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Does the History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe mean that Brexit was Inevitable?

by Ryan Chan

The European flag, a contentious issue in Brexiting Britain (Image credit: Flickr)

 

In most analyses regarding the 2016 Referendum, Britain’s legacy of Exceptionalism and Empire is commonly cited as a crucial reason for the 2016 Referendum by critics and proponents alike. Yet this article will problematise the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable as it dismisses crucial explanations on the historical development of British Euroscepticism and marginalises the plethora of reasons as to why ordinary Britons voted as they did in the referendum.

The French saying ‘l’Angleterre est insulaire’ summarises the idea that Britain is an ‘island nation’, geographically and geopolitically detached from Europe, able to choose between the ‘continent or the open seas’. In his veto against British membership in what was then the European Economic Community, Charles de Gaulle asserted in 1963 that Britain is unfit to join: “She is unlike other European countries […] linked by her markets […] to the most diverse and farthest-flung nations.’ This view of an ‘insular Britain’ was not limited to De Gaulle’s time: Stephen George’s An Awkward Partner, for instance, argues that Britain had always preferred a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and given Britain’s legacy of empire and ‘rehearsal of historical anti-French and German attitudes,’ it led to a ‘disdainful’ relationship between Britain and the EU, seeking for a ‘looser relationship based on free-trade’ rather than a political union.

Critically, the idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’ was a phenomenon that preceded a united Europe or the existence of Great Britain. After the loss of her French possessions following the Hundred Years War, Britain (then England) was more concerned with empire-building overseas rather than within Europe unlike the continental European powers. When Britain did engage with Europe however, her role as a ‘balancer’ coerced her into ‘difficult relationships’ and rivalries with most of her neighbours. Allusions to this history were prevalent in the rhetoric of the Leave Campaign. Many referenced the re-establishing of a Britain formulated on the ‘island nation’ concept: a Britain that once ruled the waves and through its Parliament opposed the evil continental European powers. For Eurosceptics, the EU is a German-led ‘fourth Reich’ and Brexit is a return to ‘global Britain’ and British sovereignty.

Over the centuries, there was little change to what ‘Britain’ was, and as a consequence, Britain placed less importance on being ‘European’ than her counterparts on the continent who experienced devastation from war and tyrannical rule. However, one does not need to look too far into British history in order to substantiate De Gaulle’s view. The inevitability of Brexit is also reflected in how Britain ‘tumbled’ into the European Community in 1973. Unlike founding members of the Community (like France, Germany and the Benelux Countries) who stress the importance of the European Union as a ‘historic success’ that brought a lasting peace to a region embroiled in centuries of conflict, Britain entered the Community during a decade of economic turmoil and the decline of empire, keen to re-establish her influence within Europe: She viewed the Community (and Europe) in economic, transactional and intergovernmental terms. Because of this history, Britain was a peripheral member within the Union, unwilling to compromise on sovereignty, strongly detested integration initiatives and only desired access to the single market. Britain’s historical legacy therefore does De Gaulle’s claim justice: Britain never belonged in Europe – she sought to redefine the Union in her own terms and was therefore first and foremost incompatible with EU values. Along with staggeringly low participation rates in European Elections, the decision to leave in 2016 seemed inevitable.

Yet, if Britain was too ‘insular’ and did not belong in the European Union, surely the decision to join the Community in 1973, the ratification of Maastricht in 1992 which founded a politically united Europe, or British support for EU expansion in the early 2000s would logically not have occurred? Could these instances dispute the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable? Such a claim overlooks Britain’s ‘Europhilic’ history, as Tim Oliver and Daddow highlight, Britain championed many European causes such as advocating for EU enlargement to central European states and was closer to EU policy decisions than generally ‘pro-European’ states like France, Holland or Ireland.

But what changed by 2016? It is important to acknowledge that British Euroscepticism was not given by virtue of history, but a ‘development’ against a perceived encroachment on British sovereignty and can be clearly demonstrated through Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s legacy. In her Bruges Speech of 1988, although she questioned the direction of European integration, she clearly states that ‘Britain’s future is in Europe’ and campaigned for Community policy reforms. This tone is unrecognisable after the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. In response to the prospects of a monetary union, Thatcher declared in 1992 that she could not support the ratification of Maastricht as it ‘conflicted with British democratic institutions and the accountability of Parliament’. British Euroscepticism was a development against an increasingly integrated Europe, as it was no longer, as Thatcher stated, in Britain’s interest to remain in a ‘federal Europe.’

Indeed, many Britons felt so as well – subsequent European policies that pushed Britain into a direction without the consent of the British electorate did much to exacerbate public opinion about Integration. A prominent case would be Prime Minister Blair’s premature push for free movement expansion to ‘A8’ EU countries in 2004, compromising support for core EU values. This would have serious repercussions in the following decade, where areas in which immigration drastically increased between 2001 and 2014 would experience a ‘94% chance of voting leave.’ These considerations therefore compromise the claim that the Referendum’s outcome was inevitable by virtue of history: the vote to leave was instead dealing with recent developments in European Integration, rather than premises of nationalistic nostalgia.

Yet, if we are to discern the core reasons for the vote to leave, we must acknowledge one fundamental truth: the ‘identity of Britain’ in relation to Europe is socially constructed and decided by the British people. Given that the vote to leave won by a mere margin of four percent and not a unanimous consensus, it is inaccurate to claim that ‘Leave’ was a product of historical nostalgia and a rejection of Integration. While some may have voted on grounds of nostalgia, it is equally probable that there are those who have voted for mundane reasons, such as immigration or political detachment from Brussels. It is also probable that many voted on pro-European issues, where some, although not a majority, voted on the premise of a shared ‘European Identity’. How British people perceive the Union could change within the near future, potentially altering the result of another Referendum as evidenced by the ever-changing opinions of Brexit polls, thus rendering the Brexit vote anything but historically inevitable or a universally shared sentiment.

Crucially, the vote to leave was not determined by Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, but more so by the attitudes of ordinary Britons towards the European Project which could significantly change in the near future given that the ‘remain’ vote was heavily concentrated among younger generations. Although it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, European policymakers cannot ignore that increasing retaliation against the process/direction of integration that won the vote to leave. This is an issue not exclusive to Britain, but also elsewhere in Europe like France, where the perceived loss of ‘sovereignty’ has given credence to Hard-Eurosceptic parties. Perhaps Macron’s proposal of a European Renaissance to stress the importance of Europeanism, or the creation of a European Constitution and greater representation of National Parliaments within the EU may be necessary solutions in order to quell sentiments of Euroscepticism or prevent future ‘exits’. These solutions to the problems of the EU can only be appreciated if it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, but a reaction.

Ryan Chan is a third year History and International Relations student at King’s College London and an opinion writer at King’s College London’s award-winning tabloid Roar News. He is interested in Modern 20th Century World History, particularly the Global Cold War, European Integration and Communist Chinese history. This article is the first of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Europe’s Greatest Gamblers: Anticipating Wars of the Future and Why European Leaders Are Choosing to Ignore Such Possibilities

Anticipating war is out of fashion, yet the potential destruction and impact on global society of a major war are huge.

 

By James M R Thorp

 

Soldiers from Poland’s 6th Airborne Brigade and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, during The Poland-led multinational exercise Anakonda-16 (Credit image: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS)

Back in February, Elisabeth Braw wrote an article for POLITICO titled, ‘Europe isn’t ready to face modern threats’. Braw’s case is that NATO is ‘preparing for the wrong war’ and needs to ‘become more creative in defending against hybrid attacks’. ‘[H]ybrid’, a term coined by Frank Hoffman, is defined as incorporating ‘a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… and criminal disorder’ acting at ‘all levels of war.’[1] Braw’s point that Russia and China have the will and ability ‘to bring a country to a standstill long before a conventional war takes place’ is one that is only just being heeded; for a start, the rate of cyber-attacks has increased dramatically in the last couple of years.[2] But Braw’s article misses the greater issue at hand: Western policies, economics, and its way of life all rely on the notion that war between the leading states of the world is no longer a real possibility. So, not only is the West unprepared for modern ‘hybrid’ threats, as Braw states, but it is almost entirely unprepared for any type of modern major conflict, even a conventional one.

But how likely is such a war and why has that possibility been ignored? Firstly, the world today is increasingly unstable: it faces a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable North Korea, and a ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the form of an increasingly dominant China, which is expanding its power and influence through measures such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Secondly, it may be that the US is globally dominant, and any major war would inevitably involve it, but it is rare to find someone who would solidly wager that such a major war (involving the US) would break out in the next five, or even ten, years. Yet, by looking at the case of the UK in the 1860-1910s – like the US now – the UK was globally dominant yet its share of global GDP was declining compared to its rivals, leading to a competition that culminated in the First World War – it is only rational to assume a similar situation could arise by the late 2020s.[3] Despite this, we continue to live in an age where the idea of ‘permanent peace’ is prevalent.

The moral, ethical, economic, and systematic structures that were formed after 1945, a world system dominated by the US and the West, has led to a decrease in conventional war and direct military confrontation; which in turn has led to a widespread global illusion – in the West especially – that the peace is prevalent and violence has been mostly eliminated. In reality, violence has been suppressed; human psychology has not changed enough since we formed as a species for us to have suddenly become incapable of violence. We have and always will be biologically and psychologically capable of both violence and peace, regardless of our moral and ethical systems.[4]

Europe unequivocally relies on the stability of this post-1945 order to remain safe and prosperous. Yet, with President Trump’s unpredictability, largely unknown agenda and open condemnation of NATO, Europe can no longer rely on the US to lead and remain a bastion of deterrence. The US itself stands highly divided, to the extent that the small, but genuine, chance of a second American civil war has become a talking-point amongst some security experts.[5] Similarly, Europe and the EU also stand divided, with waves of nationalism sweeping through, particularly in Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. If one is to consider global issues that will greatly impact Europe, climate change is an existential threat that has the potential to violently destroy not just the post-1945 order, but our global society as we know it.[6] But, after the US pulled out of the Paris Climate Accord in 2017, neither can Europe rely on the US to lead us through that, nor is there much evidence to show that anyone in Europe is realistically stepping up to the challenge.

Then, in spite of these weaknesses among its members, NATO on the one hand is a powerful alliance with over three million troops and around ten thousand tanks, making it a force that is certainly to be reckoned with. But on the other hand, this force is significantly weakened by certain factors. As a fighting force weapons systems are disparate, for example 20 different types of fighter aircraft are used; in-theatre hierarchies and command systems are unclear [7]; and most importantly, there exists an adversary with capability to exploit NATO’s ‘Article 5’, by obfuscating whether a member state has been attacked by another state[8]. Then, despite NATO’s European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and the very recently announced ‘Four Thirties’ Plan, defence spending across member states has dramatically reduced over the past decade or two and it remains to be seen whether defence spending promises will be kept.

Perhaps most important of all is one of the key lessons taught to us by the father of modern military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz: that chance is an intrinsic feature of war[9], and because war is, in his words, a ‘continuation of policy with other means’, so too then is politics affected by chance[10]. If chance cannot be eliminated, it follows that the possibility of any type of war can never be eliminated from political interaction. On top of that, wars of a more ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ nature have become, and will continue to be, an even greater possibility.[11]

Some European leaders may have taken certain measures to prepare for a major modern war, including promises to achieve or come close to the two percent of GDP expenditure benchmark on defence. But are such promises little more than lip-service to NATO and the USA, with only four nations in Europe achieving the benchmark last year?[12]  If one considers that the world’s population has grown faster than exponentially[13], leading to massive urbanisation – two-thirds of the world’s population in cities by 2040 –, it becomes entirely probable that a modern major war would be indiscriminate and catastrophic.[14] Then consider what this article has highlighted regarding the likelihood of such a war. Taking this combined consideration, it then follows that despite NATO’s usually significant efforts, defence measures by European leaders are not nearly enough, that most politicians are repeatedly betting on war not occurring and the European public are kept blissfully unaware of a perilous future. Meanwhile, the stakes remain high, and the gamble is at the greatest level.

 

James is a recent MA Intelligence & International Security candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He graduated in January 2018 and is currently based in both Suffolk and London. You can find him on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-thorp-280595/

 

Notes: 

[1] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 8.

[2] Cyber-attacks increased by double in 2017, with Russia the main source of activity, see ‘Cyber-attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017’, Infosecurity, 11 August 2017.

[3] Look at the graph on page 335 and then go to pages 338-340, see Ian Morris, What Is War Good For: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 335 & pp. 338-340.

[4] Steven Pinker, in his seminal work, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’, highlights this inner battle within humans, who ‘are equipped with five distinct motives of violence, and four faculties that allow them to inhibit or avoid violence’, see Steven Pinker, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’

[5] See Chris Arkenberg, ‘What a new U.S. civil war might look like’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017 & Lt. Col. Robert F. McTague, ‘Some thoughts on how we might get from where we’re at now to a Second Civil War’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017.

[6] For the NATO special report on this, see ‘Special Report: The Importance of Climate Change for Transatlantic Security’, NAOC, 29 November 2017, also see Steven Jermy, ‘Perfect Storm?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 12 August 2013.

[7] This was displayed very clearly within ISAF in Afghanistan: ISAF was a coalition made up from NATO members and due to inequal commitments, cultural differences and (often) incompatible caveats a potentially unified command structure was fractured – information taken from lecture by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jonathan Riley, King’s College London, 17th November 2016. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Lessons in coalition warfare: Past, present and implications for the future.’ International Politics Reviews, 1.2 (2013), pp. 78-82.

[8] Russia’s ‘little green men’ in Ukraine being a case in point, see Robert R. Leonhard and Stephen P. Philips, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), p. 3 & 43.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. University Press

[10] ibid, p. 30.

[11] For “grey zone” see United States Special Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone, September 2015, p. 1.

[12] Only France, Greece, Poland and Romania spent over 2% of GDP on defence in 2017, see ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

[13] Simon Lewis & Mark Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene, (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 6-7.

[14] ‘The Future of War: the new Battlegrounds’, The Economist, 25 January 2018.

Image Source: https://www.newsweek.com/europeans-are-quietly-preparing-war-russia-487307

Grand Coalition Deal: What to Expect from Germany’s next Government in Foreign and Security Policy

 

By Felix Manig

German soldier part of the UN-led MINUSMA mission in Mali (Credit image: Michael Kappeler/dpa)

Five months after the September 2017 elections, the ‘grand coalition’ deal between Angela Merkel’s centre-right CDU, her sister-party CSU and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) is set to end unprecedented political stalemate in Germany. While the deal hinges on a final approval by the 460,000 members of the SPD base in early March, observers are already examining the negotiation agreement for clues of what to expect from Germany’s next government. Given new geopolitical realities in Europe’s neighbourhood, uncertainty about transatlantic relations, and repeated calls for Berlin to take on a more proactive role in international affairs, what does the new proposal hold for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy? The coalition paper builds on Germany’s latest strategic military document, the so-called “White Paper” of 2016, and places a primary focus on developing an integrated approach to European foreign and security policy, increasing Germany’s commitment to multilateral alliances, and the modernization of its armed forces.

Interestingly, the current paper mandates a sense of urgency and reckoning rarely found among German lawmakers in shaping security and defence policy. (Note: A link to the full version of the coalition proposal will be provided at the end of this article.) Commitments to multilateral approaches to conflict resolution, including mechanisms at the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and along the European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are recurrent German priorities which appeared in previous coalition deals. However, parties involved in the coalition discussions now describe today’s world as “less secure and less predictable”. The paper identifies geopolitical tensions, climate change, intractable civil conflicts, as well as a new form of aggressive nationalism within and outside of Europe as key threats to international peace, security, and democracy.

 

European Foreign and Security Policy 

Decision-makers in the potential coalition are promoting the clear message that Europe needs a new narrative and must take on more responsibility to ensure its own security. The proposal identifies the need for EU states to adopt an integrated approach in foreign affairs and security issues, and to strengthen existing CSDP mechanisms. The parties’ commitment to the European Defence Union, which would see joint procurement among member states and the establishment of multinational forces within the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) framework, would be an important first step in this direction. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the paper is the call for an “Army of Europeans”, an idea EU members had previously discarded due to the reluctance to cede sovereignty on defence policy.

The potential new government also plans to strengthen German capacities for strategic analysis and communication, both on the military and civilian front. This includes increased funding for the Federal Academy for Security Policy, an education and training institution under guidance of the Ministry of Defence, as well as key German security and foreign policy think tanks such as the German Council on Foreign Relations or the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Furthermore, the coalition suggests the creation of a “European Council on Global Responsibilities”, an independent institution tasked, somewhat vaguely, to promote a European signature on questions of international order.  Equally, there is room for interpretation from what is not mentioned in the paper. While Russian meddling in the US general election continues to make headlines across the Atlantic, the coalition partners appear, at least publicly, less concerned about disinformation campaigns within Germany and its periphery. This omission is likely part of Germany’s strategy to keep wires open to Moscow in order to reach an agreement on Ukraine.

 

International and European Alliances and Partnerships 

Germany continues to view multilateral initiatives and alliances as the best tools for maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, the country is set to expand its role in these forums, harnessing the German government’s forecasts for increasing federal budgetary margins for 2018-2021. These revenues are earmarked to increase defence spending and funding for conflict prevention tools, humanitarian and development aid but also cultural and educational programs abroad. Yet, while the 2016 “White Paper” pledged to reach the NATO target for defence spending of 2% of GDP, this commitment is missing in the new coalition proposal.

As part of NATO’s strategic upgrade in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Germany is also expected to host a new alliance headquarters for troop and equipment transports near the former capital of Bonn. At the UN, Germany is applying for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council for 2019/2020 and advocates for structural reform of the UN organ, which it hopes would pave the way for a permanent seat for the EU. The authors of the coalition proposal also appear willing to increase Germany’s voluntary contributions to various UN programmes, including peacekeeping and crisis management.

 

Modernizing the Bundeswehr 

Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, have long made negative headlines about equipment shortages and poor performance. Some of these stories seem borderline comical, including reports that a German battalion in 2015 found itself without weapons during a NATO exercise in Norway, leaving soldiers to holster broomsticks to their armoured vehicles. A more recent report characterised the shortfalls as “dramatically hindering combat readiness”. In reality, the Bundeswehr is in desperate need of modernization, something the next government aims to take on.

The coalition proposal highlights digitalisation as a key priority for the armed forces in the coming years. Extra funding from a higher defence budget would be used for optimizing and harmonizing existing equipment, as well as developing new innovative capacities, such as weaponized drone capabilities. To promote technological innovation, the Ministry of Defence also plans to establish an “Agency for Disruptive Innovation in Cybersecurity and Key Technologies”.

The Bundeswehr will continue participating in most existing theatres, most notably the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as the UN-peacekeeping operation MINUSMA in Mali, where Germany has stationed roughly 1,000 troops respectively. Given the recent tactical defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, the deal sees Germany likely ending its training mission and weapons supplies to the Peshmerga forces operating across the Levant.

 

A Slowly Changing German Self-Image?

It would be far-fetched to characterise the coalition proposal as a complete departure from previous government statements regarding issues of peace and security. The new government will likely continue to place a premium on diplomacy and dialogue, while at the same time strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms in foreign and security policy.

Yet whilst it may be premature to diagnose a paradigm shift in German foreign and security policy, the proposal does contain the underlying narrative of growing European responsibility and posture. This approach will inevitably mean a more active role for Germany in shaping international affairs. At the same time, as any preliminary guiding document, the paper contains vague language and promises that can be walked back on. Bearing in mind that voter support for the SPD and grand coalition have recently dropped to a record low, there is no guarantee that the rank and file members of the Social Democrats will sign off on the coalition pact in the special ballot. If the deal fails, Germany would likely have to hold new general elections, which would plunge the country into a true political crisis.

 

Click here to access the full version of the coalition proposal (in German).

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2017/01_en/bilder/2017-01-10-bundeswehr-mali.jpg?__blob=bpaTopmeldung&v=4  

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

After the European Elections: It’s time to make the case for Europe

By Claire Yorke:

EU-UK

Waking up to the European election results this morning I was drawn to a book of Historic Tables by S. H. Steinberg from 1949 that documents the history of the world from 58BC to the end of the Second World War. Through its pages it charts the key dates and events that shaped Europe before the two World Wars that marked the start of the 20th century. In the hundred years before 1914, each page tells a story of aggression: of empires shifting and expanding, of defeats and military alliances. Not one goes by without a nation fighting to pursue its own interests at the expense of another. How different, then, is our modern experience of Europe from the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 to the European Union of 28 member states today. It is an evolution marked by efforts to build stability, where cooperation and political and economic union have been the guiding force. Yet the case for the successes and strengths of Europe as a unified entity has never really been made.

Politicians in Britain have often shied away from this task, aware that Europe is one of those toxic issues, particularly within certain sectors of the media who like to whip up fear over the loss of sovereignty and national values that come from closer ties to the continent. During the recent election campaign, out of the three main parties only the Liberal Democrats came out as pro-European. Labour and the Conservatives appeared to hedge on Europe – a strategy that is hardly inspiring to voters, but which gives them room for manoeuvre, at least on the domestic front.

There is a danger that in response to last night’s results these parties may move to appease wandering voters, andmake concessions to the rhetoric and politics of UKIP in order to bolster their votes in next year’s General Election. This strategy would be counterintuitive. Instead, what is needed is genuine leadership that does not play to the lowest common denominator but makes the case for Europe in a constructive and positive way.

Perhaps it is unsurprising that the more populist messages of the anti-Europe campaign have had greater traction. It is far easier to highlight faults and limitations than to prove the successes we take for granted: The ease with which we can travel or work in Europe without a visa; the access to foreign markets and investment that support the economy; the ability to project power and influence beyond our own capabilities through security and defence cooperation. Yet these are just a few of the achievements that should be championed. Cooperation, rather than isolation, remains the best means by which to face future challenges that do not observe sovereign boundaries or national interests.

This is not to say that Europe is without fault. It is a large institution in need of genuine reform: not least to update European institutions after its recent expansion and new members. Yet given its size, this is will not happen over night and will require the effort of all members actively involved in the process, including the United Kingdom. Withdrawing from that process will reduce our influence and ability to shape change. Nonetheless, criticisms of European bureaucracy point to a deeper issue: How much do people really know about the roles and functions of European institutions? The answer is not enough. Yet, no one from the political establishment, whether through desire or ability, seems able to articulate the role and importance of the Union in a way that makes it relevant to the wider British electorate.

As political leaders and supporters of the three main parties reflect on the results that gave Nigel Farage’s UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) almost 28% of the vote and made his party the largest British party in the EU, David Cameron’s remarks this morning that people are “disillusioned” with the European Union may hold some truth. However, it does not follow that a knee-jerk reaction against Europe will do anything to improve the real issue of voter disillusionment or disengagement with politics.

Indeed, it is interesting to examine what makes Nigel Farage so popular in spite of the revelations of his own views and those in his party, as showcased in his interview on LBC radio on 16 May. In an age when PR and media spin create a glossy veneer around the other party leaders, Nigel Farage appears, for all intent and purpose, as a typical man down at the pub. Through his willingness to speak his mind he has managed to connect with parts of the general public who view politicians as adept at platitudes and empty sound-bites. This in no way means his views are correct, far from it, but for some voters, conviction and sincerity are lacking from modern British politics and Farage is filling this gap. Party leaders appear reluctant to provide a vision and court unpopularity, although both are necessary attributes of leadership.

Looking ahead, there should be an honest debate about Britain’s future in Europe. This should not focus on the practicalities of an ‘In-Out’ referendum, which is unlikely to succeed when the debate is so unbalanced. Instead, discussions should revolve around where Europe does and does not work: what steps are needed for change and how reform can be achieved. What can the UK do to push for that change? Some of the core issues that have been revealed by the results, such as immigration and economic security, should also be tackled, while recognising that the concerns may have domestic, rather than European roots. How can concerns about immigration be addressed in a way that distinguishes fact from fear? How can Europe help rather than hinder economic recovery and job prospects? Politicians and leaders should articulate the purpose Europe serves for British interests, and the opportunities it provides for people rather than resorting to the populist messages that come too easily.

In his essay The Lion and the Unicorn written in 1940, during the Second World War, George Orwell writes: “Nothing ever stands still. We must add to our heritage or lose it, we must grow greater or grow less, we must go forward or backward”. The European project, begun after the Second World War is not yet finished. A lot needs to be done to move it forward in a way that is fit for the 21st century, but it would be foolish to undo the significant progress made by retreating into an isolationist and backward policy before the story is complete.

 

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Claire Yorke is a doctoral researcher in the War Studies Department at Kings College London and a member of NATO’s Young Leader’s Working Group. Prior to her PhD Claire was programme manager of the International Security Research Department at Chatham House in London and worked as a Parliamentary Researcher in the House of Commons. You can follow her on Twitter @ClaireYorke.