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defence

The Impact of Turkish Instability on NATO’s Nuclear Arsenal

December 4, 2019

by Mochament El Saer

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at NATO (Photo credit: Thierry Charlier/AFP)

Turkey has become an unreliable ally to the NATO alliance. The situation that Turkey has created for itself has now become a source of considerable trouble for the security architecture of the West. Turkey’s aggressive behaviour with regards to the Kurdish struggle for autonomy, the Syrian civil war, and its internal anti-democratic moves has shorn the leadership of Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of any goodwill within NATO. It is particularly with the most recent purchase of the Russian anti-air missile defence system (active defence system), the S-400, that Turkey has crossed a hazardous threshold. In fact, Turkey has affected the alliance to such a degree that the American nuclear weapons on Turkish territory should be withdrawn until its actions and align with the alliance’s policies.

Presently, Turkey constitutes one of the five non-nuclear NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) that maintain American nuclear warheads within their territories for defence and deterrence. These weapons, which are estimated to be approximately 50-80 B61 nuclear gravity bombs, are physically located on the Incirlik Airbase. These weapons were placed there to provide Turkey with security guarantees regarding historical and contemporary Russian threats to the Bosporus, to keep a lid on any conflicts in West Asia, and to ensure Turkey and its neighbours do not break the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 and develop their own nuclear program. Having said that, the Bosporus links Russian ports and its naval bases in Latakia and Tartous. As such, this area presents special importance as the 1936 Montreux Convention grants control to Turkey but nevertheless gives freedom to international naval and commercial ships (including Russian warships).

However, Turkey’s recent acquisition of the S-400 weapon system shows that the country has now decided to pursue an independent strategy in defiance of NATO. Why? The main reason why Turkey is pursuing such a foreign policy, even against the broader interests of the NATO coalition, is the development of its own indigenous nuclear capabilities. Policy-wise, Turkey has diverged from NATO’s doctrine and grand strategy and sustains asymmetric relations with Russia and surreptitious exchanges with regimes such as those of Iran and Pakistan. The asymmetric relation with Russia is not as an evident anti-NATO coalition but is more a relation that by reciprocally serving Turkish-Russian self-interests, jeopardises the policies and cohesion of NATO. In doing so, Turkey has radically weakened the mission of NATO to sufficiently deter Russia and, other regional powers such as Iran, from dominating Asia. By purchasing the S-400 system, which is a direct threat to the premier air superiority and air dominance fighters of the NATO alliance—the F-35 Lightning II—there can be no other purpose for this purchase than to ensure the security of a nuclear arsenal. And despite the American concerns over the exposure of technical functions and potential vulnerabilities of the new flagship F-35 Lightning II, Turkey has already received S-400 batteries.

This should not be a surprise to anyone. President Erdoğan has previously called the non-proliferation regime hypocritical. Even stating at the United Nations (24 September) that, ‘’the position of nuclear power should either be forbidden for all or permissible for everyone.’’ Nevertheless, this statement probably reflects a wider perception articulated mainly by North Korea and Iran. According to this perception, while superpowers possess significant nuclear arsenals, they prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons to states outside the superpower club. In addition, a few days after that Turkish President stressed that ‘’several countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us that] we can’t have them. This I cannot accept.’’ These statements should be taken as a declaration of the ultimate plan of his regime: the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

While Turkey is indeed a member state of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and has legally committed itself to forgo any proliferation of nuclear weapons, breaking international law is not a new tactic. The Invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its invasion and cleansing of Kurdish areas in Syria, ake it clear Turkey has little intention to hold to international law when its security is threatened by even (e.g. Kurds).

However, will a potential relocation of the nuclear warheads from Turkey have a catastrophic effect on NATO’s deterrence capability? This is a challenging question. But it is one with a simple answer: NATO’s deterrent capability will not vanish as long as the nuclear arsenal is transferred to a nearby location. In moving the nuclear arsenal, it will also make clear to Turkey there are severe repercussions for its actions. Specifically, this move will rebuke Turkey and remind it that without NATO’s security collaterals and guarantees, Turkey cannot survive in the emerging multipolar and anarchic – from a realist perspective – international system. Therefore, either Turkey must totally align with the interests and decisions of the alliance, minimising its aggressiveness and unilateral actions, or it will lose its strategic importance within the alliance. Undoubtedly, Turkish role in the strategic agenda of NATO and the U.S. is important as it gives direct access as to the Asia and the Black Sea as to the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea. However, it does not mean that Turkey can exploit its role and, if this is the case, NATO should present zero tolerance.

There is an easy solution to where to move this arsenal as well. Because of its proximate location to Turkey, it retains all the original purposes of this arsenal, keeps it within a close distance should they be necessary to be used, and increases cooperation with an ally that is in need of protection: Greece. Or more specifically, the NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) at Souda Air Base on the island of Crete. Nonetheless, regardless of what one might do with the nuclear arsenal at Incirlik, the question remains: so long as Turkey does not serve its principal role in the NATO alliance, and jeopardises the cohesion of the alliance, defying serious concerns about Western security, what is the benefit of sustaining the vital nuclear weaponry of NATO in Turkey any longer?

As far as I am concerned, NATO should press Turkey by relocating its nuclear arsenals to another proximate member. This is not only because Turkey should be punished but mainly because NATO’s preliminary mission is to secure the cohesion and sustainability of the alliance. And currently, the political situation of Turkey does not offer stability to NATO. Once stability and certainty are recovered, NATO’s nuclear arsenal can be restored.


Mochament Elsaer is a political scientist and a Master’s candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He has been awarded the prestigious Chevening Award by HM Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He has served at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: alliance, banner, defence, Deterrence, NATO, nuclear, Policy, proliferation, Turkey, Weapons

Turkey’s Growing Military Influence

May 23, 2018

By Gorkem Dirik & Selcuk Aydin

Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

 

 

Turkey views itself increasingly compelled to generate new strategies in foreign and security policy by combining both soft and hard power instruments because of the changing dynamics during the post-Arab Spring period. While Turkey was seen as a role model during the Arab Spring for neighboring countries that were in transition from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, this model lost its appeal due to violent toppling of democratically elected regimes as well as the escalation of conflicts in the wider Middle East. For instance, Turkey lost its political and economic ties in Egypt after the coup d’état in 2013. The Syrian civil war bears economic, social and security implications for Turkey. Hence, in order to preserve its political and economic power in the region in the wake of hostile developments around the country, Turkey began to search for other mechanisms to wield its influence. As a result, Turkey has found itself launching military bases in Qatar and Somalia and military intervention in Syria.

 

Military Journey of Turkey

Turkey was established by Kemalist military cadres who conducted top-down modernist reforms and threatened the civilian governments by coup d’états that encountered strong opposition from the social and political movements throughout Turkish political history.

Several events played a significant role in decreasing the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic politics during the Justice and Development Party era since 2002. Such factors include the EU negotiation process during the first decade of 2000, the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer cases respectively in 2008 and 2010 as well as the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 committed by the FETO (Gülenists). The consolidation of civilian politics against the TAF establishment during the Justice and Development Party era enabled the civilian government to use hard power as a diplomatic instrument. Consequently, there TAF were once identified as the determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy,  however they have undergone a drastic transformation and they have now turned into the instrument of Turkey’s Foreign policy.

As Turkey entered a new era of foreign policy implementation, this reflected upon the country’s efforts to diversify its options in this matter. For instance, Turkey established new embassies in twelve countries across the African continent to bolster economic relations. Most significantly, this change in foreign policy has positively resulted in a spill-over effect from economic to political and then security fields of relations and impacts.

Historical experiences have also played a key role in empowering the defence industry in guaranteeing the security of the country. In 1974, for instance, when Turkey conducted military operations in Cyprus, the country faced an arms embargo by the US. Ankara was also prohibited from purchasing some specific arms from its NATO allies in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s.

Along with these historical experiences, the conflict in Syria and Iraq accelerated the urgency of empowering the defence industry. Having realized this, Turkey chose to nationalise its defence industry and proceeded with the diversification of its security alliance. As part of this process, Ankara has become cautious on its relations with NATO, whilst signing the S-400 missile agreement with Russia.  Turkey also took a leading role in the Syrian peace process alongside Russia and Iran. These advancements in its defence industry allowed the country to undergo a transition from an absolute weapon-importer state to a weapon-exporter state. One illustration is this shift comes with an arms sell to Pakistan  selling arms to Pakistan.

 

Turkey’s Military Expansion

By investing in its defence industry and expanding its network of military bases, Turkey aims to become a more active player in the Middle East, Africa, and Caucasus.

This is evident when looking at the Turkish incursion in Syria, which became a showcase for Ankara to evaluate its military capacity. President Tayyip Erdogan understood the necessity of using military power as a foreign policy instrument in the Syrian war, with the statement “We are not war-lovers, but we are not far from war either” in 2012.  In this regard, the Turkish military deterrence has visibly altered the security dynamics in Syria against the ISIS and PKK affiliated groups since the beginning of Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016. As the efforts via soft power means to form a safe-zone in Northern Syria had proven fruitless, Turkey felt obligated to take the necessary steps to create a zone of influence. In addition to this, the recent Turkish-Russian-Iranian tripartite cooperation has indeed aimed to decrease conflict in Syria with agreeing on the four de-escalation zones. Thus, this underlined the prominence of Turkey’s military deterrence capabilities and its growth as a regional power.

As part of Turkey’s new strategy, Turkey has established military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Iraq, and it is expected that the number of Turkish soldiers serving in the oversea military bases will surpass 60,000 by 2022.  Moreover, Turkish military activities are not only limited to military bases. Additionally, the TAF train and equip the armies of allied countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

In Somalia, Turkey has opened dockyards, built international airports and numerous hospitals, and established a military base on 30 September 2017. With more than 10,000 soldiers serving, Turkey`s main role is to train and equip the Somali forces in their fight against terrorist groups such as Al-Shaabab. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence has been improving Somalia`s ability to secure its coastline, particularly against pirates that threaten the maritime trade route.

The sharing of common interests, especially in the foreign policy arena, has brought Qatar and Turkey together. This led Ankara to establish another military base in Qatar at the request of the Qatari government in October 2015. With 3,000 troops deployed in the Tariq bin-Ziyad military base, Turkey has further strengthened its position in the Gulf and altered the regional status quo. For instance, during the Gulf crisis, Turkey has played a key role in dissuading the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) decision to isolate and castigate Qatar for its rapprochement with Turkey, thereby underlining how the latter has increasingly shifted regional power dynamics in its favor.

Furthermore, Turkey`s security cooperation with Azerbaijan has allowed both countries holding periodic joint military exercises to evaluate the Azerbaijani Army’s potential. Turkey also assists in the modernization of Azerbaijani military education by trying to bring it in line with NATO standards. As a result, Azerbaijani military officers participate with Turkey`s peacekeeping missions abroad, for instance, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ultimately, Turkish military capability has been further solidified via an unofficial agreement between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials on `Casus Foederis`, which signifies that an attack against one country is an attack against both.

 

In conclusion, Turkey has accelerated its military activity in the Middle East in an attempt to alter the regional balance of power in its favor. Apart from Qatar and Somalia, Turkish military bases as well as its deterrence capabilities can be observed in Northern Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, Ankara provides military training as well as equipping to the military of key Central Asian countries, which also enables increased Turkish influence in this region. Moreover, Turkey`s recent incursion into northern Syria has also illustrated technological advances in its defense industry. Taking all of these developments into consideration, it can be said that Turkey has transformed itself into a crucial player whose influence impacts not only the Middle East but also farther afield, stretching from the Caucasus to Sub-Saharan Africa.


 

Gorkem Dirik

Gorkem is an Assistant Researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He previously worked at Turkish Embassies in Malta and Barcelona, Spain which enabled him to observe the inner dealings of diplomacy. Before he moved back to Turkey he carried out his studies in languages and diplomacy in Kaliningrad (Russia), Malta, Belgrade (Serbia), Barcelona (Spain), Buenos Aires (Argentina), London (United Kingdom), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). He holds a Master of Science in Conflict Studies and Nationalism from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Besides Turkish, he is fluent in English, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Spanish and Portuguese for which he holds certificates from reputable universities that he can speak them all on a diplomatic level. His book on Turkish foreign policy, titled Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st century – A Comparative Study: Turkey between East and West was published in 2012 by the University of Malta. Moreover, his dissertation on the Ukrainian Crisis, “The Role of Nationalism in the De-Facto Dissolution of Ukraine” has been awarded as the best dissertation of the year by the LSE. His research and specialisation area is Russian and Turkish foreign policies and their implications on the Balkans and the Central Asia.

 

Selcuk Aydin

Selcuk is a Researcher at the TRT World Research Centre, and a PhD Candidate, Defence Studies, School of Security Studies, King’s College London. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, Turkish diaspora in the UK, Kurdish Studies and Middle East. His research interests are colonialism, Middle Eastern politics and history, Islamic and Kurdish movements, diaspora, institutional, and security studies. Selçuk holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, a Master’s Degree in Political Economy of the Middle East from King’s College London. His PhD thesis’ title is “Post-Ottoman States and Kurdish Movements: A Comparatively Analysis of Single Party Regime in Turkey (1923-1945), British Mandate Regime in Iraq (1920-1932) and French Mandate Regime in Syria (1923-1946).”


 

Image Source: https://qz.com/1093011/turkey-opens-its-largest-overseas-military-base-in-somalia-to-train-somali-soldiers/ 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: defence, feature, industry, post-Arab Spring, Turkey

Defence undermined?

February 21, 2013

By Hal Wilson
800px-Gulf_of_Aden_-_disabled_pirate_boat

One of the greatest threats to global stability is US defence policy – but not for the reasons we usually hear. Typical allusions to sinister neo-cons or ‘American imperialism’ are both misleading and prejudiced. But current policy – specifically the cuts of January’s Defence Strategic Guidance – reflects a dangerous ignorance of history.

That this came about is no great surprise. Consider trends in US politics and discourse. The final US presidential debate saw a highly symbolic illustration of this. Mitt Romney’s remark on numerical decline in the US fleet was instantly met by Barack Obama’s scornful quip about “horses and bayonets.” Alternatively, observe the opening scene of Aaron Sorkin’s The Newsroom. The protagonist decries the idea of America as the world’s greatest nation, snapping that one of the few areas it leads in is defence spending – surpassing the next twenty-six countries combined. (The clear implication being ‘how pointless!’) Similar observations abound, sharing a similar theme: US military spending is bloated and useless; opponents of cuts are old-fashioned or dangerous.

A deeper investigation quickly highlights the problems. Obama’s quip emboldened liberal allies – but it also highlighted simplistic, worrying thinking about defence in the modern era. Equally, Sorkin’s piece in The Newsroom strikes me as childishly trite – reeling off numbers sounds convincing until you put them in context. Namely, US defence spending reigns supreme largely because so many have relied so long on America for cheap defence: the results are self-evident.

Note that Operation Ocean Shield, NATO’s anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, rests primarily on American naval power. Even so, too few ships are committed to adequately patrol the area. Likewise, while France and Britain provided major impetus toward a NATO mission against Colonel Gadaffi, the US again bore the brunt of the effort. Conversely, many European states made risible contributions to that mission – or in Germany’s case, none at all. Britain’s recent Strategic Defence and Security Review neatly underlines this: the Royal Navy is now too small to properly patrol the Somalian coast. Accordingly, when UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond urged a stronger German approach to defence, it was hard to take him seriously, but his stance was valid. Europe has largely grown complacent behind an American shield that now threatens to disappear.

This takes us back to the contentious statement beginning this article. The risk to global stability comes from the fact that the cuts threaten to hamstring the most meaningful force behind its maintenance: American power. Already, US planners find it a “struggle to preserve the necessary forces in CENTCOM to address all the possible conflicts and crises.” In 2011, a bipartisan commission found the US Navy “would need 346 ships to meet its global commitments. But, as a result of budget cuts, the fleet is going to decline from 282 ships today to fewer than 250…”. Indeed, declining numbers “means longer cruises with less time… [for] maintenance and for sailors to recuperate” – a deceptively simple yet crucial point.

Suddenly, Obama’s scornful comment to Romney seems rather ill-considered.

History warns us against such a policy as that in January’s Strategic Guidance. When European war loomed due to a Middle East crisis in 1832, overwhelming British naval power underscored Palmerston’s effort to prevent it. Likewise, it was the Royal Navy’s strength that helped it overcome terrible attrition in suppressing the slave trade. It was a strategic reserve in both cases that allowed Britain to deliver on key policies – a crucial reserve that bolstered diplomacy in the former; that absorbed losses in the latter. And it is just such a military reserve that would be compromised by January’s outlines: a dangerous prospect in the face of a challenging international outlook.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: defence, government spending, Hal Wilson, piracy, security, UK, us

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