Islamic State

Strife Feature | The Islamic State’s Social Contract: A ‘state’ founded on fear or freedom?

October 5, 2017

By Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi

A man cries as he carries his daughter while walking from an Islamic State-controlled part of Mosul towards Iraqi special forces soldiers during a battle in Mosul, Iraq, on March 4, 2017. Image Credit: REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

With the Islamic State’s caliphate crumbling, many in the towns and villages on the brink of liberation fear their post-Islamic State future. To understand why the group succeeded to such an extent and to establish a lasting end to the conflict, we must look back at how the Islamic State managed to win the hearts and minds of the people, thus allowing the rise of its caliphate. Whilst the group has attempted to portray itself as a concerned and capable ruler, the reality is that its social contract is built on a foundation of fear.

Annie Barnard and Hwaida Saad of The New York Times write: ‘The Islamic State alternates between terrorizing residents and courting them.’ The group succeeded precisely because it realised that there is no single method by which to persuade its target audiences to its cause – in this case, the revival of the Islamic caliphate. Rather, it carefully constructs its strategic communications so that it resonates with numerous audiences, appealing both to their desires and fears.

The question of whether the basis for the state – the Islamic State or otherwise – is freedom or fear is an old one. In this regard, the influences of both Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are evident in the Islamic State’s approach to establishing its caliphate. For instance, Hobbes suggests that the desire for security lies at the heart of the formation of the social contract. Ultimately, fear lays the foundations of the state. On the contrary, Rousseau’s approach to the social contract is based on freedom which, in essence, is the right of an individual to pursue his/her will. And so, the question arises: Does the philosophy of fear or the philosophy of freedom found the basis for the state? Is fear more powerful than freedom?

Mara Revkin argues that the existence of a social contract goes beyond the theoretical realm in the context of the Islamic State, as evidenced by the Wathīqat al-Madīnah [Document of the City]. The document is distributed by the group throughout territories under its control, defining the rights and duties binding together the residents of the caliphate and the Islamic State.

Excerpts of the Wathīqat al-Madīnah[i]

So, the question remains: what is – or, more accurately, was – it about the Islamic State that resonated with certain individuals?

Hobbes believes that humans are fundamentally governed by our ‘appetites and aversions’ – in other words, our desires and our fears. The Islamic State has recognised this. It capitalises on the desires and fears of its target audiences in order to construct the Islamic State, and gain and maintain support for its rule. Beyond those who are ‘ideologically committed to the goal of establishing a caliphate that is governed according to sharia’, [ii] many of those who support – or, at least accept – Islamic State control are attracted to its claims to be able to provide security and services to its residents.

Consider just one example of a target audience: Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria.

Certain individuals view the Islamic State as the only actor actively addressing its (immediate) desires for a sense of belonging, and fears of continued alienation. The group claims that ‘There is only one sect here, Sunni Islam […] Here in the Caliphate, there is no room for pluralism’.[iii] Such claims resonate with many Sunnis who feel marginalised by the relevant non-Sunni ruling sect. By nature, humans seek power so that they are able to preserve themselves. It appeals to Iraqi Sunnis’ desires to restore the power lost in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War; and, it appeals to many Sunni Syrians living under an Alawite regime (a minority sect), as evidenced in the accounts given by former Islamic State members. Peter Neumann observes that defectors’ critiques are ‘framed in jihadist and/or sectarian terms’, with some members deserting as a result of brutality against Sunnis, whom they believed the Islamic State ought to protect.[iv]

Others fear the Islamic State itself, viewing the group as a threat to their self-preservation. Whilst the role of the government should be to dispel fear, the Islamic State utilises it to consolidate its control in areas it has seized. William McCants argues that brutality can be a very efficient means with which to ‘subdue a population’ and ‘establish your own state’ – at least, in the short-term. The Islamic State made clear that violations of its strict understanding of sharī‘a codes of conduct would result in harsh punishments – from lashes to execution.

It could be argued that, as consideration for a Hobbesian social contract, subscribing citizens voluntarily give up their natural rights and pool their liberties, agreeing to live by the rule of the state in return for which the state provides them security. Yet, at least in the case of the Islamic State, the choice is often taken away from many residents living in areas under its control. They are often left with little choice but to accept the group’s rule. In a somewhat twisted version of the Hobbesian state, it could be argued that individuals accept this social contract as a means to avoid a state of war with the state itself.

Those who break the social contract – or, those who the Islamic State deem to have done so – revert to the state of war, and, thus, the state is no longer required to protect them. Rather, the state is at liberty to protect itself against such a threat to its preservation – an approach followed by the Islamic State. This is evident when considering its brutal reaction to deserters. By 2016, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had recorded more than 400 executions carried out by the group on its own fighters and followers, including many whom were trying to return to their home countries.

Whilst many of the arguments Hobbes makes are still pertinent to the construction of a state based on fear, there is an obvious flaw in applying the Hobbesian explanation of the social contract to the Islamic State. The group is actively seeking the coming of ‘the Major Malhamah’,[v] ‘eagerly awaiting’ the arrival of its opponents’ armies. [vi] Rather than avoiding war at all costs, the Islamic State invites war, and, thus, the inevitable insecurity that accompanies it. Moreover, whilst Hobbes argues that the social contract is formed so that man can live together in society without fearing one another, this is not the case with the Islamic State. Rather, many residents of the caliphate live in fear of their rulers.

Furthermore, contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau argues that the social contract is essentially founded on freedom. Individuals surrender their natural liberties in the hope that the state can protect the civil liberties that they receive in return. However, the Islamic State provides very limited rights within its social contract. It claims to abide by the religious teachings of the ḥadīth which states: ‘The people are as equal as the teeth of a comb’.[vii]

(In theory), most non-Muslims within Islamic State-controlled areas would be protected so long as they paid the jizyah tax. However, in reality, protection is only afforded to the ‘true believers’, determined by the Islamic State as only Sunni Muslims. Christians and other religious minorities are the victims of genocide at the hand of the group. This contradicts the idea that the social contract establishes mutual protection amongst citizens within society, in return for the enjoyment of the same rights as every other citizen. Thus, it appears as though this protection only extends to certain contracting parties.

The promise of rights, liberties, and security serves as a means with which to entice individuals to accepting Islamic State rule, playing to the fears of those feeling marginalised by national governments. The Islamic State attempts to construct the perception of being a compassionate, embracing, and capable governing group so that it can demand allegiance in return for the provision of security, public services, and justice – responsibilities typically associated with a traditional understanding of a state. This is explicitly demonstrated in its social contract: in the Wathīqat al-Madīnah, the Islamic State promises to provide safety and security, rights (albeit limited), and justice in return to those who ‘join the society [the Islamic State] and renounce factions and strife’. [viii]

Yet, as coalition efforts continue, the Islamic State continues to suffer considerable financial and territorial losses, affecting its ability to provide security and services in the caliphate. With its caliphate crumbling around it, the group seems to rely on fear as a sort of fail-safe. In reality, the Islamic State seems, first and foremost, based on fear – fear of the alternative and/or fear of the Islamic State itself.

Whilst the group has made attempts to demonstrate its commitment to protecting the rights of the residents of the caliphate, it is its reputation as a strict, authoritative ruler that dominates. It relies on coercive credibility, leaving residents fearful of acting out of line with Islamic State rule. Following a somewhat Hobbesian mindset, the group seems to believe that less freedom will lead to less anarchy.

As it fails to uphold the mirage of protector, even those supporting the group begin losing faith in its abilities to govern. Yet, it remains evident that the Islamic State will follow through on what it says regarding punishment of those who it deems an enemy of the group. Moreover, Hobbes argues that man is able to connect together his sensory experiences to garner what may occur in the future; consequently, mankind fears not only its present but, also, its future. Given its high coercive credibility, many residents of Islamic State-controlled areas continue to live in fear for their lives, and those of their family.

Although this has been a somewhat simplistic discussion of the Islamic State’s social contract, it is worth considering in more depth what it is that attracts individuals to the Islamic State: What do they desire? What do they fear? What made them believe the Islamic State was more able to fulfil the responsibilities and duties of the State? The Islamic State evidently possessed an answer to these questions. From its inception, the group has purported to address the disaffection of Muslims worldwide. It claims that the ‘revival of the Khilāfah [caliphate]’ has allowed each Muslim to ‘satisfy his natural desire for belonging to something greater.’ [ix] Yet, the rise of the caliphate was largely due to the Islamic State’s ability to play on the fears of its target audience(s). Rather than Hobbes or Rousseau, the success (at least, initially) of the Islamic State in establishing its State is perhaps more accurately summarised by Niccolò Machiavelli:

‘it is desirable to be both loved and feared, but it is difficult to achieve both, and if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved.’

Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi has just completed her MA International Peace and Security at King’s College London. She holds a LLB Law with French Law from the University of Birmingham, with a year spent studying at Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). Her research interests include strategic communications, counter-extremism and the MENA region. You can follow her @kieratsambhi

Notes:

[i] Revkin, Mara. 2016. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15.

[ii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[iii] Dabiq #12. 2015. “Just Terror.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 18, 2015. https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 47.

[iv] Neumann, Peter R. 2015. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” ICSR. http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors/, 10.

[v] ‘Malhamah is the singular of malahim, which are the bloody battles that occur before the Hour.’ – Rumiyah #3. 2016. Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 11, 2016. https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 25.

[vi] Al-Furqan Media. 2014. “Although the disbelievers dislike it.” November 16, 2014. https://clarionproject.org/gruesome-islamic-state-video-announces-death-peter-kassig-50/, 15:12.

[vii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[viii] Revkin, Mara. 2016a. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15, Table 1, Articles 3 & 9.

[ix] Dabiq #7. 2015. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. February 12, 2015. https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 57.

Image source:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-father/terror-on-the-mosul-front-line-idUSKBN16D2F2

Turning technology from an asset into a liability: using big data to fight ISIS

April 1, 2016

By: Sabina Ciofu

How-Big-Data-is-Aiding-in-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism — Source: www.datafloq.com

Unlike any other terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic State has consistently and efficiently made use of social media tools for self-promotion and recruitment. With an estimated 200,000 tweets a day for at least the last couple of years, it is by far the most aggressive social media offensive we have ever seen from a radical group. Western powers, often focused on traditional military and political responses to conflict and aggression, have initially reacted in a weak and fragmented manner to the wave of social media activity. It is only recently that concerted action has been taken by national and regional counter-terrorism authorities to respond to the threat of online radicalisation and recruitment. This has led to some decrease in the number and activity of English-speaking ISIS accounts, but it is still far from achieving the dismantling of their online networks.

That there is no coordinated military and political solution to the crisis in Syria and Iraq is getting more and more obvious by the day. The Western powers cooperate with the Arab countries and Sunni groups on one side, while Russia is closely working with Iran and the Shia militias on the other. With such a complex landscape of strategic interests, it is no surprise that coming up with a coherent approach to ending the war in Syria is proving a big mountain to climb. However, the latency to counteract ISIS’ charm offensive on social media – even when it targets Western citizens who have in significant numbers fallen for the Islamist rhetoric – is far more problematic.

Public-private cooperation

Following a slow initial response, in recent times several meetings have taken place between Western governments and the largest American internet platforms in an attempt to cooperate in fighting ISIS propaganda online. The US government has, upon a number of occasions, asked the private sector for assistance, most recently enlisting Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to assist in the fight against terrorism. The French government has also contacted the US companies for support in removing online propaganda material, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, while the UK Parliament had previously put blame on internet platforms, claiming that they are instrumental in spreading terrorist ideology. Far from a synchronized effort to find a common strategy to combat terrorism online, it oftentimes looks like a desperate cry for help from some governments, when they realise that what goes on online is strongly linked to national security threats. And this picture is further twisted by the complexity of the international law system, where tech companies are left with the decision of balancing out questions of freedom of expression, censorship and the difference between dissemination and promotion of online propaganda.

Using Big Data to draw patterns

What if one could turn one of the mightiest ISIS weapons into a liability? What if, by using big data analytics, one can look into the huge amount of content provided by ISIS-related websites, traditional media and social media accounts, to be able to draw relevant patterns? This may already be underway in highly classified intelligence programmes, where advanced algorithms may be used to track and determine potential terrorist activity. For example, in domestic law-enforcement domains, this is a model already being explored in some parts of the United States. By making use of mathematical and analytical techniques, police authorities are able to determine patterns that could lead to predicting criminal activity.

Apply that same technique for counter-terrorism and the value of big data analytics increases substantially. Having the technical ability to follow the data patterns, the footprints and the online records, looking into location, travel, profiles and messages of potential terrorists is a gold mine for national security authorities. It is easy to estimate that advanced big data analytics will outpace the computational ability of ISIS users to fake their identity and hide their location, as there are already a significant number of failings, even when instructed to hide their GPS location. There are situations where ISIS buildings and hotspots have been targeted by Western military forces, after users had accidentally pinpointed their location on social media. Ultimately, there is very little ISIS propagandists can do to completely hide online, if the organisation’s aim is to use the internet to spread the ideology, promote the mission and recruit new fighters.

As a general rule, recent research shows that social media analytics can be used for creating detailed profiles of potential terrorists and then looking for places where a high percentage of the local population matches the profile. Although this would seem a pretty straightforward approach, it has been shown that looking into the motivations and backgrounds of confirmed terrorists doesn’t necessarily lead to one single profile. However, sketching using big data analytics can define some widely-valid characteristics. For instance, ISIS recruits tend to be predominantly young and male and the ones originating in the EU and the US tend to come from a middle class background, with a high level of education. Drawing patterns out of huge amounts of available data has, however, obvious downsides, as it would only be a perfect profiling system if both the data and the algorithm were perfect. Therefore, privacy concerns are ultimately justified and any such governmental initiatives should duly take them into account.

Existing Big Data analytics projects

A massive data mining project by Qatar Computing Research Institute in Doha looked at social media data to figure out the origins of support for the Islamic State. Over a three month period, scientists looked into more than three million tweets, highlighting common patterns and attributes between pro and anti-ISIS messages. The algorithm was successful in “guessing” the sentiment in 87% of the cases, which is amazingly high for any big data project.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) – the high-tech research arm of the U.S. intelligence community – is also focusing several programmes on using big data analytics to tackle some of the challenges ISIS has created online. For instance, they are currently focusing efforts on a facial recognition programme, based on imagery collected from available sources, be they high resolution cameras, or mobile phones, and even devices with less reliable resolution or lighting. Of course, the process is proving to be a difficult one, especially when algorithms are in charge of creating one face and recognising it from imagery in various angles, with varying lighting and quality.

Aside from its facial recognition programme, IARPA is also focusing on analytics results based on online video searching, through its code-named Aladdin programme. This implies designing new big data search methods for video content, that does not simply target tag words or user-generated content, but scans the video itself for elements that can describe what the movie is about. While terrorists may be clever enough not to tag videos where, for instance, they explain how to make explosives in view of a potential terrorist attack, their videos would be easily inspected and tracked down if a search method non-reliant on tags would be developed. Thus, while YouTube has been doing a great job in taking down such content almost in real time and while ISIS has moved these activities to the dark web to be less visible and thus less searchable, these movie samples may provide very valuable insight to national security experts, using advanced big data analytics to extract information from video material.

Moreover, the bigger the data, the better the big data analytics will be. Shared information for national security purposes has been something friendly governments have been focused on doing ever since 9/11. The precision and quality of information coming out of a big data project will always rely on the amount of data analysed, thus making it obviously necessary that countries cooperate in exchanging the information they have. The Dfuze system, for instance, is a database that allows such information exchange across multiple countries. National security experts can use the platform to access large amount of data shared by various actors and thus draw possible trends and patterns that can assist with prevention and preparation in view of potential terrorist attacks. There are already 40 countries using this product, which is an indication that such big data application can be very powerful tool in terrorism prevention and control.

Conclusion

This is not to say that big data, alone, can prevent terrorist attacks. Lone wolves will always be a difficult category to track, hunt and make sense of. This is to say, however, that big data can have a very significant input in creating and tracking the kind of patterns needed for effective intelligence gathering. It can also have a very important part to play in prediction, especially when it comes to planned, organised and coordinated terror attacks. Significant human reasoning and expertise will have to be attached to this, to distinguishing between real attacks and online bluff, between facts and intentionally deceptive mass-upload of messages. But that is the case for any intelligence method – human reasoning will continue to be at the centre of decision-making. And while it will always be the case that intelligence failures will be blamed for terrorist attacks – and hence also the failure of the people involved and the tools used – we simply don’t know how many terror plots have already been foiled and how many anti-ISIS military operations have already been successful with input from big data analytics.

Sabina Maria Ciofu is a first year MPhil/PhD candidate in Defence Studies, at King’s College London, where she explores the relationship between big data and US foreign policy. She is also a policy advisor in the European Parliament, working on digital economy, foreign affairs and trade issues. Sabina holds a BA in Classics from Cambridge and a MA in War Studies from King’s College London. @SabinaCiofu

IDPs in Iraq and the progress of the Islamic State: An interview with Hebatalla Taha (IISS)

October 14, 2015

By: Jack Curran-Persell

The UN estimates there are now over 3 million Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq with that figure only set to rise further. http://www.geo.tv/article-167331-Displaced-top-2-million-as-winter-hits-northern-Iraq

Hebatalla Taha is a Research Analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London where she focuses on the Middle-East and North Africa.

Jack Curran-Persell: Earlier this month, you wrote a very interesting article for IISS on the situation for IDPs in Iraq. With the UN estimating over 3 million Iraqis have been displaced, could you explain what the current situation is like for these people?

Hebatalla Taha: Conditions for IDPs in Iraq have been dire. In the article, I focused on how ISIS in particular limits the movement of civilians in areas under its control, but there are actually various armed groups and actors across Iraq that make any movement across the country quite difficult. This is especially the case for IDPs in Anbar province, who represent 40% of displaced people in Iraq. Many head to Baghdad, which has one of the highest IDP populations alongside Anbar, but some are unable to enter and remain trapped in Anbar province. In Anbar there is humanitarian presence due to the high security risks, which restricts assistance to IDPs there. Other IDPs from provinces such as Diyala or Salah al-Din tend to go to Kurdish areas and Kirkuk.

According to the International Organisation for Migration, 70% of IDPs are living in private settings, such as homes that they are renting, with families, or hotels; 19% are in ad-hoc buildings, and another 8% in camps.

Funding for Iraqi IDPs is also becoming an issue. The UN’s 2015 appeal for Iraq is still 90% underfunded, and because of this, it has had to shut down, or scale back, various programmes assisting IDPs. Such conditions are related to the decision by many displaced people to flee the country altogether, whether to Europe or elsewhere, seeing no prospects for improvement.

What is the attitude of the Baghdad government, ISIS, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to those fleeing conflict in Iraq?

Regarding the attitudes towards IDPs, the government is worried about ISIS-linked infiltrators within refugee groups–especially in Baghdad which tends to have the highest number of monthly fatalities due to frequent bombings, many of which claimed by ISIS. Therefore the Baghdad government has implemented heavy restrictions and background checks, and the process often requires a long wait and sponsors. The Bzeibiz bridge between Anbar and Baghdad is mostly closed, according to UNOCHA, and only people who require medical treatment are actually allowed to cross into Baghdad.

The KRG is similar in that it is worried about ISIS operatives launching attacks in its territories, but it also cites economic reasons. The KRG says it is cash-strapped and doesn’t have the resources to deal with the influx of refugees. The situation is exacerbated by the KRG’s own rivalry with the Baghdad government; it feels that Baghdad is not sharing the burden. The political dynamics between the KRG and Baghdad are also affecting ‘contested’ areas such as Kirkuk, where the Kurds fear ‘Arabisation’ by IDPs and both sides are suspicious of one another’s actions in Kirkuk.

ISIS has tried to prevent people from leaving the territory under its control, placing explosives around cities, confiscating identity cards, and executing people who are caught trying to flee. Its bureaucracy has allowed people to leave in the past but under particular conditions, such as leaving their families hostage, giving up their homes, or paying large sums of money. ISIS is using the plight of the displaced people as a recruitment tactic. It uses images of Sunni IDPs struggling to enter Baghdad in its audio-visual material with the message, lamenting their inability to enter various provinces, including their own capital. It tries to depict itself as the only actor defending Sunnis and therefore they should to their homes in areas under ISIS control, or even volunteer to join the group.”

So Sunni people fleeing undermines ISIS’s image of a cohesive Islamic state-building project?

Very much so. And you can see this in recent propaganda videos directed at refugees leaving Iraq. A recent video urged refugees to join the ‘caliphate’, rather than fleeing to what it regards as a xenophobic Europe. Indeed, the fact that many people are fleeing ISIS contradicts the image of itself as a coherent state which it has been trying to project. Having people to govern over is essential for ISIS’s vision.

You mention at the end of your article that fleeing has become increasingly difficult because of a crackdown on internal resistance groups. How effective have groups such as the Mosul Brigade been and what types of resistance have they been putting up?

Information on resistance groups in Mosul is difficult to obtain and verify; this is the case with most of the information coming out of Mosul in general. That is why is it’s difficult to assess the impact or magnitude of such an internal resistance, or to speculate as to whether it is an organised resistance movement, Some claim they are coordinating with the Iraqi security forces and the coalition, but others appear to be individuals reacting to the violence perpetrated by ISIS or settling scores with ISIS fighters.

My guess would be that it is a combination of both. One of the main indicators that there is significant internal resistance in Mosul is that ISIS has actually instigated these heavy crackdowns in Mosul, executing hundreds of people (some sources have cited figures as high as 2,000). The make-up of those who have been executed is also telling: most are linked to the Iraqi security forces, who are thought to have been behind many of the attacks against ISIS fighters.

It has been exactly a year since the first UK airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. How effective have these US-led air strikes in Iraq and Syria been?

The airstrikes on their own do not have a decisive effect, but combined with ground operations, they have assisted Kurdish groups in regaining significant swathes of territory in northern Iraq and restricting expansion by ISIS. In the operation against Tikrit in March 2015, for example, which was led by the Hashed al-Shabi militia, the belated airstrikes by the US-led coalition were in fact key in expelling ISIS from the city. The airstrikes have not been as effective in Syria, aside from assisting Kurdish groups in the north, such as the well-known battle for Kobani. This is linked to the more complicated dynamics of the Syrian crisis: there is a lot more happening than just ISIS.

What do you make of the recent Russian military commitment to Syria in order to support Assad supposedly against ISIS?

It is a disturbing development especially since the conflict contains many actors beyond Bashar al-Assad and ISIS, and, as you were suggesting, the first airstrikes didn’t target ISIS, but rather, rebel groups.

Tragically, I think this will most likely only enable the war to drag on longer, with severe humanitarian effects—ones that we already witnessing and that will not simply go away.

Away from Iraq and Syria, how much progress are ISIS making in areas such as Libya or Yemen?

In Yemen, ISIS-linked groups that have slowly emerged throughout the past year appear to be making progress in the chaos of the current war. A recent report from a journalist based in Aden noted that ISIS seem to be more organised than Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has been successful in directing some of Al-Qaeda’s recruits and infiltrating its support bases. This is important because it suggests that the situation is changing. Earlier, ISIS-linked groups (which usually call themselves ‘Wilayet Sanaa’ or ‘Wilayet Aden’ or others based on the province) did not seem to be as organised as AQAP and were unable to challenge it. Most of the attacks by ISIS-linked groups in Yemen have been against the Houthi or Shia mosques in Sanaa, although there have been other smaller-scale incidents elsewhere, such as in the south.

In Libya, ISIS-linked groups are one of many groups vying for control, including various jihadi organisations and Islamist groups. ISIS-linked operatives have taken advantage of the chaotic war to establish a presence there and create a ‘jihadi front’ in North Africa—to which many foreign fighters have fled. It is important to emphasise that although the group has expanded due to foreign fighters, it has failed to gain many recruits from within Libya. So overall, within Libya’s military and political context, ISIS remains quite marginal.

In Egypt, the situation is different because there is a functioning state and a functioning army, but the ISIS-linked group, Wilayet Sinai in North Sinai has posed a serious threat, and its capacity has continued to grow, despite escalating crackdowns by the army.

While many of these groups have adopted tactics used by ISIS, such as beheadings, they don’t merely reflect an expansion by ISIS into these territories. Both sides effectively benefit from this partnership. ISIS can give the impression that it is unstoppable, undefeatable, and is everywhere. Its local affiliates – predominantly opportunistic groups – gain notoriety by leveraging ISIS’s name, which helps them win over recruits and possibly get funding or weapons. This is also discernible in who the ISIS-linked groups view as the main adversary in each of the different contexts, i.e. the army in North Sinai in Egypt, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Libya Dawn coalition in Libya.

In your opinion, how does a state like Libya which is effectively a failed state benefit groups like ISIS?

Armed groups such as ISIS thrive in that atmosphere of a political and security vacuum, and their emergence is fundamentally linked to the state of war. This state of war provides obvious logistical advantages, such as the ability to smuggle foreign fighters into the country, and the lack of a functioning security apparatus enables them to organise, expand, etc., but they also benefit from the political reasons that lead to the descent into a failed state. ISIS-affiliated groups, as I mentioned, are not created by ISIS, but are informed by the political crises governing each of the countries.

Thank you.

Jack Curran-Persell is currently completing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development within the War Studies Department at King’s College London.

Photo essay from the frontline against IS: playing the waiting game with the Kurdish Peshmerga

September 28, 2015

By Christiaan Triebert:

A fighter from Koya in his base – a house recaptured from Islamic State – at one of the most southern positions of the Peshmerga. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert recently returned from the frontline between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Islamic State militants in northern Iraq. This is his account of his time with the Peshmerga.

***

“Get the brothers ready for tonight’s position.”

“Yes I will, inshallah.”

“Inshallah.”

A group of Peshmerga soldiers stand around a walkie-talkie. They listen to the Arabic of Islamic State (IS) fighters who are just a stone’s throw away. Another Peshmerga fighter scans the horizon with his binoculars. “There,” he points. Two cars drive off, leaving a cloud of dust behind them.

The question is whether the information is useful to the Kurds. The village where the IS fighters take their positions overnight is about 1.5km away. Close enough to clearly see it from the six-meter-high vantage point, but too far away to hit accurately. It would be a waste of ammunition. A cloth is draped around the barrels of a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun for that reason. “We’ll take it off as soon as they move toward us.”

I stand here at the frontline in northern Iraq, between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Islamic State, east of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Oil is money, and there’s always someone who is willing to buy it, which makes this bit of land a target for IS.

In the nearby villages of Tel al-Ward and Mullah Abdullah IS flags flew six months ago. Now they have been replaced by the Alaya Rengin, the ‘Colourful Flag’ of Iraqi Kurdistan. The coalition’s air strikes have given the Peshmerga fighters the chance to recapture this territory from IS. Now they have created a new, more resilient defence line. A metre-high wall of sand separates the Peshmerga controlled area from that of IS. Every few metres a lookout has been built upon the defence line. On some of them sit sizeable guns.

An outpost overlooking 'no man’s land'. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. — An outpost overlooking ‘no man’s land’. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighters listen to their commander. The house where they sit was captured from Islamic State and is now used as a Peshmerga base. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The area between the old and the new defence lines is marked by previous battles. Major General (liwa) Wurya grabs the base plate and bipod of an improvised mortar system. According to him, chloride-loaded mortars were fired from the installation. He then points to a huge hole. Twisted steel lies in and around it. “An Islamic State suicide vehicle exploded there, luckily enough we managed to hit it just in time before it exploded at our lookout.”

These suicide trucks, so-called VBIEDS (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device), are nightmares for the Kurds: heavily armoured vehicles loaded with explosives that drive straight into the Kurdish positions and are detonated by the driver in exchange for a one-way ticket to paradise.

“Have you ever seen the movie Mad Max,” asks retired liwa Abozid Salih. I nod. “Such vehicles are also made by IS. But worse. One foggy morning, we saw an armoured harvester armed with heavy artillery looming towards us. Bullets and rocket launchers were fired — nothing helped. That day, we lost a lot of men.”

It is not surprising that many fighters emphasise how happy they are with the German supply of MILAN anti-tank-missiles, which have proved to be effective against these moving monsters.

Yet many Peshmerga soldiers complain about the poor condition of their weapons and their lack of ammunition. Most of their weapons were seized from Saddam’s forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. There are also several tanks and other hardware, but none of it can compare to the modern American-made weapons IS militants have looted from Iraqi bases.

In addition to the anti-tank-missiles, Germany has provided around 6,000 assault rifles: 3,000 G3s (“old junk”) and another 3,000 G36s (the standard weapon of the Bundeswehr), as well as thousands of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

But still there are not enough weapons on the front. One soldier asks where the other weapons are. To which another responds, “In the hands of the KDP”. Others nod in agreement. Kurdish police officers had earlier said that Massoud Barzani, the current president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR), had a monopoly on arms distribution.

Former liwa Saleh holds 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). — Former liwa Saleh holds a 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

A fighter in position with his Russian made PK machine gun at the frontline south of Kirkuk. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds are united in their fight against IS, the Peshmerga has always been plagued by internal division. The forces are still divided along political lines. Although they led the Kurdish resistance against Saddam together, armed conflict has broken out sporadically between the different Kurdish political groups, most notable in the bloody Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1997.

On one side is the group that swears allegiance to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the incumbent President Massoud Barzani and his family. On the other side are the groups that are loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani and his family. The two political parties together form the ruling coalition of the KAR.

The divide is noticeable on the frontlines. ISIS graffiti is often repainted with ‘PUK’ rather than ‘Peshmerga’. The KDP Peshmerga is mainly in the north while the PUK Peshmerga is stationed in the south. When Islamic State militants pushed an offensive on Kirkuk in June 2014, both factions sent too many troops to the region, leaving other strategic positions unmanned. At the moment, the Kirkuk front is predominantly staffed by PUK Peshmerga.

An older generation of PUK Peshmerga fighters. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Writing on a building just behind the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The main danger for the men at the Kirkuk front comes from IS mortars. Snipers are less of a threat: the walls of sand are tall enough and the distance is just too far.

Apart from the occasional mortar attacks, the front is quiet. Perhaps too quiet. In early August, Kurdish commanders said that many jihadists seemed to have been transferred from here to the IS stronghold at Mosul. But every so often there is a larger attack; recently 600 IS fighters attacked Peshmerga positions.

“I do not understand,” Wurya says. ‘Of those six hundred we killed, at least a hundred were foreigners. Why do Westerners, sometimes even with a university background, blow themselves up here? What is their right to fight here?”

This is the reason why Wurya and Saleh believe that Western countries should continue to support the Peshmerga and their fight against Islamic State. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.”

There is debate as to what role radicalisation plays among the Kurdish youth. Certainly the motivation to fight is greater in the older generation than among the young. While defending their homeland is a source of pride – as demonstrated by the many British and American Kurds have come back to fight here – many youngsters talk openly about their desire to go to Europe.

They are tired of the front, or even find it boring. The boys keep themselves busy by playing FarmVille, cards, or watching ‘funny videos’. That gets boring after a while. They also denounce corrupt politicians and the little wages they receive for their efforts at the front. This explains the remarkably large number of taxis just behind the front. A lot of guys try to earn extra dinars as taxi drivers when they’re not at the front.

A Peshmerga fighter is using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: — A Peshmerga fighter using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: “Waiting, waiting, waiting.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighter Chewan, 22, bought his ‘US Army’ outfit in the local bazar in Koya. Most fighters have to pay for their own outfits. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Liwa Wury says he does not understand why so many Westerners are fighting for Islamic State. For that reason, Wurya believes, the West should continue its support for the Peshmerga. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

“The problem of the youth is that they have learned to fight out of a book,” Wurya says. “We, by contrast, have gained experience by fighting in the mountains.” Holding a cup of tea, he laughs with his old comrades about the things they did during previous wars, reminiscing about the time one of them was the first on top of a bunker of Saddam’s troops.

Together they fought many armed conflicts, especially against the Iraqi authorities in the sixties, seventies and eighties. After the Gulf War, they fought against the KDP between 1995 and 1998 in the Kurdish civil war. In 2003, they stood side by side with the American elite units.

Yet there has been little training since Saddam was ousted from power, especially for a fight like the current one. “The Islamic State is by far the hardest enemy we’ve ever had,” Salih says. “And that battle is far from over.”

As night falls, the Kirkuk front becomes even quieter. But the silence is deceptive. There is unrest within the political landscape of the KRG, and frustrated youths would rather go to Europe than be stationed there. Whatever the case, Salih will continue his fight. He is certain that “something big will happen soon”.

A few days later, the Peshmerga launched a massive offensive involving over a thousand men. The attack was successful: IS was pushed back over 10km and several villages were recaptured. Air support from the coalition was vital to the success of the attack.

Salih knows how important that support is. He refers to the greater powers of the region and the world, all of whom have a stake in his fight. But it does not bother him. He is proud. “Despite the external support, this struggle is, to me, a Kurdish struggle. And with or without support — I will defend my country till my last breath.”

Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, including fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. — Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, which included fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

For six months, it has been relatively quiet at this front. Some soldiers go fishing, just behind the frontline, to kill time. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert (1991) is a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He completed his undergraduate studies in International Relations and International Organisation as well as Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He has visited several conflict-torn regions, most recently Northern Iraq. You can find more of his work on his website www.christiaantriebert.com or follow him on Twitter @trbrtc

NOTES

Thanks to Thomas van Linge for recognizing the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on MT-LB’s.

North Africa – between security and democracy

September 3, 2015

By: Umberto Profazio

Photo: Flickr under creative commons license.

Recent security developments in North Africa show how terrorism is gradually spreading in the region. On 20^th August one police officer was killed in a terrorist attack in Sousse, Tunisia, and the very same day a car-bomb exploded near a courthouse and a national security building in Cairo, injuring 29 people. The attack in Egypt was claimed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, also known as Wilayat al-Sinai (province of Sinai), the local branch of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organisation. Despite that its roots can be tracked to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded to expand even on the shores of Mediterranean Sea, taking advantage of the faltering security conditions and of the political instability that emerged after the Arab Spring.

IS expanded in particular in Libya, where the political transition after the fall of Gaddafi régime resulted in a stubborn stalemate between the internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli. As a consequence, chaos and instability are the dominant factors in the country today, mainly due to the overwhelming role of different militias and the ongoing struggle between the two governments. The expansion of IS in Libya was a natural consequence: despite the ouster from the stronghold of Derna, where strained relations with the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade led to clashes between these two groups and the subsequent IS evacuation of the city at the beginning of July, the group was able to make further gains. In August IS took control of Sirte, where it gained a foothold in late 2014 and where it enjoys considerable support from Ansar al-Sharia. Sirte, hometown of Gaddafi, also offers IS the opportunity of a collusion with the former régime officers, as much as in Iraq where the strategic alliance between IS and the Ba’athists created a lethal blend.

Failing or failed states like Libya are clearly the main targets of the jihadists. The ongoing clashes between HoR and GNC gave IS the opportunity to expand its control on the territory and to apply the classic rule of divide et impera among different tribes and militias. Furthermore, the complete lack of a national security force in Libya is easing IS operations in the country. Previous governments’ policies to enlist different Libyan militias in the national army resulted counterproductive, making several tribal leaders and paramilitary groups more powerful and less accountable in front of domestic and international justice. As a result, the government in Beida, which is supported by HoR, is asking the help of the international community, in terms of an easing to the arms embargo and a foreign intervention by the Arab League to carry out air attacks against IS positions in the country.

The Libyan case shows the importance of proper security sector reform as a decisive step in the political transition after the Arab Spring. To a less extent, these conditions apply also to other states in the region, where national security forces are already in place. This is the case of Tunisia, where the difficult transition from the dictatorship to a democratic government is currently threatened by security issues. The terrorist attacks at the Bardo museum on 18 March 2015 (19 victims and more than 40 injured) and at the Marhaba Imperial Beach Hotel in Sousse on 26 June (39 victims, mainly British tourists) were apparently lone-wolf operations aimed at affecting Tunisian economy, heavily dependent on the tourism sector. More important are the consequences on a political level: on 25^th July the Tunisian parliament approved a new counter-terrorism law. While the bill includes new and important provisions against the money laundering, human rights groups criticized the law’s broad definition of terrorism and the increasing power of police in suspects’ surveillance and custody, considering them as possible signs of a return to an authoritarian state. Moreover, the extension of the state of emergency for two months from the 3^rd August risks altering the delicate balance of the Tunisian transition. For example, emergency powers have been used to jail thirteen activists for two weeks protesting against unemployment in Gafsa region.

Similar developments occurred in Egypt where President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi signed a controversial counter-terrorism law, which was criticized by journalists and media workers for the limits imposed on the freedom of information. Moreover, on 29^th August three al-Jazeera journalists accused of collusion with the banned Muslim Brotherhood were given a 3-year sentence for spreading false news. While these laws are gradually restricting the political freedom and civil liberties in both countries, it is unlikely that they will seriously affect IS activities, as shown by the attacks on 20^th August. Furthermore, they lay a radicalization risk in both societies, in particular among those already emarginated by the current political developments.

More generally, government decisions in Tunisia and Egypt are reinforcing the simplistic narrative that discriminates between Secularists, often associated with the ancient régime apparatus, and Islamists, frequently equated to terrorists. A more comprehensive solution to this fake dilemma should be to reform and strengthen the security sector and its intelligence apparatus, while respecting human rights and enhancing inclusiveness.[1] This is particularly true for Tunisia, where investigations on terrorist attacks in Bardo and Sousse can be considered controversial. Despite the initial claiming by IS, the Tunisian government blamed the attack in Bardo on the al-Qaeda affiliated Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade.[2] After the attack in Sousse and the enquiries by Metropolitan British police, Tunisian authorities acknowledged that the perpetrators of both attacks were presumably trained in the same camp run by Ansar al-Sharia in Sabratha, Libya, and released 8 people that had been detained since March. These men were part of a cell belonging to the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which also claimed the 20^th August killing of the police officer in Sousse.

The reform of the security sector in transitioning societies is a delicate operation, but it should be preferable than curtailing civil freedom and fundamental rights. This solution is adoptable in Egypt and Tunisia, where effective governments are in place. For Libya options are more restricted: the presence of two rival governments and several militias created the opportunities for the expansion of the IS. While a comprehensive peace deal between the two main Libyan factions is still far from being reached, the possibility of a foreign intervention in the country is gradually increasing.

Umberto Profazio is a PhD researcher in History of International Relations at the University of Rome “Sapienza”, where his thesis focuses on Libya after independence. He is currently an analyst for the NATO Defence College Foundation and author of its Maghreb Strategic Trends. You can follow him on Twitter @profazio.

[1] Réforme and stratégie sécuritaire en Tunisie (International Crisis Group, Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord, N.161, 23 juillet 2015).

[2] Maghreb Strategic Trends (NATO Defense College Foundation, March 2015).

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