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No Way Out: How Four Local Newburgh Men Became ‘Entrapped’ into Plotting an Act of Terror

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by Michel Seibriger

James Cromitie, head of the Newburgh Four, is arrested by federal agents (Image credit: Robert Mecea/AP)

In June 2011, four men from Newburgh, New York State were convicted on 7 counts to plot a terror attack on a synagogue and a US military base with Stinger missiles, and subsequently jailed for 25 years. The men remain in jail to the present day. However, the act of terror that sealed the men’s fate never took place .[1] Theirs was the most prominent example of , in which the four men were entrapped into committing the act of terror by an FBI informant.

Sting operations feature an informant (oftentimes an ex-convict himself) that approaches individuals he deems to be vulnerable to radicalization. This informant then actively fabricates and promotes a specific terror attack before trying the would-be-perpetrator on precisely those terrorist charges.[2] In doing so, the informant not only provides the brainpower of plotting a terrorist attack but frequently also the logistical and organizational support such as artificial weapons and material to build a bomb.[3]

This new counterterrorist technique emerged in the wake of 9/11 when pressure was mounting on the FBI to justify its increased budget with a higher conviction rate of potential terrorists. As such, the Bureau tried to counteract and combat comprehensively what Donald Rumsfeld infamously dubbed the “unknown unknowns”- that is, terror threats the government did not even know existed. The FBI attempted to imagine a catastrophic terror attack in the future before “[making] sure […] that future never happens”, and thereby working toward the desired, albeit unrealistic.[4]

Crucially, stings carry with them substantial moral and legal pitfalls, only some of which have been discussed in popular discourse.[5] In the case of the Newburgh Four, the defendants were consistently instrumentalised, degraded and entrapped.

Instrumentalisation and degradation go against human dignity and, by extension, constitute a fundamental violation of human rights. The concept of entrapment has substantial legal and moral implications. Its common definition is the manipulation of an individual to commit an act he or she would otherwise have been unlikely to commit. the legal definition is more concerned with proving the defendants’ lack of predisposition to carrying out the attack.[6] Both will be applied to make the case that not only moral standards have been violated here.

To start, the initiation of contact alone warrants scrutiny since it demonstrates the instrumentalisation of the sting subjects. The eleven-month-long operation commenced when Shahed Hussain, a Pakistani migrant with a lengthy criminal history of his own, phished outside of a mosque in Newburgh, a poverty-stricken city just north of New York City. Posing as an outwardly wealthy businessman, the FBI informant got the attention of James Cromitie, a local ex-convict who worked at Walmart[7]. Notably, Hussein later stated that he selected Cromitie as the subject of the operation due to his Arab accent alone. Hong and Szpunar have considered this to be a “weak link” due to the constitutional protection of speech.[8]

The arbitrariness of the phishing methods employed by Hussein is testament to the manner in which Cromitie was instrumentalized for his operation. Moreover, the informant selected a mosque to phish for suspects, indicating a general suspicion towards Muslims that he had already displayed in a previous sting operation.[9] This spatial selection, taken together with the choice of the impoverished Newburgh, clearly demonstrates Hussain’s aim: to find any individual vulnerable to exploitation, increasing the chances of radicalisation into a would-be terrorist[10]. Since Kaufmann defines such ‘instrumentalisation’ as one way to violate human dignity, it seems very fitting to span the conceptual link between the would-be terror attack by a Muslim-American and Hussein’s phishing in front of the mosque. Therefore, Cromitie’s human dignity was violated by his random selection and instrumentalisation for the sting operation.

Next, it is important to consider the defendants’ grave financial dependence on Hussain. This dependence consistently degraded them. As per Webster, the taking away of agency and personal autonomy is tantamount to the degradation of an individual, which in turn violates his or her human dignity[11]. As will be shown, the financial dependence of the men on Hussain qualified for precisely this degradation. Throughout the course of the operation, Hussain exploited Cromitie’s financial hardship on numerous occasions in order to expedite his radicalisation [12]. Having served time before, the promise of some  $250,000 in cash seemingly trumped the knowledge of the severity of the crime that Hussein suggested for Cromitie.[13]

That being said, the local man used every chance he had to stall: at one point, he cut all contact with Hussain when his finances would allow him, and only re-established contact after losing his job.[14] This stalling, combined with the fact that he explicitly refused a leading position in plotting the attack,[15] points to the fact that while the man was keen on earning the rewards for his cooperation, he was at the very least hesitant to the proposed plan of blowing up a synagogue.[16] Therefore, by making financial benefits contingent on the carrying out of the terrorist act, Hussein consistently degraded Cromitie because the latter knew he had to, at least incrementally, deliver on promises of radicalisation and jihadism vis-á-vis his “supplier”.[17] The other members were also highly vulnerable and dependent on Hussein. David Williams claimed that the informant promised money to pay for his uncle’s liver transplant and Laguerre Payen was a schizophrenic residing in a crack-house.[18] Hussein was well-aware of the defendants’ hardships and psychological state,[19] yet continued to exploit their vulnerabilities with the lure of financial rewards.[20]

Finally, the case of the “Newburgh Four” provides a textbook example of entrapment. Despite the stalling tactics used by Cromitie, Hussein was adamant about the organisation of the attack and even provided the alleged material to conduct it.[21] The informant even taught the men about jihad and radical Islam in spite of the fact that the Newburgh men (Cromitie had “recruited” the three others) were anything but zealous.[22] Hussain conceived of the plan to attack the synagogue and US military planes alone.[23] At one point, Cromitie explicitly tried to back out, but Hussain responded by falsely claiming that he himself could be killed by fellow jihadists should the attack fail.[24] Even the presiding judge stated that without Hussain’s instigation and planning of the attack, “there would have been no crime here”.[25] Conversely, Cromitie’s actions demonstrate his striking disinclination to carry out a terrorist attack; he would never have done so were it not for Hussain’s coercion to ensure his compliance. Hussain’s tactics thereby fulfill the previously mentioned common definition of entrapment as the manipulation of individuals into committing attacks they would otherwise not have considered, and arguably even the legal definition of a lack of predisposition.[26] As a result, both the violations of human dignity and the way the defendants were entrapped allow for the claim that sting operations are not justifiable as a counterterrorism measure.

Counterterrorism operations are anything but an exact science. Decisions must be made based on incomplete information and the envisioned society of zero risk is arguably still a utopian one. However, in the wake of 9/11, the FBI has consistently attempted to fabricate future crimes by means of so-called sting operations. Preventing a terror attack seems a noble cause prima. Yet, as the case of the Newburgh Four has demonstrated, stings often violate the individuals’ human dignity by instrumentalising, degrading, and entrapping them. In so doing, they run contrary to the stated goal of a more secure country. While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it aims to provide an important moral discussion of stings that has been astonishingly sidelined in academia. Due to the human rights and legal objections outlined above, it can be said that premeditating future acts by means of sting operations cannot be justified.

[1] Harris, 2011a

[2] Hay, 2005: 390.

[3] Mariani, 2018,

[4] Grusin, 2004: 36.

[5] See, for instance, Harris, 2011a or Greenberg 2011.

[6] Greenberg, 2011.

[7] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 23 & 38.

[8] Hong & Szpunar, 2019: 319.

[9] Bartosiewicz et al., 2011: 40; Laguardia, 2013: 193.

[10] Hong & Szpunar, 2019:

[11] Webster, 2011: 79.

[12] Shipler, 2012.

[13] Harris, 2011b.

[14] Laguardia, 2013: 197;

[15] Laguardia, 2013: 195.

[16] Harris, 2011b.

[17] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 31.

[18] Bartosiewicz et al., 2011: 44.

[19] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 31.

[20] Harris, 2011b.

[21] Laguardia, 2013: 195.

[22] Harris, 2011a; Szpunar, 2017: 376.

[23] Bartosiewicz et al, 2011: 44.

[24] Harris, 2011b.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Harris, 2011a.

Aradau, Claudia, and Rens van Munster. “The Time/Space of Preparedness: Anticipating the ‘Next Terrorist Attack.’” Space and Culture 15, no. 2 (May 2012): 98–109. doi:10.1177/1206331211430015.

Baker, Al, and Javier C. Hernández. “4 Accused Of Bombing Plot At Bronx Synagogues”. Nytimes.Com, May 20, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/nyregion/21arrests.html.

Bartosiewicz, Petra, Brian Merchant, Greg Jackson, Tommy Trenchard, David Gordon, and Susan Choi. “To Catch A Terrorist”. Harper’s Magazine, 2011. https://harpers.org/archive/2011/08/to-catch-a-terrorist/.

Greenberg, Karen. „How terrorist ‘entrapment‘ ensnares us all“. The Guardian, December 12, 2011.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/how-terrorist-entrapment-ensares-us-all

Grusin, Richard A. Premediation Affect and Mediality after 9/11. Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Grusin, Richard A. “Premediation.” Criticism 46, no. 1 (2004): 17-39. www.jstor.org/stable/23127337.

Harris, Paul. “Fake Terror Plots, Paid Informants: The Tactics Of FBI ‘Entrapment’ Questioned”. The Guardian, November 16, 2011a. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots.

Harris, Paul. Newburgh Four: poor, black, and jailed under FBI’s ‚entrapment‘ tactics. The Guardian, December 12, 2011b., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/12/newburgh-four-fbi-entrapment-terror

Hay, Bruce. (2005). Sting operations, undercover agents, and entrapment. Missouri Law

Review 70, no. 2 (2005): 387-432.

Hong, Sun-ha, and Piotr M Szpunar. “The Futures of Anticipatory Reason: Contingency and Speculation in the Sting Operation.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 4 (August 2019): 314–30. doi:10.1177/0967010619850332.

Ismail, Tarek Z., Naureen Shah & Andrea Prasow. Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_1_0.pdf

Janbek, Dana & Valerie Williams. (2014). Role of the internet post-9/11 in terrorism and counterterrorism. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 20, no. 2 (2014): 297-308.

Norris, Jesse J. & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk. Temporal trends in US counterterrorism sting operations, 1989–2014, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11, no. 2 (2018): 243-271, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2017.1400421

Kaufmann, Paulus, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhaeuser and Elaine Webster, eds. Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated. Dordrecht: Springer Science Business Media B.V., 2011.

Laguardia, Francesca. “Terrorists, Informants, and Buffoons: The Case for Downward Departure as a Response to Entrapment,” Lewis & Clark Law Review 17, no. 1 (2013): 171-214

Mariani, Mike. “The Would-Be Terrorist Vs. The FBI”. GQ, November 20, 2008, https://www.gq.com/story/matthew-llaneza-alleged-terrorist-fbi-snare.

Norris, J. J. Why the FBI and the courts are wrong about entrapment and terrorism. Mississippi Law Journal, 84, no. 5 (2015): 1257-1328

Sherman, Jon. (2009). “A person otherwise innocent: Policing entrapment in preventative, undercover counterterrorism investigations”. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 11, no. 5 (2009): 1475-1510.

Shipler, David K. “Terrorist Plots, Helped Along By The F.B.I.”. New York Times, April 28, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/terrorist-plots-helped-along-by-the-fbi.html.

Szpunar, Piotr M. “Premediating Predisposition: Informants, Entrapment, and Connectivity in Counterterrorism.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 34, no. 4 (2017): 371-85.

Webster, Elaine. “Degradation: A Human Rights Law Perspective.” In Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated, edited by Paulus Kaufmann, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhaeuser and Elaine Webster. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2011.

Michel Seibriger holds a degree in International Relations & International Organisation at the University of Groningen and has completed the Honours College at the same university. Funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Germany, he is currently studying an MA in International Peace & Security at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies. His research focus is on Radicalization, Counterterrorism and Human Rights, particularly with a normative lens to it.

The Funding of Terrorism (Part IV) – A Trust Deficit is Undermining the Investigation of Terrorist Financing across MENA

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by Jack Watling

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei (Image credit: Ayatollah.ir/Wikimedia)

 

The Kingdom of Bahrain sentenced 139 people to prison in April 2019, alleging they were part of a terrorist cell, which the authorities refer to as ‘Bahraini Hezbollah’. The charges in the mass trial ranged from plotting to conduct attacks and the smuggling of arms, to terrorist financing. Specifics however were not revealed, and point to a damaging trend: the use of ‘terrorism’ as a politically acceptable charge with which to implement repression. The consequences of this policy are not just unjust, but in pushing communities to avoid cooperation with the authorities sustains avenues for actual terrorists to finance and carry out their operations.

There are armed groups active in Bahrain, just as there are non-state armed actors, many of which have carried out terrorist attacks, in Iraq, Syria, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Many of these groups are directly supported by Iran in these activities. While sanctions on Iran can be effective in reducing the country’s available resources for financing clandestine activities, limited progress has been made in restricting the routes by which money reaches armed groups. To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate how the Shia community manages its tithes. Although a minority of Shia Muslims are followers of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s religious leadership has ties across the Shia community, and the Iranian government is consequently able to leverage these networks.

Each Twelver Shia Muslim selects an Ayatollah – or religious jurist – as their spiritual guide. They are obligated to follow the scholar who they believe to be most theologically knowledgeable. A follower must pay a fifth of their profits each year to their Ayatollah. The khums is supposed to support the Ayatollah in his research, and to provide subsistence for the Howza: the seminary he oversees. Many Shia give more than the required khums and, in discussion with the cleric or their representatives, make additional donations for him to spend in support of an agreed cause.

The Shia financial system was developed in small communities. Between the collapse of distance brought about by international finance, and a rapidly expanding global population, it now sees donations made by a community of around 220 million people. The volume of money is therefore vast, and far exceeds the immediate needs of the Ayatollahs and the Howza. A far higher proportion of the money is therefore used to support charitable ventures, and to help Shia communities.

What constitutes ‘help’ is contextual. It may mean educational scholarships to students in Mali, or aid to flood victims in Pakistan. It could also mean supporting military activity. When Islamic State seized Mosul in 2014 Grand Ayatollah Sistani declared the fight to defend Iraq a ‘sacred defense’ and large amounts of money from the Marjaiy’ah – the Shia clerical authority – went to the Popular Mobilization Forces, and their families, to support the war effort. The use of religious funds to support the war effort was understandable. It also highlighted how the Shia financial system can support a wide range of political causes, and military efforts.

The capacity for Shia clerics to inject political and financial capital into causes was lamented by the British in the early twentieth century.[1] It has been viewed with hostility by Arab governments since, especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 for instance Grand Ayatollah Sistani decided that Bahraini Shia should use their khums locally.[2] Done for humanitarian reasons, this act gave the protest movement both a large amount of money, and the infrastructure for managing it.

Much of that infrastructure is entirely opaque, with local religious representatives receiving cash, and conveying or dispersing it as a matter of trust. The Shia community has a good reason for keeping their finances away from the banking system. In 1991 for instance Saddam Hussein looted the Shrines of Karbala, and actively attempted to seize khums revenues.  The fear that opening the process to scrutiny will see predatory seizures by hostile governments is both persistent within the Marjai’yah, and understandable.

From the point of view of Arab governments like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia however this architecture provides a highly suspicious and invisible flow of funds that goes to both legitimate charity, and to subversive political activities. It is exploited by Iran. The problem is that because it is opaque, finding the evidence trail of the small amount of terrorist financing in the large flow of legitimate funding is hard, especially when those conducting legitimate charity have no incentive to cooperate with the authorities.

Bahraini officials have repeatedly sought to have US counterterrorism investigators endorse their actions against what they see as Iranian subversion in their country. The problem, as a former senior US Treasury official noted in interview, is that ‘they present us with suspicious unknowns – and the opacity of Shia finance certainly represents a threat vector – but they claim it is evidence of terrorist financing. It is not.’[3]

If Bahrain – and other Gulf monarchies – intend to clamp down on the financing of terrorism they need to avoid mass trials and vague charges. They must conduct diligent investigative work, and present detailed cases. Charging five people with specific, evidenced crimes, would be infinitely more credible. It would require a shift from attempting to rule by law, to supporting the rule of law. But until governments across the region are able to build trust with the Shia community, they can expect Shia finance to remain opaque, and so long as it is opaque, it will remain a vector for the financing of subversion from Iran.

Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Department of Military Sciences at RUSI. He holds a PhD in history examining the evolution of UK policy responses to civil war. Jack has worked in Iraq, Mali, Rwanda and further afield and has contributed to the RUSI Journal, RUSI Defence Systems, Reuters, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, The Guardian, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Haaretz and others. He was shortlisted for the European Press Prize in 2016, and won the Breakaway Award at the International Media Awards in 2017. This report was supported with funding from the Pulitzer Centre.

[1] TNA, FO 800/70: Cecil Spring Rice to Edward Grey, 18 July 1907.

[2] Author interviews with officials from Iraq’s clerical establishment, held in October 2017 in Najaf.

[3] Author interview, a former senior treasury official, Washington DC, April 2019.

The Funding of Terrorism (Part I) – Hookahs and Honey: Funding Terrorism through ‘Benign’ Activities

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by Ian Ralby

4 August 2019

Shisha pipes across the Middle East are being filled with charcoal smuggled from Somalia. This seemingly benign but criminal activity nets the terrorist group Al-Shabaab millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars each year. (Image credit: Flickr)

 

Terrorism catches people’s attention, charcoal does not. It is a certitude much like the fact that a bomb blowing up a building will make international news and a fishing boat laden with jerry cans of diesel will not. Over the last decade, terrorist groups have increasingly sought to fund their operations using activities that many consider ‘benign’ and thus undeserving of serious scrutiny. While the trafficking of arms, drugs or humans draws significant law enforcement attention around the world, goods including fuel, charcoal, honey, sugar, fish and antiquities do not occupy prominent positions on most of these agencies’ priority lists – if they feature at all.  Noting how high-profile crimes tend to attract the close watch of national and international authorities, terrorist organisations around the world have found relative ease in recent years by funding themselves through profitable ‘benign’ operations. It is imperative for law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism authorities to increase their coordination on these matters and scrutinise such often overlooked activities as critical sources of terrorist financing.

Perhaps the best-known instance, at least in counterterrorism circles, of seemingly benign economic activity that actually finances terrorist organisations is the trading of Somali charcoal to the Middle East. Acacia charcoal, excellent for use in shisha pipes, has been exported from Somalia for decades. As Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group established in 2006, took over parts of Somalia, it sought to benefit from the lucrative trade in various ways, including through informal taxes and port revenues.  In response, the Transitional Federal Government banned the export of charcoal from Somalia and later the international community imposed an embargo on it. The result has been an extensive smuggling operation in an effort to maintain the income stream. Publicly disclosed estimates from the British Royal Navy suggest that this operation currently yields $7 million per year for Al-Shabaab. Prior to substantial interdiction efforts, that figure was once estimated to be in the tens, or even hundreds, of millions.  Unlike issues like piracy or wildlife trafficking, charcoal has not captured public attention in the same way, and thus has not garnered the same political interest, though recent exposés have sought to change that. While the counterterrorism community is heavily focused on charcoal, many politicians still view it as a low priority, since compared to other goods it still seems relatively benign.  And even if charcoal does gain further visibility, the situation with Al-Shabaab is only one example of a larger phenomenon.

The same apathy towards smuggling of a benign commodity has been a major factor in illicit oil and fuel activities becoming a substantial source of terrorist financing.  The majority of people around the world rely on fuel in their daily lives. Consequently, it is perhaps the most ubiquitous commodity and one which people are most interested in obtaining at a discount.  Too often, widespread and seemingly harmless shopping for discounts equates to a willingness on the part of law enforcement and the political establishment to overlook the sources of cheaper-than-market-price fuel. They disregard what seem to be low-scale illicit operations as not meriting the attention of law enforcement. This salutary neglect of black market fuel trading has become a major point of manipulation for terrorist groups looking for under-the-radar income streams.

Furthermore, the success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has inspired groups around the world to adopt a Jihadi-Salafist philosophy and seek to ‘restore’ the early Islamic caliphate.  ISIS-inspired groups, however, are inspired not only by ISIS ideology but also by ISIS methods and it is well-known that ISIS’ principle source of income has been proceeds from illicit oil and fuel activities. It is therefore not surprising that affiliated groups in other regions of the world have turned to fuel smuggling as their primary source of income. In the Philippines for example, Abu Sayyaf used fuel smuggling both to fund itself and to reinforce smuggling routes that supported its movement of weapons and ammunition in the lead-up to and throughout the year-long siege of Marawi.  In Trinidad and Tobago, a similar co-location of ISIS ideology and rampant fuel smuggling has given rise to significant international concern. As with charcoal, a prevalent perception of the commodity itself as being benign has created a blind spot that allows terrorist groups to earn substantial profits with little interference or even interest.

Beyond charcoal and fuel, other goods such as fish, livestock, honey, sugar, minerals and antiquities, depending on their availability, profitability, and relative visibility by law enforcement, have all become sources of income for terrorist groups. Osama Bin Laden used honey trading both to make profits and for money laundering.  Few goods could seem less sinister than honey, and that provided the perfect cover and income stream for one of history’s most ominous terrorists.  Whether the trade is initially illegal, as with fuel smuggling, or technically legal, as with honey or charcoal trading, the very fact that it is being used to fund terrorist organisations makes it illegal.

The point is that terrorist groups are relying on economic activities perceived as benign in order to make, maintain and move their wealth. And wealth is extremely important for terrorism, as evidenced by the direct correlation between the number of attacks perpetrated by a group and its relative financial stature.  In a 2016 interview, Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, former Director of the Israeli Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Bureau, stated, ‘The financial component of terror organizations is critical, and its indispensability for terror attacks is like fuel for the car’. As true as this statement is, the irony is that the financial component of terror organisations may literally be fuel for the car.

To change this dynamic, law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism units need to become more proactive in identifying their own blind spots and false perceptions.  This means consciously reexamining those matters they have overlooked in the past.  That, however, is not easy to do.  Terrorist groups will continue to seek, find and exploit economic opportunities that occupy lower positions on the priority lists of the authoritaries. Inevitably, as law enforcement approaches change, so, too, will terrorist activities. But, it is imperative that the crimes and trading activities that have been relegated to benign status be reconsidered not just in their own right but for their malignant implications.  The profits accruing from such overlooked criminal goods as shisha charcoal, farm diesel or artisanal honey, may actually be funding deadly bombings, hijackings, or militant offensives.

Dr. Ian Ralby is a leading expert in international law, maritime security and countering transnational organized crime.  He and his team at I.R. Consilium, LLC have world leading expertise in oil and fuel crimes, and the nexus between maritime crimes and both criminal and terrorist activities.  Among other degrees, he holds a J.D. from William & Mary and a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge where he was a Gates Scholar. 

Strife Series on The Funding of Terrorism – Introduction

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by Alexandra Roberts

1 August 2019

The funding of terrorism, an overlooked but important field of inquiry (Image credit: UK Defence Journal)

 

Editorial

We have all seen the outcome of violent acts of terrorism . The attacks of 11 September 2001 were among the largest coordinated assaults that had ever been carried out. In the near two decades that have since passed, there has been a sustained multi-national effort to curb terrorism and to try to prevent further attacks. Troops have been deployed in kinetic operations around the world and intelligence agencies and analysts have increased in numbers to gather and interpret data and intelligence. An essential, but frequently overlooked, component of stopping terrorism is preventing terrorist groups from raising the funds necessary to enact their plans. The practicalities of such operations are little known and rarely focussed on in the public discourse on terrorism. However, like any other organisation or group, terrorists need to be able to finance their activities in order to carry out their objectives.

This leads to questions of where the money come from, how it is moved and how it can be stopped. We, the public, tend to know its source is something nefarious. Almost certainly illegal. That al-Qaeda probably did not check their credit rating or apply for a larger overdraft facility in order to fund the 9/11 attacks. But, beyond that, we have very little knowledge about their funding. We know that there are laws designed to prevent the financing of terrorist activities, but we do not tend know what they are, how they operate or who applies them. Even where these laws exist, not all countries and governments agree on how or whose should be implemented. Moreover, because of the asymmetric nature of terrorism, a tool that can be used stifle one group, may have no practical application to another, whilst at the same time the methods and modes used by terrorists to finance themselves are evolving. In turn, legal instruments that can be used to stop them must also evolve too.

This Strife series explores the relationship between money and terrorism. The series looks at who funds it, how they do it, what tools we have to prevent it and even how the laws to stop it can be misused. Its purpose is to highlight quite how complex and diverse the issues surrounding terrorism’s funding are. That it is not just a matter of finding the sources of their finance and shutting it down, but rather understanding the multifaceted political web it is entangled in.

Publication Schedule 

In the first article (04/08), Dr Ian Ralby raises concerns about how low profile and seemingly benign criminal activities are used to fund global terrorism. He makes the case that law enforcement agencies need to recognise that terrorist groups will exploit these overlooked, lesser crimes as a way of raising funds and laundering money and must respond.

In the second article (06/08), Dr Vanessa Neumann explores the relationship between Venezuela’s Maduro regime and Hezbollah through long-standing links with post-revolutionary Iran. She tracks the history of the relationship between these groups and argues that ending the Maduro regime will deliver a severe setback for Hezbollah.

In the third article (08/08), Dr Michael Greenwald examines how Section 311 of the Patriot Act that pertains to correspondent banking relationships between the United States and other countries has been used to stop terrorism. He argues that in a new era of great power competition, it needs to be updated to be able to respond to the current global political and economic climate.

In the final article (10/08), Dr Jack Watling looks at how mass trails and vague charges are undermining efforts in the Middle East to stop the Shia system of tithes and its opaque financing practices potentially funding terrorism. He highlights that these questionable prosecutions are not only used as tools of state oppression, but that they are counterproductive in reaching a more transparent financial system.

Alexandra is studying for an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London. She is particularly interested in the role of women in Jihadist terrorism and US foreign security policy. Prior to starting her postgraduate studies, she worked as a political and security researcher, with a particular focus on the MENA region. She also done work focussing on the prevention of IUU fishing. Alexandra has a BSc in Oil and Gas management, with particular focus on the petrochemical industry in Iraq and its potential social, economic and political impacts on the country, using knowledge and experience gained working in the private security sector with a company specialising in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

ULFA: A Persistent Threat

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By Athul Menath

Two ULFA cadres guarding a camp in Tinsukia district, in the northeast Indian state of Assam. (Source: AFP)

 

Since 1979, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has been at the forefront of insurgent violence in the Indian state of Assam. The group sprang up during the ‘anti-outsider’ agitation which demanded the expulsion of ethnic Bengalis whose large scale influx had impacted the local demography of Assam. Soon the movement started showing a secessionist character, resulting in the birth of ULFA, under the leadership of Paresh Baruah. The group has been demanding session from the Union of India, claiming that Assam has been ‘colonised by New Delhi’. Although created in 1979, the group became active in 1982, when it killed a well-known Bengali lawyer, Kalipada Sen.

An undivided ULFA was estimated to have a cadre strength of about 5,000. Following a split in 2012, two factions emerged. The first is the Pro-talk faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF), which  conducts peace talks with the Government of India. The second is the Independent faction of (ULFA-I), which is based in Myanmar and has a capacity of about three hundred cadres.

The article is an attempt to chronicle the renewed activity of ULFA-I and  to identify the underlying reason for its longevity in the plethora of insurgent outfits in the often under-reported and misunderstood Northeast India.

 

Recent activities

On January 13, 2018 an ULFA-I cadre was arrested from Chabua in the Dibrugarh District. He was reportedly tasked by ULFA-I to collect information on aviation-carrying turbine fuel (ATF) tankers entering Chabua Air Force station. The alleged purpose was to place an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on ATF tankers entering the air base.

The month before, on the 8th December 2017, six militants of ULFA-I entered the Kunapathar Tea Estate in Bordumsa, Tinsukia District and opened fire at the estate manager, notably after the authorities refused to pay extortion money that the militants had previously demanded from the planters a couple of weeks prior. A few days later, on the 11th, the ULFA-I militants shot dead a Village Defense Party (VDP) President – identified as Anteswar Mahanta – and his son Karun at Dirak-Hunjan, Tinsukia District. The killing resulted in wide spread protests and demonstrations in the District, with civilians claiming that state Government had failed to provide security.

Additionally, reports in January 2018 indicate that ULFA-I and the Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) were planning attacks in India. For instance, it has been reported that ULFA-I leaders have found a location near the Namdapha National Park in Changlang of Arunachal Pradesh to set up a transit camp for about seventy cadres. Furthermore, the same report also claims that once the camp is ready, parts of Assam close to the south-east of Arunachal Pradesh will witness a rise in violence.

The insurgent group is also conducting ‘recruitment drive’ in Udalguri and Darrang, as well as Tinsukia, Shivsagar and Dibrugarh, the districts which have been their strongholds.

There is evidence to suggest that ULFA has revamped its abduction for ransom activities within the region. For example, they abducted the son of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) local leader of Tinsukia District, for INR 20 million. He was released on the 25th December, after ten days in captivity, although his family stated that they did not give any extortion money. However, Assam Police argues that ULFA-I could target more tea gardens and the business community in Upper Assam for extortion, given the area was facing a severe financial crisis.

 

Official statements- From Dismissive to cautious

The resurgence in ULFA-I activity follows briefly after the Assam Chief Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, stated that the strength of ULFA was “no more” and there is “no law and order problem” in Assam. Although the state only witnessed twenty-six insurgency-related fatalities (five civilians, three Special Forces and eighteen militants) in 2017, compared to eighty-six in 2016 (thirty-three civilians, four SFs and forty-nine militants), the threat of armed outfits are persistent in the state.

Despite the Chief Minister’s statement, Assam Director General of Police (DGP) was more cautious about dismissing the group as a spent force. He stated that ULFA-I “was down but not out”. He also added that the militants were using neighboring states of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh to enter Assam from Myanmar. The recent dormancy of ULFA-I, although interpreted by governing authorities as a sign of weakness, suggest that the organisation has been lying low to recover the losses it had incurred, and realign its strategy according to the evolving context in Assam.

The aforementioned contradictory statements may well be an indicator of the way by which inter-departmental coordination function at the state level. On the one hand, the political class may be attempting to convert the brief lull in to political gain as well as to claim the break in violence as a governmental achievement. On the other hand, however, the security establishment calls for a more cautious approach.

 

Secret of Longevity- Alliances

As Winston Churchill once said, there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.

The armed group has been able to keep itself alive over the years by developing a nexus with other militant groups in the region. Given that ULFA is a part of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA), a conglomerate of militant groups in north east India provides further credence that the group is yet to be defeated. UNLFWSEA was responsible for the June 2015 Paralon ambush in Manipur, where eighteen Army soldiers were killed. Also, the group was more recently involved in a joint insurgency attack in the same region, with another conglomerate group from a neighboring state and Coordination Committee (CorCom) – on the 22nd January 2017, it killed two SFs and two militants. It is also reportedly supported by Inter service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.

The connection takes place with other militant groups active in India such as the aforementioned NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K, as well as with Myanmar based militant groups such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which was instrumental in imparting insurgent tactics to ULFA cadres. Such an endeavour has helped the secessionist militant group to sustain itself for more than three decades, by securing safe havens and bases outside of India. The connection it had with Bangladesh’s Directorate of Field Intelligence (DGFI) also helped not only about safe havens but also to set up income generating projects. ULFA reportedly had number of firms including media consultancies and soft drink manufacturing units. Moreover, it was reported to own three hotels, a private clinic, and two motor driving schools in Dhaka. Paresh Barua was reported to personally own or has controlling interests in several businesses in Bangladesh, including a tannery, a chain of departmental stores, garment factories, travel agencies, shrimp trawlers and transport and investment companies.

 

Indian security forces with the suspected ULFA member arrested in Chabua (Credit: Avik Chakraborty)

 

Significance of the recent reinvigoration

The latest reinvigoration by ULFA-I comes at a politically sensitive time for Assam, after the first draft of National Register of Citizens (NRC) was published. The NRC aims to identify the ‘illegal migrants’ in the state, an issue which ignited the armed separatist movement in Assam in the first place. The second draft will be published following the Supreme Court’s order later in 2018. Additionally, Assam is scheduled to host a Global Investors’ summit from the 3rd-4th February 2018, in an attempt to seduce investors. The summit is expected to attract both major domestic and international investors. Moreover, the reported plan to attack the air base might indicate an attempt from ULFA to significantly escalate the level of violence. Targets would no longer be limited to SF patrols or perceived ‘outsiders’, but would also include defence and infrastructural installations.

 

Conclusion

In light of the aforementioned events, the possibility of a high impact militant attack resulting in mass fatalities cannot be ruled out. Also, such an attack would send a message to the business community that the law and order in the state remains unstable and insurgent groups cannot be written off completely.

Additionally, it is important not to rule out how ULFA uses the NRC to indulge in ethnic violence against those perceived to be ‘non-Assamese’. Any ethnic violence would act as a huge boost for ULFA and simultaneously increase the amount of cadres in its ranks. This surge could result in the revival of militancy in Assam. Hitherto, the highest number of deaths occurred in 1998 and 2000, with 783 and 758 fatalities respectively.

This festering rebellion also highlights the limits of the Indian Government’s security-centric approach towards internal insurgencies. Indeed, it heavily relies on armed forces to bring about a military solution to the crisis. Whilst this strategy may help in reducing or containing militant violence, it is incapable of addressing the political motivations that initially fuel insurgents. As a result, while militant groups are tactically defeated, the underlying political grievances (real or perceived) pave the way for insurgents to revive themselves periodically.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56.

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