iraq^{^[11]} and Afghanistan^{^[12]}), or to consider the role of culture and religion in engaging with the local elites and population (as in Libya^{^[13]}).

This last point is particularly emblematic. In the chapter on Libya, the author underlines how essential for him was the familiarity with local culture, religion, and political practices. In this way, Wieloch effectively conveys the fundamental importance of knowing the people that are involved in conflict. The book emphasises this stance and supports it with real examples, leading us to forgive its several small digressions. By doing this, Wieloch also gives an advice that will be helpful for many commanders in the wars to come. As for the book on its whole, another aspect of its importance lies in the disclosure of the complex work of those who operate between politically-dictated strategy and action on the ground. As the wide range of operations of the British Army goes often unrecognised, Belfast to Benghazi may raise the public’s awareness of the difficult work of officers and of the multifaceted role of the armed forces in the world today.

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities of the Global South: in particular, he is interested in understanding the role of the urban environment in shaping organized political violence. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus from the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include the evolution of insurgency, urban riots, the crisis of classic state sovereignty, civil wars and, generally, all forms of global mayhem.

Notes:

^{^[1]} R. Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi. Untold challenges of war, Cirencester, Mereo Books, 2016, IV-V.

^{^[2]} Ibid. pp. 6-8, 11-12.

^{^[3]} Ibid. pp. 9-10. Interestingly, a similar point is raised later in the chapter on Bosnia. Talking profusely with the local population is presented as paramount in securing the inhabitants’ respect and ensuring the regiment’s freedom of movement. ibid. p. 109.

^{^[4]} Ibid. pp. 18-23.

^{^[5]} Ibid. pp. 95, 103, 118.

^{^[6]} Ibid. p. 151.

^{^[7]} Ibid. p. 159.

^{^[8]} Ibid. p. 194.

^{^[9]} Ibid. pp. 198-199, 207-208. A point emphasised by Wieloch in these pages is the effect of the high turnout of soldiers in the city, which “prevented the British forces from developing the meaningful relationships” that would have avoided a hike in insecurity and insurgent attacks.

^{^[10]} Ibid. pp. 99-100, 104-105, 107.

^{^[11]} Ibid. pp. 199-200.

^{^[12]} Ibid. pp. 203-205.

^{^[13]} Ibid. pp. 247, 249-250, 288-89.

Image Credit: US Army Europe (2014), Available from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/14445596924 (Accessed Oct 10 2016)

PROXY Capabilities – A Renewed Strategy of the 21st Century

April 4, 2016

By: Cheng Lai Ki

Photo credit: Diaz,J. ‘Russia is developing a drone army – including amphibious models’, SPLOID, January 16, 2014.

This is the first of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki.

The technological advancements over the last decade have allowed for the development of new tactics and strategies for security, intelligence and warfare options. These ‘advancements’ have undoubtedly augmented multiple state capabilities within those domains. In his book, War Made New, military historian Max Boot charts the technological developments supporting warfare throughout human history.[1] Through the lens of the book, an argument can be made that mankind has consistently improved at one thing, warfare. However, a second consistency can be identified. This is an increase in the operational distance and capabilities of states. This phenomenon can be identified through modernised versions of traditional strategies or emerging technology centric methods. Regardless of the method employed, the warfare strategy for states to use either a willing third party actor or remote control ordinance can be categorised under the broader term: ‘proxy warfare’. This series explores this exact phenomenon and the collaboration between a state and its utilisation of non-state (or remote control) actors.

The term ‘proxy’ possesses multiple definitions depending on its associated strategy, tactic and theatre. Within the context of warfare, ‘proxy’ capabilities can be analysed against the three overarching levels of: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.[2] Expanding on the concept of ‘proxy’ capacities of both state and non-state actors has raised several debates over the decades, mainly around the areas of impacts, accountability, effectiveness and oversight. However, the objective here is not the deliberate these considerations but more to explore the broadening scope of ‘proxy’ capabilities themselves; which would range from large state level proxies to small individual private contractors or unmanned ordinances. When applied effectively, ‘proxy’ capabilities could provide benefits such as plausible deniability, increased distance from harm and the augmentation of existing skills. The utilisation of ‘proxies’ is however, not a new phenomenon and has been around for centuries. Its earliest form can be represented by mercenaries. Mercenaries were (and still are) groups of ex-soldiers who contract out their skills to lords and kings with a force-limitation in a certain domain.[3] The trend has only continued to expand and broaden in scale and associative categories through the years, leading to the development of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) and probably one of the most classic examples of ‘proxy’ warfare.[4] There are of course other forms, as mentioned, these can be in the forms of a remote control ordinance.

Strategically, ‘proxy’ capabilities can refer to the involvement of entire organisations (state or non-state) as an extension of power to influence distant geopolitics. Although the utilisation of a weaker state by a global super-power could be situated as a ‘proxy’ capability. Such partnerships could not just influence national security policies but also potentially the strategic considerations of other states. Operationally, ‘proxy’ capabilities would refer to the involvement of private organisations as either an extension of power or augmentation of existing capabilities. Traditionally, this can be represented by the involvement of corporate or non-state actors who provide security, intelligence or consultancy services to government agencies that would enhance existing capabilities. Within ‘operational’ domains, ‘proxies’ are fundamentally used to empower existing state-capabilities. For example, consider a state that wants to increase its capabilities to gather intelligence in inaccessible regions, they could deploy unmanned aerial vehicles or commonly referred to as drones for the conduct of surveillance operations.[5] Finally, on a tactical level, the effects of ‘proxy’ capabilities would have been the most evident. This can primarily be represented by the application of unmanned ordinances to tactically support military operations through the provision of critical and live battlefield information or fire support (i.e. Russian Uran-9 Ground Combat Drone).[6] More recently, the world has experience a surge in cyber augmented scenarios attributed to either supporting existing warfare capabilities or espionage operations conducted by states.

Despite the technological augmentations currently available to states, the concept of ‘proxy’ capabilities as explained earlier is not a new phenomenon. However, the number of capabilities that can be encompassed under the concept has now broadened; evident from efforts of awareness initiative such as the Remote Control Project – a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group stationed in London.[7] It is advisable that we under the notion and expansion of what can be considered ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. State-actors are obtaining more effective ordinances to arm their unmanned systems to conduct more effective information gathering and strike missions. Cybersecurity companies and security/intelligence agencies are collaborating with skilled non-state agents to empower their existing capabilities to tackle advanced persistent treats.

This series explores this consistently broadening cope of ‘proxy’ capabilities within the 21^st century and various associated issues towards their respective categories through a three-part series entirely written by Master students currently studying under the King’s College London, War Studies Department. Part One of the series addresses the most traditional form of ‘proxy’ capabilities of involving a third non-state actor to support existing state activities in conflict or contested zones. Gregory Wilson will kick off the series by exploring the role of Russian Private Military Companies and their involvement within pro-Russian activities within recent theatres.

Part Two of the series takes a further step back and explores the technologically enhanced hardware dimensions of ‘proxy’ capabilities through an analysis of surveillance techniques by Saher Naumaan; and followed by a study of the application of unmanned ordinances by various countries by Rian Whitton.

Part Three of the series finally embarks into the most recent form of ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. Elmer Hernandez first bridges the gap between the physical and cyber realms by analysing how state agencies are collaborating with non-state ‘hackers’ to support their ongoing counter terrorist operations. Finally, this series wraps up with an analysis of the current Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom and the involvement of private telecommunication companies by Mustafa Batuhan Albas.

The objective of this series is to reveal the broad – and expanding – capabilities for state-actors to have their existing powers augmented through ‘proxy’ capabilities. With modernisation and technological advancements, the world in locked into a cycle of consistent change. These trends slowly distance the capability of states away from symmetrical and more towards asymmetrical strategies. It is therefore vital that we understand these expansive dimensions before it completely redefines state strategies in warfare, intelligence and geopolitics.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London where his academic interest revolves around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea.

[1] Boot, M. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Gotham Books), 2012.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Untied States, (25 March 2013).

[3] Singer, P. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry, (New York: Cornel University Press), 2003.

[4] Kinsey, C. Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York: Routledge), 2006.

[5] Kreps, S & Kaag, J. Drone Warfare, (Cambridge: Polity), 2014.

[6] Mizokami, K., ‘The Kremlin’s Tiny Drone Tank Bristles With Weapons’, Popular Mechanics [Online], Available from: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18948/russias-new-ground-combat-drone-uran-9/, Accessed 26 March 2016.

[7] Remote Control Project, (London: Oxford Research Group) [Online], Available from: http://remotecontrolproject.org/about/, Accessed 12 March 2016.

Henchmen of Ares

March 18, 2014

By Louis Mignot:

Josho Brouwers, Henchmen of Ares: Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece. Rotterdam: Karwansaray Publishers, 2013. Pp. 208. €29,95/ £25.07. ISBN: 978-94-90258-07-8.

Brouwers’s Henchmen of Ares traces the development of warrior culture from the thirteenth to the fifth century BC. By using Homeric epics and other near-contemporary accounts in tandem with archaeological finds, Brouwers attempts to drill down to the nature of warfare and its development. There are issues surrounding the use of such sources but, despite this, Henchmen of Ares is a good read for anyone seeking to gain a foundational understanding of the cult of the Early Greek warrior.

***

‘I am a henchman of the lord god of war
and skilled in the lovely gift of the Muses’
-Archilochus

Henchmen of Ares is a deeply researched and engrossing work. It provides a good foundation of the culture surrounding combat and warfare in early Greece. Covering a long period of history, from the thirteenth to the fifth century BC, this book examines the cult of the warrior through the works of classical authors and archaeological finds. The progression in military technology and tactics (shown to be intrinsically linked) is traced from diffuse ‘war bands’ to the classic image of Spartans fighting in organised shield walls at Thermopylae.

The work is centred on a reading of Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, followed by an extrapolation of the information gleaned from these sources. Now, while it is true that the Homeric epics are important sources for the perception of warfare in the Greek mind-set, it is perhaps putting the cart before the horse to use them as one’s principal source. In that, just as art, film and literature exaggerates and glorifies the nature of war today, so too did their early Greek counterparts. This is not to compare the use of the Iliad as a source with the use of the film ‘300’, but nonetheless there are inherent historiographical flaws. Brouwers often alludes to issues with sources, such as Herodotus’ account being written fifty years on, but they are not pursued sufficiently. The provenance of any source is something that must always be considered and this is not done sufficiently in Henchmen of Ares.

Untitled-1 — This representation of Lykaon and Nike, on display at the British Museum, dates from 440 BC. This is a good example of how we should not take pictorial representations of combat as the be all and end all in evidence. The fact that Lykaon is naked here, is a stylistic feature found in much art from this period (Photo by Louis Mignot)

Brouwer’s use of art, particularly pottery, is an interesting historiographical method. The pictorial representations of warriors on vases and other pieces are drawn upon several times throughout the work to inform comments on an individual’s equipment and, occasionally, tactics. These conclusions are then excellently illustrated by several talented illustrators. However, just as Brouwers fails to critically engage sufficiently with his classical authors, so too does he fall short with his archaeological evidence. There are a number of fundamental problems here. Firstly, generalisations in terms of equipment are likely to be made; frescos are cited by Brouwers showing soldiers with a certain type of helmet. The author then suggests that these helmets must therefore have been widespread. Yet, soldiers in these pictures are idealised forms, and the same can be said for their equipment. In terms of tactical conclusions there are more issues. Making judgements on the numbers of soldiers in a battle based on a representation on a vase is very difficult. Firstly, the picture is in profile, so you cannot see the three-dimensional aspect of the battle; how many are there in this line or ‘wave’ of soldiers? Secondly, the issue of idealisation comes up again; an artist will exaggerate a warrior’s prowess in art. For example, several illustrations cited by Brouwers show naked warriors, he correctly dismisses the notion that they fought naked, but it is a good example of the impressionistic attitude of the artist.

The author does, however, tackle anachronism well. This period is steeped in a poor chronological understanding, which can be misleading. For example Brouwers refutes the notion of the Greek ‘knight’ and ‘squire’ dynamic; he points out that the young man aiding the warrior served to keep the fighter’s horse safe, not aid him in combat or arm him.[1] Additionally, the author does admit that artistic representations of equipment are likely to be exaggerated, showing the peak of technology rather than the reality. Brouwers concedes that metal armour was not wholly widespread in this period.[2] He also tackles the anachronism of the Phalanx, pointing out that this method for fighting only really became effective and organised under Philip of Macedon in the 300s. Brouwers’s discussion of tactics is strong; one can clearly see the progression from what he calls ‘mass combat’ and ‘massed combat’.[3] This delineation does not suggest a leap from loose-knit ‘teams’ to the phalanx, but indicates a greater cooperation and mutual protection by the warriors on the battlefield. This, no doubt, was facilitated by technological progression towards improved armour and weapons.

The use of illustrations (that is modern reconstructions, not contemporary art) in the book is a double-edged sword. The pictorial representations of warfare, particularly of arms and equipment, are in some ways helpful, but they do, at times, detract from the argument. If one was to examine the illustrations provided, the impression gained would be of widespread use of armour, yet Brouwers states that sophisticated armour types were not always widely proliferated. Moreover, photographs of pottery and of geographic locations serve to illustrate the author’s argument, but here they are often a few pages on from the relevant passage. This is something that could be addressed (perhaps in a future re-edition) to aid the book’s argument.

Readers expecting a clear, factual tactical discussion of Greek warfare may perhaps be disappointed. Henchmen of Ares is very much a cultural exploration of warfare, with detailed discussions of possible equipment, but little in the way of battle technique. Moreover, when Brouwers does discuss tactics, the reasons behind the specific tactic and its success are not fully explored. Despite this, the cultural examination of warfare is fascinating. The author discusses the cult surrounding the successful warrior, pointing out the proclivity in sources for deeds of heroism. Brouwers suggests that this may have been due to less organised formations -the phalanx in its most organised form in this period- allowing for more individual combat. Yet it is important to be aware of the impediments that Brouwers faces; almost every source available is unreliable to some extent. Despite these historiographical difficulties, it is surely commendable that the author has constructed an interesting discussion of warfare, thereby facilitating understanding, .

Henchmen of Ares is an important foundational read for anyone interested in Greek warfare. Detailed tactical discussions are absent, but blame cannot be solely placed on the shoulders of the author. The sources available are perhaps more impressionistic, rather than specific. The cultural discussion in this book is an interesting insight into the social landscape of the early Greek world, but it is important that we critically engage with our sources and question the implications of provenance.

NOTES

[1] J. Brouwers, Henchmen of Ares, Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece, Karwansaray Publishers, 2013, p. 76.
[2] ibid. p. 102.
[3] ibid. p. 92.

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