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Internet Sovereignty as a Gateway to Global Norms: The Battle over Global Internet Governance

by Eve Gleeson

18 July 2019

A borderless world, or not really? (Image credit: Pxhere)

Introduction

The Internet’s essence as “open, global, [and] borderless” has complicated attempts toward international cooperation on Internet governance. Many authoritarian states with comprehensive cybersecurity policies and strategies regard the Internet as a tool to monitor and quell internal dissent that may threaten regime stability, while liberal democracies, especially those belonging to Western multilateral organisations such as the EU and NATO, have tended to conceive of it rather as a borderless space free from excessive regulation.

Authoritarian states, such as Russia, China and the states with whom they maintain rather informal ties, such as Iran and Southeastern Asian states like Malaysia and Indonesia, clash with the proponents of liberal democracy whose values traditionally prevail in international institutions. As leaders of the Internet Sovereignty (IS) movement, China and Russia hope to use their growing diplomatic influence to manipulate global Internet governance standards in favour of state sovereignty. This article will discuss how the values of IS may impact the global power balance and a transnational Internet governance agreement, stressing the position of Russia and China in global diplomatic bodies.

Transnational cybersecurity governance

Bodies like the UN and its agency the International Telecommunications Union have created and reviewed numerous initiatives concerning transnational Internet protocols. However, these initiatives have proved to be vague and incomplete strategies victim to gridlock and technical limitations. IS leaders Russia and China and their increasingly potent force of global Internet allies remain challenged by Western actors, such as the United States, who benefit from institutionalised power and market-dominating private technology companies.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this area has been prolific as powerful states seek to gain Internet allies who may represent their interests at the global negotiating table. This includes the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an alliance originally designed to combat terrorism but has since ushered its eight members, hailing from South and Central Asia, toward strategies and norms that speak to the threat that information poses to national security and stability. Other occurrences of inter-group cooperation are reflected through signatures on UN resolutions by band-wagoning states, including by developing states in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as collaborations on global Internet conferences.

China and Russia: Messiahs of Internet Sovereignty

These states serve as beacons of hope for national jurisdiction over the digital space, serving up bold cybersecurity policies and strategies. With landmark policies like the Golden Shield and the Great Firewall, and technology giants like Huawei and Alibaba, China has become a leader of technological prosperity. Russia has created similarly robust Internet policies in addition to several market-dominating technology companies including Yandex and Kaspersky Lab. This has given the Russian state the capacity to expel Western technology companies, bolster the national economy, and monopolise national identity creation through social media censorship.

Chinese policies of filtering and censoring content reflect the ideals of state control over national identity, information access, dissent and mobilisation, and emerging technologies. China’s investment in the telecommunications sectors of East African states (linked with their adoption of Chinese-inspired censorious cybersecurity policies) and policy leadership in the SCO and BRICS partnerships reflect the state’s efforts to “promote [their views] as the basic principles for structuring international relations and regimes on a global level.”

In 2015, China and Russia formalised their bilateral cybersecurity relations with the Agreement on International Information Security Cooperation. Russia has also forged formal cybersecurity ties with less advanced emerging economies, such as Southeast Asia through an emerging agreement with ASEAN and existing cybersecurity collaboration with the Philippines. In addition, Russia has used the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, an alliance comprised of former Soviet satellite states, as a tool to consolidate a collective cybersecurity strategy. By combatting Western technological dominance, both materially and normatively, Russia and China can expand their own industries, retain control over their population, and spread non-Western ideals among states who may, in turn, provide support to them in international fora.

Implications and Conclusion

A global Internet governance regime ruled by IS ideals, whether it be a codified UN agreement or more informal norms and practices, would not mirror the hierarchical structure of traditional governance bodies: instead, it would create no order of power at all, with each individual state executing autonomy over Internet activity within its borders. This sort of agreement may also impact how cybersecurity development programs are funded, with resistance from China and Russia for developing states to receive development aid from the West.

Such a collaborative agreement may also struggle to set human rights and transparency norms. By granting states autonomy in this arena, it would relinquish authority over domestic consequences of Internet policies. This would leave states with a pre-modern degree of sovereignty, allowing them to steer the Internet toward or away from state-based information and knowledge control, political mobilisation, and national identity creation. Russia and China’s efforts toward Internet sovereignty norms will persist as they advance their interests of building a strong anti-West alliance. As they grow as economic powers, their efforts to integrate Westphalian values of sovereignty into international institutions will grow in tandem, threatening liberal ideals of globalisation.

So far, the transnational agreements that have been proposed, amended, and rejected have encountered fragmentation, ambiguity, and logistically-weak imperatives. The economic and infrastructural disparities between states, the struggle for policy to outpace technological advances, the role of private stakeholders that uphold the industry, and the logistical impracticalities of enforcing Internet policies have all stifled ventures toward global cooperation. In addition to resolving these issues, states must realistically engage in compromise to construct a functional regime.

Eve Gleeson is a master’s student in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Communications Manager of Strife and a security analyst at AMC Solutions. Her research focuses on technology governance, cybersecurity of critical systems, and socio-technical theory. Eve holds a BA in International Studies with a focus on conflict and security from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. You can find her on LinkedIn and on Twitter @evegleeson_.

Impact of New Technologies on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

By Felix Manig

The UAVs used by the UN are unarmed and used by the UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo to track movements of hostile actors and bolster humanitarian responses. Image credit: Felix Manig, 2014, Goma, DRC

Rapid technological advancements are changing the nature of warfare and military operations, with serious implications for peace and security. At present, states are investing immense sums into the research and development of emerging technologies for their national security. This phenomenon is led by the U.S. government which approves nearly $3 billion annually for its defense research agency DARPA. As technology becomes ever more essential in an evolving and complex world, how can less affluent security projects like multilateral United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) benefit from new technologies and integrate the positive effects into their mission? Introducing advanced technology into peacekeeping missions yields significant opportunities but must go hand in hand with strengthening the existing capabilities of UN diplomats and agencies that address the socio-economic, development and political issues related to the conflict.

UNPKOs have a poor technology track record

UNPKOs have been slow to adapt to technological change. In part, this is because the private sector is most often better situated than governments or bureaucratic organisations to harness and promote innovation. Secondly, the UN peacekeeping infrastructure is chronically underfunded and currently faces threats of further financial cuts. In February 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation appointed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological capabilities considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement to operate effectively. It also cited these deficits as a direct reason for tech-enabled militaries of developed member states to refuse to participate in the field. With missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan or Syria representing some of the world’s most complex conflict environments, can new technologies soften the critical voices that attest these PKOs a failure to execute their Security Council mandate?

How can UNPKOs benefit from new technologies?

As the United Nations system is set to undergo significant reforms introduced by the new Secretary-General António Guterres, some changes and amendments include scaling up the technological capabilities of peacekeeping operations. The positive effects of new technologies are most likely to be useful for the prevention and response to conflicts, intelligence gathering, and communications system of missions.

In his vision statement, the Secretary-General stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. Technology can play a central role in supporting the UN’s endeavor to prevent conflict. Most importantly, the collection and analysis of data about crime and conflict could result in indicators which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic monitoring and mapping of crises can promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective. For example, when the UN tested the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the DR Congo and Central African Republic (CAR), significant advancements were made in the protection of civilians from ambushes by armed groups. UAVs also allowed peacekeepers to maintain improved situational awareness by tracking migration movements or performing aerial reconnaissance of hostile actors, thereby helping them to operate in difficult asymmetric threat environments.

Another important step in ramping up the prevention of conflict and violence would be a concerted effort among UN member states to develop an intelligence agency within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. While UNPKOs have established intelligence-gathering units, they are largely based on an ad-hoc approach and member states have expressed confusion around this concept. The UN doesn’t like to see itself as an intelligence-gathering unit; however, intelligence capabilities are required if peacekeeping operations want to effectively address threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century. Several issues currently impede the development of an intelligence oversight body, including the reluctance of member states to share information and equipment, questions of accountability, and the lumbering communications infrastructure of many peacekeeping operations, making it difficult to bring together the civilian, police and military components of a mission.

The communication network of UNPKOs is the third pillar that could benefit enormously from improved technology by incorporating local populations into missions – dubbed along the lines of “participatory peacekeeping”. Some recent ideas include letting locals send their information, observations or alerts directly to the peacekeeping force as a confidence-building measure and as a means to engage local communities in the process of conflict resolution. Modern communications equipment and better coordination between peace operations would also help improve the safety and security of UN personnel and assets.

A holistic approach to peacekeeping

At the same time, it is essential to understand that while new technologies can offer great assistance to UNPKOs, they are not a panacea to prevent all forms of conflict and violence. The heads of UNPKOs should be careful not to overstate the opportunities of big data analytics and simply replace their understanding of local politics and context-sensitive approaches with statistical models. It would be extremely foolish to discard the value of personal relationships that diplomats and conflict mediators have formed with actors on the ground over time or the important work of other UN agencies in the field.

Danger also lies in the adverse effects modern communication and technology can have within conflict settings. Concerns over internet privacy, censorship, and surveillance, or the opportunities technologies offer to extremist groups for recruitment and propaganda tools should all be considered. Furthermore, as armed drones or offensive cyber attacks become more frequent in today’s conflicts, international laws and norms are yet to materialise to contain their irresponsible use.

Missing the opportunities new technologies provide means missing chances for peace. The fact that the UN has adopted a strategy for technology and innovation for its PKOs is a promising step. At the same time, current operations must also address the technological capabilities of adversaries and civilians in conflict zones. In the end, PKOs need a holistic approach by effectively combining the opportunities of modern equipment and innovation, political solutions, and paths to economic development to secure peace.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany.

 

Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World – Conference Tickets on Sale

By: Johan Lammers

In times of travel bans and Brexit, as a foreign student from The Netherlands where the polls are led by a party whose official stance on immigration is literally ‘zero asylum seekers extra and no more immigrants from Islamic countries; border closed’, migration is never far from my thoughts and conversations. In this blogpost, I would like to give an idea of why migration is worthy of our growing concern in the interconnected, digitalized ‘Age of Information’. In doing so, I also set the scene for the upcoming annual Conflict, Security and Development Conference happening on the 3rd of March 2017 on this issue with the title ‘Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World’.

The UN documents over 243 million migrants around the world, or 3.3% of world population. Between 2014-2016, EuroStat recorded over 3 million first-time asylum requests to the EU; in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Lebanon, refugees make up 43%, 36% and 27% of the population. While the concept of a smartphone did not exist at the end of the Cold War, 37% of the world population is expected to own one in 2020; a 2015 survey found that close to 86% of the Syrian youth in a refugee camp in Jordan did. Unsurprisingly, both strongly upward trends have an influence on each other. Migrant and host communities are increasingly interconnected through constant and abundant live information. This increasingly blurs the lines that divide consumers and producers of generated news and public opinion about ongoing conflicts. The emergence of physical and virtual information and communication networks have an endogenous reinforcing effect and facilitate an unprecedented flow of people and ideas.

However, these flows are far from uncontrollable as numerous stakeholders with varying if not directly opposing interests seek to manage, coordinate or exploit this modern phenomenon of (forced) migration in an interconnected world. Whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees seeks to manage global databases in camps based on biometric registrations, border police are using drones for monitoring. Separated families can remain in touch or even reunite across vast distances. Expectation management for aspiring migrants, educational information and preparing for integration greatly benefit from a wealth of online data, programs and apps. Meanwhile, migrants risk entire livelihoods based on the best practices, rumours and accounts of strangers via Facebook groups.

In addition to these parallel mechanisms that make up the interaction between technology and migration, single mechanisms do not have a uniformly beneficial or harmful effect. Does technology hamper the capacity of human traffickers through increased transparency in their practices, or does it provide them with unchecked informal advertising platforms and viral mouth-to-mouth networks? How does the constant feed of real-time available media material influence both mutual perceptions of migrant and host communities and the political climates that result for their political representatives?

Hence, a proper understanding of migration and technology cannot come from merely a single perspective but requires multiple lenses. Yet neither is it merely a ‘problem’ that should be ‘solved’, without also discussing the opportunities to be seized.

During the Conflict, Security and Development Conference on the 3rd of March 2017, we will address several of these issues by bringing together academics, NGOs, policymakers, journalists, entrepreneurs and migrants for discussion. Through this forum, we seek to compare and contrast how these combined perspectives provide an idea of what the current challenges and opportunities are, and how these integrated trends are likely to develop in the years to come.

In our first panel, we bring together migrants-turned-activists and entrepreneurs to identify how modern technologies have a personal impact on a migrant’s experiences, but also how businesses emerge to employ migrants and cater towards particular needs of these emerging target audiences. Our second panel discusses how NGOs and other migration managers seek to employ technologies to coordinate these flows of peoples. Our third panel considers what policy implications modern, digitalized migrants might have, and how technologies can be instrumentalized towards advancing these aims.

More information on how to buy tickets, our speakers’ profiles, and the schedule for the day can be found on our website. Payment: The conference welcomes all audiences, though students from the University of London can attend at a reduced fee.  

Notes:

Beheshti-Kashi, Samaneh, Makki, Baharak (2013), ‘Social Media News: Motivation, Purpose and Usage’, International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.97-105

The author is pursuing his MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. This piece was submitted by the 2017 Conflict, Security and Development Conference organisers as an advertisement for the annual student-led CSD Conference. You can buy tickets here.

Image source: http://www.wnyc.org/story/a-harrowing-journey-into-europe-aided-by-apps-and-internet-access/

De-Funding the Enemy: Can Technology Help Prevent Military and Diplomatic Procurement Spending From Being Used Against Us?

By: James C Sinclair

Can technology help to prevent military and diplomatic procurement spending from being used against us?

Can technology help to prevent military and diplomatic procurement spending from being used against us?

Profli-gate

That there is a degree of waste associated with large-scale government procurement projects is hardly news. Even during peacetime, there are few limits on the profligacy and incompetence of sovereign supply chain administration, such as the £10bn spent by the UK Government on an abandoned NHS IT system.[1] In times of conflict, it gets even worse, with vast amounts of taxpayer’s money not just wasted but actually handed to our enemies, who are only too willing to accept our largesse. The 2011 US Commission on Wartime Contracting estimated that in the previous decade, contractors executing US Department of Defence and State projects had wasted or lost to fraud at least $60bn of US taxpayer funds committed for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.[2] This fraud has reinforced the financial strength of international organized crime networks, some of which are now being used to facilitate the flow of African migrants and refugees into Europe.[3]

Between 2006 and 2013, I witnessed some of this waste and fraud at first hand. I was a co-founder and legal director of FSI Worldwide, a UN award-winning ethical employment organization trying to secure fair employment for South Asian and East African migrant workers in the Gulf. We watched as billions of US Dollars were plowed into corrupt networks of agents and fixers whose specialty was to move people and goods with a ruthless and deeply unethical efficiency. We pleaded the case for better supplier scrutiny with governments and corporations, both ostensibly committed to ethical business practices, especially around trafficking in persons. However, we found that all too often they were content with a ‘tick box’ approach to corporate compliance, despite the widespread acceptance that this was singularly ineffective. We were also deeply concerned about the long-term implications for governance and security in already troubled migrant worker source countries (e.g. Nepal), especially as these were people about whose prosperity we are supposed to care, and to whom we send significant amounts of aid and development funding. It was a classic case of giving with one hand and taking with the other.

In short, we had (and have) a system of sovereign and corporate procurement that is ineffective at monitoring how money is spent and, in particular, fails to ensure that it doesn’t find its way into the hands of corrupt or malign actors. This is not just a problem for governments, whose taxpayers are understandably wary of funding wasteful foreign adventures or vanity projects. It is also a major concern for international corporations, whose interests are both financial and reputational. The question is whether we can we do anything meaningful about it.

The legal framework

Governments in both the USA and the UK have responded quite positively in terms of creating a tough new regulatory environment for their own procurement protocols and those of their international businesses and supply chains. Since 2009, we have seen a number of incremental changes to the US Federal Acquisition Regulations, the 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, the 2010 UK Bribery Act (with its tough ‘duty to prevent’ regulations) and 2015 Modern Slavery Act. However, there remains a significant gap between the idealism of the new legislative and political environment, and the reality of supply chain management, which continues to see the enrichment of organized crime networks at our expense. An example of this is currently happening in plain sight on the FIFA World Cup construction sites in Qatar. Whilst the main parties involved insist that everything is being done to minimize corrupt and exploitative practices and, indeed, there is no shortage of laws, procedures, and policies to which they can point, numerous investigations suggest that this showpiece of international sport is exploiting and reinforcing the South Asian slave trade.[4] However, it should be noted that these are very complex problems involving webs of state and private sector corruption, allied to culturally ingrained working practices and tragic expectations of exploitation.

Technology and the aid paradigm

Encouragingly, there are a number of technological advances that could be about to help us clean up supply chains. Blockchain, the underpinning of the crypto-currency Bitcoin, is one option. It is essentially a shared public ledger based on a cryptographic platform which allows for a highly transparent, secure and perfectly auditable series of transactions.[5] When allied to the latest advances in machine learning, which enables computers to adapt to the data they are processing, the potential starts to become clear. It is easy to see how this push towards hyper-transparency and accountability could help to clean up military and commercial supply chains and improve international human rights. If we could shine a spotlight into the murky transactions that characterize corrupt or exploitative deal making, erase cash from the equation and otherwise systematize proper due diligence, could we not take a big step towards the creation of a more ethical international marketplace? If we can connect vulnerable workers directly with meaningful and effective grievance procedures and remedies, could we not give an ‘e-union’ voice to the voiceless? That is certainly the goal for those of us working in this area.

The technology will never be a ‘silver bullet’ as no such thing exists, and high-quality human intelligence will always be critical. However, it is a tool that could significantly enhance our capacity to tackle the most egregious human rights abuses and deny our enemies some of their funding.

James Sinclair is a War Studies PhD candidate, an international human rights lawyer at Clarkslegal LLP (@clarkslegal) and Executive Director at Ethical Innovations (@ethicalinnov), which is developing technological solutions to human rights problems. You can follow him at @jamescsinclair.

Notes:

[1] Rajeev Sayal ‘Abandoned NHS system has cost 10bn so far’ (The Guardian 2013) accessed online on 5th November 2016 at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/18/nhs-records-system-10bn

[2] Commission on Wartime Contracting, Final Report to Congress 2011 pp.68-98 accessed online on 5th November 2016 at: https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213820/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf

[3] Peter Tinti & Tuesday Reitano ‘Migrant Refugee, Smuggler, Saviour’. (Hurst 2016)

[4] Owen Gibson ‘Migrant workers suffer appalling treatment in Qatar World Cup stadiums’ says Amensty’ (The Guardian 2016) accessed online on 5th November 2016 at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/31/migrant-workers-suffer-appalling-treatment-in-qatar-world-cup-stadiums-says-amnesty

[5] For a good explanation of cryptocurrencies and the general application of Blockchain, see Ferdinando Ametrano ‘Hayek Money’ (Politecnico Milano 2016) accessed online 5th November 2016 at: http://blockchain.cs.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/themes/responsive-childtheme-master/p2pfisy/presentations/files/Ametrano_p.pdf

Image credit: http://www.blockchaintechnologies.com/blockchain-definition

PROXY Capabilities – A Renewed Strategy of the 21st Century

By: Cheng Lai Ki

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Photo credit: Diaz,J. ‘Russia is developing a drone army – including amphibious models’, SPLOID, January 16, 2014.

This is the first of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki.

The technological advancements over the last decade have allowed for the development of new tactics and strategies for security, intelligence and warfare options. These ‘advancements’ have undoubtedly augmented multiple state capabilities within those domains. In his book, War Made New, military historian Max Boot charts the technological developments supporting warfare throughout human history.[1]  Through the lens of the book, an argument can be made that mankind has consistently improved at one thing, warfare. However, a second consistency can be identified. This is an increase in the operational distance and capabilities of states. This phenomenon can be identified through modernised versions of traditional strategies or emerging technology centric methods. Regardless of the method employed, the warfare strategy for states to use either a willing third party actor or remote control ordinance can be categorised under the broader term: ‘proxy warfare’. This series explores this exact phenomenon and the collaboration between a state and its utilisation of non-state (or remote control) actors.

The term ‘proxy’ possesses multiple definitions depending on its associated strategy, tactic and theatre. Within the context of warfare, ‘proxy’ capabilities can be analysed against the three overarching levels of: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.[2] Expanding on the concept of ‘proxy’ capacities of both state and non-state actors has raised several debates over the decades, mainly around the areas of impacts, accountability, effectiveness and oversight. However, the objective here is not the deliberate these considerations but more to explore the broadening scope of ‘proxy’ capabilities themselves; which would range from large state level proxies to small individual private contractors or unmanned ordinances. When applied effectively, ‘proxy’ capabilities could provide benefits such as plausible deniability, increased distance from harm and the augmentation of existing skills.  The utilisation of ‘proxies’ is however, not a new phenomenon and has been around for centuries. Its earliest form can be represented by mercenaries. Mercenaries were (and still are) groups of ex-soldiers who contract out their skills to lords and kings with a force-limitation in a certain domain.[3]  The trend has only continued to expand and broaden in scale and associative categories through the years, leading to the development of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) and probably one of the most classic examples of ‘proxy’ warfare.[4] There are of course other forms, as mentioned, these can be in the forms of a remote control ordinance.

Strategically, ‘proxy’ capabilities can refer to the involvement of entire organisations (state or non-state) as an extension of power to influence distant geopolitics. Although the utilisation of a weaker state by a global super-power could be situated as a ‘proxy’ capability. Such partnerships could not just influence national security policies but also potentially the strategic considerations of other states. Operationally, ‘proxy’ capabilities would refer to the involvement of private organisations as either an extension of power or augmentation of existing capabilities. Traditionally, this can be represented by the involvement of corporate or non-state actors who provide security, intelligence or consultancy services to government agencies that would enhance existing capabilities. Within ‘operational’ domains, ‘proxies’ are fundamentally used to empower existing state-capabilities. For example, consider a state that wants to increase its capabilities to gather intelligence in inaccessible regions, they could deploy unmanned aerial vehicles or commonly referred to as drones for the conduct of surveillance operations.[5] Finally, on a tactical level, the effects of ‘proxy’ capabilities would have been the most evident. This can primarily be represented by the application of unmanned ordinances to tactically support military operations through the provision of critical and live battlefield information or fire support (i.e. Russian Uran-9 Ground Combat Drone).[6] More recently, the world has experience a surge in cyber augmented scenarios attributed to either supporting existing warfare capabilities or espionage operations conducted by states.

Despite the technological augmentations currently available to states, the concept of ‘proxy’ capabilities as explained earlier is not a new phenomenon. However, the number of capabilities that can be encompassed under the concept has now broadened; evident from efforts of awareness initiative such as the Remote Control Project – a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group stationed in London.[7] It is advisable that we under the notion and expansion of what can be considered ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. State-actors are obtaining more effective ordinances to arm their unmanned systems to conduct more effective information gathering and strike missions. Cybersecurity companies and security/intelligence agencies are collaborating with skilled non-state agents to empower their existing capabilities to tackle advanced persistent treats.

This series explores this consistently broadening cope of ‘proxy’ capabilities within the 21st century and various associated issues towards their respective categories through a three-part series entirely written by Master students currently studying under the King’s College London, War Studies Department. Part One of the series addresses the most traditional form of ‘proxy’ capabilities of involving a third non-state actor to support existing state activities in conflict or contested zones.  Gregory Wilson will kick off the series by exploring the role of Russian Private Military Companies and their involvement within pro-Russian activities within recent theatres.

Part Two of the series takes a further step back and explores the technologically enhanced hardware dimensions of ‘proxy’ capabilities through an analysis of surveillance techniques by Saher Naumaan; and followed by a study of the application of unmanned ordinances by various countries by Rian Whitton.

Part Three of the series finally embarks into the most recent form of ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. Elmer Hernandez first bridges the gap between the physical and cyber realms by analysing how state agencies are collaborating with non-state ‘hackers’ to support their ongoing counter terrorist operations. Finally, this series wraps up with an analysis of the current Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom and the involvement of private telecommunication companies by Mustafa Batuhan Albas.

The objective of this series is to reveal the broad – and expanding – capabilities for state-actors to have their existing powers augmented through ‘proxy’ capabilities. With modernisation and technological advancements, the world in locked into a cycle of consistent change. These trends slowly distance the capability of states away from symmetrical and more towards asymmetrical strategies. It is therefore vital that we understand these expansive dimensions before it completely redefines state strategies in warfare, intelligence and geopolitics.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London where his academic interest revolves around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea. 

[1] Boot, M. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Gotham Books), 2012.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Untied States, (25 March 2013).

[3] Singer, P. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry, (New York: Cornel University Press), 2003.

[4] Kinsey, C. Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York: Routledge), 2006.

[5] Kreps, S & Kaag, J. Drone Warfare, (Cambridge: Polity), 2014.

[6] Mizokami, K., ‘The Kremlin’s Tiny Drone Tank Bristles With Weapons’, Popular Mechanics [Online], Available from: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18948/russias-new-ground-combat-drone-uran-9/, Accessed 26 March 2016.

[7] Remote Control Project, (London: Oxford Research Group) [Online], Available from: http://remotecontrolproject.org/about/, Accessed 12 March 2016.