#COIN

Insurgency Scenario in Arunachal Pradesh

February 9, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Athul Menath

Arunachal Pradesh, located in north east of India (Credit Image: The Tribune India)

The North Eastern states of India – often referred to as ‘the Seven Sister’ states – have been affected by insurgency in varying proportions since the 1950’s. Although the root causes of insurgencies can be traced back to India’s chaotic partition and colonial history, these violent movements arguably have been sustained due to failures of the Indian state, including a lack of transparent governance and employment opportunities, as well as the support provided to militants by hostile neighbours .

Geography is also a big factor. Arunachal Pradesh borders Myanmar in the east, China in the north, Bhutan in the west, as well as the two insurgency affected states of Nagaland and Assam. Despite the absence of sustained high level violence or indigenous insurgency, this state has been adversely affected by armed conflicts in adjacent areas and has become the life line of militant movement in the region. According to Assam Director General of Police (DGP), Assam was facing militant threat from groups’ based out of Arunachal and Nagaland.

On February 1, Indian Security Forces (SFs) killed two militants of the independent faction of the United Liberation Front (ULFA-I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Shankapani in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Only a week earlier, on January 24, 2018, an Indian Army trooper of the 11 Grenadiers regiment was killed in a joint ambush by Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and ULFA-I, at Namsai District along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. This was the first SF fatality in more than a year. The last in state SF fatality was recorded in December 3, 2016 when two SFs were killed and eight wounded in Nginu village in Tirap District in a joint operation by Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), ULFA-I and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

The highest militancy-related fatality in Arunachal was recorded in 2001 with 63 fatalities, however between 2007-17 only three years recorded more than ten insurgency related fatalities.

Year	Civilians	Security Forces	Terrorists	Total
2000	7	3	24	34
2001	40	12	11	63
2002	7	4	21	32
2003	7	1	31	39
2004	6	2	35	43
2005	3	1	15	19
2006	0	0	4	4
2007	2	3	16	21
2008	0	0	2	2
2009	0	0	9	9
2010	0	0	0	0
2011	0	0	41	41
2012	0	0	4	4
2013	0	0	4	4
2014	3	0	6	9
2015	2	4	4	10
2016	0	2	7	9
2017	0	0	6	6
2018	0	1	2	3
Total	77	33	242	352

* Militancy fatalities between 2000-18 (Source : SATP)

Significance and Spillover Threat

Arunachal Pradesh – which spreads over 83,743 square kilometres with a population of about 1.3 million – is a logistical hub for militants from adjacent states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The militants use the state to cross over to the loosely governed Sagaing region of Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar, where at least 2,500 Indian militants are based.

The Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of the state share 520 kilometers of the 1, 643 Kilometers long porous border with Myanmar. According to security agencies, these Districts along with Nagaland’s Mon and Tuesang Districts have become the nerve centre of militant activity in the region. As of January 31, 2018, in the last ten years these five Districts accounted for about 313 fatalities.

District	Civilian	Security Forces	Terrorists	Total
Mon	6	13	110	129
Tirap	1	11	73	85
Tuesang	18	0	43	61
Changlang	5	3	26	34
Longding	0	0	4	4
Total	30	27	256	313

Fatalities from five bordering districts of India (Source* SATP)

The three districts of Arunachal host militant groups such as NSCN-K, a reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R); the ULFA-I; the Saigora faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S); and CorCom. According to a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, ‘several armed modules of ULFA-I either individually or jointly with CorCom are active in several locations….in Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts.’ The notification also adds that the Assam-Arunachal interstate boundary continues to be used as hideouts and corridors for movement by militant groups.

NSCN-K, which abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in 2015, has been the predominant organisation in Arunachal Pradesh. With a plethora of groups present in the region, the possibility of one militant group attempting to gain dominance in the area remains likely, which may result in a spike in factional clashes. According to an intelligence official, NSCN-IM, which currently conducts peace talks with Indian Government and is also a rival to NSCN-K, has attempted to gain dominance and destabilize NSCN-K by propping up local proxy militant groups such as the Eastern Naga National Government (ENNG).

Arunachal Pradesh Police records from 2016 indicate that there were at least 80 cases of extortion and about 103 incidents of abduction. In 2017, the number of abduction cases stood at 106 and extortion at 75. A majority of these incidents are perpetrated by militant groups as means to generate funds. Moreover, Arunachal Pradesh is located adjacent to the ‘golden triangle’, one of the primary opium producing regions in the world comprised of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. According to a 2016 report, NSCN-R has reportedly been recruiting drug addicts across the opium belt of Arunachal Pradesh to broaden its extortion racket. Apart from Longding, Tirap and Changlang, Lohit and Anjaw Districts are notorious for opium cultivation. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Arunachal topped the list of states in illegal poppy production for opium during 2014-15. NCB officials also claim that illegal poppy farms are guarded by armed militia who are known to work with insurgents.

Shift in Centre of Gravity & Future of Violence

After Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 2014, Dhaka cracked down on Indian insurgents based in the country, resulting in militant groups relocating to Myanmar’s Sagaing region. With this development, the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgent movement shifted to Myanmar. Union Minister for Home Hansraj Ahir stated that between 2015 and March 31, 2017, the Indo-Myanmar border witnessed a steady rise in insurgent activities, resulting in the death of 18 security personnel and 32 insurgents, as well as the arrest of 337 militants .

Other Indian militants groups such as PLA and ULFA-I have shifted their bases to Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province. Chinese intelligence has reportedly renewed relations with some militant leaders. ULFA has established links with Beijing’s proxy in Myanmar the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Additionally, Chinese intelligence officers arguably favoured the constitution of UNFLWESA, a conglomerate of various groups . In 2017, ULFA-I issued a statement against the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh.

Conclusion

Although the Indian Army has been able to keep violence contained in three Districts, rampant extortion, abduction and drug production highlight the inefficiency of the policing machinery of the state. The inefficient policing apparatus could also be an indicator of a possible deficiency in human intelligence, since the police is likely to have more local level contacts as they are indigenous to the area, unlike the Army. Consequently, intelligence-based targeted operations carried out at a grass root level also suffer.

The primary causality for the drop in insurgent violence can be attributed to the security cooperation extended by Dhaka, but the Indian counter insurgency strategy can only occupy a peripheral secondary position. With Myanmar becoming the primary base of operations for insurgent groups, the Arunachal Pradesh will play a vital role in strategy of Indian insurgent groups. In light of Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the supply of weapons to insurgents makes it a geopolitical issue rather than an internal security issue. The Indian government would do well to act accordingly.

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56

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Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

June 2, 2016 by Strife Staff

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees — Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

April 22, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: Peter Kirechu

Barack_Obama_and_Abdullah_II — President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability.

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

The Somaliland Campaign and the Origins of British Counterinsurgency Airstrikes

March 7, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: James A. Fargher

In response to an effective Islamist insurgency which threatened British interests in the Greater Middle East, the Cabinet sent a carrier-based strike force to commence an air campaign to disrupt and degrade the insurrection.[1] A radical Somali cleric, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, had inspired the uprising, which threatened to spread and to radicalise British subjects elsewhere. With a newly-formed special forces unit[2] and an RAF squadron, codenamed ‘Z-Force,’ the Admiralty dispatched an aircraft carrier to the Gulf of Aden to conduct surgical strikes against the militants. Displaying many parallels with the present day, the ensuing campaign fought in northern Somalia in 1920 marked the first time that carrier-based airpower was used to fight in an asymmetric war.

The ship was HMS Ark Royal, the world’s first purpose-built aircraft carrier,[3] and the bombers on board were Airco DH.9A single-engine biplanes which had recently served on the Western Front. The special forces unit was the Somaliland Camel Corps, which had been created in 1914, and now formed the ground component of the British government’s strategy to destroy the self-proclaimed Dervish State with simultaneous attacks from the land and from the air. Its plan pioneered the use of airpower in asymmetric warfare, and the RAF bombers were used successfully to locate enemy forces and to bombard them from the air. This innovation contributed to bringing a twenty-year insurgency to an end in three weeks, and persuaded the British government to use airpower in future imperial counterinsurgency campaigns, such as Iraq in 1921.

The Dervish Revolt

The uprising began in 1899, only twelve years after Britain had declared a protectorate over Somaliland, and would continue with varying degrees of intensity until 1920. Inspired by the Mahdist uprising in Sudan which had briefly established an Islamic empire in the 19^th century before being crushed by Lord Kitchener at the Battle of Omdurman, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan gathered a band of followers and declared a jihad against the British government.[4] Nick-named the ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British, Hassan was a skilled leader, and his Dervish forces conducted raids largely unchecked throughout British Somaliland.[5] British infantry punitive expeditions struggled to find and to engage Dervish militants, who could withdraw to their fortified bases deep in the arid and rugged Somali interior. By 1914, the British administration had withdrawn to the protectorate’s capital in Berbera on the coast, leaving much of Somaliland in the hands of the insurgents.[6]

In the ensuing crisis of the Great War, the Dervish uprising in Somaliland was all but forgotten, and by the time the armistice was signed in 1918, the British public was in no mood for a protracted military campaign on the Empire’s fringes.[7] Nevertheless, the protectorate’s governor, Geoffrey Archer, was keen to use the armistice in Europe as an opportunity to finish the insurgency once and for all. In fact, his petition to the Colonial Office came at a propitious time for the infant Royal Air Force, which was then fighting for its existence as an independent service during a time of severe budget cuts and hostility from the Army and the Navy.[8] The Air Ministry presented a plan to the government to crush the insurgency from the air, and assured the Treasury that it could do so at a fraction of the cost of an Army-led operation.

The Campaign

After some wrangling with the War Office, in October 1919 the government agreed to the plan, and following initial preparations, HMS Ark Royal set sail from Malta to Berbera in December.[9] Royal Engineers had prepared an aerodrome in Berbera from which the bombers would operate, but Ark Royal stayed on in the harbour to act as a depot and repair ship for the aircraft. Archer, appointed to be Commander-in-Chief of the operation, devised a combined arms offensive, using the aircraft to locate and strafe Dervish formations whilst pre-positioned regular troops and friendly auxiliaries would interdict retreating forces and mop up any remaining resistance. Z-Force would also bomb the Dervish capital and forts to break enemy morale and to soften up positions before they were stormed by the Camel Corps’ mounted infantry.[10] In this campaign, the aircraft would play a key role in locating enemy positions over a huge area of operations and in providing the 1920s equivalent of ‘shock and awe.’ The infantry, by contrast, were the means to establish control over the territory out of which Hassan and his forces operated.

On 19 January 1920, the bombers took off for their first attack mission. Although only one plane actually found the target, one of Hassan’s fortified compounds, it dropped eight 20 lbs bombs into the fort, wounding Hassan himself and killing one of his sisters and ten fighters.[11] Increasingly effective bombing missions continued regularly after this raid, hitting the fortified camps which Hassan had established across Somaliland and machine-gunning flocks of sheep and camels – the main source of food, transportation, and revenue for the group. In a concerted attack on the 27^th, four planes bombarded one of the Dervishes’ main forts before it was stormed by waiting infantry.

These attacks forced Hassan to retreat south towards his fortress-capital of Taleh, deep in the Somali hinterland and close to the frontier with Italian Somaliland. Z-Force was able to identify the Dervish line of retreat, and on 4 February Taleh was bombed. Heavy bombs landed on the main gate and an incendiary bomb set the huts clustered around the outer walls ablaze.[12] Once the Camel Corps had advanced through the desert, the British launched a combined aerial-ground attack on Taleh on 9 February, capturing the city and large herds of camels, killing large numbers of Dervish militants.

The victory at Taleh drove Hassan into the Ogaden desert in Ethiopia, where he died several months later. The bombers returned to Ark Royal, and the Dervish insurgency collapsed. The use of aircraft was critical for the success of this campaign, as it allowed the British to locate and destroy Hassan’s forces and to cut off their access to revenue in what had proven to be a difficult environment.[13]

The significance of this campaign is that it represents the first time that carrier-based airpower was used in fighting a counterinsurgency operation. Moreover, it was launched from the world’s first aircraft carrier and it was the RAF’s first mission as an independent branch of the Armed Forces after the First World War. During a time of constrained military budgets, Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, effectively demonstrated that the RAF could be used as an imperial police force to patrol the huge, unguarded hinterlands of the Empire such as north-west India and territories in the Middle East.[14] This victory in Somaliland would preserve the RAF’s independence, and airpower go on to become a fixture in Britain’s counterinsurgency campaigns.

James A. Fargher is a doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

Notes:

[1] David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 39.

[2] ‘News in Brief,’ Times, 12 Aug. 1913: 8, The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[3] Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, vol. I: 1909-1945 (Herndon: Potomac Books, 2006), 15.

[4] Randal Gray, ‘Bombing the “Mad Mullah” – 1920,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 125.4 (1980): 41.

[5] ‘Another Little War,’ Times, 17 Feb. 1920: 17, The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[6] Chaz Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-38 (London: William Kimber, 1988), 56.

[7] Ibid.

[8] David Killingray, ‘A Swift Agent of Government: Air Power in British Colonial Africa,’ Journal of African History, 25.4 (1984): 432.

[9] ‘Mullah’s Overthrow,’ Times, 19 Feb. 1920: 13. The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[10] Gray, ‘Bombing the “Mad Mullah” – 1920,’ 43.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 45.

[13] ‘Somaliland Operations,’ Times, 20 Feb. 1920: 13. The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[14] Michael Paris, ‘Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919’, Journal of Contemporary History 24.2 (1989): 209.

Controversy over interpreters reminder of failures in Afghanistan

September 19, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Alex Calvo:

Corporal Natasha Richards Royal Military Police instructs some of the up and coming Afghanistan police. Continuing police training is having a real result bringing the Afghanistan police up to speed showing modern methods of policing. Captain Damian Coxon aged 24 from Folkestone and Corporal Natasha Richards aged 30 from Eastbourne have helped in the process of building a better police service for Afghanistan. The training is held at Musa Qala Camp where the focus has been at a lowe level training which involved demonstrations and reacting out some potential roles, going through discussing where things have gone wrong or just ways to improve better policing. Date: 21st Feb 2010 Location: Musa Qala, Afghanistan Unit: Royal Military Police Photographer: Staff Sergeant Will Craig Event: Showing local town and business in Musa Qalal Crown Copyright Media Ops Camp Bastion Helmand Afghanistan — Photographer: Staff Sergeant Will Craig, photo from UK Government.

The fate of the almost 3,000 interpreters who worked with the British forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province has recently been highlighted in the media, prompting a debate about whether they should be allowed to settle in Great Britain. The interpreters fear reprisals and some have already suffered violence or even death in their native country.

The issue illustrates two key aspects of the long Afghan campaign. First, the confusion concerning its ultimate nature: whether it was a punitive intervention against a regime which had protected those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or an exercise in counterinsurgency (that is, nation-building under fire). Second, is the lack of a political settlement in Afghanistan laying down the foundations for future peace and stability?

Afghanistan began as a light footprint expeditionary campaign designed to overthrow the Taliban regime for providing a base to Al Qaeda, and ideally capture the latter’s leader, once the ultimatum to hand him over had expired. The former goal was quickly achieved through a combination of local actors (Northern Alliance, previously pushed into a few pockets in Northern Afghanistan by the Taliban), Special Forces, air power, and ELINT (Electronic Intelligence). However, rather than disappear, the Taliban went underground, and to some extent across the border to their Pakistani sanctuaries. Meanwhile, Bin Laden remained in hiding.

In a short period of time a friendly regime had been installed in Kabul. This may well have been the end of the story – mission accomplished – with just the necessary measure of financial, military, and diplomatic support in place for the new government to survive and prevent the return of any international terrorist network.

However, soon more ambitious plans were in place, with Afghanistan designed to become a modern nation state, a democracy, and a developed country, and a large number of Western troops arriving to support the work of official development agencies and NGOs, while waging what would soon become an intense counterinsurgency campaign. None of these goals is negative in and of itself; after all, who is against elections, road-building, or female education?

Yet as the country’s history teaches us, no one has ever managed effective control over the whole of Afghanistan, and attempts to modernise from the centre have always met a violent response from her myriad valleys.

The transition from punitive expedition to nation-building under fire took place without a proper public debate, and enthusiasm to see Afghanistan become the Switzerland of Central Asia gradually gave way to impatience, as progress was slower and the cost in blood and treasure mounted. Finally, emphasis switched to training, mentoring, and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and policy, in a bid to pave the way for a quick withdrawal not followed by an immediate collapse and return of the Taliban to power.

With regard to the fate of Afghan translators, this is important because if the intervention had merely been designed to punish a regime that had granted shelter to international terrorists, preventing their return, then it would have made sense to grant refugee status to those Afghans who would otherwise be risking their lives and those of their relatives by staying behind once British and allied troops had left.

Despite there not necessarily being an international legal obligation, and setting aside moral duties, loyalty to auxiliaries may facilitate recruitment in future operations. On the other hand, if the purpose of the campaign was to provide the foundations for the emergence of a modern, developed, Afghan nation-state, depriving the country of 3000 of her best-prepared citizens would be damaging for the nascent nation. In addition to other skills, either pre-existing or gained though work with the British military, their command of English may be useful as Afghanistan moves forward in areas like foreign trade and tourism.

Already during the nation-building stage of the international intervention, there were discussions that the heavy presence of NGOs and government agencies were attracting the most qualified strata of the workforce with their higher salaries. This was apparently prompting a crowding-out effect in the labour market that saw, for example, a significant number of teachers choose to become drivers or interpreters instead of continuing their teaching.

The controversy over the interpreters is also a reminder that despite years of combat, diplomacy, and development cooperation, Afghanistan remains politically divided, with a violent opposition bent on returning to power by force of arms, with the civilian population caught in the crossfire. The 2001 Bonn Conference, where the blueprint for the modern Afghan state was approved excluded the defeated parties, Versailles-style, and despite later proposals and initiatives designed to achieve national reconciliation, such a goal has not been achieved. In the words of former British Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles, “the Bonn settlement that had followed (the US invasion) had been a victors’ peace, from which the vanquished (the Taliban) had been excluded.”

One of the aspects of any such settlement would be a guarantee on the life and property of Afghans who have worked for, or in any way cooperated, with international forces and institution. While a lasting settlement should lead to safety and security for the whole of the population, an explicit commitment by the Taliban not to take reprisals against their fellow Afghans who had worked for international forces would underscore that this was no mere ceasefire but rather true reconciliation, without victors and defeated. Otherwise, as in the current scenario, it is only normal that those who worked with Her Majesty’s forces should fear for their future.

The challenge remains how to promote Afghanistan’s modernization without prompting a violent backlash by her more conservative citizens. While it is unlikely that the Taliban can be defeated militarily, progress in this area by international and Afghan government forces should be enough to ensure that the resulting settlement does not threaten progress in key areas like female education.

if the international intervention in Afghanistan was designed as a mere punitive expedition, then the Afghan interpreters should be allowed to settle in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, if the intervention was intended to be a successful exercise in counterinsurgency, resulting in a political settlement and an end to violence, it would only be logical for the translators to remain in Afghanistan, contributing to the country’s development. In COIN force is only a means to an end, the establishment of a reasonably legitimate and efficient government and a working economy bringing tangible benefits to the population.

Since the purpose of the intervention has changed with time, and a lasting settlement has not been reached, none of these two principles can be applied. Therefore, the best and most honourable solution is to grant the interpreters refugee status, in recognition of their contribution to the British presence in Afghanistan, while taking note that future interventions must be preceded by a proper public debate on their nature, keeping in mind that limited expeditions, punitive or otherwise, are very different from counterinsurgency campaigns – always long, complex, and costly.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. His most recent work includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact“, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College, 23 December 2013. You can follow him on Twitter @Alex__Calvo.

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