Korea

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part II – The view from Tokyo

January 22, 2018

By Andrea Fischetti

Pacifist Pro-Article 9 Demonstration in Tokyo, May 2014 (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Characterised as a peace-loving nation, Japan has earned this favourable international reputation through a combination of its culture and society. Also, the Constitution does not allow the country to possess offensive military capabilities.[1] Nonetheless, it is involved in territorial and political disputes with most of its neighbours, and at times, its foreign policy is perceived as assertive by other regional actors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Therefore, this article will explore the reasons why a so-called pacifist country such as Japan is involved in so many disputes. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan is situated in a region where history and historical memories still resonate politically, and continue to drive regional actors’ foreign policies, resulting in territorial and diplomatic disputes as well as long-lasting rivalries. In fact, the national perspectives of Japan and its neighbours are inseparable from their past experiences.

The “abnormalcy” concept

Firstly, in order to understand Japan’s perspective, it is necessary to consider the nature of its “abnormalcy”. Realist scholars believed that the phenomenal economic development that Japan experienced during the second half of the 20th century would inevitably result in rising military ambitions. This was seen to be especially true, considering Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic past. However, Japan did not try to translate its economic might into military capabilities, nor did it attempt to challenge the hegemony of other powers. As a consequence, Japan has been considered an “abnormal” country, due to its “pacifist” behaviour.[2]

The idea that Japan is not a “normal” country, has been reinforced by its US-drafted constitution, implemented in the aftermath of the Second World War by American occupying forces. Japan’s Constitution, not only contains a peace clause, but is also considered rare due to its longevity.[3] In other words, Japan may be considered an abnormal country because despite its economic power, it has not tried to develop modern offensive military capabilities; instead, the country has preserved a foreign-drafted pacifist constitution for over seven decades.

Whether it deserves the title of “abnormal” is debatable, as it would imply the existence of some sort of international standard;[4] nonetheless, considering its legal framework, society, and behaviour on the international stage, it is understandable why Japan is considered a pacifist and exceptional country.

Yesterday’s rivalry, today’s dispute

Domestically, Japanese society has been able to overcome its wartime experiences thanks to policies that guaranteed “peace and prosperity”. During the post-war period for example, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida developed the “Yoshida Doctrine”, which included a number of “pacifist” policies that were aimed at preserving peace while focusing the country’s capabilities on achieving economic prosperity.[5]

However, while Japan has been enjoying decades of “peace and prosperity”, the spectre of its behaviour in wartime has remained very much alive among its neighbours. After the war, Korea was divided in two different countries. Not only did this division result in numerous diplomatic and strategic issues, but also, as ‘halved’ parts of a single country, neither ROK, nor the Northern side – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – have managed to equal Japan’s economic development. This is perhaps unsurprising, considering the long-lasting effects of Korean War, in combination with economic sanctions, and trade restrictions. Furthermore, the diplomatic and strategic issues on the Korean peninsula have been exacerbated by the DPRK nuclear programme, and more specifically the recent missile tests.

Similarly, the PRC has been dealing with its own problems following the Second World War, despite the fact they were on the winning side, unlike Japan. Yet, it did not feel like a victory for Beijing: as numerous social and economic issues affected the country, China had to watch Japan’s remarkable growth and development. While the Land of the Rising Sun was enjoying peace and prosperity, the PRC was dealing with the trouble of overcoming the “century of humiliation”, a period of foreign occupation, territorial losses, and military defeats that took place between the 19^th and the 20^th century.

Northeast Asian rivalries fuel many disputes: all actors in the region have, to different extents, disputes with their neighbours, and Japan is no exception. What is notable is the vital role that historical memory plays in this volatile regional context. Accordingly, Japan’s involvement in disputes with other regional actors can be very largely be attributed to history.

Following the war, Japanese society welcomed the advent of peace and prosperity, quickly adapting to the new image that Japan projected of itself at international level. The Japanese military was totally discredited, and with the help of US occupation, the country developed anti-militaristic norms.[6] Japan’s national identity of a pacifist country is also demonstrated by public opinion polls on the country’s priorities[7], and the influence that the strong popular support for peace and prosperity has on the policy making process.[8]

As a result, at the dawn of the 21st century, Japan’s domestic memories of war were not forgotten, but were instead relegated to the past. By contrast, wartime memories were still vivid in among the populations of local neighbours including China and Korea. A fact that has been reflected in the Chinese “obsession” for power balance between the United States, Japan, and China[9], or in the long-lasting dispute on the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan, inciting several diplomatic incidents regarding Japan’s apologies for sexual slavery during the Second World War.

In the case of China, for example, the dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has been emblematic in defining its approach to Japan: China has to show strength, to overcome its past “humiliations”. China sees the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) as an occupant of its territory, namely the ‘Diaoyu Islands’ (considered Chinese according to Beijing’s historical view).

Conversely, Tokyo’s official stance is that ‘the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Island’.[10] Furthermore, as Japan’s military capabilities are intended for self-defence purposes only, what the Chinese consider an aggression, is seen as self-defence in Tokyo, a legitimate “resolute stance” (kizen to shita taido), also considering that the Senkaku Islands (Senkaku-shotō) are controlled by Japan as per the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement. The Japanese perspective on this issue, which does not involve acknowledging a dispute due to the above reasons, only appears to be even more assertive in the eyes of Beijing. This is the essence of the regional security dilemma facing North-east Asia today.

Similarly, Japanese society finds it difficult to justify the ROK’s continued emphasis on the comfort women issue. On the one hand, Japanese occupation and wartimes memories have not been forgotten in South Korea, and they remain a highly debated topic. On the other, having apologised multiple times, and considering itself a pacifist country and a “contributor to peace”[11], Japan sees South Korea’s insistence on this matter as unjustified. Further to social, cultural, and political differences, the divergence in perspective among these countries is also a result of the different kinds of narratives and government-led propaganda they are subject to.[12]

Conclusion

Japan’s national identity is that of a pacifist country, and one who is far more interested in promoting diplomatic relations than remembering historical disputes or rivalries. Despite its geopolitical role in a number of disputes, the country has enjoyed peace and prosperity for many decades, its society identifies itself as pacifist, and its behaviour on the international stage reflects its pacifist values. From alternate perspectives, it could reasonably be argued that its neighbours are generally more prone to fuel disputes, yet Japan’s conviction in its pacifist national identity might also mean it is failing to address these issues properly. In order to fix the conflictual relationship with its neighbours and prepare for future challenges, Tokyo should focus on taking into account its international image from the viewpoint of countries such as China or South Korea.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT Scholar researching on Japan and East Asian Security at The University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. Andrea earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University, and worked in the House of Commons.

Notes:

[1] Berger, 1998; Katzeinstein, 1996.

[2] Kennedy, 1994; Waltz, 1993; 2000.

[3] Comparative Constitutions Project, 2017; Elkins et al, 2009.

[4] Soeya et al, 2011.

[5] Yoshida and Nara, 2007.

[6] Berger, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996.

[7] Asahi Shimbun, 2012.

[8] NHK, ‘Seiji ishiki getsurei chōsa’, 2007.

[9] Rozman, 1999.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016.

[11] Japan National Security Council, 2013.

[12] Pugliese and Insisa, 2017.

Image Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Proarticle9demo-may2014nearginza.jpg

Bibliography:

Asahi Shimbun (2012) ‘Abe Naikaku Sijiritsu 59%’, Asahi Shimbun, December 2012.

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security. 17(4): 119-50.

Berger, T. U. (1998) ‘Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan’. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Comparative Constitutions Project (2017) Timeline of Constitutions. Available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ [Accessed on 13 August 2017]

Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J. (2009) ‘The Endurance of National Constitutions’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Japan National Security Council (JNSC) (2013) ‘National Security Strategy’, provisional translation, December 2013.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) ‘Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan’. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Kennedy, P. (1994) ‘Japan: A twenty-first-century power?’ in C. C. Garby and M. Brown Bullock (eds) Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 193-9.

King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) ‘Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’.’ Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016) Senkaku Islands Q&A. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q1 [accessed on 12 November 2016]

NHK (2007) Seiji Ishiki Getsurei Chōsa (政治意識月例調査) Available at https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/2007.html [Accessed 11 March 2017]

Pugliese, G. and Insisa, A. (2017) ‘Sino-Japanese Power Politcs: Might, Money and Minds’. London, Palgrave.

Rozman, G. (1999) ‘China’s Quest for Great Power Identity’. Orbis, 43,3, 383-402.

Soeya, Y., Tadokoro, M., Welch, D. A. (eds) (2011) ‘Japan as a ‘normal country’? A Nation in Search of its Place in the World’. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

Waltz, K. N. (1993) ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security 18(2): 44-79.

Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the cold war’. International Security 25 (1): 5-41.

Yoshida, S. and Nara, H. (2007) Yoshida Shigeru: Last Himeji Man. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

Military Exercises And The Necessity Of Practice

June 22, 2017

By Davis Florick

South Korea and US army top brass watch from an observation post as the likelihood of a real war breaking out grows by the day. Reuters.

As the North Korean crisis mounts, the utility of the joint military exercises in the region involving South Korea and the United States (US) has come under increasing scrutiny. Beijing has gone so far as to propose that Pyongyang could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a moratorium on Seoul’s training activities with Washington. Regardless of how much value one may attribute to China’s offer and to North Korea’s credibility, understanding the utility of military exercises is prudent. Given Pyongyang’s history of inflammatory rhetoric and weapon tests in response to training activities, North Korea’s objections to South Korea and US exercises is unlikely to abate. For any government conducting multilateral exercises, at least five overarching reasons underlie its decision to do so: providing technical demonstrations, improving integration and transparency, addressing challenging strategic problems, assuring partners, and deterring adversaries. Exploring the benefits of military drills can provide valuable takeaways for different actors globally.

Military exercises provide an ideal opportunity to demonstrate new technological capabilities. Given long development timelines, the culminating step of utilizing a system in an operational setting carries considerable military and political value. Using new capabilities in a simulated environment helps strategists and operators to plan and train with their equipment. On the one hand, partners have tangible evidence of how their military equipment and training needs are being addressed. On the other hand, potential adversaries are presented with new potential forms of deterrent effects to their strategies and tactics. For instance, during Russia’s Vostok-2014 exercise in its Far East, Moscow test-fired the Iskander-M. While Russia had previously claimed the system had been used during the conflict in Georgia in 2008, this was the first public launch, and doing so near China undoubtedly carried political utility. The spotlight placed on multilateral exercises presents a distinctive opportunity to display new technological capabilities.

While showcasing advanced military technology is a strategic move, just as important are the personal relationships, integration, and transparency through joint training. During a crisis, there is little room to overcome language barriers, technical hurdles, or policy discrepancies. Simulating combat situations allows people and machines to harmonize and to develop ways to overcome natural impediments. Furthermore, by integrating capabilities and improving human communication prior to an actual conflict, forces are much more synchronized during a crisis, thereby reducing potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. In the process of strengthening synchronization, working partners are likely to find that transparency is a valuable by-product of engagement. When states demonstrate the willingness to work with one another such as through the sharing sensitive information, trust can develop. Similarly, leveraging personal commonalities is a unique way of engendering lasting relationships that can serve to benefit all parties involved. Multilateral military exercises thus serve to improve macro-level and micro-level cooperation.

Beyond improving coordination and transparency, addressing serious conceptual and strategic dilemmas is a critical component of multilateral exercises. As international affairs become increasingly complex, the challenges faced by senior officials are becoming more difficult as well. Given that tomorrow’s conflicts may involve multilateral aspects, different cultures and equities will lead partnering states to see problems in disparate ways which, if not addressed, may themselves lead to discord. To minimize the chances of divergence during a conflict, parties should undertake important discussions which may include uncomfortable and challenging scenarios since dialogue during peacetime – including a wider range of whole-of-government options that may incorporate considerations as diverse as economic impediments and nuclear exchange scenarios – and occur at a more measured pace than dialogue during wartime. Conceptually, the different perspectives we all possess increase the likelihood of innovation and reduce the risk of groupthink. Leveraging these qualities can have a profound impact on the options provided to senior officials during a crisis.

Although it may not seem readily apparent, military exercises have an important role in assuring allies and partners of security commitments. By conducting training events abroad, a state can demonstrate its willingness to participate in conflicts, or promote mutual defence elsewhere. Practicing and preparing for various situations signifies that officials are thinking through problems and are taking an active role in preparing for potential scenarios. Beyond the simple act of displaying a regional presence, joint exercises with foreign partners carry a powerful message to those states’ domestic audiences and can display equality in the relationship. Moreover, cooperation signifies that the parties involved are analyzing and preparing for potential conflicts. As a result, should confrontation emerge, a state’s partners can function more securely with the knowledge that they will likely have support. The assurance value of joint exercises comes in the form of day-to-day strategy and acquisition while also serving as a valuable means to reinforce support should conflict occur.

Parallel to its assurance utility, joint military exercises abroad are instrumental in deterring potential aggressors. To a considerable extent, the same qualities that contribute to bolstering ties with partners can also play an important role in shaping adversary perceptions. Practicing how states respond in a conflict scenario demonstrates to potential adversaries that a first strike option may not be in their favor. In conjunction with other opportunities, such as deploying units forward, exercises are an important tool in showing that costs will be imposed and benefits denied if another state(s) chooses an aggressive path. From a political standpoint, exercises serve as an ideal means to demonstrate commitment. Where an adversary to attempt an aggressive act, it would do so with the knowledge that its decision would be forcibly countered. The response may raise the threshold for an aggressive adversary who might otherwise prefer to take decisive action. As an example, the annual US-South Korea Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises reminds North Korea of Washington’s presence on the Peninsula – precisely the opposite of the US position prior to the Korean War. Ultimately, by deterring potential aggression, regional and strategic stability are stronger.

Multilateral military exercises play a significant role in shaping decision makers’ perceptions of benefits and costs of their choices. By practicing how partners may respond in the event of a conflict, those states will be more comfortable in their disposition. As a result, they may be less likely to pursue a first strike option. Conversely, a potential adversary may be less inclined to risk a first strike because the likelihood of a successful campaign might be decreased. Alongside the assurance and deterrence utility of multilateral exercises, there is value in cooperating with the militaries of partner states. For instance, collaborating on military strategies could prove invaluable for synchronizing forces during inherently time-sensitive and complex operations. There are even technological benefits to joint exercises as states are able to experiment with new capabilities and improve multilateral communication while reducing technical barriers. Invariably, perhaps one of the best assessments for the utility of multilateral exercises is the degree to which they are criticized and looked at with suspicion by other parties – whether in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s concerns over Russia’s Zapad, China’s objections to the US-India-Japan Exercise Malabar, or the North Korea’s anger over the US and South Korea’s Foal Eagle.

Davis Florick is a strategic policy analyst for the US Department of Defense, a Senior Fellow with the Human Security Centre, and a 2016 WSD-Handa Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum. He earned a Master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University. He specializes in North Korean strategic and human security issues.

North Korea – more of the same, but where is it heading?

May 1, 2013

By Michael Jefferson

For those who follow North Korea the pronouncements of 30 March that it was entering a “state of
war” with South Korea followed by the 2 April declaration that it will restart its Yongbyon nuclear
complex were the latest in a set of provocative acts that the secretive regime has performed over the
past couple of decades. Looking at the media reaction you would think that it was a Cuban Missile
Crisis take two and we are on the brink of nuclear war. However, although they are undoubtedly
closer to an aggressive nuclear weapons capability, there is little evidence to suggest that North
Korea has the capacity to deliver any nuclear weapons beyond its own borders. In fact I contend
that these actions point to growing domestic instability in the country, which when combined
with the fledgling state of the Kim Jong-un’s regime are designed to cement and enhance power
structures in Pyongyang.

During the 90s and 00s North Korea used its nuclear programme, the ratcheting up and down of
its rhetoric and military actions such as missile tests, as a way to secure international concessions.
However, North Korea’s inability or more likely lack of willingness to meet commitments it has
made over the years means such offers are now unlikely. In recent times Pyongyang’s provocative
acts have been met firmly by economic sanctions from the international community while China
has quietly provided enough support to allow the regime to survive. I cannot imagine that even the
leadership in Pyongyang could have imagined that these recent moves would successfully secure
concessions such as food aid, or even North Korea’s stated aim to hold bilateral talks with the US.

All of these actions should serve to remind us that there has been very little outside contact, even
with China, since Kim Jong-un took power. It is still not clear whether he, his aunt and uncle (Kim
Kyong-hui and Jang Sung-taek) or a faction within the Armed forces are calling the shots. I think
this recent escalation is designed to elevate Kim Jong-un and secure his position among both the
Pyongyang elite and wider North Korean public, but the information mismatch makes it very hard
to ground analyses with certainty.

What is, however, certain is that North Korea is more porous with mobile phones now seemingly
available and some citizens able to access external radio and TV shows. In response to this, it
seems those in power have fallen back on their tried and tested way to demonstrate their value – the
protector against the capitalist threat. Here we need to remember that the ability of Pyongyang to
control information means that many North Koreans are genuinely petrified of capitalism and what
might happen without the Juche philosophy that they believe serves them so well.

The principal point of interest of this crisis is that it comes at a time with relatively new regimes in
China, South Korea and Japan and a new US Secretary of State. It was a new experience for them
and communications, protocol and expectations over North Korea have not yet been established
between them, I would hope that such communications are now being set up. The ultimate
achievement for Pyongyang would be securing bilateral talks with the US on their terms and,
although ruling out talks on North Korean terms, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated
by US Secretary of State John Kerry even mentioning talks in a press conference -with numerous
conditions attached.

In a strange way, this may actually benefit wider East Asian relations. An ever more unpredictable
North Korea means that South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and USA, the countries who primarily
need to manage Kim and North Korea, may build the lines of communication and relationship that
forms the basis of improved diplomatic relations. This can then be hopefully be leveraged for other
issues such as territorial disputes -and here the South China Sea looms large.

In the long run I think there is little doubt that North and South Korea will unify, however the
timeline and method of this unification is still very much up in the air. The key issues on this
prospect will be how to pay for it, and how to manage a population that is, as yet, unready to
join the consumer societies of East Asia. The population issue is one of particular interest as the
collapse of the current regime will undoubtedly unleash a wave of migration which will be hard
to manage in a ‘liberated’ country. South Korea will be most affected most by unification, but the
aforementioned regional powers and the international community will need to contribute to make
any integration plan viable.

Ultimately the timing of this collapse will probably come down to the time when China is either
ready to let the regime fall or Kim goes so far that it poses a danger to China itself. In the meantime
we can only expect more provocative actions from Pyongyang and an increased focus on the
military at the expense of the rest of the population as the economic and social situation further
destabilises the country.
—
Michael Jefferson

Michael works in public affairs for an international bank. He has extensive experience in public policy and
international relations from his current role as well as from his time working for the UK Government on
international trade. He has an MA in Japanese from St Catherine’s College, Oxford specialising in Japanese
politics and international relations.

Korea

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