• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • News & Events
  • Contact us
  • Join our Newsletter
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Features
  • Interviews
You are here: Home / Archives for Grand Strategy

Grand Strategy

EU Foreign Policy: More Grand Delusion than Grand Strategy

May 23, 2019

by Eliz Peck

24 May 2019

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron after the signing of a new Germany-France friendship treaty at the historic Town Hall in Aachen, Germany on Tuesday, 22 January 2019. (AP Photo/Martin Meissner).

Henry Kissinger once said that “no foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none”. With the EU divided not just between – but within – its member states, a united EU foreign and security policy seems less likely than ever to succeed, regardless of the strength of its leaders.

The job title ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ sounds important. And yet, relatively few everyday people living in the EU have probably heard of Federica Mogherini, or her job. In June 2016, Mogherini’s office published a European Union Global Strategy. It projected its vision of the EU’s grand strategy. In its introduction she urgently called for a united EU foreign and security policy in the face of “increasingly fractured identities.” Her calls came following the crises in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, where the EU proved itself an inadequate foreign policy actor, incapable of coordinating amongst its member states an effective and timely response to international crises.

It is misguided to simply attribute these foreign policy failures to weak political leadership. At state-level, leaders of the larger European countries have been as pro-active as domestic contexts have allowed in seeking to combat international crises. Chancellor Merkel sacrificed her political longevity when she threw open Germany’s doors in 2015 in response to the migrant crisis, asserting Wir Schaffen Das (‘We Can Do This’). The growth of the far-right, anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party can be traced back to Merkel’s ambitious open-door refugee-policy. This domestic backlash pushed her to back-peddle on a liberal policy, instead striking a deal with Turkey in March 2016 that would curb the number of refugees arriving in Europe.

Although countries can cooperate in certain foreign policies, grand strategy is typically the preserve of an individual state. Hal Brands, Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, sees grand strategy as “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world”. At their very core, grand strategy and foreign policy are a projection of the values and identity of the state. We see this clearly in President Truman’s policy of ‘containment’ between 1945 and 1953, which Brands describes as ‘the golden age of grand strategy’. First articulated in George Kennan’s so-called Long Telegram, the strategy of containment sought to mobilise the military, economic and diplomatic resources of the American state during the Cold War in order to mitigate the rise of their ideological and strategic rival, the USSR. Viewed from this perspective, the Marshall Plan not only aimed for a peaceful post-war economic reconstruction of Europe but sought to promote capitalist notions of liberty and prosperity that lie at the very heart of the American Dream.

Launching a coordinated European grand strategy for multiple states and multiple identities was always going to be tough. What is more, the EU is vast. Individual strategic priorities differ because of the way that they are shaped by historical context and the geo-political landscape. Russian aggrandisement is a pressing concern for Eastern European countries like Poland, but not for Southern European countries like Italy who are struggling with the flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean.

No issue more clearly illustrates the failure to coordinate a single EU grand strategy than the rise of China. Despite the recently published EU-China document deeming China a ‘systemic rival’ and calling for ‘full unity’ in EU responses, the member states have nevertheless prioritised national interests over falling in line with Brussels. This is seen in the growing bilateral links between China and the Central and Eastern European states – the so-called 16+1 group, eleven of whom are in the EU – who are hungry for Belt and Road investments. In March 2019, President Macron tried to show a united front when he invited Chancellor Merkel and European Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker to his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He triumphantly claimed “The face of a Europe that speaks with one voice on the international scene is emerging.” Only days later, this claim was undermined when Italy became the first G7 partner to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China, endorsing the Belt and Road.

The new critical focus on EU foreign and security policy comes in the wake of the radically changed geopolitical landscape. Before 2016, there was little desire for a coordinated EU foreign policy as outlined in the EU Global Strategy. After plans for a European Army were abandoned in 1954, the European integration project was first economic and later political. Secure in their defensive NATO alliance, and on American support for individual foreign policy, the larger EU countries felt an officially coordinated foreign policy with their non-NATO neighbours was not a priority.

Yet Trump’s erratic ‘America First’ policies have thrown doubt on the previously steadfast NATO pact. In a somewhat frantic response, EU countries have had to look to each other for support. The 2017 formation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – an EU defence union – and Macron’s proposal of a European Intervention Initiative (E2I) at Sorbonne can be viewed in this light.

But this comes too little, too late. The time for establishing the groundwork for a common foreign and security policy was when times were good, not now. Euroscepticism dominates today’s political landscape. The rise of the far-right in Hungary and Poland, the populism of Brexit and Italy’s Five Star Movement and the domestic turmoil facing Macron and Merkel are calling into question certain values – multilateral cooperation and human rights, to name a few – that are the founding assumptions of EU cooperation. What we see now is a crisis of identity that goes to the very heart of the European project.

Collaboration between these countries is not impossible. The success of Europol and the European Counter Terrorism Centre show that states unite against a common-enemy. EU foreign policy has been even more effective in coordinating maritime missions aimed to disrupt acts of Somali-piracy based off the Horn of Africa, which threaten trade routes off the Gulf of Aden. But arguably, this success traces to the clear economic incentive for participation; most other foreign policy issues do not have such direct economic benefits. Without a wholehearted commitment to the European project, states will run into difficulty.

The last time the European territories’ foreign and security policies were coordinated under one single grand strategy was under Charlemagne, the ‘Father of Europe’ who died in the year 814 and was buried in Aachen. President Macron and Chancellor Merkel symbolically met there at the start of this year, in a show of solidarity and mutual commitment more than half a century after the Élysée Treaty was signed. Designed as a show of strength and renewed commitment, the limited progress made at the meeting only reinforced just how difficult foreign and security coordination is in the context of the current European disharmony.


Eliz Peck is an MA candidate in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @PeckEliz


Image source: https://www.apnews.com/02d7f1384f454f09b31a7c852d275e4e

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: European Union, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, NATO, security and defence

Event Review — The Future of UK Grand Strategy

January 10, 2019

By Harrison Brewer

4 January 2019

Georgina Wright, Cllr. Peymana Assad, and Dr. Charlie Laderman spoke at a Strife-PS21 event, which was moderated by Peter Apps (left to right). (Image credit: Kayla Goodson)

 

Strife and PS21 joined forces to present a fascinating panel discussion on the future of the UK’s grand strategy. We live in an uncertain world that gets more uncertain by the minute, as the United Kingdom flails around Brexit, Trump’s America turns away from Europe, and Europe looks to redefine what it means to be in the Union. All the meanwhile, the UK avoids the aging imperialist elephant in the room: who are we, what are we doing, and how can we do it? PS21 brought in an expert, an academic, and a practitioner to help disentangle the UK’s approach to grand strategy in the 21st Century.

Dr. Charlie Laderman, a lecturer in International History at King’s College London, first explained his definition of grand strategy, believing it to be the intellectual architecture that forms foreign policy. It is a historically British concept — although Dr. Laderman questioned whether Britain ever got it right — and is predicated on balancing peacetime goals with war and using limited resources to achieve a state’s goals. Dr. Laderman suggested that British foreign policy experts have a ‘maddening pragmatism’ that is borne out of Britain’s historical pole position in global politics but argued that it is imperative for the UK to break out of this mould and to reassess.

The UK has long been perceived as the facilitator and bridge between the US and Europe, but this relationship is at risk. Trump’s de-Europeanisation policy and Merkel’s and Macron’s attempts at firming the bonds of European fraternity leave the UK out of the loop post-Brexit; therefore, Dr. Laderman believes the UK must engage in the business of trade-offs. Britain must consider how it can use its limited yet still formidable capabilities in defenCe, soft power, and international development to continue to be a reliable partner, as well as a global player. Lastly, Dr. Laderman noted that the UK needs a stable EU in order to thrive. Therefore, despite leaving the union, the UK must look to fortify it relationships with EU states and support the EU as best as it can.

Cllr Peymana Assad, a defence and international development expert, as well as a local councillor in the London Borough of Harrow, discussed how the UK must address its relationship with its imperialist and colonialist past to improve its foreign policy. Assad underlined the need for the UK to champion equality in its foreign policy, acknowledging that the UK could use soft power to correct some of its mistakes made under colonialism. Assad referenced her work in Afghanistan and recalled a conversation she had with Afghan tribal leaders about the Durand Line, the internationally accepted border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan people were absent in this international decision-making process, she noted, which showed a disregard for the people directly affected by this decision. She argued that the UK’s grand strategy needs to be founded on principles of equality for all actors, both international and local, and it needs to address Britain’s imperial history and the suffering it caused.

To summarise, she stated the focus should be on the following points:

1) The key to establishing ourselves in the world is seeing all as equals. In order to do this, we must understand the real impact of colonisation and imperialism on the countries we left behind, and we must understand how some of those actions of the past haunt us today.

2) The UK needs to consider and seek opportunities with non-western powers like China and India, but also continue to facilitate between European and other allies, such as the United States — it’s too important not to do both. We should not solely focus on Europe.

3) Britain must use its soft power and understand that the world has changed; we can command more influence through art, culture and education by way of exchange and scholarships. India currently leads through music, film and education, for example in the South Asian region.

Finally, Assad stated that in order to achieve this, we need to bring the British public with us, on the ride and convince them, that engaging with Europe and the non-western world, brings us benefits and also stops us being swallowed up in a world of constant changing super powers.

Georgina Wright, a research associate in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, began by stating that British foreign policy must be separate from the Brexit process. Britain has a privileged position in global affairs — it is both one of the leaders in official development assistance and a strong partner of both the US and the EU — and the UK should not forgo this position as a consequence of Brexit. Rather than turning further inwards, the UK should take the opportunity to engage more meaningfully and extensively with its allies. This change, however, must be managed carefully and swiftly to prove the UK’s commitment to the international community.

Wright outlined three risks the country faces post-Brexit: a more inward-looking Britain that is fully consumed by Brexit; incoherent external policy that is driven commercially rather than politically; and a failure to grapple with the changing international context, evidenced by the rise of China and Russia, as well as rising levels of inequality and popular insurgency.  Wright then proposed five areas the foreign office should focus on to form its foreign policy. First, the foreign office needs to clearly articulate the vision for Global Britain. Second, the UK must figure out how to do more with less and avoid commitment without impact. Third, without the stage of European Union politics for alliance building, the UK must prioritise how it uses the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and where. Fourth, the government must mobilise the entire British population, not just London, behind any grand strategy to ensure its success. Finally, the foreign office needs to be consistent. Wright ended by pointing out that Brexit will only become more intense with trade negotiations on the horizon and a plethora of actors and interests that will need to be balanced at home and abroad. Above all, the UK needs to ensure that it builds a strong, deep partnership with the EU despite its departure.


Editor’s note: This event review was also published by PS21. 


Harrison Brewer is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development. He recently graduated from McGill University in Montréal, Canada with a degree in Classics, Political Science, and Art History. Harrison has previously worked for Deverell Associates, a security consultancy firm in London, specialising in crisis preparedness and leadership training. He is now working for Boxspring Media, a tech-driven learning disruptor for corporate firms. Harrison’s interests include strategic analyses of paramilitary violence in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on gendered violence, insurgency patterns, and conflict simulation. Harrison has designed and produced a simulation modelling the urban warfare of the Iraqi Army’s campaign for Mosul in 2016-2017 that is being developed for commercial use. You can follow Harrison on twitter at @_HarrisonBrewer.

Filed Under: Event Review Tagged With: 21st century, Brexit, Grand Strategy, Trump, UK

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Part II: Is Trump saying “Sayonara” to U.S. Grand Strategy in East Asia?

December 14, 2016

By Andrea Fischetti

This photo illustration shows extra editions of Japanese newspapers reporting the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election in Tokyo on November 9, 2016. AFP PHOTO / TORU YAMANAKA
This photo illustration shows extra editions of Japanese newspapers reporting the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election in Tokyo on November 9, 2016. AFP Photo / Toru Yamanaka

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s statements on foreign policy often contradict both his own past statements and those of his national security advisers. However, one thing has remained consistent over time, and that is Trump’s view of East Asia. Accordingly, the new Republican administration will likely call for decreased U.S. involvement in East Asia and a revision of its alliances in the region—this will be a major change in U.S. grand strategy. In the past few years, the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” has focused on rebalancing within the East Asian region – engaging with emerging powers, bolstering already established partnerships, and supporting regional institutions as a means of demonstrating American capability to project power on a global scale [1].

Maintaining a regional presence in East Asia is particularly important due to security arrangements with U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, the high concentration of rising economies, territorial disputes, a nuclear North Korea, and the growing threat of Chinese aspirations to establish regional hegemony. U.S. interests and credibility are at stake in the region, and should the opportunity arise, China will likely challenge a weaker (or withdrawn) America, giving rise to potential flashpoints. Already, the sovereignty of American allies is being challenged owing to territorial disputes. One of America’s closest post-war allies – Japan – has been involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China in the East China sea and is increasing military activities in the South China Sea as well. In fact, Japan and other American allies in the region have adopted a proactive behaviour in recent years, taking advantage of the limited “window of opportunity” in the last decade, when U.S. military supremacy in the region remained unmatched by China’s naval capabilities[2]. This behaviour involved smaller actors advancing territorial claims in the South China Sea and other neighbours reinforcing already established national positions such as the Japanese nationalisation of the Japan-administrated Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. However, this window is rapidly closing and previous measures like the U.S.-led Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia suffer from a potential lack of continuity and encouragement by the American government. Therefore, it will become increasingly difficult for U.S. allies to be assertive in responding to China’s moves.

Foregoing the American grand strategy in Asia

Domestic economic challenges, coupled with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have left the United States with a national debt of almost US$ 20 trillion. As an immediate consequence, U.S. military spending will reduce by US$ 500 billion over the next few years[3]. However, East Asian politics is ripe for hegemonic and revisionist tendencies. Given China’s assertive behaviour and increasing maritime aggression, U.S. involvement could arguably get more expensive over time. Despite such costs, the U.S. would undoubtedly benefit from preserving an American naval presence in East Asia. In the event of conflict breaking out, an American naval presence would provide a vital regional base that could reduce response time and stem operational inefficiency among the allies. As U.S. Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara states: “a shrinking fleet will nullify our attempts to pivot to Asia”. Furthermore, retrenching from the current American grand strategy would significantly diminish U.S. influence in the region. Scholars argue that retrenchment would also undermine the current peaceful order created by U.S. hegemony[4].

However, Trump has been very clear about the future of U.S. grand strategy in East Asia. As he has reiterated, America will come first in any case and national and domestic interests will be prioritized. The impact of such an approach will be widely felt in the region and particularly so for Japan. Hillary Clinton was the first Secretary of State to reassure Japan about the Senkaku Islands, stating that they are covered by article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, U.S. obligations could change with a Trump administration. In Trump’s words: “They [Japan] are going to have to defend themselves with whatever they are going to have. We, right now, defend Japan. . . Japan pays us a small fraction of the cost, a very small fraction. . . We’re talking about billions of dollars. . . Our country is stone cold broken. . . So whenever I talk about Japan I say, if they don’t make us whole, they are going to have to defend themselves. . . It’s up to them. . . You have to be prepared to walk from a deal. . .They have been ripping us off for a long time”[5].

We cannot yet predict what American grand strategy in Asia will look like under Trump. If he chooses to compromise U.S. alliances in East Asia and underestimate the importance of the region from a security perspective, the power hierarchy in the area will be shaken and the current political order would be greatly altered. The uncertainty surrounding U.S. leadership could also destabilise regional power structures. At present, the ‘hub and spokes’ or ‘San Francisco’ system of alliances[6] established by the U.S. continues to define the East Asian security architecture. Nevertheless, with a possible U.S. retrenchment under Trump, multilateral alliances may be formed, and some countries may fall into Beijing’s orbit. Therefore, the American “power-play” strategy will be challenged by either multilateralism or an increasingly influential China. It will be up to Donald Trump and his advisers to assess whether this will fall within America’s national interest.


Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti ) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. He was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London.


Notes:

[1] Parameswaran, P. 2014. Explaining US Strategic Partnerships is the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Developments and Prospects. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs; August 2014, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p. 262.

[2] Pugliese, G. 2016. Japan 2015: Confronting East Asia’s Geopolitical Game of Go. Asia Maior 2015, Vol. XXVI, M. Torri and N. Mocci eds., The Chinese-American Race for Hegemony in Asia, Roma: Viella, 2016: 93-132.

[3] Drezner, Daniel W. “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).” International Security 38, no. 1 (Summer 2013): 52-79

[4] Brooks, S., Ikenberry, G. J. and Wohlforth, W. C. 2012. Don’t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchement. International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13). Pp. 7-51.

[5] Diamond, J. and Jokuza, E. 2016. Trump and Japan’s Abe meet for ‘very candid discussion’ in New York. Video interview of Donald Trump. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/17/politics/abe-trump-japan-meeting/index.html?sr=twCNN111816abe-trump-japan-meeting1135AMStoryLink&linkId=31305792

[6] Cha, V. D. 2010. Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 158-196

Image Credit: Japan Times, available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/n-analysis-z-20161110.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Donald Trump, East Asia, feature, Grand Strategy

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Introduction: Whither Grand Strategy?

December 9, 2016

By: John A. Pennell

war-board-games
Grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power

In light of recent Western political developments—“Brexit,” Trump’s U.S. electoral victory, rise of populist and/or far-right movements across Europe—coupled with an assertive China, a resurgent Russia, bolder actions from Iran and North Korea, continued terrorist threats from ISIS and its affiliates, and an ongoing refugee crisis emanating from Africa and the Middle East, a number of experts have sounded the alarm regarding the implications of these developments for the cultural, economic, political, and security arrangements that have shaped the post-Second World War order and the role of “grand strategy” in the emerging world (dis-?)order.[1]

This series explores the impact of such trends on grand strategy in the specific country and regional contexts that include the U.S., Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Mexico. Before offering a summary of the pieces in the series, we should first take a step back and define what we mean by “grand strategy.”

According to British strategist Liddell Hart, grand strategy is the ‘policy which guides the conduct of war’ and its role is to ‘co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.’[2] In other words, grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power—the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—into the conduct of war and maintenance of peace.

With the exception of combatting terrorist organizations, the countries and regions reviewed in this series are generally not at war with any other state.[3] Thus, for the purposes of this series, we will refer to grand strategy in terms of its role in guiding states in their pursuit of political (including foreign policy) objectives rather than strictly military objectives.

Most authors in this Strife series explore how a new Trump administration’s grand strategy or policy priorities may affect a particular country or region, while one author considers how the strategic culture in Mexico has failed to adapt to the evolving global order.

First, Brian Babb focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the incoming Trump administration. He argues that the new White House leadership would use an “America-first” foreign policy based on transactional deal-making. The implications, Babb claims, are that the U.S. would prioritize stability over the promotion of liberal values (e.g., democracy, human rights), be more willing to work with certain authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia and Syria) and be less inclined to support security arrangements (e.g., NATO) or economic partnerships without a clear material benefit to the U.S.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti examines the implications of a potential U.S. withdrawal from or a decreased presence in East Asia. He argues that the U.S.’ maintenance of security arrangements with its allies—Japan and South Korea—is critical during a time of increased territorial disputes between powers in the region, a nuclear North Korea, and Chinese aspirations for regional hegemony. Without a significant U.S. military presence in the region, Fischetti fears the long-standing East Asian security architecture would collapse resulting in U.S. partners falling into Beijing’s orbit.

In the third article, Jonata Anicetti explores how the new U.S. administration would deal with the South Asian nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. On the one hand, Anicetti describes Washington’s improving relations with India since the Clinton administration as part of an effort to counter China’s rise within Asia, and on the other hand, its deteriorating relations with Pakistan over the past several years. Nevertheless, in Anicetti’s view, President-elect Trump’s recent overtures to Pakistan offer hope that relations with Pakistan could potentially improve and lead to greater stability in South Asia.

Tony Manganello considers how the incoming Trump administration would view the U.S.’ security partnerships in Africa in the fourth article of the series. He argues that the U.S.’ ‘small footprint‘ approach to addressing key issues (e.g., counter-terrorism) across the African continent has been highly effective, in no small part due to the time-intensive cultivation of cooperative relationships with African governments and security forces. Taking a unilateral approach to fighting terrorism, including the use of conventional forces, Manganello warns, would not only undermine these relationships but likely prove to be unsuccessful.

The fifth piece in the series, authored by Alexis Herrera, takes a different approach. Herrera, rather than focusing on potential U.S. strategy towards Mexico, examines instead the grand strategy and strategic culture of Mexico as a “middle power.” In his view, Mexico’s strategic culture is found lacking due to an inability to prepare for the long run and a misunderstanding of the evolving global order. Examples of this include Mexico’s continued faith in the North American integration process and economic benefits of NAFTA, despite surging headwinds against those processes dating back to the 2008 recession amplified with recent political developments in the U.S. and elsewhere.

The pieces in this series offer important perspectives regarding the effects of potential shifts within the emerging global order on some select country- and regional contexts. While a number of the trends described in these pieces may raise significant concerns over global stability and the future of the so-called liberal world order, it is important to emphasize that many of these trends have yet to fully take shape. Thus, their potential impacts, positive or negative, are still open to debate. It is also necessary to remind ourselves that there’s often a significant gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policy formulation; key elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere have yet to take place; the conditions under which “Brexit” moves forward are still underway; and so forth. Still, the rising tide of populism and right-wing movements across the West, along with emerging powers who pose a challenge to the liberal international order, indicate the potential for significant change moving forward. To reiterate, this order is still evolving. Our current assumptions will very likely need adjustments as the economic, social, and political trends described earlier reach their conclusion.

Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed in this document reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.


John A. Pennell is a Series Editor of StrifeBlog and a PhD candidate in the Defence Studies Department (DSD) within the School of Security Studies at King’s College London. Mr. Pennell is a Career Member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, currently serving in Kyiv, Ukraine. His prior assignments have included Afghanistan, East Africa, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Mr. Pennell has an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National Defense University/National War College (Washington, DC), an M.A. in Political Science from American University (Washington, DC), and a B.A. in Politics from The Catholic University of America (Washington, DC). You can follow him on Twitter @jpennell1970


Notes:

[1] Ian Buruma. November 29, 2016. “The End of the Anglo-American Order.” The New York Times Magazine. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-order.html); The Economist.“Trump’s World: The New Nationalism.” November 19, 2016. (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710249-his-call-put-america-first-donald-trump-latest-recruit-dangerous?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/trumpsworldthenewnationalism); Peter Feaver. November 29, 2016. “A Grand Strategy Challenge Awaits Trump.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/a-grand-strategy-challenge-awaits-trump/); Mike J. Mazarr. October 5, 2016. “The World Has Passed the Old Grand Strategies By.” War On the Rocks. (http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-world-has-passed-the-old-grand-strategies-by/); David Rothkopf. November 29, 2016. “Hitting the Reset Button on the International Order.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/hitting-the-reset-button-on-international-order/).

[2] B.H. Liddell Hart. Strategy. Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. (accessed from http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html)

[3] Although the U.S. and its allies are actively fighting the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I do not consider ISIL a state in the traditional sense. Rather, I consider it a terrorist organization.


Feature Image Credit: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/topics/war-military-strategy

In-article Image credit: http://img2.rnkr-static.com/list_img_v2/19293/1839293/full/war-board-games.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Africa, East Asia, feature, Grand Strategy, Mexico, South Asia, Strife series, USA

Book Review: Bremmer, Ian (2015), Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World

August 15, 2016

Reviewed by: Alexandria Reid

Bremmer, I. Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World, ( London: Portfolio Penguin), 2015. ISBN:978 0 24121 677 4

051615bremmer1_1280x720

In his latest book, written with America’s 2016 election in mind, policy pundit and LinkedIn favourite Ian Bremmer laid out three competing visions of America’s future role in the world. Deliberately written in layman’s terms, he asked Americans to consider foreign policy when casting their vote. To aid this process, he included what one reviewer dubbed the kind of multiple choice quiz that belongs in an issue of Cosmo at the start of the book. [1] It is the kind of quiz that might be used to assess your personality and tell you which moisturiser to buy accordingly, except instead of your star sign, he wants to know your views on China’s threat to America, the concept of American leadership and ‘America’s biggest problem in the Middle East’. [2]

Offering an unforgiving portrait of Obama’s foreign policy strategy – or lack thereof – Bremmer argues that today’s ‘Question Mark America’ is causing allies and enemies alike to take unnecessary and destabilising geopolitical risks. America is not yet fully in decline, he diagnoses, but Obama’s foreign policy improvisation threatened to change that. Published before anyone had seriously toyed with the previously unfathomable rise of Donald Trump, Bremmer wanted the electorate to put an end to the indecision of America’s post-Cold War presidents by demanding a clear foreign policy strategy from the 2016 candidates. With Trump’s populist foreign policy revealed, perhaps now he regrets ever asking?

Bremmer’s diagnosis of a declining America is deceptively simple, instinctively appealing and therefore utterly convincing at first glance. Whether addressing an elusive threshold for intervention in Syria in 2013, or a once-sovereign border in Crimea and Ukraine, the ambiguous nature of U.S. intentions leaves other players unsure where to locate America’s increasingly retrenched line in the sand. Simultaneously, he projects an America that is overstretched, burdened with leadership and receiving none of the benefits that justify taking the risk. Bremmer’s overarching message is that American foreign policy today jeopardises both domestic and international security. Worse still, it’s leading to America’s preventable decline. The prognosis almost goads people to demand not just an outline of a foreign policy strategy, but one which will Make America Great Again.

The remedy for American decline is an informed choice on foreign policy. Once you’ve completed your quiz, Bremmer handily lays out three options to choose from: ‘Indispensable America’, ‘Moneyball America’ and ‘Independent America’.

Indispensable, the most familiar of the three, is in essence a proposal for the reclamation of the post-1945 American leadership role that has been half-abandoned in America’s recent incertitude. Embodying Neoconservative ideals, but deliberately avoiding the pejorative connotations that come with the use of the label, Indispensable America continues to police world order whilst exporting its liberal values. Why should America bear the burden of making the world safe for democracy? Here, Bremmer could have easily answered in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt; isolationism would lead America to become ‘a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.’ [3]

Moneyball, by contrast, sees this approach to world affairs as prohibitively expensive in both blood and treasure, and instead advocates ‘a cold-blooded, interest-driven’ strategy akin to that of the Oakland A’s manager Billy Beane after whom Michael Lewis wrote the book ‘Moneyball’. Moneyball America’s interests are defined narrowly, epitomised by the key phrase ‘America’s value, not its values’. Accordingly, its finite resources must be efficiently invested in strategic partnerships, predominantly with China, even at the expense of failing to support democracy abroad or relationship commitments in regions including Europe and the Middle East.

Independent America’s world outlook differs from both alternatives. In one of the more memorable lines of the book Bremmer suggests that ‘[i]t’s time for a new declaration of independence—a proclamation of emancipation from the responsibility to solve everyone else’s problems.’ [4] Much effort is expended to assure the reader that this is not a return to the disastrous isolationism of the 1930s, rather, it is about adopting an unambiguous stance of non-interventionism and leading by example. By making others take responsibility for their own security at last, America can focus on its own values by ‘perfecting democracy at home’, rebuilding American infrastructure and keeping more money in the taxpayers’ pockets. America cannot afford the exceptional role of policing the world, nor should it, because it forces the nation to compromise the liberal constitutional values that made it exceptional in the first place.

Only at the very end does Bremmer reveal that he prefers a foreign policy strategy that delivers an Independent America. Employing the Goldilocks method of decision-making, Bremmer infers that if Indispensable is too expensive and can no longer attract domestic support, and if Moneyball is too secular for a society which still believes in their own exceptionalism, then, in his eyes, Independent America is just right. Picking the option that most resembles a dangerous isolationism might come as a surprise to those who know Bremmer as the founder and President of the Eurasia Group, the world’s leading political risk consultancy.

Bremmer’s personal choice aside, it is the way in which he approaches the debate that should concern anyone reading Superpower. The debate the book hopes to incite is an important one, and candidate and voter alike would benefit from a meaningful and accessible discussion about foreign policy in America today. Yet, this is not what Bremmer offers. Instead, he provides a deeply flawed book which infantilises the reader under the guise of accessibility. This does the reader a disservice because it fails to provide them with the tools of analysis to judge whether Trump or Clinton are capable of actually delivering an Independent or Indispensable America with their outlined policies.

Bremmer’s book might help you decide what you want if you were not sure in the first place, but it will not help you make a reasonable choice about how to get it. By offering three mutually exclusive and easily recognisable categories, Bremmer seeks to eliminate the essence of the grand strategic conundrum that has seen America oscillate between policy characteristic of both Indispensable and Independent America since the end of the Cold War. It is the same conundrum that has left many people to wonder if there has been an ‘Obama Doctrine’, or merely a series of post-hoc rationalisations for a reactionary foreign policy. [5] Yet to an unrealistic degree, Bremmer’s discussion mutes the importance of feasible policy in American grand strategy. This is where Trump’s politics triumph. They promise the unattainable in the pursuit of ‘America first’, exercising flagrant disregard for the constraints of domestic and international politics. [6] Both Trump and Bremmer’s vision of the American domestic project is built on the foundations of a liberal international order that demands American proactivity in ways that contradict their foreign policy analysis. Bremmer’s book encourages the reader to demand what they rightly consider to be their national interests, but offers no roadmap for how to reasonably achieve them in a dynamic and multipolar context.

 

 

Alexandria Reid is a recent graduate of War Studies at King’s College London and recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Award for Best Graduate in BA War Studies. Alex currently works for Strife as a Social Media Coordinator, and as a research assistant for Dr. John Bew. In September she will begin her Master’s education as a Conflict, Security and Development student at KCL. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1]  Boyes, Roger (27 June 2015), ‘Superpower Three Choices for America’s Role in the World by Ian Bremmer’, The Times, Accessed 5/08/2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/books/non-fiction/article4479814.ece

[2] Bremmer, Ian (2015), Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (Penguin), pp.1-4

[3] Franklin D. Roosevelt (10 June 1940), ‘Address at the University of Virginia’, Accessed 5/08/2016: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15965

[4] Bremmer (2015), p.50

[5] See, McCoy, Alfred (15 September 2015), ‘The Quiet Grand Strategy of Barack Obama’, The American Conservative, available at: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-quiet-grand-strategy-of-barack-obama/ and Drezner, Daniel (2011), ‘Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp.57-68, available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy

[6] McCurry, Justin (21 July 2016), ‘Trump says US may not automatically defend Nato allies under attack’, The Guardian, Accessed 5/08/2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/donald-trump-america-automatically-nato-allies-under-attack

Image Credit: http://www.wsj.com/video/ian-bremmer-geopolitics-in-an-unstable-world/6FA80445-CFF1-4437-B7BC-E6AE2A9A028D.html

 

 

 

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Book Review Tagged With: Alexandria Reid, America, Book Review, feature, Grand Strategy, Ian Bremmer, Politics, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, US Foreign Policy

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

editors@strifeblog.org

 

Recent Posts

  • Event Review – London’s Nuclear Week: The Future of Nuclear Arms Control
  • The Impact of Turkish Instability on NATO’s Nuclear Arsenal
  • Franchise Jihad: The Role of the Bedouin for ISIL in Sinai
  • Rising Sun? Japanese Politics and the Shifting Nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
  • The Road to Oligarchic Peace: Comparing the Nashville Conventions of 1850 and the Severodonetsk Congress of 2004

Tags

Afghanistan Africa al-Qaeda Brexit China conflict counterterrorism Cybersecurity Cyber Security Daesh Diplomacy Donald Trump drones East Asia Elections EU feature France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Palestine Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine us USA women Yemen